Judgment Uday Sinha, J. 1. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by an officer of Bihar Subordinate Judicial Service. The respondents to this application are the State of Bihar, the Patna High Court and Mr. Shambhu Prasad Singh, retired Judge of this Court. 2. The prayers of the petitioner originally were firstly, to issue a writ of mandamus upon the State of Bihar to promote the petitioner as Additional District Judge : secondly, a writ of mandamus upon the High Court to confirm the petitioner as Subordinate Judge and thirdly, to quash the suspension of the petitioner effected by the order of the High Court dated 21-2-1980 (annexure-2). Subsequently the petitioner filed an application for amendment of the writ application. The amendment prayed for was to add the prayer for quashing the departmental proceeding initiated against the petitioner by the High Court by order dated 21-2-1980 which is annexure-5 to this application. The amendment petition was filed on 17-9-1981. The order for initiation of departmental proceeding having been passed on 21-2-1980 was very much in existence when the petitioner was suspended. That prayer, therefore, should have been made in the main application itself. The amendment petition was put up for consideration before N.P. Singh and S. Narain, JJ. on 17-9-1981. The Bench ordered that the amendment petition be considered at the time of final hearing of the main writ application. When we took up hearing of the application, the prayer for amendment of the petition was pressed before us. Not going by technicality, we allowed the prayer for amendment of the application by adding one more prayer. Thus the fourth prayer of the petitioner is to quash the departmental disciplinary proceeding against him. At this stage, 1 would only like to state that the Enquiring Officer, Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi has already submitted his report and has found the petitioner has been called upon to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. 3. The petitioner was appointed as Munsif in February 1958. After fourteen years of service the petitioner was promoted to officiate as Subordinate Judge in July, 1972. In February, 1973 he was permitted by the High Court to cross the first efficiency bar. On 11-2-1974 he was allowed to cross the second efficiency bar. The necessary notification to this effect was issued on 22-1-1975. After fourteen years of service the petitioner was promoted to officiate as Subordinate Judge in July, 1972. In February, 1973 he was permitted by the High Court to cross the first efficiency bar. On 11-2-1974 he was allowed to cross the second efficiency bar. The necessary notification to this effect was issued on 22-1-1975. In April, 1974 the petitioner was posted to Nawadah as Chief Judicial Magistrate. According to the petitioner, he should have been confirmed with effect from 7-1-1976 when there was vacancy in the rank of substantive Subordinate Judges. As is usual, the question of confirmation of the petitioner as Subordinate Judge was not taken up in January, 1976. In fact, no officer of his batch was confirmed at that time. The want of confirmation would not stand in the way of the High Court in tb.3 matter of recommending names to State Government for promotion to the rank of Additional District Judges. According to the petitioner, he was by-passed with the innocuous and cryptic remark "not fit for promotion". The High Court not having recommended his name for promotion, the State Government naturally did not promote him as Additional District Judge, Before I proceed to dwell upon the attitude of the High Court and the State Government in the matter of his promotion, it would be useful to dispose of one of the submissions urged very vehemently on behalf of the petitioner. That relates to the mala fide action of respondent No. 3. Mala fide of respondent No. 3 4. The submission on behalf of the petitioner is, that respondent No. 3 was an influential member of the Standing Committee. Being Judge Incharge Administrative Department, his mala fide action was the cause for the petitioner not being recommended by the High Court for promotion as Additional District and Sessions Judge. The petitioner has averred that he was a very good officer with brilliant record of service for more than nineteen years, but all of a sudden he became a bad officer because he suddenly incurred the displeasure of respondent No. 3. To claim a brilliant record of service, whatever may be the fact is usual for every officer moving this Court for relief. No officer has up till now stated that he did not have a brilliant record of service. To claim a brilliant record of service, whatever may be the fact is usual for every officer moving this Court for relief. No officer has up till now stated that he did not have a brilliant record of service. Be that as it may, the assertion of the petitioner is that when respondent No. 3 became Judge Incharge Administrative Department in May, 1976 he recommended the name of Ramakant Singh for the special post of Under Secretary. Law Department by ignoring the petitioner. The reason, according to the petitioner, for his being by-passed is that Ramakant Singh was a relation of Mr. Shambhu Prasad Singh. The action of the Standing Committee was tainted by mala fide. Thus contended learned Counsel for the petitioner. 5. The allegation of respondent No. 3 being a relation of Ramakant Singh is vague to the extreme. Merely saying that the two were related hardly makes any sense. The petitioner did not disclose what was the relationship between them. Respondent No. 3 in his counter-affidavit has denied the existence of any relationship between him and Ramakant Singh. He has stated that the sister and sisters son of Ramakant Singh have been married in the same village as respondent No. 3, in entirely different families. The assertion of the petitioner in regard to the relationship is not worth taking note of Respondent No. 3 has shown that there is no relationship between them. The denial of existence of relationship between respondent No. 3 and Ramakant Singh has not been controverted. The first link in the assertion of mala fide on the part of respondent No. 3 has proved too weak and the chain snaps. 6. The second link in regard to mala fide action of respondent No. 3 and the High Court is that the petitioner having learnt of Ramakant Singh having been recommended for the post of Under Secretary, Law Department and not the petitioner, he expressed his shock, surprise and resentment over the action of respondent No. 3. The resentment of the petitioner was conveyed to respondent No. 3 by making it spicy which piqued respondent No. 3 all the more. He, therefore, made up his mind to proceed against the petitioner. The assertion of vindictiveness in this behalf is not fit even to be touched with a pair of tongs. The resentment of the petitioner was conveyed to respondent No. 3 by making it spicy which piqued respondent No. 3 all the more. He, therefore, made up his mind to proceed against the petitioner. The assertion of vindictiveness in this behalf is not fit even to be touched with a pair of tongs. It is well known that seniority is no consideration in the matter of appointment to several special posts. It is regrettable that the recommendation in favour of Ramakant Singh shocked the petitioner. There are various considerations on which the High Court acts. Being senior to Ramakant Singh did not clothe the petitioner with any right to be recommended for appointment as Under Secretary, Law Department. The petitioner does not disclose where and before whom he expressed his resentment. He also does not disclose who conveyed his resentment to respondent No. 3. The petitioner does not disclose in what manner his resentment was made spicy and communicated to respondent No. 3, and yet the petitioner has asserted that his allegation of facts are true to his personal knowledge and belief. The mala fide thus attributed to respondent No. 3 is just trash and must be rejected at its face value. 7. The links to sustain the plea of mala fide on the part of respondent No. 3 besides being without any basis are entirely irrelevant. The plea of mala fides against the decision of the High Court has thus no legs to stand upon. It is elementary that the decision to recommend Ramakant Singh for the post of Under Secretary was that of the Standing Committee of the High Court consisting of Chief Justice and four senior most Judges. It was a decision of the Standing Committee and not of respondent No. 3 alone. That being the position, it was futile for the petitioner to attack respondent No. 3. The plea of mala fide on the part of respondent No. 3 and through him of the High Court must be squarely rejected. Promotion-- 8. I shall now consider whether the petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to promote him to the rank of Additional District and Sessions Judge. The provisions of Chapter VI of the Constitution should now be considered. In terms of Article 236, the expression District Judge includes Additional District and Sessions Judge. Promotion-- 8. I shall now consider whether the petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to promote him to the rank of Additional District and Sessions Judge. The provisions of Chapter VI of the Constitution should now be considered. In terms of Article 236, the expression District Judge includes Additional District and Sessions Judge. Article 233(1) provides for promotion to the office of Additional District and Sessions Judges. In the instant case, we are not concerned with the provisions or Article 233(2). Article 233(1) of the Constitution lays down that the promotion and posting of District Judges, which includes Additional District Judges, shall be made by the Governor of the State in cosultation with the High Court. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Governor of the Slate is not bound by the opinion of the High Court. It was submitted that whereas no appointment can be made by the Governor in terms of Article 233(2) unless a candidate has been recommended by the High Court. In regard to promotion to the office of Additional District Judge, the Governor has to act not upon the recommendation of the High Court but only in consultation with it. According to learned Counsel for the petitioner, the connotation of consultation being entirely different from concurrence or recommendation, the Governor was not obliged to abide by the opinion of the High Court. Several decisions of the Supreme Court were cited at the Bar on behalf of the petitioner in regard to content of the expression consultation. Relying upon them it was submitted that consultation implies full disclosure of all facts and, therefore, the High Court was bound to disclose the circumstances which had weighed with the High Court in not recommending the name of the petitioner to the post of Additional District Judge. The High Court having failed or refused to disclose materials against the petitioner, the processes of consultation being over, the State Government had the power and jurisdiction to promote the petitioner if it found that the High Court had no material for not recommending his promotion. The State Government having failed to act in this behalf a writ of mandamus should issue commanding it to promote the petitioner. Thus contended learned Counsel for the petitioner. 9. The State Government having failed to act in this behalf a writ of mandamus should issue commanding it to promote the petitioner. Thus contended learned Counsel for the petitioner. 9. The role of the Governor, of a State and of the High Court in the matter of control over the judiciary of the State is no more in the dark. It is now well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court. Article 235 of the Constitution vests the control over District Courts and the Courts subordinate thereto including confirmation, posting and promotion in the High Court, The control of the High Court is complete and absolute subject of course to the limitations laid down by Rules framed in this behalf consistent with the provisions of Article 235. 10. In The High Court of Punjab and Haryana etc V/s. The State of Haryana and Ors. -- . A.N. Ray, C.J. approving the decision in The State of West Bengal V/s. Nripendra Nath Bagchi -- ., observed that the word control used in Article 233 includes disciplinary control or jurisdiction over District Judges. The Control is vested in the High Court to effectuate a purpose, namely, the securing of the independence of the subordinate judiciary and unless it includes disciplinary control the very object would be frustrated. In the view of Ray, C.J. the word control includes something in addition to mere superintendence over these Courts. To quote the words of Ray, C.J., The control which is vested in the High Court is complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment including dismissal and removal and initial posting and promotion of District Judges. The control is not merely the power to arrange the day to day working of the Court but contemplates disciplinary jurisdiction over the presiding judge. The Supreme Court laid down in unambiguous terms that the confirmation of persons in the Judicial Service either promoted or appointed is clearly within the control of the High Court, If that were not so, there would be a duality which would not be in consonance with the letter and spirit of Article 235 of the Constitution. The members of the subordinate judiciary look up to the High Court for discipline and dignity. Unless the High Court is in complete control of the subordinate judiciary, unfettered by dual control the purpose could not be achieved. The members of the subordinate judiciary look up to the High Court for discipline and dignity. Unless the High Court is in complete control of the subordinate judiciary, unfettered by dual control the purpose could not be achieved. The Governor, i.e. the Executive has no role to play. 11. In Chandra Mohan V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1987., it will be observed that the Governor can appoint a person to the post of District judge fro 11 the service only in consultation with the High Court. 12. In Chandramouleshwar Prasad V/s. Patna High Court -- ., it was held by the Supreme Court that the Governor must make an appointment in consultation with the High Court and that the Governor is not free to ignore the view of the High Court in regard to appointment of a District Judge/Additional District Judge. 13. In State of Haryana V/s. Inder Prakash Anand and Ors. -- ., it was observed as follows: The control vested in the High Court is that if the High Court is of opinion that a particular Judicial Officer is not fit to be retained in service the High Court will communicate that to the Governor because the Governor is the authority to dismiss, remove, reduce in rank or terminate the appointment. In such cases it is the contemplation in the Constitution that the Governor as the head of the State will act in harmony with the recommendation of the High Court. If the recommendation of the High Court is not held to be binding on the State, consequences will be unfortunate. It is in public interest that the State will accept the recommendation of the High Court. The vesting of complete control over the Subordinate Judiciary in the High Court leads to this that the decision of the High Court in matters within the jurisdiction will bind the State. The Government will act on the recommendation of the High Court, That is the broad basis of Article 235. See Shamsher Singhs case -- (supra). 14. Again in Baldeo Raj Gurlani V/s. The Punjab, and Haryana High Court and Ors. -- ., at paragraph 15 Goswami, J, observed as follows-- ...Yet, the stark reality is that the High Courts recommendation was given a go by and the Commissions contrary advice was preferred by the Governor". See Shamsher Singhs case -- (supra). 14. Again in Baldeo Raj Gurlani V/s. The Punjab, and Haryana High Court and Ors. -- ., at paragraph 15 Goswami, J, observed as follows-- ...Yet, the stark reality is that the High Courts recommendation was given a go by and the Commissions contrary advice was preferred by the Governor". Time and again this Court has been observing hopefully that it will be in the best interest of a high and healthy tradition for the Governor to ordinarily accept the recommendation of the High Court in a disciplinary matter concerning judicial officers, And again in paragraph 24 it was observed as follows: ...If the recommendation of the High Court is not held to be binding on the State, consequences will be unfortunate. It is in public interest that the State will accept the recommendation of the High Court. The nature, character and weight of the view of the High Court was squarely posed in paragraph 26 and held that the recommendation of the High Court in respect of judicial officers should always be accepted by the Governor, Whenever the Governor feels, for certain reasons, that he is unable to accept the High Courts recommendations. This should be communicated to the High Court to reconsider the matter. "It is however, inconceivable that, without reference to the High Court, the Governor would pass an order which had not been earlier recommended by the High Court. That will be contrary to the contemplation in the Constitution and should not take place." 15. Note must be taken of the case of Mani Subrat Jain etc. V/s. State of Haryana and Ors. -- ., wherein it has been held that Article 235 does not imply that the Governor must accept whatever advice or recommendation is given by the High Court, The observations in paragraph 13 do not support the bald view that the Governor is not bound by recommendation of the High Court. All that the case laid down was that the Government could communicate its reasons for not accepting the recommendation of the High Court without taking any positive step to appoint without the recommendation of the High Court. The observations in paragraphs 15 and 16 clearly bring out the position in law that the Governor cannot ignore the advice of the High Court. 16. In Hari Datt Kainthia and Anr. V/s. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. The observations in paragraphs 15 and 16 clearly bring out the position in law that the Governor cannot ignore the advice of the High Court. 16. In Hari Datt Kainthia and Anr. V/s. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. -- ., the Supreme Court observed at paragraph 12 as follows-- ...Therefore, when promotion is to be given to the post of District Judge (which expression must include Additional District Judge) from amongst those belonging to subordinate Judicial service, the High Court unquestionably will be competent to decide whether a person is fit for promotion and consistent with its decision to recommend or not to recommend such person. The Governor who would be acting on the advice of the Minister would hardly be in a position to have intimate knowledge about the quality and qualification of such person for promotion. At Paragraph 13, the Supreme Court laid down the law observing that either in the case of promotion or in the case of direct recruitment, the consultation with the High Court would assume the form of recommendation. It is thus obvious that there is not much difference between the expression "consultation" and "recommendation" of the High Court. In short, the purport of Chapter VI of the Constitution is that the view of the High Court must have primacy over that of the Governor. In the interest of judicial independence, integrity and dignity, it is essential that the control must be the exclusive recluse of the High Court. The founding fathers of the Constitution clearly intended to prevent the Executive from frustrating the laudible objective of judicial independence and integrity. 17. In the instant case, the High Court did not consider the petitioner fit for being promoted to the post of Additional District Judge and, therefore, did not recommend his name for promotion. The Governor accepted the recommendation and, therefore, the petitioner was not promoted. The High Court not having recommended and the Government accepting the view off the High Court that should be the end of the matter. The petitioner cannot contend that the Governor should not have accepted the recommendation to promote others preceding the petitioner. The Governor accepted the recommendation and, therefore, the petitioner was not promoted. The High Court not having recommended and the Government accepting the view off the High Court that should be the end of the matter. The petitioner cannot contend that the Governor should not have accepted the recommendation to promote others preceding the petitioner. In the case of Hari Datt Kainthia (Supra) a similar situation had arisen and the Supreme Court observed that the High Court having recommended some of the respondents and the Governor having accepted the recommendations the appointments of the respondents of that case were consistent with the recommendations and that such a course was in conformity with the provisions of Article 233 of the Constitution. In the instant case, as well the constitutional mandate was complied and no statutory rule was violated in recommending some for promotion by-passing the petitioner. I find it difficult to accept the submission that the Governor should be directed to promote the petitioner although the High Court has not recommended his promotion. With a disciplinary proceeding pending against the petitioner the High Court cannot be compelled to recommend the petitioners promotion and in the absence of the recommendation of the High Court we cannot direct the Governor by a writ of mandamus to promote the petitioner. 18. Has the petitioner been by-passed? The petitioner contends that the Governor did not accept the recommendation of the High Court to by-pass the petitioner and, therefore, kept two places reserved for promotion, one for the petitioner and another for Rameshwar Prasad (who has since been compulsorily retired). Let us see how facts stand. In Paragraph 14 of the petition it has been stated that two notifications were issued on 9-2-1978 and 11-2-1978 promoting 18 officers, who had been recommended for promotion in May and December, 1977. According to the petitioner, the State Government did not accept the unfitness of the petitioner as valid ground for his supersession but due to misconception as to the interpretation of Article 233 of the Constitution the State Government has not taken any final decision as yet. According to the petitioner, the State Government did not accept the unfitness of the petitioner as valid ground for his supersession but due to misconception as to the interpretation of Article 233 of the Constitution the State Government has not taken any final decision as yet. In Paragraph 15 - it has been stated that the petitioner filed representation to the Governor on 20-2-1980, a day before the suspension, to promote the petitioner, but the representation of the petitioner is still hanging fire with Respondent No, 1 and, therefore, the Governor must be commanded by a writ of mandamus to promote the petitioner. It appears that by notification dated 25-2-1978 (Annexure-1) the State Government on the recommendation of the High Court promoted six officers, namely, Lala Radha Kumar Sinha, Nawal Kishore Prasad Sinha, Sachchitan and Kishore Prasad Singh, Animdh Prasad Sinha, Radhika Raman Prasad Sinhaand Akhauri Anjani Kumar Sinha (now dead) to the posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges although the High Court had recommended eight names. In this notification in Paragraph 3 the State Government in Department of Personnel in disregard of the recommendation of the High Court kept the first two vacancies reserved for the petitioner and Rameshwar Prasad until final decision was taken by the State Government. The State Government did not issue notification promoting Nawal Kishore Prasad No. 1 and Ravindra Nath Roy. Prior to the issuance of the notification while the question of promotion was under consideration, the State Government asked the High Court to intimate why the High Court had not recommended petitioner for the promotion while recommending those junior to him. By letter dated 20th August, 1977 the High Court informed the State Government that it was not obliged to furnish the information asked for by the State Government. It is necessary to give a finding as to whether the High Court was answerable to the State Government for not recommending the petitioner for promotion or not, but the Executive in the State Government should have appreciated that the High Court (Judiciary) was supposed to know better about the conduct of judicial officers than the Executive. The High Court, however, was not shy to disclose the reasons for supersession of the petitioner. The High Court, however, was not shy to disclose the reasons for supersession of the petitioner. Paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit on behalf of Respondent No. 3 shows that the Principal Secretary, Personnel Department came to the High Court and discussed the matter with Judge, Administrative Department and the reasons for supersession of the petitioner. After discussion and consultation the Principal Secretary was satisfied that the High Court had adequate grounds for superseding the petitioner. Annexure-F to the counter-affidavit filed by the High Court supports the stand of Respondents 2 and 3 that the representative of the State Government was furnished all materials which were the basis for not recommending promotion of the petitioner, Annexure-F shows that the State Government was satisfied that the conduct of the petitioner was prima-facie suspicious. The State Government, however, was of the view that mere supersession was not enough and that disciplinary proceeding also should be initiated and if the assumptions of suspicion was not adequate, it would not be proper to deny him promotion. The Government advised that if the High Court was prima-facie satisfied that the allegations against the petitioner were sustainable, then disciplinary proceedings should be initiated. It was unfortunate, however, that the State Government persisted in observing in Annexure-F that two vacancies had been kept reserved for the petitioner and Rameshwar Prasad. On receipt of Annexure-F dated 4/6-3-1978 the High Court pressed its view for promoting N. K. Prasad No. I and R. N. Roy the State Government ultimately accepted the recommendations of the High Court and issued notification on 16-6-1978 promoting them. This notification (Annexure-A) expressly modified notification No. 3431 dated 25-2-1978 (Annexure-1) by which posts had been reserved for the petitioner and Rameshwar Prasad. It is thus firmly established that the High Court recommended eight names for promotion superseding the petitioner and the State Government accepted the same and appointed all of them. There is thus no post vacant for the petitioner. The stand of the petitioner that a post has been kept reserved for him and that the State Government has not taken any decision in regard to his promotion is untenable in the face of Annexure-A. I have not the least doubt that the consultation between the State Government and the High Court was full and effective. In the face of Annexure-A, Annexure-1 and Annexure-F reserving a post for the petitioner has no meaning. In the face of Annexure-A, Annexure-1 and Annexure-F reserving a post for the petitioner has no meaning. The reservation of post for the petitioner by Annexure-1 and Annexure F must be deemed to have been superseded by Annexure-A. That being the position, the prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus to direct the State Government to promote the petitioner to the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge has no substance and must be rejected. 19. At the cost of repetition, I would like to state that once the High Court informs that it does not consider a particular Subordinate Judge fit for promotion to the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge, that should be a closure for the State Government. The High Court while expressing its views cannot be expected to write a judgment in regard to the non-suitability of a particular officer for promotion. The law and the constitutional mandate will have been fully compelled if the High Court writes that it does not consider a particular officer fit for promotion. Of course, it is not a privileged matter for the High Court and an officer cannot be shut out from contending that he had been declared unfit for promotion without any valid ground. That matter can be looked into by the High Court on its judicial side. In the instant case, all the files concerning the antecedents of the petitioner were made available to learned Counsel for the petitioner. We have also looked into those files. On looking into the files and the affidavit of the High Court in this writ application, I am satisfied that the High Court had adequate materials for being of the view that the petitioner was not fit for promotion. Opinions may vary, but the adequacy and sufficiency of materials in regard to the unfitness of the petitioner cannot be a ground for the High Court to interfere on the judicial side in its writ jurisdiction much less for the Executive the State Government. The prayer for issuance of a writ of Mandamus upon the Governor to promote, being devoid of any substance must be rejected. 20. Confirmation. The next grievance of the petitioner is in regard to the failure of the High Court to confirm the petitioner as substantive Subordinate. The prayer for issuance of a writ of Mandamus upon the Governor to promote, being devoid of any substance must be rejected. 20. Confirmation. The next grievance of the petitioner is in regard to the failure of the High Court to confirm the petitioner as substantive Subordinate. The facts relevant are on the basis of which the submission was urged on behalf of the petitioner, that till 1972 the petitioner had an unblemished record of service. In February, 19/4 the petitioner was allowed to cross the second efficiency bar. The petitioner was asked to give his consent in regard to his deputation as Deputy General Manager of Bihar State Civil Supplies and Food Corporation. The petitioner was also asked by the High Court for giving consent, which he did, for appointment as Under Secretary, Law Department of the State Government. Further, District Judge, Gaya had praised the petitioner in regard to his efficiency and integrity in glowing terms. Upon these circumstances, the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner is that he was not confirmed by the High Court out of malice. Malice, in fact has been attributed against Respondent No. 3, but the decision not to confirm this petitioner was taken not by Respondent No. 3, but by the Standing Committee which included besides Respondent No. 3, the Chief Justice Shri K.B.N. Singh. Mr. Justice S. Sarwar Ali, Mr. Justice M. M. Prasad and Mr. Justice S.P. Sinha, The assertion of malice as a fact against Respondent No 3,1 have already considered and rejected. There can be No. question of malice as a fact against the entire Standing Committee nor is there such an averment. The question of malice in law as against the entire Standing Committee is equally devoid of merit. Five senior most Judges of different hues discussed and decided that the petitioner was not fit for being confirmed. Sitting in writ jurisdiction we are not called upon to decide the weight of the materials for and against the petitioner. If there were materials against the petitioner as well besides those in his favour, and if the Standing Committee formed the view that the petitioner was not fit for being confirmed, we are not supposed to impose our own judgment in regard to the suitability or fitness of the petitioner. If there were materials against the petitioner as well besides those in his favour, and if the Standing Committee formed the view that the petitioner was not fit for being confirmed, we are not supposed to impose our own judgment in regard to the suitability or fitness of the petitioner. It should be stated that the question of confirmation of the petitioner was raised subsequent to the consideration of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge. In that behalf High Court office after cataloguing the merits and demrits in relation to the petitioner put up the following note for consideration of his case by the Standing Committee : (2) Shri Ranjit Prasad Sinha. He is presently posted as Addl. Sub-Judge-cum-Chief Judicial, Magistrate at Saharsa on transfer from Nawadah. A copy of his C.B. which is kept at flag 69 shows that he has two adverse remarks to his credit. The first remark is recorded on the basis of the minutes in file No. XXIII-2-62 for his leaving station in January, 1962, without the permission of the District Judge. The other adverse remark is of the year 1961-62 recorded by Sri S.M. Karim, the District Judge, wherein he has been described as a careless and undesirable type of officer who needed discipline and careful watch. All the subsequent remarks earned by him are quite encouraging wherein his judicial work and relationship with Bar have always been found satisfactory. In the last unconsidered remark for 1975-76, he has been reported to be a competent Officer of unquestionable integrity. It may, however, be mentioned that while this officer was posted at Nawadah some allegation petitions and pamphlets had been received against this officer and they have in pursuance of the minutes of the Standing Committee extracted at page 9/n of linked file No. XXIX-55-76, been sent to the District Judge of Qaya for confidential enquiry and report which is still being awaited. The State Government have also forwarded similar copies of allegation petitions and pamphlets, which are kept in the same file. In these circumstances, it is for consideration as to whether he should be found fit for promotion." In the face of the facts contained in the above note, I am unable to find fault with the Standing Committee of the High Court, if they did not consider him suitable for confirmation. In these circumstances, it is for consideration as to whether he should be found fit for promotion." In the face of the facts contained in the above note, I am unable to find fault with the Standing Committee of the High Court, if they did not consider him suitable for confirmation. The reasons for which the petitioner was not recommended for promotion would provide sufficient reasons for the Standing Committee not to confirm the petitioner. The above note put up by the Registry before the Standing Committee was drawn up on 26-7-1976. 21. Besides the facts mentioned in the office note, there was another circumstance which may have weighed against his confirmation. That was his attitude in regard to compliance with an order of the High Court whereby the petitioner showed scant regard for an order for grant of bail to one accused. This incident relates back to 14-7-1976 and was subject matter of a contempt case being Original Criminal Case No. 14 of 1976. Although Madan Mohan Prasad, J. discharged the rule against the petitioner in the contempt matter, did not leave it covert that the petitioner had certainly behaved in a funny manner in carrying out the order of the High Court. Prasad, J. in paragraph 14 of his judgment observed as follows: 14. The circumstances in this case, therefore raise very great suspicion that the Chief Judicial Magistrate tried to find out one ground or the other to postpone the release of the petitioner until after he had gone to jail for sometime. It passes my comprehension that when he took so much care to examine the bail bond and the affidavit how did the statement regarding the ownership of the land escape him. But, that it may be also accidental, cannot be ruled out. There is however, no doubt that the Chief Judicial Magistrate was grossly negligent in his duties in not examining the bail bond and affidavit more carefully than he had done particularly when on that very ground he was refusing to accept the bail bond in a case where this Court has granted an anticipatory order for bail, which is meant to avoid unnecessary harassment to a citizen and his going to jail. I cannot but express my displeasure at and disapproval of the manner in which the Chief Judicial Magistrate conducted himself in this case which was certainly not above suspicion And again in paragraph 15 his Lordship observed as follows: As I have said above the circumstances are greatly suspicious and point in the direction of substantiating the allegation made by the petitioner against the Magistrate. The observations of Prasad, J. in the contempt matter were certainly damaging to the petitioner. 22 Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the rule against the petitioner having been discharged in the contempt matter, the observations of Prasad, J. were of no moment and could not be taken into account while deciding whether the petitioner should be confirmed or not. I regret, I am unable to accept this submission. Although the rule was discharged, yet the judgment was scathing condemnation of the conduct of the petitioner as a judicial officer. Although those conclusions were not found to rest a conviction by Prasad, J. it was certainly a material to be looked into on the Administrative side and weighing its significance when the question of confirming the petitioner arose. It may be stated that Prasad, J. was one of the members of the Standing Committee which decided against the confirmation of the petitioner. 23. There was yet another material against the petitioner for the High Court to have decided not to confirm the petitioner. That was the enquiry report of Mr. B.P. Jaiswal, District and Sessions Judge, Gaya, dated 18-2-1977. This report shows that this Court had received some pamphlet/bulletin against the conduct of the petitioner when he was posted as Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nawadah. On receipt of the bulletin the High Court asked Mr. Jaiswal, the then District Judge, Gaya on 28-13-1979 to hold a confidential inquiry into the allegations mentioned in the pamphlet. Mr. Jaiswal held discreet inquiry and found several of the allegations in the pamphlet substantiated. The adverse report of the District Judge was certainly material for the Standing Committee to consider while deciding whether petitioner should be confirmed or not. 24. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner was never informed about the confidential inquiry so that he never had an opportunity to show that the facts mentioned in the pamphlet were baseless. I regret this submission is untenable. 24. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner was never informed about the confidential inquiry so that he never had an opportunity to show that the facts mentioned in the pamphlet were baseless. I regret this submission is untenable. The petitioner was not entitled to any notice at the stage of discreet preliminary inquiry. It was essential for the High Court to have a discreet inquiry before deciding to initiate regular disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. It would not have been right to initiate departmental proceeding against the petitioner straightway on receipt of the pamphlet. The High Court, therefore, adopted the absolutely right course in calling upon the District Judge to enquire confidentially whether there was any substance in the pamphlet. In S. Ptatap Singh V/s. State of Punjab -- ., in paragraph 55, Raghubar Dayal, J. observed that it is not necessary to call for an explanation from the delinquent officer before suspending him. Thus no malice in law or of fact can be attributed to the High Court in asking District Judge, Gaya to report upon the allegations after holding confidential enquiry. 25. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the High Court acted maliciously in asking Mr. B.P. Jaiswal to hold the confidential enquiry against the petitioner. It was submitted that the petitioner was on estranged terms with Mr. B.P. Jaiswal and, therefore he was not the person to whom any inquiry should have been entrusted in regard to the petitioner. This submission is absolutely untenable. At the relevant time Mr. B.P. Jaiswal was the District Judge, Gaya within whose jurisdiction Nawadah, where the petitioner was posted lay. It was, therefore, only in the fitness of things that the District Judge and nobody else, should have been called upon to hold an inquiry. The plea of estrangement with the petitioner is equally valueless. The plea founded on the footing that a contest had taken place between the Munsifs recruited in 1952, which was the batch in which Mr. B.P. Jaiswal and several others had been appointed as Munsifs appointed in 1958 in which group fell the petitioner. The Munsifs of 1958 batch were claiming to be senior to Munsifs appointed in 1952. The petitioner has averred that Mr. B.P. Jaiswal was looking after the writ application regarding seniority on behalf of the Munsifs of 1952 batch. B.P. Jaiswal and several others had been appointed as Munsifs appointed in 1958 in which group fell the petitioner. The Munsifs of 1958 batch were claiming to be senior to Munsifs appointed in 1952. The petitioner has averred that Mr. B.P. Jaiswal was looking after the writ application regarding seniority on behalf of the Munsifs of 1952 batch. Apart from the mere Ipse Dixits of the petitioner that Mr. B. P. Jaiswal was looking after the interest of the 1952 Munsifs before the High Court in the writ application, there is nothing to substantiate this allegation. The petitioner cannot count much on this. Even if this assertion of the petitioner were to be accepted there could be no personal animus between Mr. B.P. Jaiswal, a Munsif of 1952 batch and the petitioner, a Munsif of 1958 batch. I am inclined to accept the assertion of respondent No. 3 that the High Court at least did not know that there was any personal animus between Mr. B.P. Jaiswal and petitioner Ranjit Prasad Sinha on account of the writ application before the High Court. No fault can, therefore be found with the High Court, if it called upon the concerned District Judge to hold a confidential inquiry and submit a report. The position of the High Court and all the then Judges of the Standing Committee is unassailable. 26. The question of confirmation of the petitioner was taken up sometime in May, 1977 along with several officiating Subordinate Judges. This consideration related to the cases of the petitioner as well as several others senior and junior to the petitioner as to whether they should be confirmed or not. Thus when the matter relating to confirmation of the petitioner was taken up by the High Court on the one hand, the High Court had the materials that the petitioner had been permitted to cross the second efficiency bar in December, 1974, he received a good chit from Mr. U.S. Sharma in regard to his integrity in 1975 and there was the circumstance that the High Court had asked for consent to special posts. On the other hand, the High Court had received damaging remarks of District Judges recorded in 1961 and 1962 against the petitioner, the strong observations of M.M. Prasad, J in a contempt matter and the inquiry report of Mr. B.P. Jaiswal. On the other hand, the High Court had received damaging remarks of District Judges recorded in 1961 and 1962 against the petitioner, the strong observations of M.M. Prasad, J in a contempt matter and the inquiry report of Mr. B.P. Jaiswal. The submission that the High Court had no material against the petitioner is clearly misconceived. If the Standing Committee after applying itself to all the materials did not consider it appropriate to confirm the petitioner it is not for this Court in its writ jurisdiction to substitute its own views in the matter. This Court is not a Court of Appeal against the conclusions of the Standing Committee. There were materials for and against the petitioner and the Standing Committee took one view of the matter. That should be the end of it. It is not for us to say that the Standing Committee should have preferred another view. 27. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that once the High Court recommended the cases for confirmation, all that it said about the petitioner was that he was not fit to be confirmed. This, according to the petitioner was a very bald and vague opinion. Learned Counsel for petitioner characterised it as rubber stamp opinion which cannot be sustained by any judicial body. All that need be said for rejecting the submission is that the High Court alone is the Judge of the merit, efficiency and integrity of a Subordinate Judge. If after looking into all materials the Standing Committee, consisting of five senior most Judges of this Court, did not consider the petitioner fit for confirmation, the conclusion of the High Court and its communication to the State Government is free from any vice, The Executive Authority acting for the Governor cannot sit in judgment over the conclusion of the High Court. The reliance placed upon S.G. Jaisinghani V/s. Union of India and Ors. -- ., and E.P. Royappa. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. A.I.R. 1947 S.C. 555. and The Regional Manager and Anr. V/s. Pawan Kumar Dubey -- , have no relevance to the instant case as they did not relate to judicial officers. As I have said earlier, materials appearing against the petitioner was made known to the Principal Secretary, Personal Department. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. A.I.R. 1947 S.C. 555. and The Regional Manager and Anr. V/s. Pawan Kumar Dubey -- , have no relevance to the instant case as they did not relate to judicial officers. As I have said earlier, materials appearing against the petitioner was made known to the Principal Secretary, Personal Department. Therefore, although all that the High Court communicated to the State Government was that it did not consider the petitioner fit for confirmation, the view of the High Court cannot be assailed on the ground that it was cryptic. For all the reasons discussed above, I am of the view that the High Court had adequate grounds for not confirming the petitioner. 28. In regard to non-confirmation of the petitioner in the cadre of judicial service, it was submitted that no order had been passed by the Standing Committee not to confirm the petitioner, and therefore, the High Court was bound to confirm him and on that basis to issue a writ on the Standing Committee. That is putting the matter in very superficial manner. The Registrar considered the cases of the petitioner and several other Subordinate Judges. The merit and demerit of each of the candidates were mentioned in the office note. After going through the office note and the materials contained therein the Standing Committee decided to confirm several others and agreed with the suggestion of the Registrar that some which included the petitioner should not be confirmed. The resolution of the standing Committee, therefore, must be read as an order not confirming the petitioner. In my view, therefore, there was clear order for not confirming the petitioner. The acceptance of the office note amounts to stating of reason for not confirming the petitioner, It is patent that when a departmental proceeding was in contemplation and his conduct was being enquired into by the District Judge, Gaya, there could be no question of confirming the petitioner. 29. Suspension,--The next submission urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner not having been suspended and not having been proceeded against departmentally by the full High Court, but only by its Standing Committee the suspension and initiation of the disciplinary proceedings was illegal and without jurisdiction. Reliance in this connection is placed upon Rule 3(vii) of the High Court Rules which reads as follows: 3. Reliance in this connection is placed upon Rule 3(vii) of the High Court Rules which reads as follows: 3. The Standing Committee shall have power, without reference to the Judges generally-- ... ... ... ... (vii) to make recommendations regarding the degradation and suspension of Subordinate Judges and Munsifs; In terms of the above provision it has been submitted that the Standing Committee had the power only to make recommendations regarding degradation and suspension of Subordinate Judges and Munsifs. The question of degradation does not arise in the instant case, The only matter, therefore, left for consideration is the suspension of the petitioner. It will thus have to be seen whether Rule 3(vii) of the Patna High Court rules authorised and empowered the Standing Committee to suspend the petitioner and initiate departmental proceeding. 30. Rule 3(vii) does not relate to initiation of departmental disciplinary proceeding. This rule, therefore, places no bar upon the Standing Committee to initiate departmental proceeding, The prayer for quashing the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner must be rejected at the threshhold. 31. We shall now see whether the Standing Committee had the jurisdiction to pass final orders for initiation of departmental proceedings, and suspending the petitioner. 32. The submission urged on behalf of the petitioner is entirely fallacious and must be rejected outright. It is not in controversy, and cannot be, that in terms of Article 235 of the Constitution the High Court alone is competent to take disciplinary action against any judicial officer. Question is whether the Standing Committee of this High Court could do it? The power of the Standing Committee to suspend a judicial officer flows from Rule 2 of the High Court Rules and not from Rule 3(vii). The general powers of the Standing Committee are contained in Rule 2. Rule 3 is only enumeration of some of the functions of the Standing Committee. Rule 2 reads as follows: 2. The Standing Committee shall be charged with the control and direction of the Subordinate Courts, so far as such control and direction are exercised otherwise than judicially. The above rule lays down that the Standing Committee is given the charge to control and direct the Subordinate Courts. The expression "control and direction" in Rule 2 necessarily implies the power to take disciplinary measures against officers. The above rule lays down that the Standing Committee is given the charge to control and direct the Subordinate Courts. The expression "control and direction" in Rule 2 necessarily implies the power to take disciplinary measures against officers. Without the power to suspend a judicial officer the expression "control and direction" would denude much of the power of the Standing Committee. The expression "control" occurs in Article 235 of the Constitution as well. In relation to Article 235 the expression "control" has been read by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions that it implies not only the power of transfer and posting, but also to include power to suspend and to initiate departmental proceeding. It was so held in The State of West Bengal and Anr. V/s. Nripendva Nath Bagchi (supra), where it was held that the power to control included the power of suspension. The expression "control" of the Subordinate Courts in Rule 2 must have the same content as the expresion "control District Courts and Courts Subordinate thereto" in Article 235. I am, therefore, of the view that Rule 2 empowered the Standing Committee to suspend the petitioner. Rule 3 being enumeration of only some of its functions, and Rule 3(vii) did not denude the Standing Committee of the power to suspend the petitioner. 33. Learned Counsel for the petitioner feebly submitted that the High Court, meaning all the Judges, could not delegate its functions to Standing Committee. He, however, ultimately conceded, and in my view rightly, that if all the Judges of the High Court had empowered the Standing Committee to take final decision in regard to disciplinary matters, the decision of the Standing Committee would be the decision of the High Court. A High Court works through Benches in judicial matters and through Committees in Administrative matters. If this were not to be accepted as the mode of functioning by the High Court, it would be difficult for the High Court to function. If this were not so, all criminal revision applications, bail applications, civil revision applications etc. would have to be heard by all the Judges sitting together. It is, therefore, obvious that the Full Court could authorise the Standing Committee to take such decisions as may be necessary to control and direct the Subordinate Courts. I shall leave the matter at that. 34. would have to be heard by all the Judges sitting together. It is, therefore, obvious that the Full Court could authorise the Standing Committee to take such decisions as may be necessary to control and direct the Subordinate Courts. I shall leave the matter at that. 34. A question may well arise, if Rule 2 itself empowered the Standing Committee to all such actions for the control and direction of Subordinate Courts, what was the point in providing in Rule 3(vii) that the Standing Committee shall have power to make recommendations regarding suspension of Subordinate Judges and Munsifs. Forgetting the question of degradation of officers at the moment, the short answer to the problem is that the provision for making recommendations for suspension of judicial officers is an euphemism of the past. Recommendations to whom? Does it mean recommendations to the High Court or recommendations to the State Government. In my view, Rule 3(vii) provided for recommendations regarding suspension to the State Government and not to the Court. This must be so, if we consider the preconstitution position. When the High Court was set up in 1916 under the Letters Patent, Rule 3(ii) of the High Court Rules read as follows: 3. The Standing Committee shall have power without reference to the Judges generally. ... ... ... ... (ii) to make recommendations for the appointment of Subordinate Judges, and for the promotion, degradation, or suspension of Subordinate Judges and Munsifs; This has continued. At that time all matters mentioned in the above rule, were taken to be the fort of the Governor, The requirement of making recommendations, therefore, necessarily thereto referred to recommendation to Government. Although the rule as it then existed has been split up into different sub-rules, but the euphemism of the past in regard to suspension has continued. The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that Rule 3(vii) referred to making recommendations to State Government. It did not refer to making a recommendation to the Full Court. So far as the High Court was concerned, the deliberation of the Standing Committee was final in the matter of suspension. Prior to the Constitution, although the concept of independence of the Judiciary from the Executive was well enshrined, it did not have statutory recognition. It found statutory recognition in Article 235 when the Constitution came into being. So far as the High Court was concerned, the deliberation of the Standing Committee was final in the matter of suspension. Prior to the Constitution, although the concept of independence of the Judiciary from the Executive was well enshrined, it did not have statutory recognition. It found statutory recognition in Article 235 when the Constitution came into being. Prior to that the power to suspend was taken to be implicit in the power to appoint and dismiss. This was view until the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court, 447 (Supra) laid down that Article 235 made High Court the sole custodian of control over the Judiciary. It was also laid down that word "control" not only means power of transfer and posting and to manage day to day affair, but also the power to take disciplinary action. In short, the firmly established law now is that the State Government (which must be equated with the Governor) has only the power to appoint or dismiss, remove etc. in terms of Article 311 of the Constitution and no more. After the appointment has been made by the State Government, the High Court steps in and the entire administration of Subordinate Judiciary is taken over by it. Thus provisions for the Standing Committee making a recommendation to the State Government for suspension of a judicial officer now has become meaningless. In fact, I would go to the extent of stating that it is ultra vires Article 235 of the Constitution. There is no question of making recommendation to the State Government. Rule 3(vii), therefore, in my view, related to making recommendations to the State Government. In relation to the High Court, Rule 2 completely filled the bill. Rule 3(vii) related to making recommendations to the State Government. That is now ultra vires Article 235. Apparently, Rule 3(vii) appears to create an ambiguity in regard to the content of Rule 2, but for the reasons I have discussed above, the power of the Standing Committee to suspend an officer contained in Rule 2 is not whittled down by the provisions of Rule 3(vii). The High Court, however, would be well advised to suitably amend Rule 3(vii) by deleting the expression "and suspension" from Rule 3(vii). 35. The High Court, however, would be well advised to suitably amend Rule 3(vii) by deleting the expression "and suspension" from Rule 3(vii). 35. There is yet another view for my view that the provisions for making recommendations in Rule 3(vii) mean recommendations to the State Government and not to the High Court. Rule 3 as it stood prior to the Constitution reads as follows: 3. The Standing Committee shall have power, without reference to the Judges generally-- (i) to dispose of all correspondence within its own department urgent in its nature and not of general importance; (ii) to make recommendations for promotion of subordinate Judges to the rank of Additional District and Sessions Judges and of the Additional District and Sessions Judges to the rank of District and Sessions Judges, and their initial posting on promotion or appointment; (iii) to make recommendations for vesting the District Judges and the Subordinate Judges respectively with the powers of Sessions Judges as also for vesting them with other special powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure or under any special Act; (iv) to pass orders granting or refusing leave to District and Sessions Judges and Additional District and Sessions Judges and to pass orders of transfer of District and Sessions Judges, and Additional District and Sessions Judges; (v) to make recommendations for the deputation of officers of Bihar Judicial Service or Superior Judicial Service to posts under the Government of India, Government of Bihar or other State Government or to foreign service; (vi) to issue orders regarding the promotion of Munsifs; (vii) to make recommendations regarding the degradation of Subordinate Judges and Munsifs; (viii) to issue circulars and orders and General letters to the Subordinate Courts; (ix) to dispose of any matter which might have been dealt with by the Judge in charge of the English Department, but which he has referred to the Committee for their opinion: From the above it would be seen that the requirement of recommendations by the Standing Committee is to be found in Rules 3(ii), 3(v) and 3(vii) providing for the Standing Committee making recommendations. The recommendations necessarily had to be made to the State Government. The recommendations necessarily had to be made to the State Government. This was so for the reason that in regard to promotion of Subordinate Judges to rank of Addition-la District Judges and of promotion of Additional District Judges, the vesting of District Judges, Additional District Judges and Subordinate Judges wish sessions power and other special powers as also for deputations of officers of Bihar Judicial Service to Government of India or to Government of Bihar or to foreign service has to be done by the State Government and not by the High Court. High Court can only make recommendations. Final orders in regard to all matters covered by Rules 3(ii), 3(iii) and 3(iv) have to be passed by the Government. In that setting the expression "to make recommendations" in Rule 3(iii) also, in my view, directed making recommendation regarding suspension of Subordinate Judges Rule 3(vii), therefore, was not a clog on the power of the Standing Committee in relation to the High Court to pass final orders for suspension of judicial officers. The power in that behalf is to be found in Rule 2. Rule 3(vii) does not limit their power. It is only an elaboration of some of the functions and powers governed by Rule 2. In my view, therefore, the suspension of the petitioner by the Standing Committee must be deemed to have been effected by the full High Court. I am, therefore, unable to hold that the order for suspension of the petitioner was illegal and without jurisdiction. 36. I have not considered it necessary to refer to the submission of the Additional Advocate General in this behalf, appearing for the High Court, as I find no substance in it, But only to take note of the submission it need be stated that the submission was that the practice in the High Court is that after the Standing Committee has taken decision every Judge is informed about the disposal of a particular matter by the Standing Committee and it would be open to any Judge to call for a discussion on that subject in terms of Rule 14. If no Judge objects to the decision of the Standing Committee that should be taken as the decision of the Full Court. This is no answer. If no Judge objects to the decision of the Standing Committee that should be taken as the decision of the Full Court. This is no answer. The order for suspension was given effect to immediately after the decision of the Standing Committee without waiting for the comments of individual Judges and at times Judges do not get the relevant flies for 2/3 months. There is, therefore, no substance in the submission urged on behalf of the High Court. 37. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the reasons which apply in regard to invalidity of suspension by the Standing Committee apply a fortiorari to initiation of disciplinary proceeding as well. Since I have not accepted the submission in regard to the power of the Standing Committee to suspend any officer, the want of jurisdiction in initiating disciplinary proceeding must also be rejected for the same reasons. Besides this Rule 3(vii) does not deal with initiation of disciplinary proceeding. Therefore, even the little support which learned Counsel for the petitioner drew from Rule 3(vii) in regard to suspension is not available in respect of limitation of disciplinary proceeding. 38. In my concluded opinion, therefore, the Standing Committee had the power to suspend the petitioner. It had the power to initiate disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. The power is to be found in Rule 2 of Patna High Court Rules. Rule 3(vii) in so far as it speaks of making recommendations for suspension to the State Government is ultra vires Article 235 of the Constitution. 39. The next submission on behalf of the petitioner was that there was no material before the Standing Committee to have suspended the petitioner and that there was complete non-application of mind in that behalf. Reliance was placed on Paragraph 3 of M.S. Raos Circular issued in April, 1960 to all Departments of Government. This Paragraph reads as follows: 3. In cases where a Government servant is being proceeded [against departmental if there are good reasons to believe on the basis of materials available at the time of initiation of the proceedings that he has been guilty of gross misconduct or corruption which, if proved, will lead to dismissal or removal, he should be suspended even if the suspension is likely to continue for a long time. In terms of Raos circular the submission is that there was no good reason to suspend the petitioner. In terms of Raos circular the submission is that there was no good reason to suspend the petitioner. This submission is devoid of any substance and does not merit serious consideration. The materials before the Standing Committee were the adverse entries of 1961-62, the adverse enquiry report of Shri B.R. Jaiswal, the then District Judge, Gaya and the scathing comments of M. M. Prasad, J. in the contempt matter against the petitioner besides adverse reports of two District Judges of Saharsa. It cannot, therefore, be submitted seriously that there was no material before the Standing Committee to suspend the petitioner and it did not apply its mind in suspending the petitioner. The materials appearing against the petitioner were brought to the notice of the State Government and the latter agreed with the High Court that there were some suspicious circumstances against the petitioner and, therefore, it was desirable not only that he should be denied promotion but that a disciplinary departmental proceeding also should be initiated. The High Court, therefore, with all those materials initiated the pending departmental proceeding to suspend the petitioner. The submission of want of materials and of non-application of mind to the matter of suspension of the petitioner is devoid of substance and must be rejected. 40 In that background the reliance placed upon Nandlal Khadidas V/s. Bar Council Gujarat and Ors. -- , is entirely misplaced. The Standing Committee did take into account the materials appearing against the petitioner and it did from the conclusion that the petitioner should be suspended, and the departmental proceeding be limited. The submission that when Government was asking the High Court to state the reasons for supersession and the High Court did not state that the District Judge Shri B.P. Jaiswal had submitted his report against the petitioner, then that report was no material which could form the basis of suspension, lacks content, I do not intend to waste ray time over this submission except to reject it by stating that it is not in controversy that Shri R.P. Jaiswals report was in existence when the petitioner was suspended and departmental proceeding was initiated against him. 41. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the resolution of the Standing Committee to suspend the petitioner does not show that suspension had been ordered on the basis of the report of Shri B.P. Jaiswal. 41. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the resolution of the Standing Committee to suspend the petitioner does not show that suspension had been ordered on the basis of the report of Shri B.P. Jaiswal. It was not necessary to state in the resolution what materials they had taken into account. All materials were placed before the Standing Committee on the basis of those materials the Standing Committee took the decision to suspend the petitioner. I fail to find any infirmity in this decision. 42. The last aspect of the matter is that the petitioner had earlier moved the Supreme Court in Writ Petition No. 4333 of 1978. By that petition under Article 32 of the Constitution the petitioner challenged the conduct of the High Court in not recommending the promotion of the petitioner to the post of Additional District Judge. The attack was based on the footing that the act of the High Court in not recommending him amounted to discrimination contravening Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. After full hearing, the Supreme Court dismissed his application in the following words Thereafter Mr. Ranjit Prasad Sinha petitioner in W.P. 4333/78 was called upon to make his submission. Hearing concluded and the Court dictated an oral order dismissing writ petition with no order as to costs. Signed order is placed on the file and is to be reported. Sd. Court Master. The order of the Supreme Court (Annexure-3) attracts the bar of res Judicata. The matter, having been heard and rejected by the Supreme Court, is not available to be agitated before this Court in the present application. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Supreme Court did not hear the petitioner on the ground that no application lay before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution and that the petitioner should move the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. There is no such observation of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in unmistakable term dismissed the petitioners application. It was not an order for withdrawal or Dismissed as withdrawn" therefore, of the view that the petitioners prayer for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to promise the petitioner is barred by the principles of res judicata. The decision of the Supreme Court, however, has no application to the question of suspension and initiation of the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. The decision of the Supreme Court, however, has no application to the question of suspension and initiation of the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. 43. As stated in para of this judgment, the petitioner has prayer for quashing the departmental discretionary proceeding initiated against the petitioner by order dated 21-2-1980. This prayer was added by an amendment petition. It has, therefore, to be seen whether there is merit in this prayer. The prayer for quashing the disciplinary proceeding was passed firstly on the ground that the Standing Committee had no jurisdiction to initiate the proceeding. I have already discussed this aspect of the matter and rejected this submission on behalf of the petitioner. The second limb of the prayer for quashing the proceeding is that the charges are based on honest grounds; that they do not show any delinquency on the part of the petitioner, I regret, there is no merit in this submission at all. Several definite charges were framed. The petitioner was given opportunity to rebut those charges. The Conducting Officer, Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi has already conducted the inquiry and has reported that several of the charges levelled against the petitioner has been established. Thereafter, the petitioner has been asked to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. That being the position, the submission is entirely untenable. The disciplinary proceeding is almost at its conclusion. The charges having been established, it is not possible for this Court sitting in writ jurisdiction to say that the charges are baseless and that they are based on non est grounds. The prayer for quashing the departmental disciplinary proceeding is based neither on legal infirmity nor on factual infirmity. The proceeding, therefore, cannot be quashed. Thus, this prayer also cannot be granted. 44. For all the reasons, discussed above, I am of the view that there is no merit in this application and that the petitioner is not entitled to the grant of any writ. The petition must, therefore, fail and is dismissed accordingly. In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. R.C.P.Sinha, J. 45 I agree.