JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, M. - This is a plaintiff's good second appeal against the judgment and decree dated July 4, 1975 by the learned Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizabad, modifying the decree dated March 5, 1974 by the learned trial court in a suit under Section 176 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. 3. Bindeshwari and Bankey Prasad plaintiffs and Chandrika Prasad and Roop Narain defendants in the suit for partition are the sons of the same father Kedar Nath. The trial court held each one entitled to share but the learned Additional Commissioner found that the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated March 7, 1970 during the consolidation proceedings holding each brother entitled to share was without jurisdiction and, therefore, was ab initio a nullity. He further decided the two defendants to be entitled to share each in accordance with the order of the Consolidation Officer in Chakbandi. In the trial court, the defendant Chandrika had claimed sole rights for himself while the plea of Roop Narain defendant was that he and Chandrika were entitled to share. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the finding of the learned Additional Commissioner that the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had no jurisdiction and that his order is a nullity, is a wrong finding, not based on any acceptable ground. He has argued that under Section 11 of the U.P.C.H. Act, any party to the proceedings under Section 9-A of the Act aggrieved by any order of A.C.O. or the C.O. could file an appeal. The appeal before the S.O.C. was filed by Chandrika which was perfectly in order. Under Section 41 of the U.P.C.H. Act, provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act have been made applicable to all proceedings including appeal and applications under the Act. Under Section 216 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, the appellate court may confirm, vary or reverse the order. Under Section 41 of the U.P.C.H. Act, provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act have been made applicable to all proceedings including appeal and applications under the Act. Under Section 216 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, the appellate court may confirm, vary or reverse the order. Thus, he argued that the S.O.C. in this case had also power to vary the order of the C.O. In view of the applicability of these provisions, the S.O.C. cannot be considered restricted by the provisions of C.P.C. and very well find entitlement of the remaining two shares of each of the remaining two sons of Kedar Nath, Bindeshwari Prasad and Bankey Prasad. The learned counsel further argued that the learned Additional Commissioner while allowing the appeal, in fact, had dismissed the plaintiff's suit and, therefore, had no power to decide the shares of the defendants inter se. He further argued that the plaintiffs were recorded tenants and under Section 176 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the court had no jurisdiction to decide that the recorded tenants had no shares at all. In support, he cited a ruling shares at all. In support, he cited a ruling reported in 1981 R.D. 157, wherein it was held that if a person is recorded as co-tenant in the revenue papers, it cannot be held in a suit for partition that the is not a co-tenant and such a finding could be given only in a declaratory suit. He further argued that the revenue courts cannot go behind the orders of the consolidation courts and cited a ruling reported in 1970 R.D. 413 in support. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent Chankrika has argued that the two other persons (plaintiffs) had not filed any objection before the C.O. hence they were not entitled to file any appeal. The appeal was filed by Chandrika Prasad and only he was entitled to any relief and not the other two persons. He further argued that before the Consolidation Officer three plot numbers 89-Ka, III-Kha and 99-Kha were not in dispute and, therefore, no shares in these plots could be granted in the instant suit. He argued that before the C.O., plot No. 89-ka was held to be Abadi and was excluded from the decision. He further argued that before the Consolidation Officer three plot numbers 89-Ka, III-Kha and 99-Kha were not in dispute and, therefore, no shares in these plots could be granted in the instant suit. He argued that before the C.O., plot No. 89-ka was held to be Abadi and was excluded from the decision. He also argued that the orders of the S.O.C. was a nullity because the two plaintiffs were not parties before the C.O. He relied upon a ruling reported in A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent Roop Narain has argued on similar lines Roop Narain has argued on similar lines that only the order of the C.O. dated February 7, 1967 was acceptable and the order of the S.O.C. had to be dis-regarded. 7. The main point for consideration is whether the order of the S.O.C. could be deemed a nullity. In view of the provisions contended under Section 41 of the U.P.C.H. Act, applicability of Section 216 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act and the provisions contained under Section 9-A and section 11 of the U.P.C.H. Act, my considered view is that power to adjudicate title under Section 9-A of the Act was not limited only to persons filing objections, and so the S.O.C. can decide the title in respect of all the four brothers and this was made possible by the provisions under Section 216 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act by which the order of the C.O. could be varied by the S.O.C. in appeal. Section 9-A of the U.P.C.H. Act is very clear on the point, even if no objections are filed, the scope of enquiry and adjudication of title is not limited to the persons present. If the C.O. had power to decide a share in favour of Bindeshwari and Bankey Prasad, it cannot be said that the appellate court enjoyed less powers. Possible that is the reasons why to this special Act, the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, particularly Section 216, were made applicable. 8. It has come in evidence that no revision was filed by Roop Narain or Chandrika Prasad before the Deputy Director of Consolidation against the order of the S.O.C. dated March 7, 1970, although they had knowledge, of the order. By not filing any revision, this order had become final. 8. It has come in evidence that no revision was filed by Roop Narain or Chandrika Prasad before the Deputy Director of Consolidation against the order of the S.O.C. dated March 7, 1970, although they had knowledge, of the order. By not filing any revision, this order had become final. When Roop Narain and Chandrika Prasad did not contest the jurisdiction of the S.O.C., it is not for the learned Additional Commissioner to hold otherwise. In fact, the U.P.C.H. Act itself had got a provision of filing revision for the purpose of challenging jurisdiction. Therefore, normally, it should not be the revenue court to decide whether the S.O.C. had jurisdiction or not. 9. The argument of the learned counsel for Chandika Prasad in respect of the three plots mentioned above, arise out of the contention that the order of the S.O.C. does not exist. I do not find so. The order of the C.O. was not final. The last order was of S.O.C. which does not exempt these three plots. Plot number 89-ka was found to be a grove. For other plots also, there is no justification to exclude. The argument that the scope of appeal before the S.O.C. could not include these plots has no basis in view of the wide scope of Section 9-A under which the C.O. had power to decide. It is only the approach before the S.O.C. which is limited to a person aggrieved being a party before the C.O. 10. As regards the ruling by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it gives only the general principle after taking it for granted that an order is a nullity. In the instant case, why the order of the S.O.C. was nullity, has not been established to satisfaction. As dealt with above, it is found to be perfectly within the jurisdiction of the S.O.C. to pass orders regarding title of the two plaintiffs, Bindeshwari and Bankey Prasad. Obviously, the ruling is not applicable to the instant case. Even the learned Additional Commissioner has just taken for granted that the order of the S.O.C. was a nullity but has not discussed or stated why it was a nullity. 11. The argument that the plaintiffs just because they could not file any appeal before the S.O.C. could not get any relief, is against the scheme of adjudication under the U.P.C.H. Act. 11. The argument that the plaintiffs just because they could not file any appeal before the S.O.C. could not get any relief, is against the scheme of adjudication under the U.P.C.H. Act. The construction of Section 9-A of the U.P.C.H. Act makes it clear as discussed earlier. The argument that the person not a party to a suit or appeal is not bound by the judgment also does not apply to the present case. Here, the judgment does not go against the persons who are not parties to the case. Parties present were the respondents Chandrika Prasad and Roop Narain and the decision of the S.O.C. is binding on them according to the principle. The plaintiffs although not parties before the S.O.C., are only gaining their due title and not losing any title, so that they are not aggrieved and there is no occasion for them to challenge the decision of the S.O.C. on the above principle. 12. The result is that the adjudication by the consolidation authorities is finally represented by the order dated March 7, 1970 by the S.O.C. The learned trial court had framed issue numbers 4 and 7 in respect of bar under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act to the defence and to the suit respectively. The defence being based on not considering the order of the S.O.C. is obviously barred under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act and the suit is for the same reasons not barred under Section 49. The view of the learned Additional commissioner to the contrary is against law and cannot be allowed to prevail. 13. I also agree that this bring not a declaratory suit, it was not open to the court to decide that the recorded co-sharer Bindeshwari and Bankey Prasad had no share. The ruling cited is quite applicable. Further, I also agree that in case the suit was dismissed, there was no question of deciding the shares of the defendants inter-se. 14. In view of the above, the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Commissioner cannot be upheld. The learned trial court has based its findings on cogent reasons and that judgment and decree dated March 5, 1974 has to be confirmed. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree dated July 4, 1975 by the learned first appellate court is set aside and decree by the learned trial court is hereby confirmed.