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1982 DIGILAW 986 (ALL)

Sultan Singh v. Ratan Singh

1982-08-30

DEOKI NANDAN

body1982
JUDGMENT :- This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for partition of a plot at Orai. The parties are all of them brothers being the sons of Net Singh. Ratan Singh, the first defendant respondent is the eldest of them. Sultan Singh, the plaintiff-appellant is the second; Tej Singh, the second defendant, is the third, and Paras Ram, the third defendant, is the fourth. I may; incidentally mention that Tej Singh, the third respondent, in the second appeal in this Court, has wrongly been described as a plaintiff-respondent. He is, in fact, the defendant-respondent. 2. The pedigree given in the plaint shows that the father of the parties, namely, Net Singh, had two other brothers, Balram and Dal Chand. Balram had five sons of whom Panna Lal was one. Dal Chand had a son, Ram Charan. The plot, of which the land in suit forms a one-third part, was purchased jointly by Panna Lal, Ram Charan and Ratan Singh under a sale deed, dated the 30th Jan, 1956, which is Ext.A 2 on the record. According to the plaintiff, there was a partition of the plot, into three equal portions between Panna Lal, Ram Charan and Ratan Singh in the beginning of the year 1972, at which the western portion measuring 90 x 35 was allotted to Ram Charan, and, out of the remaining two-thirds portion, the southern portion measuring 70 x 45 was allotted to Panna Lal while the northern portion measuring 70 x 45 was allotted to the plaintiff and the defendants, meaning thereby that it was allotted to Ratan Singh as a representative of Net Singhs branch of the family. It is then alleged that when the land was purchased in 1956, the parties were members of a joint family, and the land was purchased by Ratan Singh from joint family funds as its Karta. The three defendants filed a joint written statement. They denied the plaintiffs case and asserted that he had no share in the land in suit, and was not in possession of any part or portion thereof; that even if he had any right, it was lost by adverse possession for more than twelve years, and that the land was purchased by the first defendant, Ratan Singh, from his own self acquired funds and he alone was the owner. It was then alleged that the plaintiff had separated from the defendants more than twenty years ago and only the cultivation remained joint. The allegation that the defendant No. 1 was the Karta of the family and that the land was acquired by him from joint family funds as the Karta, was specifically denied as incorrect. This is followed by the allegation that in the year 1970, there was a family settlement between the parties, and a memorandum of the shares allotted to the parties was prepared on the 5th Jan, 1970, which showed the agricultural land and other properties moveable and immoveable allotted to the parties respectively and it was settled that so far as the land in suit was concerned, the defendant No. 1 alone shall remain its owner, and that the parties were in possession of their respective share accordingly. 3. The first issue raised by the Trial Court was whether the plaintiff is entitled to one fourth share, and the second whether the defendants are sole owners of the disputed property. It was not the defendants case that the three of them were the owners of the property in suit to the exclusion of the plaintiff. Their case was that the first defendant alone was the sole owner of the property in suit, and apart from the fact of the purchase of the property in his name along with Ram Charan and Panna Lal, they relied on the memorandum of the property allotted in the Kura of the first defendant, Ratan Singh, which is dated the 5th Jan, 1970, and is signed by the four parties to the suit as also by four Panchas, with whose mediation, the division was arrived at between the parties. This document was filed on the 9th Dec, 1974 and has been marked Ext. A. 1, and is supposed to have been exhibited on the 17th Nov, 1975, but does not bear the signatures of the learned Munsif at the foot of the endorsement marking it an Exhibit. On the said issues Nos. This document was filed on the 9th Dec, 1974 and has been marked Ext. A. 1, and is supposed to have been exhibited on the 17th Nov, 1975, but does not bear the signatures of the learned Munsif at the foot of the endorsement marking it an Exhibit. On the said issues Nos. 1 and 2, which the learned Munsif took up for consideration together, he held that in view of paragraph 11 of the written statement of the defendants, wherein the movable and immovable properties of the joint family were said to have been partitioned in the year 1970, the family must have continued to be joint till then and the land must be presumed to have been purchased from joint family funds in the name of the Karta, and was, therefore, joint family property, in which the plaintiff had a one-fourth share. The issue No. 3 was whether the suit is barred by estoppel and acquiescene. The learned Munsif considered the question of admissibility of the memorandum, dated the 5th Jan, 1970, which has been referred to by him as Paper No. 12 Ka-1 and not as Ext. A. 1, and held that since it purported to create a right in immovable property of the value of more than Rs. 100/- and was unregistered, it was inadmissible in evidence, and consequently, in the absence of any evidence, it cannot be held that the suit is barred by estoppel and acquiescence. Issue No. 4 raised the question of limitation. According to the trial Court, the family having been joint till 1970, and the suit having been filed in 1974 within less than twelve years, it was not barred by "Arts.64 and 65 of Indian Limitation Act." In the result, the learned Munsif held on issue No. 5 that the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed and decreed the suit "for partition and possession" with costs and directed that a preliminary decree be prepared accordingly. 4. On appeal by the first defendant, Ratan Singh, the said judgment and decree of the Trial Court were set aside, but the learned Civil Judge, who decided the appeal, also ruled the Paper No. 12 Ka-1 out as inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. The appeal was allowed by him on the finding that the land was not joint family property. The appeal was allowed by him on the finding that the land was not joint family property. According to the learned Civil Judge, "the mere existence of a joint family cannot raise the presumption that the acquisitions made by the family were joint family properties" and that "to prove that a particular acquisition is a joint family property one must further prove that the joint family possessed a nucleus which was sufficient to provide funds for the new acquisition". Further, he held that the burden was on the person who alleged that the land in suit is joint family property to prove that it is so. The penultimate finding and the reasons therefor as given by the learned Civil Judge, are in these words : "The sale deed Ext.A. 2 stands in the name of three persons. If it was a joint family venture it must have stood in the name of one person namely the then Karta of the family. Besides that there is not an iota of evidence that the joint family possessed any nucleus whatsoever. Under this circumstance the learned Trial Court misread the ruling cited before him although the citation of the ruling has not been given in the judgment of the learned Trial Court. I, therefore, find that the plot in suit was not a joint family property." 5. Learned Counsel for the appellant was rather critical of the way in which the case has been dealt with by the lower Appellate Court. He contended that the land in suit was joint family property and the Paper No. 12 Ka-1, on which the defendants relied on, having been ruled out of evidence as inadmissible, the plaintiffs suit for partition of the land deserved to be decreed. 6. The learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that both the Courts below were in error in ruling the Paper No. 12 Ka-1 out of evidence as inadmissible. He contended that the document was not an instrument of partition. It was just memorandum of the property, which had been allotted to the first defendant at a partition which had been orally arrived at and agreed to by the parties through the mediation of the four panches. He contended that the document was not an instrument of partition. It was just memorandum of the property, which had been allotted to the first defendant at a partition which had been orally arrived at and agreed to by the parties through the mediation of the four panches. It was admissible as an admission of the fact that the land in suit had been allotted to the first defendant at a partition arrived at between the parties by way of a family settlement to resolve their disputes. 7. That the land in suit could easily be presumed to be joint family property should be clear from the fact that the three persons in whose names the plot, of which the land in suit forms the one-third part, had been purchased, represented the three branches of the three brothers Net Singh, Dal Chand and Balram. Net Singhs branch being represented by Ratan Singh, the first defendant, Dal Chands branch being represented by Ram Charan and Balrams branch being represented by Panna Lal. It appears that the land was purchased by the joint family which consisted at that time of the three branches of Net Singh, Dal Chand and Balram. According to the plaintiffs case, there was a partition between the three branches of three brothers sometime in the beginning of 1972. In the written statement, although the time, when the partition is said to have taken place, is denied the fact of partition of the plot into three portions and the allotment of one portion out of the three to Ratan Singh, defendant No. 1 alone is admitted. The question was, whether the one-third portion of the land so received by Ratan Singh by partition between him and his uncles sons was coparcenary property qua his brothers. The property received at a partition is ancestral in the hands of a father qua his sons. In this case, it is the younger brothers of Ratan Singh and not his sons but if the property was held by Ratan Singh, Ram Charan and Panna Lal as coparcenary property, the one-third share allotted to him at the partition between him and Ram Charan and Panna Lal, would be coparcenary property qua his undivided brothers, for at such a partition Ratan Singh would be deemed to have represented the branch of the sons of Net Singh, his father, as the Karta. 8. 8. The question, whether the acquisition of the property by Ratan Singh was made out of his self acquired funds or out of the funds of the joint family, does not really arise on the facts of this case, but even if it did, the fact that the property was acquired in the names of Ratan Singh, Ram Charan and Panna Lal in a state of jointness, leads to the presumption that it was coparcenary property unless the three of them proved that it was acquired by them from their own separate funds as co-sharers, and not as coparceners. At any rate, the burden lay on Ratan Singh to prove that he acquired the property from his own separate funds, and that a defined one-third share was acquired by him in the plot of land as his own separate property. The lower Appellate Court perverted the entire burden of proof and its finding is, on the face of it, incorrect and vitiated in law. 9. The next question raised by the learned Counsel for the defendants-respondents about the admissibility of the Paper No. 12 Ka-1 (Ext.Ka-1) must now be considered. It is a very informal kind of a document drawn up by way of a memorandum of property allotted at a partition which had been arrived at between the parties orally by way of a family settlement by the mediation of four Panchas and the document records the assent of the parties thereto. It does not purport to be, and is not an instrument of partition. It is a memorandum which described the property in Kura No.1 which was allotted to Ratan Singh, the first defendant. Some of the things are said to have remained joint between all the four parties. Some of them are said to have remained joint between three parties. It is a record of property allotted to one at a family settlement. Having locked at the document and having read the terms in which it is couched, I have no manner of doubt that it is not an instrument of partition nor is it an award, and it did not require registration. It is indisputable that partition can be effected orally. Having locked at the document and having read the terms in which it is couched, I have no manner of doubt that it is not an instrument of partition nor is it an award, and it did not require registration. It is indisputable that partition can be effected orally. It is merely a record by way of a memorandum of the property included in Kura No. 1 which was allotted to Ratan Singh, the first defendant at an oral partition which had been arrived at between the parties by the mediation of the four Panchas and assented to by all the parties. The statement contained as a part of the first item to the effect that the entire Orai Plot was in Ratan Singhs Kura No. 1 is admissible as an admission of the plaintiff, Sultan Singh, whose signatures appeared under the document. In face of the said admission, the denial by Sultan Singh, the plaintiff, of the allotment of the one-third share in the plot of land at Orai in the Kura No. 1 to Ratan Singh, the first defendant at the partition, which took place between the brothers before the execution of that document on the 5th Jan. l970, is clearly proved to be false. I am supported in my view that the said document (Ext.A-1) is admissible in evidence by the declaration of the law by the Supreme Court in Kashinathsa v. Narsingasa, AIR 1961 SC 1077 . The Supreme Court observed in that case that the true effect of what are called awards is not by their own force to create any interest in immoveable property; they recorded divisions already made and on the facts proved in this case, their validity depends upon the acceptance by the parties. The records made by the Panchas were documents which merely acknowledged partitions already made and were not by law required to be registered." 10. It has to be emphasised that there were other properties too, strangely the plaintiffs suit is only for partition of the one-third share in the plot of land at Orai. The other brothers admitted that it belonged to the first defendant. If the plaintiff had a share, the other brothers would also have a share, but they expressly declared in the written statement that the land was allotted exclusively in the Kura of the first defendant. 11. The other brothers admitted that it belonged to the first defendant. If the plaintiff had a share, the other brothers would also have a share, but they expressly declared in the written statement that the land was allotted exclusively in the Kura of the first defendant. 11. I may here notice an argument raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant by way of rejoinder. Reading the language of Item No. 1 under the heading Kura No. 1, Ratan Singh, as described in Ext.A-1, the learned Counsel contended that the plot at Orai was not allotted to the share of Ratan Singh alone, but was expressly kept joint property of all the four brothers. I have not the slightest doubt that if that were so, the plaintiff would have jumped When Ext.A-1 was filed by the defendants and would have relied on it as the first thing in his case. It is only the frontage of the tank which was left as the joint property of the four brothers. The land of the plot at Orai was allotted exclusively to the first defendant, Ratan Singh. 12. In the result, this appeal must fail though for reasons entirely opposite of those given by the lower Appellate Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed and the dismissal of the suit for partition is maintained; but, in the circumstances, I would direct the parties to bear their own costs in this Court, and Since, while allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit, the lower Appellate Court has not passed any order as to costs, the result is that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.