JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This First Appeal is directed against an order of the Court of the First Additional District Judge, Bijnor, rejecting an application made by the appellant for a direction to the respondent, who was the guardian of his person and property, to submit an account of the appellant's property and its income, and to deposit the same in Court as also to deliver all the properties to the appellant who had attained majority. The application pruports to have been made under Section 41(3) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, in Case No. 20 of 1963 of the court of the District Judge, Bijnor. It bears the date 1st September, 1975 but it appears to have been filed on the 3rd September, 1975. Case No. 20 of 1963 of the Court of the District Judge, Bijnor was the number at which the respondent's application for his appointment as the guardian of the person and property of the appellant was registered. The respondent was appointed guardian of the person and property of the appellant by order dated the 25th May, 1963 of the Court of the District Judge, Bijnor. The order contained the direction that he shall manage the minor's property as a prudent man and shall not transfer any portion of it without express permission of the court and shall submit an account of the income and expenditure of the minor's property on the 1st November each year. The application giving rise to the present appeal stated that the respondent was appointed guardian of the appellant's property, of which details were annexed to the application for his appointment as the guardian that the respondent was appointed guardian by order dated the 30th May, 1963 and was managing the property, that he was required to submit account and deposit the income, but he failed to submit any account of income or profits, and that the income from the property was not less than Rs. 2000/- per year. It was alleged that the property remained in the respondent's possession since 1963, and he must submit his account. 2000/- per year. It was alleged that the property remained in the respondent's possession since 1963, and he must submit his account. In the order under appeal, the learned Additional District Judge held that the remedy of the appellant lay by way of a regular suit and not by way of the application made by him, inasmuch as the respondent had claimed that there was no balance of any income of the appellant's property with him. The learned Additional District Judge held that under Section 34 of the Guardians and Wards Ad, 1890, he could pass orders only in respect of accounts admitted by the guardian to be due from him or those that were due from him on accounts submitted by him. 2. At the outset, there was a preliminary objection to the competence of the appeal, inasmuch as Section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act does not provide for an appeal from an order passed under Section 34 or under Section 41. I may, in this context, observe that the learned counsel for the appellant stated categorically that the appellant had invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court under Section 41(3) of the Guardians and Wards Act, after the cessation of the guardianship when the appellant attained majority. Learned counsel could not, therefore, dispute the position that an appeal from an order passed on an application made under Section 41(3) of the Guardians and Wards Act was not competent. He accordingly requested the court to hear the appeal as a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since there was no objection to the Court's doing so and since it appears to me that the impugned order of the court of the Additional District Judge did not call for any interference, I proceeded to fully hear the matter on the merits also, rather than to first allow the appellant to formally convert the appeal into a revision and then to hear the matter finally. 3. After the order, dated the 25th May, 1963, appointing the respondent as the appellant's guardian, a statement of account appears to have been filed on the 23rd November, 1963 which was ordered to be placed on the file by the court's order dated the 12th March, 1964 after seeing the office report. 3. After the order, dated the 25th May, 1963, appointing the respondent as the appellant's guardian, a statement of account appears to have been filed on the 23rd November, 1963 which was ordered to be placed on the file by the court's order dated the 12th March, 1964 after seeing the office report. The first proceeding taken thereafter was the application made by the appellant on the 3rd September, 1975, under Section 41(31). The application was made more than three years after the appellant attained the age of twenty one years which is the age of majority in case of minors whose guardians are appointed by the court. The first reply to the appellant's application, that was given by the respondent, is dated the 7th February, 1976, in which it was stated that the house property and the open piece of land did not yield any income and possession over agricultural land had already been delivered by the minor appellant's mother under a contract to Nayaz Uddin and others even before the respondent was appointed guardian, and the appellant had recently sold it away ; that the respondent did not earn any income from the agricultural land, and, on the other hand, out of love and affection for the appellant, he had constructed nine shops on the appellant's land, on which rupees thirty to forty thousand had been spent after selling property : that out of these nine shops, two were constructed about five years ago another two were constructed about three years ago and the remaining five were constructed about one and a half years or two years ago and the rent notes of the same had been executed in the appellant's favour who was recovering the rent of the shops himself; and that the respondent had not received any income of the appellants property and, therefore, he had not kept any account and he may be excused from furnishing the same. On the orders of the court, statements of account were furnished by the respondent showing that the excess of the expenditure over the income from the years 1964 to 1971 amounted Rs. 6709/- besides the minor's maintenance, the expenditure included Rs. 7000/- on construction of shops which the respondent had found by selling his own land. Objection were filed on behalf the appellant in writing dated the 29th May, 1976, to the account submitted by the respondent. 6709/- besides the minor's maintenance, the expenditure included Rs. 7000/- on construction of shops which the respondent had found by selling his own land. Objection were filed on behalf the appellant in writing dated the 29th May, 1976, to the account submitted by the respondent. An application, dated the 7th August, 1976, was thereafter made by the appellant for a direction to the respondent to furnish a detailed and true account of the income from the groves and the land which were said, to have been omitted by the respondent from the account. It was in this back-ground that the learned District Judge held that the proper course for the appellant was to file a regular suit. 4. Mr. R.H. Zaidi, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Additional District Judge had illegally refused to exercise the jurisdiction enquiring into the correctness of the accounts submitted by the respondent and in refusing to call upon the respondent to pay the amounts found due on such accounting and also to account for of the property of the appellant which came into the respondent's hands as his guardian. In support, the learned counsel cited the decision of the Rangoon High Court in Abdul Hamid Sarkar v. Abdul Jabbar AIR 1940 Range. 246. 5. Mr. Iqbal Ahmad on the other hand relied upon several decisions referred to in the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, namely, Abdul Rehman v. Smt. Husn Jahan, AIR 1937 Oudh 463, Ram Lal Sahu v. Tan Singh Lal Singh AIR.1952 Nag. 135, Misra Rang Nath v. Misra Murari Lal, AIR 1936 Allahabad 179, and Jogappar v. Harunakka, AIR 1952 Mad. 498 , and urged that the jurisdiction of the district court under Section 41(3) was a limited one and was of a summary nature. It did not contemplate a determination of disputed questions of fact about the things or the property which came into the possession of a guardian and remained with him on the cessation of the guardianship. It applies only to that property or money or things which the court finds either on admission or on summary inquiry to be in possession or control of the east while guardian, on the cessation of the guardianship, either on the basis of the accounts furnished by the guardian or an admission of the guardian. Mr. It applies only to that property or money or things which the court finds either on admission or on summary inquiry to be in possession or control of the east while guardian, on the cessation of the guardianship, either on the basis of the accounts furnished by the guardian or an admission of the guardian. Mr. Iqbal Ahmad also referred to the fact that the application was made more than 3 years after the cessation of the guardianship, that is to say after the expiry of the limitation for a suit for compelling a guardian to account for a minor's property or to restore it to the minor in case he was found to be in possession. He relied on Kisandas Laxmandas Gujar and others v. Godavaribai Govindadas Gujar and others, AIR 1937 Bombay 334, in this connection in which it was held that a minors suit against the guardian for account filed more than three years after attaining majority is barred by limitation notwithstanding Section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1980. 6. I shall first deal with the question of delay, as it appeared to me prima facie that the application might be regarded to be time barred under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 which is the last Article of that Schedule and appears under the heading of a separate part II, of its "third division application" Mr. R.H. Zaidi for the appellant, however met the point by referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Town Municipal Council Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court Hubli and others, AIR 1969 S.C. 1335 , paras 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 at pages 1341 to 1344 of the report, which was followed by the Supreme Court in State Bank of Hyderabad v. Vasudev Anant Bhide and others, AIR 1970 S.C. 196 , para 17 at page 202. In the cases of Athani Municipality and the State Bank of Hyderabad, the question before the Supreme Court was whether Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 governed an application under Section 33 *C of the Industrial Disputes Act, and in both these cases, for the reasons given in the former case of Athani Municipality, the Supreme Court held that an application before the labour Court under Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act is not governed by the limitation prescribed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1973. Two reasons were given by the Supreme court. First that it had been held by the long catena of cases under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 that the residuary article 181 applied only to applications made under the Code of Civil Procedure and the same limitation was to be read into Article 137 of the Scheduled to the limitation Act, 1963 also, and secondly that the Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceedings before a Labour court or an Industrial Tribunal, The second one of these reasons appears to be the main reason why the Supreme court held that. Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1973, did not apply to an application under Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act. Nevertheless, the Supreme court has observed, and the observation cannot be said to be merely obiter, that notwithstanding the reference to the applications under the Cods of Criminal Procedure and the alterations made in the scheme of Articles contained in the Third Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, "cannot be held to have materially altered the scope of the residuary Article 137 which deals with other applications and that it is not possible to hold that the intention of the legislature was to drastically alter the scope of this article so as to include within it all applications, irrespective of the fact whether they had any reference to the Code of Civil Procedure." Being bound by this declaration of the law by the Supreme Court it is not possible for me to reject as time barred the application that was made in the present case in the district court more than three years after the appellant had attained majority. The Case of Kisandas v. Godavaribai, ( supra ) cited by Mr. The Case of Kisandas v. Godavaribai, ( supra ) cited by Mr. Iqbal Ahmad shows that the remedy by way of suit to which the appellant has been referred by the order under appeal, was barred by time even when the application was made in the district court on 3rd September, 1975. This highlights the importance of the question whether the district court had jurisdiction, under Section 41(3) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, to order an enquiry into the correctness of the accounts filed by the respondent in this case and if it were found on the result of such enquiry that any moneys or property had remained with the respondent when the appellant attained majority, to direct the respondent to restore all such property and money to the appellant. 7. The Rangoon High Court's decision in Abdul Hamid Sircar v. Abdul Jabbar, AIR 1940 Rangoon 246, supports the contention of Mr. Zaidi. One distinction between that case and the present one is in the fact that the application in the Rangoon case was made well within three years of the attainment of majority by the minor. The other distinction is that in the Rangoon case, the District Court had said that the minor must file a suit within three weeks, failing which the guardian would be discharged. However, before the matter was decided by the Rangoon High Court, the suit has already been filed. The Rangoon High Court observed : "The position at the earliest of these dates was that the applicant, who had attained majority desired accounts to be rendered, and when he obtained what purported to be accounts he asked the Court to hold an inquiry respecting them as he was not satisfied with what he was given, and the learned District Judge, most unfortunately told him first of all that it was not a case in which it was necessary or desirable to hold inquiry. From first to last in these proceedings it appears to have been overlooked that it is the duty of the Court to protect the interests of a minor until he gets the property which has been placed under the care of his guardian. From first to last in these proceedings it appears to have been overlooked that it is the duty of the Court to protect the interests of a minor until he gets the property which has been placed under the care of his guardian. And at this stage of the proceedings he was told, not only that an inquiry was unnecessary, when it was extremely desirable to order one, but that he had a remedy in another direction, namely by filing a suit. They completely overlooked sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 41 Guardians and Wards Act, and also Section 48 which would debar him from any remedy once the order of discharge had been made." 8. With these observations, the Rangoon High Court set aside the impugned orders of the District court ; but in view of the fact that the suit had already been filed, it did not order inquiry by the District Court into the correctness or otherwise of the account and instead ordered that "No matter relating to the remuneration or discharge of the guardian can be considered till judgment has been delivered in the applicant's suit, and that the order granting the guardian his discharge is, of course, expressly revoked, and, therefore for the purposes of the suit he is still the guardian." 9. In Abdul Rahman v. Mt. Husn Jahan, AIR 1937 Oudh.463, one Abdul Rahman was formerly the guardian appointed by the Court of his grand daughter Mt. Husn Jahan. He was removed and Mr. Mirza Mohammad Wasi, Advocate, was appointed her guardian. On the report of Mr. Wasi, the Subordinate Judge found that the sum of Rs. 5605-90 was due from Abdul Rahman to the minor and ordered its payment into Court within fifteen days. The order was not complied with. The Court imposed a fine of Rs. 200/- on Abdul Rahman, presumably under Section 45(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act, which was followed by an order directing that Abdul Rahman be detained in civil Jail until he paid the balance due to the minor. The contention before the Oudh Chief court was that the orders imposing the fine of Rs. 200/- on Abdul Rahman, presumably under Section 45(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act, which was followed by an order directing that Abdul Rahman be detained in civil Jail until he paid the balance due to the minor. The contention before the Oudh Chief court was that the orders imposing the fine of Rs. 200/- and directing Abdul Rahman's detention in Civil prison were illegal, inasmuch as it was not open to the Subordinate Judge to take action under Section 45 of the Guardians and Wards Act, "on the basis of a computation arrived at by the Court as to the amount due from him, as distinguished from an amount admittedly due from him." Relying on Misra Rangnath v. Misra Murari Lal, AIR 1936 Allahabad 179, the Oudh Chief Court held that the balance of authority is in favour of the contention that it was not open to the Subordinate Judge to take the disciplinary action which he did against Abdul Rahman for non-compliance with an order to pay into the Court an amount which was not admittedly due from him, but was arrived at by the Court itself on the basis of a report made by the present guardian, together with the Court's own enquiry into the correctness of that report." This case was distinguishable from the present one in so far as it was not on an application made by a quondam minor. Nevertheless, the nature of the order directing Abdul Rahman, who had been removed from guardianship, to deposit the amount found by the Court to be due by him was such that it could well be deemed to be an order under sub-section (3) of Section 41 of the Guardians and Wards Act. Prima Facie, it did not appear to be an order under clause (d) of Section 34, for that provision defines the powers of the Court in relation to a guardian of the property of a ward, appointed or declared by the Court. It postulates the continuance of guardianship Sub section (3) of Section 43, on the other hand, postulates as the first thing, the cessation of the guardianship whether by death, removal or discharge of the guardian or by the Ward ceasing to be a minor. It postulates the continuance of guardianship Sub section (3) of Section 43, on the other hand, postulates as the first thing, the cessation of the guardianship whether by death, removal or discharge of the guardian or by the Ward ceasing to be a minor. Section 45 deals with penalty for contumacy, under clause (a) of sub-section (I), in case a person having the custody of a min or fails to produce him etc. or under clause (b), if a guardian appointed or declared by the Court fails to comply with an order issued under clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (d) of Section 34, and under clause (e) in case of a person who has ceased to be a guardian, if he fails to deliver any property or account in compliance with a requisition under Section 41(3). The effect of the decision in Abudul Rahman's case ( supra ), therefore, is that in a case where an amount is not admittedly due from the quondam guardian, the Court cannot determine the amount due on the basis of an inquiry under Section 41(3) of the Guardians and Wards Act. The further thing to be noticed is that this result was arrived at by the Oudh Chief Court by following a Division Bench decision of this Court in Misra Rangnath v. Misra Murari Lal, ( supra ). On the law of precedents, I am bound by both the decisions, particularly the Division Bench decision of this Court in Misra Rangnath's case ( supra ). 10. Misra Rangnath was appointed guardian of Misra Murari Lal by the District Court's certificate granted on 1st August, 1923. The minor Misra Murari Lal attained majority on the 7th August, 1930. On 7th February, 1931 that is to say exactly within six months, he applied for a direction to a quondam guardian to render accounts. The District Judge took the view that either the guardian should file an account or the minor may file a suit, by order dated the 14th April, 1931. The guardian filed accounts on, 16th May, 1931 for the period 1927 to 1930. Accounts of previous years had already been tiled. Murari Lal objected to the accounts filed and alleged that a large sum was due to him and that the guardian had not disclosed the income accrued from endowed property of which he, the quondam minor was the trustee. Accounts of previous years had already been tiled. Murari Lal objected to the accounts filed and alleged that a large sum was due to him and that the guardian had not disclosed the income accrued from endowed property of which he, the quondam minor was the trustee. The quondam guardian objected, contending that accounts could not be gone into in a miscellaneous proceeding of that nature, and that in fact, instead of any thing being due to the quondam minor a small amount was due to him. An auditor was thereupon appointed to audit the account. The auditor reported that the accounts were not reliable and it was not possible to arrive at a definite conclusion, and as the quondam minor contemplated the filing of suit no further inquiry is desirable. The District Judge, however, ordered on the 26th February, 1932 that he had jurisdiction to go into the dispute about the accounts and directed that the auditor may be asked whether he was prepared to give a definite report. The auditor submitted a second report. Even there he did not disclose any definite sum as being due from the quondam guardian. A third report was submitted by the auditor in accordance with the direction of the District Judge. Thereafter, the District Court ordered that the guardian should pay what was found to be due by the office, on calculations made, on the basis of the auditor's report, the sum so found due was ordered to be paid by the quondam guardian to the quondam minor. This led to a revision in the High Court, and the reported case is the decision of the High Court in that revision. The quondam guardian's contention before the High Court was that, or an application filed by the minor, who has attained majority, which must be deemed to be an application under Section 41(3) of the Guardians and Wards Act, the only direction, which the District Judge can give, is to order the guardian to deliver any property in his possession or control relating to any past or present property of the ward, and that the property or accounts, which can be so delivered, are those which are admitted by the guardian to be with him. The contention raised on behalf of the quondam minor was that on the accounts furnished by the guardian the Court ought to institute a detailed inquiry and give proper directions to the guardian on the basis of such an inquiry. 11. On a consideration of the authorities on the point, the Division Bench held in favour of the quondam guardian, and allowing his application for revision, directed the District Court that if any property or accounts belonging to the ward was admittedly in the possession of the guardian, he should be ordered to deliver the same to the quondam minor, but if the guardian applies for his discharge, the Court should refuse to give such a discharge, as it is obvious that the minor objects to and the Court is not satisfied with the accounts submitted by the guardian, unless a suit by the minor for rendition of accounts is barred by time, now. The quondam minor was referred to a suit, and the question of discharge was left to abide the result thereof. 12. In view of the authority of the above Division Bench decision of this Court, it is unnecessary to refer to or to go into the other cases. It must be held that the District Court had no jurisdiction in these proceedings to go into the disputed questions raised by the quondam minor about the correctness of the accounts furnished by the quondam guardian. The matter required detailed determination by suit. 13. The next question which consequentially arises in the light of the last observation contained in Misra Rangath's cases ( supra ) is whether the quondam guardian should be given a discharge under sub-section (4) of Section 41. Such a discharge will have the effect of barring a suit. Although Mr. Iqbal Ahmad for the quondam guardian, who is the respondent in this case, had relied upon the Bombay High Court's decision in Kisandas v. Godavaribai, AIR 1937 Bombay 334, to show that the suit would be barred notwithstanding Section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, I do not think it proper to prejudge the issue in these summary proceedings. It would be for the appellant to decide whether or not to file a suit against his quondam guardian. If he does file the suit, the question whether it is within limitation or not will be decided in the suit. It would be for the appellant to decide whether or not to file a suit against his quondam guardian. If he does file the suit, the question whether it is within limitation or not will be decided in the suit. It cannot be appropriately decided in advance in these proceedings. Further, the question whether the respondent should be given a discharge under sub section (4) of Section 41, could arise only on an application made by him in that behalf of the District Court. 14. In the result, this First Appeal From Order, though heard as a revision, lacks merits and is dismissed as such. However, I make no order as to costs in this Court.