JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member - This Full Bench has before it the following question answer: "Whether the proceedings under Section 134 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act pending before any court or authority, should be abated on the publication of notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P. C.H Act." 2. We have heard the learned counsel for both the parties in the review application number 104 of 1977-78, Azaingarh out of which the reference arose, presumably on account of the fact that this was new question on which the original revision petition was decided on December 6, 1976 by abatement under Section 5(2) of the U.P. C.H. Act and again the review application was rejected on November 30, 1977, confirming the abatement. In the second review application, the learned counsel has again and again pleaded that this was an apparent error of law and has to be rectified by way of review. 3. The learned counsel for the opposite party raised certain preliminary objection in respect of the second review application but these must be decided by the Division Bench hearing the review application, for the scope of consideration before this Full Bench is limited to the question stated above, the learned counsel further pointed out certain defects in the review application and while noting that the ruling by the Board's Full Bench reported in 1975 R.D. 156 considered such defects, it was felt that these questions also can be considered here. It was felt that the question before this Bench is independently of considerable significance and need not be deferred on account of any defects or non-maintainability of the review petition. 4. The learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the explanation to Section 5(2) of the U.P. C.H. Act had already been added by the Act number XXXV of 1976 on November 18, 1976 which made the position clear that it was not the intention of the legislature to include much suits or proceedings within the scope of Section 5(2) of the U.P. C.H. Act which would not result in the declaration or adjudication of any rights which could be decided by the consolidation court. From the explanation, it was clear that uncontested proceedings under Ss. 134 to 137 of the U. P. Z.A. and L.R. Act were considered obviously outside the scope of Section 5(2) of the Act. From the explanation, it was clear that uncontested proceedings under Ss. 134 to 137 of the U. P. Z.A. and L.R. Act were considered obviously outside the scope of Section 5(2) of the Act. The learned counsel has further argued that only such suits or proceedings would abate under Section 5 (2) (a) which were meant to declare or adjudicate rights or interest in any land, in regard to which the proceedings can or ought to be taken under the U.P. C.H. Act. Since under the U.P. C.H Act, there is no provision for grant or cancellation of the Sanad Bhumidhari, the proceedings under Section 134 to 137 were clearly outside the scope of Section 5(2) (a) and would not abate. He further argued that Sri B.B. Vohra Member in his dissenting judgment in Gaya Prasad v. Kailash, 1975 R.D. 358 had followed the view taken in 1975 R.D. 103, wherein it was held that the proceedings under Section 134 were quasi-judicial in nature. If these proceedings were abated, the consolidation authorities being not competent forum to dispose of the matter (grant of Sanad Bhumidhari), the application would be left undecided. 5. The learned counsel for the opposite-party has argued that he depended entirely on the majority view in Gaya Prasad v. Kailash (supra) and his arguments and rulings in support were the same. 6. It is a settled view that the proceedings under Section 134 to 137 are summary in nature. As observed earlier, the Hon'ble High Court in Shiv Charan v. Tota Ram, 1970 RD 103 have held that the proceedings under Section 134 of the Act are quasi-judicial in nature. It appear that the provision under Section 137(1) as reproduced below, is construed to mean that the grant of Sanad Bhumidhari involves declaration of rights and the satisfaction, contemplated in that section means satisfaction regarding rights or interest in the land: "If application has been duly made and the Assistant Collector is saddled that the application is entitled to the declaration mentioned in Section 134, he shall grant a certificate to that effect." Another factor which has influenced the majority in Gaya Prasad v. Kailash (supra) is rulings relating to abatement of a suit under Section 209 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R Act and abatement of suits for cancellation of sale-deed. However, it is further observed that our esteemed predecessor Sri S.R. Vohra in his dissenting judgment has already distinguished these other rulings from grant or cancellation of the Sanad Bhumidhari because in those cases, adjudication of title is involved while there is no declaration of rights or interest in proceedings under Sections 134 to 137-A has held in Chintamani v. Shitla Sahai, 1970 RD 254. In this ruling, it was further held that these are summary proceedings for grant of Bhumidhari Sanad and the declaration of rights or interest could be sought under Section 229-B of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act and orders in the summary proceedings will be subject to orders in the declaratory suit. In S.T. Bhogwati v. Banarasi, 1971 RD 298 also, it was held that the proceedings under Sec. 137-A for cancellation of the Bhumidhari certificate do not come within the purview of Section 5 of the U.P. C.H. Act. 7. While uncontested proceedings under Sections 134 to 137 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act are clearly outside the scope of Section 5(2) of the U.P. C.H. Act, a close examination would show that even contested proceedings would not provide a case for abatement under Section 512 of the U.P. C.H. Act. Keeping in view the quasi-judicial and summary nature of the enquiry under Section 134, it is readily seen that the enquiry and satisfaction of the Assistant Collector relate to ascertaining prim facie eligibility of the applicant and by no means any adjudication of a party's title to the land. In case of contest, the Assistant Collector never undertakes adjudication title and it is well settled that the grant of Sanad Bhumidhari does not operate as res judicata, nor does it bar the jurisdiction of a competent court to decide and declare whether a person holding Sanad is a Bhumidhar or not. This position makes it amply clear that no declaration of rights or interest in land are involved in the proceedings under Section 134. This is further confirmed by the fact that no provision exists under the U.P. C.H. Act for grant of Sanad Bhumidhari. 8. This position makes it amply clear that no declaration of rights or interest in land are involved in the proceedings under Section 134. This is further confirmed by the fact that no provision exists under the U.P. C.H. Act for grant of Sanad Bhumidhari. 8. In view of the above exposition, we are firm in our view that the proceeding under Section 134 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act should not be abated under Section 5(2) of the U.P. C.H. Act, and our answer to the question is as below: "Proceedings under Section 134 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act pending before any court or authority should not be abated on the publication of the notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P. C.H. Act." 9. The reference with answer be returned to the Member having jurisdiction for proceeding further.