ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This petition by a defendant in a civil suit filed by the respondent No. 3 for the ejectment of the petitioner is directed against concurrent decrees passed by the Courts below in favour of the said respondent for the relief of ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and damages. 2. The suit giving rise to this petition was filed by the said respondent for the aforesaid reliefs on the assertion that the plaintiff was the owner and the defendant was the tenant of the accommodation in dispute which was in the shape of a garage in which the defendant was running a Chakki (flour machine). The defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff in the said garage at a monthly rental of Rs. 60/-, the tenancy beginning from 1st of every English calendar month and ending on the last date of the same month. As the garage was constructed and completed in the year 1975 and assessed by the Municipal Board for the first time on 1st of June 1975 the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 were not applicable. The garage was required by the plaintiff for his own personal use. He, therefore, requested the defendant to vacate the same. The defendant, however, did not agree. Whereupon, the plaintiff served a notice terminating her tenancy under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendant did not vacate the premises not paid the arrears of rent demanded through the said notice, hence the suit. 3. The suit was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the accommodation was an old construction which was governed by U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The suit was hence not maintainable. In any case, as the accommodation had been let out for manufacturing purposes, the notice given by the plaintiff under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was invalid and ineffectual in law, not having given to the defendant six months' notice as envisaged by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 4. The trial court decreed the suit on the findings that the garage was constructed in the year 1975 and was hence not governed by U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 4. The trial court decreed the suit on the findings that the garage was constructed in the year 1975 and was hence not governed by U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. that the tenancy being a monthly tenancy, one month's notice was sufficient to determine the tenancy of the defendant and that the plaintiff was entitled to the reliefs claimed in the suit. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decree, the petitioner filed a revision but without any success. In the revision the only point canvassed on behalf of the defendant was that the tenancy being for manufacturing purpose, six months' notice alone could legally determine the lease and the one month's notice given by the plaintiff was hence invalid. The revisional court considered the evidence on the record and held that on the evidence existing on the record the conclusion of the trial court that the contract in the present case was for a monthly tenancy (Sic-Ed). One month's notice was hence sufficient to determine the tenancy of the petitioner. The revision was consequently dismissed. 6. In support of this petition learned counsel confined his arguments mainly to the finding recorded by the courts below on the question whether the plaintiff was required to give six months" notice to determine the tenancy of the petitioner under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Learned counsel, however, also made a very feeble attempt to challenge the correctness of the finding recorded by the trial court as regards the date of construction of the building under tenancy. He, however, did not pursue that point in the rejoinder which he gave in reply to the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents. 7. Coming to the main point urged in support of this petition, the submission of the learned counsel was that the lease in question being admittedly for manufacturing purposes, the courts below ought to have held consistently with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act that the lease was from year to year terminable only by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of tenancy. It was urged that the courts below were unduly swayed by the mode of payment which was monthly. It was urged that the courts below were unduly swayed by the mode of payment which was monthly. It was also urged that the courts below were wrong in presuming that the averments of the plaintiff that the tenancy was a monthly tenancy had not been specifically denied in the written statement. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I find no merit in this petition. In my opinion, the courts below have rightly concluded that the notice in question was a valid notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 9. The revisional court has observed that the plaint assertion that the defendant was a tenant at a monthly rental of Rs. 60/-, the tenancy starting from 1st of every English calendar month and ending on the last date of the same month has not been specifically denied. This conclusion of the revisional court seems right. Paragraph 2 of the plaint runs thus : "That the defendant was tenant of the plaintiff in the said Garage (Chaki) at a monthly rent of Rs. 60/- (Sixty only) and her tenancy started from the 1st day of ever) English calendar month and is ended on the last day of the same month." 10. Paragraph 2 of the plaint was just denied by the defendant. Two things have been stated in paragraph 2 of the plaint. (1) That the defendant was a tenant at a monthly rental of Rs. 60/-. (2) The tenancy started from 1st day of every English calendar month and ended on the last date of the same month. In reply to these two specific averments all that the defendant had to say in paragraph 2 of the written statement was "paragraph 2 is denied." The denial was far from specific. The courts below were hence entitled to stress the absence of any specific denial by the defendant in her written statement of categorical averments of facts on an important issue. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, laid considerable stress on paragraph 10 of the written statement which runs thus; Regarding para 2, this defendant is tenant of the premises, in which she runs a flour mill and according to section 106 of T. P. Act the lease shall be deemed to be a lease from the year to year and not from month to month. That besides defendant is not tenant of garage (Chaki) as depicted in the plaint and the suit is liable to be dismissed with costs." In my opinion, even paragraph 10 of the written statement cannot be regarded as specific denial of a positive averment made by the plaintiff on a material point of fact. Paragraph 10 of the written statement merely states a proposition of law. It does not contain an averment of fact that the lease was in fact from year to year and that the allegation of the plaintiff that the tenancy commenced on the first day of every English calendar month and ended on the last date of that month was wrong. 12. It may, however, be mentioned that the revisional court has not disposed of the controversy merely on the ground that the aforesaid averment of fact contained in the plaint has not been specifically denied. It has also relied on the testimony of the plaintiff himself as well as that of Sri Munna Lal the husband of- the defendant revisionist, both of whom had stated that the defendant ;as tenant of the accommodation in dispute on a monthly rental of Rs. 60/-. 13. On a totality of the evidence on the record including the rent receipt, oral evidence and the pleadings of the parties, the revisional court held that the conclusion of the trial court that the tenancy was a monthly tenancy cannot be said to be contrary to law, justifying interference under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The revisional court rightly appreciated the legal position. It has observed relying on the language of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act that in the absence of a contract to the contrary where the lease is for manufacturing purpose six months' notice is required under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The revisional court, however, observed that in the present case, there was a clear indication that there was a contract to the contrary namely that though the lease was for a manufacturing purpose the tenancy began on the first day of every English calendar month and ended on the last day of the same month. 14. The revisional court also referred to and relied on a decision in the case of Binda Din v. Smt. Pran Dei reported in 1968 All LJ 721. 14. The revisional court also referred to and relied on a decision in the case of Binda Din v. Smt. Pran Dei reported in 1968 All LJ 721. I have examined this case and find that the same fully supports the view taken by the courts below. In this case, it has been held that though a tenancy may be for manufacturing purposes, the parties may agree that the tenancy would be from month to month irrespective of the purpose of tenancy. It was further held that where there was an admission by the tenant that in regard to a manufacturing lease monthly rent was payable, it would be a stronger case for holding that the tenancy was of monthly duration. The learned Judge referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Kumar v. Jagdish Chandra reported in AIR 1952 SC 23 and held that section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act embodied a rule of construction for finding out the duration of the lease and he observed that if there was no other evidence and circumstance, the lease would be deemed to be from year to year terminable at six months' notice where it is for manufacturing purpose. However, the learned Judge observed that if there was an indication that the tenancy was from month to month, the lease would be liable to be terminated on a month's notice even if it was for manufacturing purposes. 15. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid case. Learned Counsel however placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Kumar (supra) and contended that the decision of this court in the case of Binda Din reported in 1968 All LJ 721 requires reconsideration. He submitted that according to that decision, it is the purpose of the lease and not the mode of payment of rent which is decisive of the issues. 16. I cannot agree. The Supreme Court has not ruled that where the lease is for manufacturing purpose, there cannot be an enquiry whether there is any indication that the parties had agreed that the lease would be from month to month. Nor has the Supreme Court said that the mode of payment cannot afford any indication as to the duration of the lease agreed to between the parties. Nor has the Supreme Court said that the mode of payment cannot afford any indication as to the duration of the lease agreed to between the parties. The Supreme Court in this connection observed thus at page 27 (column 1) : "It has no doubt been recognised in several cases that the mode in which a rent is expressed to be payable affords a presumption that the tenancy is of a character corresponding thereto. Consequently, when the rent reserved is an annual rent, the presumption would arise that the tenancy was an annual tenancy unless there is something to rebut the presumption." 17. The decision of this Court in the case of Binda Din 1968 All LJ 721 is in my opinion in accord with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the mode of payment cannot be a ground for holding that the tenancy was a month to month tenancy. The submission has no force. In Ram Kumar's case ( AIR 1952 SC 23 ) (supra) the Suprem Court has made observations (quoted above) which do lend support to the view that mode of payment, even if not conclusive of the controversy, can be considered for ascertaining whether notwithstanding the purpose of the lease there is no indication that there was a contract to contrary within the meaning of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In any case, in the present case, it is the cumulative effect of various facts and circumstances on the basis of which the courts below have held against the petitioner. The mode of payment was not the sole ground for holding against the petitioner. In my view, even if the mode of payment may not per se be decisive of the issue, it cannot, in my view, be said that the mode of payment is an altogether irrelevant circumstance. Far from being irrelevant, the mode of payment is, in my view, an important and relevant circumstance for ascertaining whether there is any contract to the contrary as to the duration of the lease. 19. Relying on various decisions (AIR 1969 Assam 134, AIR 1977 SC 1158 and AIR 1976 SC 461 (470)), learned counsel contended that the pleadings ought to be read as a whole. I am unable to accept the contention. 19. Relying on various decisions (AIR 1969 Assam 134, AIR 1977 SC 1158 and AIR 1976 SC 461 (470)), learned counsel contended that the pleadings ought to be read as a whole. I am unable to accept the contention. However, liberally the pleadings of the defendant in the present case may be construed, it cannot be denied that a material proposition of fact which was vital to the suit was not denied specifically. I have already made my comments in this behalf and hence it is unnecessary to dilate on this point. Each case, in my opinion will have to be examined on its own pleadings. Be that as it may the conclusion of the courts below cannot be said to be wrong justifying interference by this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 20. The second submission which was faintly urged by the learned counsel was that the revisional court is not right in saying the no other point was urged. It was submitted that the petitioner had challenged the finding of the trial court also on the issue of when the building was constructed. The submission is wrong. There is a categorical statement of fact contained in paragraph 4 of the judgment under challenge in which the revisional court has clearly stated that only one point was pressed in the revision. The same statement is repeated in paragraph 7 of the judgment. The allegation made in paragraph 11 of the writ petition that all the points were urged have been denied in paragraph 10 of the counter- ' affidavit. Under the circumstances I am not satisfied that any other point was urged in the revision on behalf of the petitioner. 21. Further having gone through the finding of the trial court find that its conclusion that the building was constructed in the year 1975 and it was assessed for the first time in the same year to house tax is perfectly sound. On the evidence on the record no other conclusion was possible. It is perhaps because of this that the finding was not challenged in the revision. if 22. No other point was urged in support of this petition. 23. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. On the evidence on the record no other conclusion was possible. It is perhaps because of this that the finding was not challenged in the revision. if 22. No other point was urged in support of this petition. 23. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The execution of the decree for the ejectment of the petitioner is, however, stayed until the 31st of December, 1982 provided that the petitioner shall hand over vacant possession of the accommodation in dispute to the plaintiff-respondent within this time and shall further deposit in the trial court or pay to the plaintiff-respondent within a period of two months from today the entire decretal amount due up to date, failing which the decree shall become executable forthwith. If the petitioner has made any deposit towards these amounts, the same may be adjusted.