Judgment :- 1. The scope of S.452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which provides for the disposal of property by the Criminal Court at the conclusion of trial arises for consideration in these cases. After the acquittal of the accused, a third party applies to Court for the return of the money deposited in Court for the release of the property seized in the case from the accused on the ground that the money deposited was his and that the deposit was made by the accused on his behalf as the property belonged to him. The third party also wanted the release of the samples kept in Court to biro. The accused also applied for the return of the money and samples to them. The Court directed the parties to get their title to the property established by a competent Court. The question is whether the stand taken by Criminal Court requires any reconsideration. 2. The short facts of these cases, shorn of unnecessary details, are: In the early hours of the day 11-6-1976, 3 lorry loads of raw cashewnuts were seized one after the other at Mandapathinkadavu,12 K. Ms. inside the Kerala Tamilnadu border by the Special Officer for Cashew Industry, Quilon and his party. The lorries and the goods were produced before the Judicial Sub Divisional Magistrate's Court, Neyyattinkara on 12-6-1976 and as per orders of the Court the lorries with the goods were kept by the Neyyattinkara Police. Pending investigation of the cases by the Police, the drivers and cleaners of the lorries, the accused against whom cases were registered, filed three criminal miscellaneous petitions before the Sub Divisional Magistrate for releasing the lorries and the raw cashewnuts to them. The Sub Divisional Magistrate by separate orders passed in the 3 cases allowed those petitions on 13-7-1976. in the order it is stated: "pending conclusion of the investigation and trial, if any, the raw cashewnuts in 110 bags weighing about 8640 Kgs. produced in this case will be released to the petitioners accused if they after five days and within ten days from this day furnish cash security of Rupees Twenty thousand (Rs. in the order it is stated: "pending conclusion of the investigation and trial, if any, the raw cashewnuts in 110 bags weighing about 8640 Kgs. produced in this case will be released to the petitioners accused if they after five days and within ten days from this day furnish cash security of Rupees Twenty thousand (Rs. 20,000/-) only which will approximately be equivalent to the price of the said raw cashewnuts, for keeping the said amount under judicial deposit and also executing a bond undertaking to forfeit to the Government the said security amount in toto if the accused petitioners fail to produce so much quantity of raw cashewnuts before court as and when required sample nuts from each bag will be taken and kept separately in the respective bags and retained as material objects for the purpose of evidence." As per the above orders, the accused made deposits of Rs. 20.000/- in all the cases and got the raw cashewnuts released. Under S.451 of the Criminal Procedure Code, whether the Sub Divisional Magistrate could thus release the raw cashewnuts on furnishing cash security is a different matter. 3. The Police completed the investigation and laid charge-sheets before the Sub Divisional Magistrate. In all the cases, the driver, the cleaner and the other person who accompanied the raw cashewnuts in the lorry were made accused. In one case, a person who was accompanying the lorry in a car was also included as an accused. The learned Sub Divisional Magistrate tried the cases and acquitted all the accused in all the cases. According to the Magistrate, it was not established that the raw cashewnuts seized were cashewnuts locally procured in Kerala. The Magistrate also held that as the lorries were intercepted at a place 12 K.Ms. within the border it could not be said that there was an actual movement or an attempt to move the raw cashewnuts from Kerala to Tamilnadu and hence no violation of Clause.3 of the Kerala Raw Cashewnuts (Control) Order, 1975 was made out. The Magistrate directed that the raw cashewnuts with gunny bags will be returned to the 1st accused driver from whom it was taken possession of and with whom it was entrusted on furnishing cash security of Rs. 20,000/-. As a matter of fact, nothing was said in the judgments about the cash security furnished for the release of the raw cashewnuts. 4. 20,000/-. As a matter of fact, nothing was said in the judgments about the cash security furnished for the release of the raw cashewnuts. 4. After the acquittal of the accused, in all the cases separate applications were filed by the counsel for the accused, the accused and by a third party claiming to be the owner of the raw cashewnuts seized, for the return of the cash security furnished and the gunny bags with the raw cashewnuts left in them as samples, The stand taken by the third party who filed the application for return of the goods and the cash security was that his firm was having a cashew factory in Tamilnadu and the firm entrusted the raw cashewnuts with the owner of the lorry for transporting the same from Quilon to Tamilnadu, that the 1st accused was the driver and the 2nd accused was the cleaner of the lorry and that they had no right over the goods except temporary custody at the time of seizure. It was also stated in the application that the cash security deposited by the accused in Court was amount advanced by the applicant-third party and as he was not a party to the proceeding, the money was entrusted to the counsel engaged for defending the accused and it was thus that the cash security was deposited in Court. The Magistrate dismissed all the applications. The Magistrate held: The direction in the orders of acquittal in all the cases was to return the property to the accused from whom, according to the prosecution, the same was taken possession of. The Criminal Court has no power to review its order. The general rule is that at the conclusion of the trial the property has to be returned to the person entitled to the possession of the same. The Court has no jurisdiction to enquire into the question of ownership. The amount kept in deposit in the treasury can be returned only to the rightful claimant. It will be kept there until the question is decided by a competent Court. The sample nuts and the gunny bags will be disposed of as per rules and amount kept in deposit until the rightful claimants come up. 5. The amount kept in deposit in the treasury can be returned only to the rightful claimant. It will be kept there until the question is decided by a competent Court. The sample nuts and the gunny bags will be disposed of as per rules and amount kept in deposit until the rightful claimants come up. 5. The direction in the judgments of the Magistrate regarding the disposal of the property in all the three cases were challenged by the third party claimants in criminal appeals filed before the Court of Session, Trivandrum. They also challenged the orders of the Magistrate dismissing their claim petitions in criminal revisions before the Court of Session. The accused who were respondents in the appeals and revisions contested the claims made in the appeals and revisions. The Court of Session heard all the criminal appeals and criminal revisions together and dismissed the same by a common judgment. In the judgment the Court of Session said: "Whatever be the motive of the appellants in not coming out in the open when the cases were pending before the lower court, the fact remains that till the cases ended in acquittal they did not make any claim for the ownership or possession of the cashewnuts. They came into the picture with the claims only after the accused were acquitted The lower court was right in not embarking on a very wide and deep enquiry into the title to the cashewnuts in proceedings which can only be regarded as summary proceedings. It was under these circumstances that the lower court directed that the amounts will be kept in court till the rightful claimants are decided upon by a competent court considering the complicated nature of the disputed questions, the scope and sweep of the enquiry which may be necessary to decide on the claims preferred by the appellants, I think interests of justice would be well served by keeping the amounts in Court deposit till the appellants' claims are adjudicated upon by a competent court." 6. The dismissal of the appeals, by the Court of Session is challenged in the criminal revisions filed by the appellants before the Court of Session. They have also challenged the dismissal of the criminal revisions in the criminal miscellaneous petitions filed. 7. The dismissal of the appeals, by the Court of Session is challenged in the criminal revisions filed by the appellants before the Court of Session. They have also challenged the dismissal of the criminal revisions in the criminal miscellaneous petitions filed. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended: The raw cashewnuts seized in these cases belonged to the petitioners and there were records in the lorries to show that. The accused respondents had no case that the cashewnuts belonged to them. The courts below ought to have found that the application for the return of the cashewnuts happened to be filed in the name of the accused because the petitioners were not parties in the cases. The petitioners as owners of the cashewnuts made the deposits of Rs. 20,000/-insisted in all the cases in the name of the accused-respondents to get the release of the nuts which belonged to them. Hence, only the petitioners are entitled to the return of the above amounts. The sale proceeds of the samples and the gunny bags are also to be returned to the petitioners. The accused respondents have no title to these and hence no amounts can be returned to them. The properties in the Court are to be returned to the rightful owners. The courts below failed to exercise their judicial discretion according to the principles laid down in Moideen Kunhi v. Abdulla (1976 KLT. 855) and other cases. The court below ought to have received in evidence the affidavit filed by the Advocate who appeared before the trial court for the accused respondents. 8. The learned Public Prosecutor contended that the disposal of the claim petitions of the petitioners involves decisions on questions of title which only a Civil Court is competent to give and hence there is nothing wrong in the stand taken by the lower courts that the claimants should get their rights to the properties established in a competent Court. It was also pointed out by the Public Prosecutor that even according to the petitioners the deposits made were benami deposits and hence the question as to who is entitled to the deposits will have to be decided by a Civil Court and a Criminal Court cannot decide that question. According to the Public Prosecutor, no interference is possible by this Court in these proceedings against the orders challenged. 9. According to the Public Prosecutor, no interference is possible by this Court in these proceedings against the orders challenged. 9. Disposal of property at the conclusion of a criminal trial has to be made under S.452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The claims are to be decided by the Criminal Court. But this does not mean that a Criminal Court under S.452 will have any power which a criminal court cannot have under the Code, and which only a Civil Court has. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the power of the Criminal Court under S.452 is quasi-civil in nature it cannot be said that under S.452 a criminal court can assume the powers of a Civil Court and decide questions which only a Civil Court is competent to decide. So, in a case where the disposal of the claim necessarily involves decision of questions which only a Civil Court is competent to take if the Criminal Court directs the parties to get a decision from the Civil Court on those questions, it cannot be said that the direction is one which a Criminal Court cannot give under S.452. It cannot be forgotten that in such cases also it is the Criminal Court that will dispose of the claims ultimately. The only difference is that the disposal will be after getting the decision of the Civil Court and taking into account that decision also. So, it cannot be said that by directing the parties to get a decision from the Civil Court the Criminal Court is abdicating its powers under S 452 of the Code. In these cases, the admitted case of the petitioners is that the deposits of Rs. 20.000/- were made by them in the names of the accused respondents because the petitioners were not parties in the cases. So. even according to the petitioners, the deposits made were benami deposits. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that a Criminal Court should be asked to decide a question of benami, which only a Civil Court is competent to decide. The claim petitions submitted before the trial court include the above deposits of Rs. 20,000/-made in all the cases. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that a Criminal Court should be asked to decide a question of benami, which only a Civil Court is competent to decide. The claim petitions submitted before the trial court include the above deposits of Rs. 20,000/-made in all the cases. The accused who made the deposits have not forgotten to file claim petitions for the return of the deposits made and the sale proceeds of the samples and the gunny bags The petitioners also claim that they are the persons entitled to the return of the sale proceeds. It cannot be said that the Court was in any way in the wrong in directing the petitioners to get a decision regarding their title to the properties from a competent Court. The question whether the accused respondents were in a position to make the deposits is a question which is to be considered by that Court and not by the Criminal Court. 10. In coming to the above conclusion I find support in certain authorities which I will presently refer to. In Ibrahim Rahmatullah v. Emperor (AIR. 1947 Nag. 33) S.517 of the old Code was construed as follows: "Orders under S.517 and under S.520, Criminal P. C., do not settle any rights nor do they confer any title. These are merely empowering sections which empower the criminal Courts to dispose of the property which has been seized in the course of an enquiry or trial, in a summary way and all that is necessary is that the Court should be satisfied that an offence appears to have been committed with respect to that property." (Para. 7) In Mahmmad Yusuf'v. Krishna Mohan (AIR. 1938 Cal. 17) it has been held: "If by reason of a disputed claim to possession, an order for delivery cannot be made, or the property may not be finally disposed of by destruction or confiscation or otherwise, the Court will not make any order under this section at all, but leave the parties to their remedy in a Civil Court, if any." (Page 20) In Budhulal Harnarayan v. Sukhman (43 Crl L. J. 698) construing S.517 of the old Code the Court said: "This section authorises the Court to return the articles whether or not an offence is committed in respect thereof to the person claiming to be entitled to possession. The expression 'person claiming to be entitled to possession' is important. It does not mean the owner. Ownership involves a question of title, whereas possession does not." (Page 699) In Muthiah v. Vairaperumal (AIR. 1954 Mad. 214) it has been held: "It is not the function of a criminal Court to decide nice questions involving principles of civil law, if there is a dispute between rival parties claiming a return of the property. It should not help a party whose object is to endeavour to obtain its judgment upon a question which ought to be determined in a civil Court. Where, therefore, there is a 'doubt as to ownership' of property, or where a 'question of bona fide title' by purchase or otherwise arises, the duty of the criminal Court is to leave the parties to their remedy in a civil suit." (Para. 3) In Vaiyapuri Chetti v. Sinniah Chetty (AIR 1931 Mad. 17) it has been held: "But if on the other hand the Magistrate is to be allowed to try the civil cause, to weigh evidence, and to estimate probabilities the District Magistrate when moved under S.520 would have to show that he had applied his mind to the same matters. Otherwise it would not only be a civil cause decided by a criminal Court, but one decided without privilege of appeal." (page 18) In the above case the Court also observed that the order of the Second Class Magistrate cannot be supported on the merits and furnishes a good example of the advisability of keeping these civil disputes out of criminal Court. In In re Annapurnabai (ILR. I Bom. 630) the High Court of Bombay had occasion to observe that a Magistrate of the District had no sort of right to assume to himself the functions of a civil Court. In Ramphal Tatwa v. Jasodia Malain (40 CWN. 862) the Calcutta High Court has held: "It appears to be clear from the order recorded by the Magistrate on the 16th August, 1935, and from the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge in the case before us, that there were conflicting claims to the properties in question in the case, and that the titles set up could only be adequately dealt with by a Civil Court. In consonance with the view taken by this Court in the case of Ram Khalawan Ahir v. Tulsi Telini (23 CWN.1094), in which the effect of the amendment of S:c, 517 was taken into consideration, we hold that the judge in the court below is right in the direction that he has given that the properties referred to in his judgment are to remain in the custody of the trial Court, subject to any order that might be made by a competent Court of civil jurisdiction." (Page 863) In Sivasankara Pillai v. State of Kerala (1972 KLT.61) it has been held: "It may be noted that the proceeding under S.517 of the Code of Crimi-nal Procedure is a quasi civil proceeding which arises on the conclusion of an enquiry or trial in a Criminal Court for the purpose of disposal of any property produced before it or in its custody or regarding which an offence appears to have been committed or which has been used for the commission of the offence. An order under this Section only decides the question of possession and not that of ownership or title which has to be decided by a Civil Court. Ordinarily when no offence has been committed in respect of any property in the Court's custody, the Court should restore it to the person from whose possession it was seized. As pointed out already, in exceptional cases where circumstances so warrant and the evidence so indicates that it should be inequitable to restore it to the possession of the person from whom it was seized, the Court may, in the proper exercise of its judicial discretion, restore it to a person who in its opinion is the person best entitled to its possession." (Para. 8) In the above case, the Court ultimately directed the revision petitioners (the complainants in this case) to make out their title in a Civil Court and recover the value of the gold from the respondents if they are so entitled to get. In Moideen Kunhi v. Abdulla (1976 KLT. 855) the challenge was against an order of the Court of Session reversing an order of the Magistrate under S.517 (old Code) directing the return of the sale proceeds of the property involved in a theft case to the complainant, where in the case the accused was acquitted on benefit of doubt. In Moideen Kunhi v. Abdulla (1976 KLT. 855) the challenge was against an order of the Court of Session reversing an order of the Magistrate under S.517 (old Code) directing the return of the sale proceeds of the property involved in a theft case to the complainant, where in the case the accused was acquitted on benefit of doubt. As pointed out in para 6 of the judgment the main contentions urged in the above case were that the Court of Session seriously erred in placing the entire burden of proof on the petitioner, that it is really a proceeding of a civil nature or at least a quasi-civil nature, and that the burden of proof has to be equally cast on both sides who have to prove their respective cases. In the judgment the learned judge held: "What we are concerned in a proceeding of this nature is whether there are sufficient materials on record to hold as to who actually is entitled to possession of the property involved in the case. It may be noted in this respect that S.452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure corresponding to S.517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, speaks of disposal of property to any person claiming to be entitled to possession thereof. It is clear that it is not mere custody or possession that matters but there must be material to show that the custody or possession was lawful. It was mainly on the basis that the property was seized from the possession of the respondent that the order of the learned Magistrate was interfered with. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that in view of the confirmation of the order of acquittal, the general rule is that the property should be returned to the person from whose possession it was seized and therefore on this short ground the order of the learned Sessions Judge has to be sustained." (Para 10) On the facts, the above decision is not applicable here. Not only that, an earlier decision of this Court in Velayudhan v. State (1968 KLR. 262) it seems, was not brought to the notice of the learned judge who decided Moideen Kunhi's case (1976 KLT. 855). The question that arose in Velayudhan's case (1968 KLR. 262) was whether the Magistrate under the cover of S.517 (old Code) can go into complicated questions of title or ownership. 262) it seems, was not brought to the notice of the learned judge who decided Moideen Kunhi's case (1976 KLT. 855). The question that arose in Velayudhan's case (1968 KLR. 262) was whether the Magistrate under the cover of S.517 (old Code) can go into complicated questions of title or ownership. Ia the case the Court held: "Under S.517 Crl. P. C., the Magistrate is given the power to make appropriate orders regarding the disposal of the property after the trial is over. Thus after the disposal of the case the Magistrate may take up question of the disposal of the thondi, and after enquiry it is competent for the court to give the necessary direction in respect of it. At one time it was thought that the court is not competent to direct the disposal of the articles brought before it in the case if the trial has ended in acquittal in acquittal, since no offence was proved to have been committed in respect of such article. Now the position is different and under S.517 even though there has been no conviction or offence proved in which the property produced has been used, the court has power to pass an order regarding the disposal of the property; but in disposing of the claims of the various parties, the court has to bear in mind that it is called upon to decide only the question of possession and not that of ownership or title which has always to be decided by a civil court." (Para. 2) The Court further held: "I have no doubt in my mind that the question has to be decided solely on possession at the relevant time and not on questions of title or ownership. Learned counsel for the respondent emphasising on the expression 'person claiming to be entitled to possession' appears in S.517, argued that the question of ownership also can be gone into since the owner is a person who is ultimately entitled to possession. This is not correct." (Para. 3) The Court also held: "These are points arising for decision before the property is adjudged in favour of either party and these can be gone into only in a civil action. This is not correct." (Para. 3) The Court also held: "These are points arising for decision before the property is adjudged in favour of either party and these can be gone into only in a civil action. When there are conflicting claims to the property and the title could only be decided by a civil court, the proper order to be passed is to direct the aggrieved party to a civil court." (Para. 5) In Gokaldas v. Mohanlal (1963 (1) Crl. L. J. 531) Bhagwati J, as he then was, has held: "It must also be remembered that what the Court has to consider is who is entitled to possession, and the Court has not to consider, and not competent to consider, who has a good title in property. No doubt it may sometimes happen, in order to decide who has the best right to possession, that the Court has to consider prima facie questions of title,' (vide the judgment of Beaumont C.J. and N. J. Wadia J„ in Dhanmall Chellaram v. Kasturchand Krishnaji, Criminal Rev. Appln. No. 65 of 1935 reported in the foot-note in 38 Bom. LR.119 (FN) but it would not be right for the Court to go into questions of title and to decide them finally one way or the other. That would be a matter for the civil Court and the Court would be going beyond its powers under S.517 in entering upon a consideration of any such questions." (para. 2) In Padmanabhan Nambiar v. Kannan Nair (1961 M L.J. (Crl) 319 it has been held: "It is not normally the function of a criminal Court to decide nice question involving principles of civil Law. If there is a dispute between rival parties claiming the return of the property, it should not help a party whose object is to endeavour to obtain its judgment upon a question which ought to be determined in a civil Court. Where therefore there is 'a doubt as to the ownership of property' or where 'a question of bona fide title' by purchase or otherwise arises the duty of a criminal Court is to leave the parties to their remedy in a civil suit." (Page 323). 11. Where therefore there is 'a doubt as to the ownership of property' or where 'a question of bona fide title' by purchase or otherwise arises the duty of a criminal Court is to leave the parties to their remedy in a civil suit." (Page 323). 11. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Court of Session ought to have received in evidence the affidavit filed by the Advocate who appeared for the accused before the trial Court need only be stated and rejected. The Court of Session has considered the question of receiving the affidavit filed before it in Para.9 of its judgment. The valid reasons given by Court of Session do not call for any interference by this Court in these proceedings. 12. In the result, the Criminal Revision Petitions and Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions are dismissed. Dismissed.