JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS Second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff-appellant against the judgment passed by the Additional District Judge, vidisha, in Civil Appeal No. 139-A of 1971 dated 4th April 1972 confirming the judgment and decree passed by the Additional Civil Judge, Class II, kurwai, dated I8th September 1970, in Civil Suit No. 5i-A of 1968, dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellant as barred by time. ( 2. ) THE facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are that Pragsingh, randhirsingh and Jujharsingh were the original holders of land including the land in dispute. A draft-statement was prepared under the M. P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the act,) and was published as contemplated under Sub-section (3) of Section 11 thereof. It is not in dispute that an intimation or notice of this draft-statement was not given to the plaintiff-appellant, but it appears that having learnt about it, an objection was filed by the plaintiff-appellant which was rejected by the competent Authority by his order dated 30th December 1967 holding that the objections were filed beyond time provided in Section II of the Act. ( 3. ) IN the year 1963, the three original holders had filed a suit against the plaintiff-appellant for possession of the suit land on the allegation that the appellant has trespassed over that land and is in unautherised occupation. This suit was dismissed by the Court of the Additional Civil Judge Class II, kurwai, in Civil Suit No. 61-A 1963, decided on I6th August 1965. In this decision, it was held that the present appellant being in possession for more than 12 years the suit filed by the three holders, viz. Prag Singh, Randhirsingh and Jujhar Singh, was barred by time. The objections filed by the plaintiff-appellant were rejected by the Competent Authority by his order dated 30th december 1967, the plaintiff-appellant, has filed the present suit on 20th june 1968 after giving a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the respondent State. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit holding that it was barred by time as Sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act provided that the suit should have been filed within three months from the date of the order rejecting the objections by the Competent Authority. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit holding that it was barred by time as Sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act provided that the suit should have been filed within three months from the date of the order rejecting the objections by the Competent Authority. According to the plaintiff, it was alleged that he had no intimation about the order of the Competent Authority delivered on 30th December 1967 but he learnt about it in the month of March 1968 whereas it was pleaded by the respondent state that the order of the Competent Authority was in fact noted by the counsel of the plaintiff-appellant on 31st January 1968, and, therefore, the suit filed on 20th June 1968 was beyond the period of three months. ( 4. ) IT is not in dispute that the learned courts below came to a finding of fact that counsel of the plaintiff-appellant noted the order of the Competent authority on 31st January 1968, and therefore, even if the plaintiff-appellant had not known the date of the order but as his counsel noted the order on 31st January 1968, the period of limitation started running from that date. The learned courts below also came to the conclusion that the plaintiff-appellant was not given a notice under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the act as the plaintiff-appellant was not a sub-tenant claiming to be an occupancy tenant. ( 5. ) AGAINST this Judgment, the plaintiff-appellant has filed the Second appeal. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant:- (i) that as the plaintiff-appellant was not a party to the ceiling proceedings before the Competent Authority under sections 9 and 10 nor a notice was served on the plaintiff-appellant as contemplated under subsection (2) of Section 11, the limitation contemplated under sub-section (5)of Section 11 of the Act will not apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff as the plaintiff in this suit has claimed a declaration that the Ceiling proceedings and the draft statement prepared under sub-section (3) of section 11 of the Act and the order passed by the Competent Authority is not binding on the plaintiff and it does not affect the land in possession of the plaintiff-appellant. (ii) It was also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if it is found as has been found by the learned courts below that the counsel for the plaintiff-appellant had noted the order passed by the competent Authority on 31st January 1968, excluding the period of notice under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code in view of the language of section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act, the plaintiff could file a suit within 5 months and as the suit has been filed within 5 months from 31 st January 1968, the suit could not be dismissed as being filed beyond the period of limitation. ( 6. ) THE learned counsel for the respondent State on the other hand contended that a notice under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code in proceedings under the Act is not necessary as has been held by a Division Bench of this court in Kishanlal Baldevji and others v. Collector, Indore, 1975 M P L J 766. and, therefore, the exclusion of the period of notice in the light of the language of Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act will not be applicable to the plaintiff-appellant. It was also contended by the learned counsel that although notice of the draft-statement under section 11 (3) of the Act was not served on the plaintiff-appellant, but the plaintiff-appellant noticing the draft-statement had filed objections and his objections were disposed of by the competent Authority by orders dated 30th December 1967. This order being an order under subsection (4) of Section 11 is final* except if set aside by a competent Civil court under sub-section (5) of Section II, and a suit under sub-section (5)of Section 11 to set aside a decision of the Competent Authority under subsection (4) of Section 11 of the Act could only be filed within 3 months of the order passed by the Competent Authority, therefore, the suit is clearly barred by time and the learned courts below were right in dismissing the suit. ( 7. ( 7. ) SUB-SECTION (5) of section 11 of the Act reads as under:- "the order of the competent authority under sub-section (4) shall not be subject to appeal or revision, but any party may, within three months from the date of such order institute a suit in the civil Court to have the order set aside, and the decision of such Court shall be binding on the competent authority, but subject to the result of such suit if any, the order of the competent authority shall be final and conclusive. " This provides that the order of the Competent Authority shall be final subject to the decision of the Civil Court in a suit which is filed within three months from the date of the order of the Competent Authority. A Division Bench of this Court in Kishanlal Baldev and others {supra) held that for a suit under sub-section (5) of section 11 of the Act a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not necessary. It is also not in dispute that in a case where notice is not necessary the period of notice could not be excluded from the period of limitation within the provisions of section 15 (2) of the Limitation act. Under these circumstances, therefore, the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit was within time even within the meaning of sub-section (5) of section 11 of the Act cannot be accepted. ( 8. ) IT appears that the learned Courts below have not only decided the question of limitation but have also gone into other material questions. Both the Courts below with regard to the question about a notice under section 11 (3) of the Act came to the finding that the notice was not necessary. The learned lower appellate Court considering this question felt that as the plaintiff-appellant was not a sub-tenant, a notice under section 11 (3) of the act was not necessary. The learned Courts below, also felt that as he was not a sub-tenant, therefore, the land in question could not be protected from the ceiling proceedings. To this conclusion, the learned lower appellate court has arrived after considering the judgment of the Civil Court in Civil suit No. 6i-A/i963, decided on 16th August 1965. The learned Courts below, also felt that as he was not a sub-tenant, therefore, the land in question could not be protected from the ceiling proceedings. To this conclusion, the learned lower appellate court has arrived after considering the judgment of the Civil Court in Civil suit No. 6i-A/i963, decided on 16th August 1965. It is apparent that the three holders who were parties to the proceedings under this Act were the recorded holders (Bhumiswamis), but it was the appellant who was in possession of the land in dispute. The suit filed by the three holders for possession against the appellant on the basis of title has been dismissed as barred by time holding that the plaintiff-appellant is in possession for more than 12 years. It is now well settled that a person in adverse possession acquires the right of a Bhumiswami if he is in adverse possession to that of a Bhumiswami. It is, therefore, clear that when the Civil Court found the appellant in adverse possession vis-a-vis the three holders, the right of the three holders in the land came to an end and this judgment of the Civil Court in Civil Suit no. 6i-A/i963, is dated the 16th August 1965, i. e. much before the statement under section II (3) of the Act was published by the Competent Authority. It appears that the learned lower appellate Court felt that as the appellant was not a sub-tenant a notice was not necessary, but it failed to consider that the appellant having acquired the rights which originally were in the three holders with regard to the land in dispute, it could not be declared to be surplus without plaintiff-appellant being made a party to the proceedings. It is not disputed that the plaintiff-appellant was not a party to the proceedings under the Ceiling Act nor was noticed as an interested person within the meaning of sub-section (3) of section II of the Act. ( 9. ) THE scheme of the M. P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, I960, indicates that under section 9 a holder who has land in excess of the ceiling limit is expected to submit a return to the Competent Authority. The word holder has been defined under section 2 (h) of the Act. ( 9. ) THE scheme of the M. P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, I960, indicates that under section 9 a holder who has land in excess of the ceiling limit is expected to submit a return to the Competent Authority. The word holder has been defined under section 2 (h) of the Act. It reads :-"holder" means a tenure holder or an occupancy tenant or a Government lessee of land within the State and the expression "to hold land" or "holding land" shall be construed accordingly", a perusal of this definition shows that a tenure holder or an occupancy tenant or a Government lessee is brought within the ambit of this definition. Section 10 of this Act provides that if a person holding land in excess of the ceiling area fails to submit the return as contemplated under section 9, the competant authority may, by a notice call upon such a person to furnish the return. Section 10 of the Act reads:- "10. Collection of information- (I) If any person holding land in excess of the ceiling area fails to submit the return under section 9, the competent authority may, by a notice in such form and served in such manner as may be prescribed, require such person to furnish the return within the time specified in the notice and on his failure to do so obtain the necessary information in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) Omitted. " A reading of these two provisions, therefore, clearly contemplates that when a holder holding land in excess of the ceiling limit he is expected either to voluntarily submit the return or submit it on notice from the Competent authority and the holder means a holder as defined in section (2) (h ). It is not disputed that in these proceedings under sections 9 and 10 which ultimately culminated into the draft statement under sub-section (3) of section 11, this plaintiff-appellant neither filed any return as a holder nor filed a return on notice from the Competent Authority. It is also clear that under sub-section (3) of Section 11, no notice of the draft-statement was served on the plaintiff-appellant. It is also clear that under sub-section (3) of Section 11, no notice of the draft-statement was served on the plaintiff-appellant. Sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act reads :- " (3) The draft statement shall be published at such places and in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof shall be served on the holder or holders concerned, the creditors and all other persons interested in the land to which it relates. Any objections to the draft statement received within thirty days of the publication thereof shall be duly considered by the Competent Authority who after giving the objector an opportunity of being heard shall pass such order as it deems fit. " This provision clearly provides that a notice of the draft statement shall be served on a person interested in the land to which it relates. It is not in dispute that the land in question was included in the draft statement as surplus land. It is also not in dispute that the plaintiff-appellant was in possession of this land with the decision of the civil Court in his favour holding that he had acquired title by adverse possession and still it is not in dispute that no notice was served on the plaintiff-appellant under the provisions of sub-section (3 ). It is, therefore, plain that the plaintiff-appellant was not a party to the proceedings under the Ceiling Act. Sub-section (5) of section 11 (quoted in para 7 above) permits any party to file a suit within three months. The phrase occurring in sub-section (5) "any party" clearly contemplates a party to the proceedings under this Act. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent State that in spite of the fact that no notice was served on the plaintiff-appellant, he still preferred an objection and that objection was disposed of as contemplated under sub-section (4) of section 11, and, therefore, to that extent the plaintiff-appellant was a party to the proceedings under this Act. But looking to the scheme of the Act, as discussed above, parties to the proceedings will be those who are expected to file the return under section 9 or to whom a notice under section 10 or to whom a notice under sub-section (3) of section 11 of the Act is served. But looking to the scheme of the Act, as discussed above, parties to the proceedings will be those who are expected to file the return under section 9 or to whom a notice under section 10 or to whom a notice under sub-section (3) of section 11 of the Act is served. Admittedly, the plaintiff-appellant is not a person who was expected to file the return under section 9, nor is a person to whom a notice under section 10 was served nor a notice under section 11 (3) was served. In this view of the matter, it appears that it could not be held that the plaintiff-appellant was a party falling within the ambit of the term "any party" as provided in clause (5) of section 11. It appears that the Competent Authority as well as the learned courts below failed to notice the definition of the word "holder". The proceedings have gone on an assumption that the three original holders are the "holders" of the land in dispute which is in possession of the plaintiff-appellant, but have failed to take notice of the decision of the civil Court wherein it was held that the rights of the three holders in the land in dispute have come to an end and the plaintiff-appellant had acquired the right by adverse possession. This clearly places the plaintiff-appellant in the category of "holder" within the definition of the term provided in section 2 (h) so far as the land in dispute is concerned, and, under these circumstances, the question that had to be considered was as to whether the land in dispute which the plaintiff-appellant has held would fall within the mischief of this Act, i. e. whether it could be that the plaintiff-appellant held the land more than the ceiling area and, therefore, was it necessary for him to file a return under section 9 or that if he had not filed a return a notice under section 10 was issued to him. It appears that in the present suit a declaration which is being sought by the plaintiff-appellant is that these proceedings under this Act where he was not a party do not bind him nor does it affect the land in dispute which is in his possession and by decision of the civil Court in Suit No. 6i-A/i963 he has acquired title to it. Such a suit clearly cannot be said to be a suit falling within the ambit of sub-section (5) of section II. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent State that in the plaint a paragraph pertaining to limitation as has been drafted shows that it was a suit under subsection (5) of section 11 of the Act. But, even if it is so, merely because an attempt was made by the plaintiff-appellant to bring the suit within limitation even if sub-section (5) of section II was applicable, will not make it a suit under sub-section (5) if in substance it does fall within the ambit of sub-section (5 ). As discussed above, apparently the plaintiff-appellants suit is by a person as stranger and he claims that his land has been included showing it to be a land within the holdings of the three original holders, wherein in fact these three original holders had lost their right in the land in suit and, therefore, what is claimed by the plaintiff-appellant is a declaration that these proceedings do not affect the land in suit and do not affect the plaintiff-appellant. In substance, therefore, it is clearly a suit for declaration of title and further a declaration that the decision of the Competent Authority and the proceedings under this Act have no effect so far as the plaintiff-appellant is concerned and the land in dispute is concerned. It appears, that the learned Courts below did not examine this case in this light and also omitted to consider the effect of the judgment in the Civil Suit declaring that the appellant had acquired title by adverse possession. It appears that as the learned Courts below treated it to be under sub-section (5) of section 11 only emphasised on the question of limitation incidentally also decided other issues without examining the implication of the judgment of the Civil Suit No. 61-A/1963 wherein the right of the appellant has been declared and the said suit filed by the joint holders was dismissed. It was because of this that it appears that both the learned counsel appearing in this second appeal for the appellant as well as the respondent only advanced contentions with regard to the question of limitation. ( 10. It was because of this that it appears that both the learned counsel appearing in this second appeal for the appellant as well as the respondent only advanced contentions with regard to the question of limitation. ( 10. ) AS discussed above, as the suit could not be a suit falling within the ambit of sub-section (5) of section 11, it could not be said that the suit is beyond time as admittedly the suit has been held to be beyond time by applying the period of limitation provided under sub-section (5) of section 11 of the Act. ( 11. ) IN result, the appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below are set aside and the case is sent back to the trial Court for a decision afresh on merits in the light of the above discussion. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs as incurred. Appeal allowed.