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1982 DIGILAW 942 (ALL)

Rama Shankar Upadhyaya v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Varanasi

1982-08-16

K.N.MISRA

body1982
ORDER K.N. Misra, J. - This writ petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 31st March, 1982, passed by the Assistant Director of Consolidation, Varanasi, under S. 48, U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) in the matter relating to allotment of chak-road to opposite parties 4 and 5, Chak holder 373 in proceedings under S. 20 of the Act. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner Rama Shanker Upadhyaya was allotted Chak 437 village Jathi, Pargana Kolasia, District Varanasi. His mother, Smt. Kunti Devi was allotted chak 48 adjacent to the chak of the petitioner near village abadi. Smt. Kunti Devi died during pendency of these proceedings leaving behind petitioner as her heir and successor. Opposite parties 4 and 5, Virendra Pratap Singh and Mahendra Pratap Singh had moved an application for providing a chak road to their chak 373 from village abadi. The Consolidation Officer, by his order dated 2nd July, 1975 provided a chak-road near the house and tube-well of Smt. Kunti Devi, passing through her chak. On appeal this chak-road was slightly shifted to the north by order dated 16th March, 1978 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation. But since this chak-road still passed through the chak of the petitioner and his mother Smt. Kunti Devi, they filed a revision which was heard and decided by the Joint Difector of Consolidation, opposite party vide order dated 20th April, 1978 after making spot inspection. The opposite party cancelled the chak-road which passed through the chak of the petitioner and his mother and provided a chak-road passing through a portion of plots 657, etc. which were reserved for extension of abadi. Aggrieved by this order, opposite parties 4 and 5 had preferred writ petition 4099 of 1978 in this Court which was heard and allowed on 29th January, 1981 on the ground that since after local inspection made by the Joint Director of Consolidation, the petitioners were not afforded an opportunity of hearing, hence the order stood vitiated. The order of the Joint Director of Consolidation, dated 20th April, 1978 was, therefore, quashed and it was directed that the revision be decided afresh according to law in the light of observations made in the order. 3. The order of the Joint Director of Consolidation, dated 20th April, 1978 was, therefore, quashed and it was directed that the revision be decided afresh according to law in the light of observations made in the order. 3. After remand of the case, the Deputy Director of Consolidation again made spot inspection on 28th February, 1982, and fixed 29th March, 1982, for hearing arguments and on said date the arguments were heard and judgment was ultimately pronounced on 31st March, 1982. He maintained the chak-road passing through plots 661 and 711 as was provided by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, vide his order dated 16th March, 1978. This chak road bifurcated the two chaks namely chak 48 which belonged to Smt. Kunti Devi and chak 437 which belonged to the petitioner. Both the chaks now belong to the petitioner after the death of his mother Smt. Kunti Devi. Aggrieved by the impugned order dated 31st March, 1982, passed by opposite party 1, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Deputy Director of Consolidation while making spot inspection did not prepare any memo of inspection nor any note regarding his observation about the spot conditions and things found located on the plot 637. etc., was prepared and kept on record and as such the so called hearing given by him in the matter in relation to the spot inspection was mere illusory and the petitioner was materially prejudiced. He further contended that in the interest of justice it was necessary for opposite party to have prepared spot inspection memo and the same should have been kept on record so as to afford an opportunity to the parties to address their arguments with reference to it. In support of his argument he referred to R. 24-D. Consolidation of Holdings Rules, which provides that : - " The Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, as the case may be shall, when making a local inspection of the spot under S. 9-B, or for the purpose of deciding an appeal under S. 11, prepare inspection memos and place them on the file containing his orders." 5. He contended that although in the said Rule reference to Deputy Director of Consolidation has not been made, but referring to S. 44-A of the Act, he contended that where powers are to be exercised or duties to be performed by any authority under the said Act or the Rules made thereunder, such powers or duties may also be exercised or performed by any authority superior to it. Thus, according to him, the Deputy Director of Consolidation should have prepared a spot inspection memo containing his observation regarding spot condition and it should have been placed on record. Having not done so, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, according to him, acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in passing the impugned order basing it on his observations made at the spot inspection. The impugned order thus stands vitiated. 6. Learned counsel for the opposite parties contended that R. 24-D relates to proceedings under S. 9B and appeals arising therefrom filed under S. 11 of the Act. He contended that the said Rule would, therefore, not apply in proceedings under S. 21 of the Act. Referring to sub-cl. (3) ol S. 21 he contended that in proceedings for drawing provisional consolidation scheme il has been provided that the Consolidation Officer shall, before deciding objection and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, before deciding an appeal, may make inspection of the disputed plot after notice to the parties concerned and Consolidation Committee. He contended that in these proceedings it is not imperative for the Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, to prepare inspection memos and to place them on record as is required under R. 24-D. Thus, according to him, if inspection memo was not prepared and placed on record, it would not vitiate the proceedings and the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be said to suffer from any illegality or with any material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction. 7. Having given my anxious consideration to the matter, I find much substance in the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and in my opinion the impugned order passed by opposite party cannot be sustained. 8. 7. Having given my anxious consideration to the matter, I find much substance in the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and in my opinion the impugned order passed by opposite party cannot be sustained. 8. It is a fundamental principle of law that a judge must act on the evidence before him and not on outside information, and, further, the evidence on which he acts must be given in the presence of both the parties or at any rate, each party must be given an opportunity of being present. The evidence on which the order is based must form part of record and no finding can be recorded on the basis of any impression existing in mind of the judge on the observations made at the spot inspection, It is true that a view is a part of the evidence which is as much material as an exhibit. It is real evidence, no doubt, but such evidence in the form of inspection memos must be available on record before any finding be based on it while deciding the case. 9. Since a view is part of evidence just like any other evidence, the Tribunal has to reduce it to writing in the form of spot inspection memo mentioning the real state of affairs found on the spot and his observation about it so that the parties may be able to address Court on that real evidence afforded by the spot inspection. In the case of Ram Deo v. Dy. Director of Consolidation (1980 Rev Dec 324) : (1980 All LJ 723), R. M. Sahai, J. observed that (at p. 724):- "The hearing before local inspection was nullified and petitioner was entitled to fresh hearing on material obtained after inspection. (Emphasis supplied). 10. Hearing on the material obtained after local inspection could be nothing else but illusory, if spot inspection memo has not been prepared and brought on record. In the absence of spot inspection memo on record, hearing would be meaningless and futile exercise for want of real evidence on record. (Emphasis supplied). 10. Hearing on the material obtained after local inspection could be nothing else but illusory, if spot inspection memo has not been prepared and brought on record. In the absence of spot inspection memo on record, hearing would be meaningless and futile exercise for want of real evidence on record. It will also be in violation of fundamental principle of law as well as of rules of natural justice if the Judge would have his findings on spot inspection in absence of any spot inspection memo on record, because a Judge can decide a case only on the basis of evidence on record and not on "anything outside record or on the impression carried by him in his mind and memory while making spot inspection. Parties, in the absence of spot inspection memo on record, cannot have inkling of the mind of the Judge about observation made by him on the view of the spot made at the local inspection and so they cannot possibly address him with regard to it nor the Superior court will be able to scrutinise the veracity and merit of the observation in the judgment about facts found on spot inspection in the absence of spot inspection memo on record. 11. The provisions contained in O. 18. R. 18, C.P.C., as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 104 of 1976, are just similar to the provisions contained under sub-cl. (3) of S. 21 of the Act. It would thus be relevant to refer to some earlier decisions. 12. Considering the provisions contained in O. 18, R. 18, C.P.C.. Somayya, J. of Madras High Court in T. A. Padmasani Bai v. Sabapathy Mudaliar (1939 - 2 Mad LJ 284) observed that : - "A local inspection of premises made by a Judge should be used by him only to test the accuracy of the evidence let in. 12. Considering the provisions contained in O. 18, R. 18, C.P.C.. Somayya, J. of Madras High Court in T. A. Padmasani Bai v. Sabapathy Mudaliar (1939 - 2 Mad LJ 284) observed that : - "A local inspection of premises made by a Judge should be used by him only to test the accuracy of the evidence let in. He should not make his knowledge the sole evidence for determining the question raised before him, without making a note of his impressions and giving opportunities to the parties to let in counter evidence and explain what he noted at the inspection." 12-A. It was further observed that : - "The learned Judge has based his judgment solely on the impression formed by him at the time of his local inspection and has come to a conclusion quite contrary to the only evidence on the point, namely, that if the alterations proposed by the defendant were carried out the room would be rendered useless for the purpose for which it is being used. The Judge did not make any notes of inspection and he has not placed on record what it is that he found on inspection so as to enable this Court to come to an independent conclusion whether his decision is right." 13. In Anant Lal Sahu v. Gokul Sahu (AIR 1916 Pat 334), King ford. J., observed that : - "It is doubtful whether under the provisions of the present Civil Procedure Code it is legal for the Court in person to hold any local investigation. In case the Court holds any local investigation, to result of the investigation should he made a matter of record in order that the party adversely affected by it may have an opportunity of meeting it. and further it should be used only for the purpose of enabling the Judge to understand the evidence and not for the purpose of finding his decision thereon." (Emphasis supplied). 14. A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Hari Charan Chakraburtty v. Jitendra Nath Gangully (1922 - 65 IC 601) observed that : - "The law as to local inspection is that, when a Court bases its judgment on the result of the local inspection held by it, it ought to enter, the result of such investigation on the record in order to enable the parties to adduce evidence in respect thereof." 15. In Municipal Council, Calicut v. Palakkal Velayudha Menon ( AIR 1931 Mad 531 ), Anantakrishna Aiyar. J.. observed that : - "Judges, both the Courts of first instance and Courts of appeal, who have to appreciate evidence and understand its bearing properly, are entitled, in proper cases, to make local inspections with a view not only to save time with reference to the arguments in the case but also to enable them to follow intelligently and understand the evidence in the case. But at the same time it is not open to a Court either of first instance or of appeal to base the Court's findings of fact solely on the result of its local inspection, not without giving opportunities to the parties to let in counter evidence and explain what is recorded as the result of the inspection." (Emphasis supplied). 16. In R. Govindaswami Naidu v. G. Pushpalammal ( AIR 1952 Mad 181 ), the Division Bench in a rent control case observed that (at p. 182) : - "In cases where the Rent Controller makes a local inspection, it is desirable, and it will be useful also at the further stages of the case, that he makes notes of the inspection forthwith to the knowledge of the parties and counsel who may be present at the time. This procedure will help the parties to know the impressions which the officer had formed as a result of the local inspection and this knowledge will enable them to adduce such evidence as they may choose to support or controvert the impressions of the officer." 17. In Kaliammal v. Pongiammal ( AIR 1958 Mad 331 ), the Division Bench observed that : - "In spite of the omission in the rule of any provision to make it obligatory on the court, holding a local inspection, to make notes of such inspection and keep them on record it is not only desirable but necessary to prepare such notes and keep them on record especially where there is a possibility that one of the parties might not have been present at the local inspection despite the notice having been given to him and it is desirable that both sides should know all the facts the judge observed at his local inspection and the result of such local inspection. The failure to prepare such notes and keep them on record will vitiate the judgment as the facts observed by the judge at the local inspection must have consciously or unconsciously been taken into consideration by him in arriving at his conclusion in the judgment, although the judgment itself is not visibly proved to have been so influenced." 18. In Mungara Venakataramaniah v. Vudata Subbaramayya (AIR 1959 Andh Pra 153), the learned single Judge, after considering the aforesaid and other decisions took a different view on the point, holding that (at p. 158) : - "I am, however, in respectful agreement with Rajamannar, C.J., and other learned Judges that it is most desirable that whenever Judges make local inspection, the notes of such inspection should be kept as part of the record. But where I am unable to follow the learned Judges who decided Kaliammal v. Pongiammal, AIR 1958 Mad 331 (supra) is that irrespective of the fact whether the Judge has relied upon his impressions at the local enquiry or not and irrespective of the fact whether the judgment rendered by him is based upon independent evidence or not, the mere failure to keep the notes on file would render the entire trial vitiated. It seems to me such a view would convert a salutary principle of prudence into a mandatory rule of law. The failure to keep the notes as part of the record may at the worst amount to an irregularity in a proceeding or suit, not, however, affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court." 19. Similar view was taken in Sannagoundara Siddappa v. Mahadevappa (AIR 1964 Mys 214) by N. Sreenivasa Rau, C.J. of Mysore High Court following the view expressed in Mungara Venkataramaniah's case (supra). 20. I have gone through the aforesaid decisions very carefully and I am of the opinion that although the salutary rule of prudence regarding preparing and placing on record inspection memo may not be equated with the mandatory rule of law in the absence of any provision to that effect, but its non-observance cannot be justified merely on that ground. 20. I have gone through the aforesaid decisions very carefully and I am of the opinion that although the salutary rule of prudence regarding preparing and placing on record inspection memo may not be equated with the mandatory rule of law in the absence of any provision to that effect, but its non-observance cannot be justified merely on that ground. If inspection memo is not prepared a situation may arise that the Judge, who has made local inspection, if stands transferred before deciding the case, then his successor would not be in a position to decide the case on the basis of local inspection made by his predecessor-in-office for want of inspection memo on record. He would then be required to repeat the process again for making local inspection, and suppose he too omits to place on record inspection memo and prior to deciding the case he is also transferred the same process of making local inspection will have to repeated. It would, therefore, besides causing inconvenience to parties, also result in unnecessary delay in disposal of the case. Apart from it, the superior Court will also not be able to consider on merits the correctness of the findings recorded in the case based on local inspection in the absence of inspection memo on record. Thus the judicial wisdom and propriety, in all fairness, requires that the said salutary principle of prudence be unfailingly followed although it may not be equated with rule of law on the point. In my opinion, its breach, even if inadvertently made, would vitiate the decision given in the case if it is based on facts noticed at local inspection which are merely retained in the mind of the officer making local inspection and not reduced to writing in the form of inspection memo. This will be serious jurisdictional lapse on the part of the Judge, apart from being violative of rules of natural justice because no decision can be based on the material not on record but lying concealed in the mind and memory of the Judge. 21. This will be serious jurisdictional lapse on the part of the Judge, apart from being violative of rules of natural justice because no decision can be based on the material not on record but lying concealed in the mind and memory of the Judge. 21. If, however, the decision is not at all based on local inspection, but is based on independent evidence on record it cannot be said to stand vitiated for want of preparation of spot inspection memo nor for want of opportunity of hearing on that matter, because then it cannot be said that any inadmissible evidence has formed basis of the findings. On the other hand, if the judgment is based on the facts noticed and observations made at the spot inspection by the Judge merely on the basis of what he retained in his mind and without bringing it in writing on record, the decision would stand vitiated and cannot be sustained being based on evidence not on record. Although the findings may be supportable on other evidence on record but the same cannot be upheld on that ground because it cannot be predicted with all certainty as to what would have been the ultimate decision in the case if observation made at local inspection would not have formed basis of the findings and the same were ignored altogether on account of absence of inspection memo on record. 22. In the absence of inspection memo on record the parties to the litigation cannot exactly know as to what was noticed by the Judge on the actual view of the spot and what impression he gathered and carried in his mind, which he ultimately utilised in basing his findings. In the absence of spot inspection memo on record, the parties would get no real opportunity of hearing and there would, thus, occur violation of rule of natural justice. In the absence of spot inspection memo on record, the parties would get no real opportunity of hearing and there would, thus, occur violation of rule of natural justice. The order based on such a spot inspection would, therefore, stand vitiated and cannot be sustained in spite of the fact that a case of actual prejudice caused on account of findings being based on such a spot inspection is not substantiated, for it is well settled rule of law that no decision can be founded on the evidence or material not on record and no findings can be based on the material stored in the mind of the Judge, which would not be known to the parties and so they would not be able to explain it. Thus, the possibility of resultant real prejudice cannot be ruled out. Hence, in this view of the matter, I do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the opposite party that the petitioner cannot be said to have been prejudiced by the omission on the part of Deputy Director of Consolidation in not placing on record inspection memo and in basing his findings on such local inspection. 23. It has been averred by the opposite parties in the counter-affidavit that notes were prepared by the the Assistant Director of Consolidation at the time of his inspection, but it is not disputed that no such notes or inspection memo forms par of the record. In the rejoinder-affidavit filed by the petitioner it has been averred that no inspection memo is available on record. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the Assistant Deputy Director of Consolidation acted contrary to said rule of prudence in not placing on record the inspection memo and as such in its absence the hearing in the case after spot inspection made by him cannot be said to be a proper hearing in respect of it. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed. And it also appears desirable that the Deputy Director of Consolidation should now make fresh spot inspection after giving notice to the parties and in their presence. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed. And it also appears desirable that the Deputy Director of Consolidation should now make fresh spot inspection after giving notice to the parties and in their presence. He should also prepare spot inspection memo and the site-plan of the land in question mentioning therein all material things which may be noticed on the spot situated on plot 657 etc., so that the parties may get an opportunity to know and to controvert it and also to address their arguments on the matter. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the end contended that chak-road should not have been provided passing through the chaks of the petitioner and it should have been provided by utilising the land vested in the Gaon Sabha available nearby on plot 657 etc. as is envisaged in sub-cl. (4) of S. 52A of the Act, and this guideline, according to him, deserves to be allowed in the absence of any guideline provided under S. 19 to 21 of the Act or in any other provision of the Act and Rules, to be followed for providing a chak-road during consolidation proceedings. He further argued that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in not providing chak-road passing through plot 657 on erroneous ground that there are manurepits of certain other persons who have acquired easementary rights. He contended that the Deputy Director of Consolidation had no jurisdiction to determine the question regarding easementary rights, nor any such easementary rights can be claimed by any person in plots vested in Gaon Sabha. Hence, according to him, the chak-road was rightly provided by order dated 20th April, 1978 passing through a portion of the said plot 657 etc. 25. Since I am remanding the case to the Deputy Director of Consolidation only on the aforesaid ground and with the directions already referred to above, I refrain from expressing any opinion on aforesaid contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and it would be open to the petitioner to place these arguments before the Deputy Director of Consolidation at the time of hearing of the case by him after spot inspection. 26. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. 26. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 31st March, 1982 (Annexure-4) passed by the Assistant Director of Consolidation is hereby quashed and he is directed to restore the revision and decide it afresh on merits in the light of observations made above. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.