JUDGMENT - SHARAD MANOHAR, J.:---An extremely interesting and somewhat ticklish question has arisen in this petition which is filed by the original decree-holder who has obtained a decree against one of his tenants by compromise and the said decree has been at nought by the Court during the execution proceedings on the ground that the decree was inexecutable on account of various reasons. I will presently allude to those various reasons. 2. The facts of the case are as follows :--- The petitioner in these proceedings is the owner of the suit premises. At this stage atleast, there is no dispute that the suit premises were let out by him jointly to two persons---one Vastimal and other Kapoorchand. It needs be emphasised that it was a joint lease. Before the suit in question was filed Kapoorchand had died and hence in the relevant suit to which a reference will be presently made his heirs and legal representatives were impleaded as defendants Nos. 2 to 9. It may be mentioned here further that even Vastimal had died during the pendency of this litigation. However, for the sake of convenience Vastimal and his heirs will be referred to compendiously, as defendant No. 1 and all the heirs of Kapoorchand as defendant No. 2, in this judgment hereafter. The landlord who had filed the suit in question and who is present before me will be referred to hereinafter as the plaintiff. 3. The plaintiff filed a Regular Civil Suit No. 94 of 1971 against the defendants for the possession of the suit premises on various grounds including the grounds of default in the payment of rent, unlawful sub-letting and bona fide requirement of the land. It is unnecessary in this judgment to refer to the written statement of the defendants. The next relevant fact is that on 24-1-1973 a compromise was arrived at between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 only. By the said compromise defendant No. 1 admitted the plaintiff claim. He admitted the various arrears. However, in Clause 4 of the compromise agreement it was provided that in case defendant No. 1 paid the various arrears to the plaintiff within the stipulated period the decree should be marked as satisfied and that the plaintiff should not recover possession of the suit premises. He admitted the various arrears. However, in Clause 4 of the compromise agreement it was provided that in case defendant No. 1 paid the various arrears to the plaintiff within the stipulated period the decree should be marked as satisfied and that the plaintiff should not recover possession of the suit premises. However, it was further provided that in the case of default on the part of defendant No. 1 in that behalf the decree should be executed by the plaintiff and that he should recover possession of the suit premises. Clause 7 of the said compromise is of somewhat intriguing character. What is mentioned in the said clause has got some relevance to the question to be decided in this petition. Hence the translation of the said Clause 7 may be set out fully. The said Clause 7 runs as follows :--- "The other defendants do not reside in the suit premises; but for technical reasons they are made parties to the suit. The plaintiff does give his consent for an order to be passed against those defendants also as against this defendant." Clause 9 provided that plaintiff was at liberty to get refund of the Court fees paid by him for the purpose of filing of the suit. This compromise was signed by defendant No. 1 only. In no sense of the terms defendant No. 2 had any truck with this compromise. What is more bewildering is that the Court purported to pass a decree in terms of this compromise but the Court did not even purported to pass a decree against defendant No. 2 and as such the suit filed against defendant No. 1 was neither dismissed nor decreed. It appears that the Court was practically oblivious of the fact that in the suit relief was claimed not only against defendant No. 1 but also defendant No. 2 who was after all a joint lessee with defendant No. 1 It is the grievance of the plaintiff that original defendant No. 1 committed default in the matter of compliance with the stipulations in the compromise decree and hence he filed the Darkhast for recovery of the possession of the suit premises by execution of the decree. In this Darkhast defendant No. 1 as well as defendant No. 2 were impleaded as judgment debtor. 4. The execution was resisted by the defendants on various grounds. In this Darkhast defendant No. 1 as well as defendant No. 2 were impleaded as judgment debtor. 4. The execution was resisted by the defendants on various grounds. One of the grounds was that the decree was a nullity inasmuch as the Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree against a tenant protected by the Bombay Rent Act by a compromise. The second ground of resistence was that no decree was passed against defendant No. 2 and inasmuch as the lease was a joint lease, the entire decree was inexecutable. It was also contended further that the compromise resulted in the creation of a fresh tenancy in favour of the defendants. 5. The trial Court seems to have negatived the defendant's contention relating to the creation of a fresh tenancy. However, the trial Court was persuaded to take the view that the decree passed against defendant No. 1 alone was inexecutable in view of the fact that there was no judgment or decree against the other defendant who was the joint lessee. On this ground the Executing Court held the execution not to be maintainable and hence the Darkhast was dismissed by the Court. The present petition is filed by the original decree-holder against the said order invoking my jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. Mr. Walawalkar, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, questioned the correctness of the reasoning of and ultimate conclusion arrived at by the lower Court. According to him, even though defendant No. 2 was a joint lessee still there was no provision in the Civil Procedure Code by virtue of which the decree could not be passed against one of the joint lessees alone. He contended that if the decree was passed against one of the joint lessees it would not be binding upon the other joint lessee and to that extent the decree-holder shall have obstacle in the matter of execution of the decree. But that fact by itself, contends Mr. Walawalkar, does not make the decree passed against one of the joint lessees a less of a decree. I am not impressed by this argument. To my mind in the ultimate analysis the procedural law has got to be subservient to the substantive law. But that fact by itself, contends Mr. Walawalkar, does not make the decree passed against one of the joint lessees a less of a decree. I am not impressed by this argument. To my mind in the ultimate analysis the procedural law has got to be subservient to the substantive law. When a joint lease is given to two persons the landlord can neither terminate the tenancy of only one of the lessees nor can he file a suit for eviction only against one of the lessees. If he files such suit that would be a case of non-joinder of necessary party and it is well-known that if the necessary party is not impleaded the suit had got to 'be dismissed'. Taking the illustration of the instant case itself, if the plaintiff had filed a suit against defendant No. 1 alone with a specific averment that he was one of the joint lessee, the trial Court would have no option but to dismiss the suit, for the simple reason that such a suit was just not maintainable. It is not that the decree in such a case would be merely not executable against the other joint lessee who was not a party to the suit. The legal position would be that no decree could be passed even against the joint lessee who was very much impleaded. It, therefore, follows that the decree in such a case against one of the joint lessees alone would be wholly inexecutable and in that sense a nullity. I am, therefore, in agreement with the view taken by the lower Court to the effect that in the absence of a decree being passed against defendant No. 2, the entire decree was non est. 7. I may also refer to the submissions made by Mr. Agarwal in support of the order passed by the lower Court. His contention was that a glance at the decree passed even against defendant No. 1 would show that a fresh contractual tenancy was created in favour of the defendants. He contended that in any event both the defendents were allowed to live in the premises even subsequent to the date of the decree. But that was not all. His contention was that a glance at the decree passed even against defendant No. 1 would show that a fresh contractual tenancy was created in favour of the defendants. He contended that in any event both the defendents were allowed to live in the premises even subsequent to the date of the decree. But that was not all. He contended that even according to the decree-holder, if the demands as regards arrears of the rent made by the decree-holder were complied with by defendant No. 1, the decree for possession was not to be executed by the plaintiff at all and in that case both the defendents would continue to remain in possession as tenants. He contended that such a possession was nothing but that of a new contractual tenant. He further contended that even assuming that a new contractual tenancy could not be spelt out from such a decree the fact remains that both the defendents would continue to remain in possession in their own right and if after all the arrears were paid they continued by virtue of the provisions of the decree they could not be subsequently evicted expect without a suit against them. This would give rise to an inference that the defendents were constituted atleasts as the licensees of the plaintiff and the contention was that having regard to the provisions of the amendment of the Bombay Rent Act which came into effect from 1st February, 1973, the defendants must be deemed to have been completely protected. He contended that the said protection was bound to be made available to them even in the present execution proceeding. His further contention was that the compromise decree was without jurisdiction and in this connection he referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1970 Supreme Court page 838 (Smt Kaushalya Debi and others v. K.L. Bansal)1, and A.I.R. 1973 s.c. page 1311 (K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri)2. According to him the present case was governed by the above authorities and not by authorities of this Court reported in 78 Bom.L.R. page 252 (Digambar Narayan Kulkarni v. Gajanan Laxman Barve)3. According to him the facts of the case did not justify the application of the dictum of law laid down by the Supreme Court even in (1978)1 S.C. Cases page (Smt. Nai Babu v. Lala Ramnarayan and others)5, Mr. According to him the facts of the case did not justify the application of the dictum of law laid down by the Supreme Court even in (1978)1 S.C. Cases page (Smt. Nai Babu v. Lala Ramnarayan and others)5, Mr. Walawalkar, on the other hand contended that the facts of the instant case certainly require application of the dictum of law laid down in the cases reported in 78 Bom.L.R., page 252 as also by the Supreme Court in (1978)1 s.c. cases page 58. Since I am not deciding this question by examination of the authorities I do not propose to set out the various ratio of the above mentioned various decisions with the consent of Mr. Walawalkar, I proceed to assume that Mr. Agarwal is right in contending that the present decree was a nullity and it was inexecutable for any of the reasons mentioned by Mr. Agarwal. 8. The question then arises as to what is the duty of the Court in these circumstances. The contention of the judgment-debtor is that though the decree was passed against one of the two defendents, the decree was wholly inexecutable firstly because no decree could be passed by compromise, secondly because the decree has been passed only against one of the joint lesses and passing of such a decree was without jurisdiction and thirdly because no decree can be passed by compromise against tenants protected by sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act. But the point is that if no decree has been passed against defendant No. 2 then it cannot be said that the original suit was fully disposed of at all. As a matter of fact, it is possible to state as a statement of law that if the Executing Court takes a legitimate view that the decree brought before it is a nullity, it is not a decree at all. The suit in which nullity of a decree is passed is a suit in which in fact the further is passed and if that conclusion is correct it is just a short step to the further conclusion on that the suit in question really speaking remains as undisposed of as ever. 9. The question then arise is whether the original plaintiff should be driven to file a separate suit or whether the original suit itself should be directed to proceed from where it left off. 9. The question then arise is whether the original plaintiff should be driven to file a separate suit or whether the original suit itself should be directed to proceed from where it left off. The contention of Mr. Agarwal was that the suit is disposed of once for all when the decree in question was passed in the instance case. His contention is that even though the decree passed was a nullity or was an inexecutable decree, still there was a decree and that when the decree was passed by the Court, the Court became functus officio. If the plaintiff was aggrieved by the said decree, either he had to file an appeal against the said decree, if it was a decree in invitum, or had to take appropriate proceedings by way of suit or otherwise to have his rights established. Revival of the previous suit in which such a decree was passed, contends Mr. Agarwal, was inconceivable. 10. I have given my anxious thought to this entire question but I do not find it possible to subscribe to the view urged by Mr. Agarwal. To my mind such a view is neither desirable nor warranted by the provisions of our procedural law. As a general proposition of law tenable, nor is it tenable with reference to the facts of the instant case. 11. I will first deal with reference to the particular facts of the instant case. In the instant case what we find is that the suit was filed by the landlord against the two joint lessees for eviction. One of the lessees entered into a compromise with the landlord and allowed conditional eviction decree to be passed against him. The point is that to that compromise the other joint tenant was not a party at all. But that is not all. What is more important is that even the Court has neither purported to pass any decree against him nor has done anything which could be constructed to be a decretal order against him. I scanned the entire compromise decree from top to bottom and called upon Mr. Agarwal to point out anything in the decree which would justify an inference that the decree was passed against defendant No. 2. The contention of Mr. I scanned the entire compromise decree from top to bottom and called upon Mr. Agarwal to point out anything in the decree which would justify an inference that the decree was passed against defendant No. 2. The contention of Mr. Agarwal was that the very fact that a decree has been passed by the Court together with an order for refund of court fees shows that implicity there is a decree against defendant No. 2. I fail to see any jurisdiction for such a reasoning. If it is possible to contend that merely because there is no decree against defendant No. 2, the decree must be deemed to have been passed against defendant No. 2, it is equally possible to hold that in view of the absence of any decree against defendant No. 2, the suit against defendant No. 2 had been in fact dismissed by the trial Court. It is really impossible for the Court not to come to the conclusion that no decree is passed by the Court vis-a-vis defendant No. 2 at all. If that is so, it follows that the suit remains undisposed of and continues to remain as a pending suit. The position, therefore, is that so far as defendant No. 1 is concerned there was a purported decree against him; but it was a nullity meaning thereby it was not a decree in the eyes of law. So far as defendant No. 2 is concerned, neither in fact nor in law any decree is passed. To my mind, in the facts of the instant case it would follow that the Court might have intended to pass something like a decree but in fact passed no such order as could be recognised as a decree in the eyes of law. The conclusion must, therefore, follow that the Court has not passed any decree. If, there is no decree in the instant case, it is the bounden duty of the Court to proceed with the matter from the point where it left off its proceedings without passing of a decree. 12. Mr. The conclusion must, therefore, follow that the Court has not passed any decree. If, there is no decree in the instant case, it is the bounden duty of the Court to proceed with the matter from the point where it left off its proceedings without passing of a decree. 12. Mr. Walawalkar invited my attention to the provision of the Order 9, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides as follows :--- "Where there are more defendents than one; and one or more of them appear, and the others do not appear, the suit shall proceed, and the Court shall, at the time of pronouncing judgment make such order it thinks fit with respect to the defendents who do not appear." Relying on this provision Mr. Walawalkar tried to justify the view that I am taking namely that the suit against defendant No. 2 cannot really be said to have been disposed of the Court at all. He pointed out that the trial Court had in fact failed in its duty or obligation when no order whatsoever was passed by the Court in compliance with the said provision in Order 9, Rule 11, of the Civil Procedure Code. To my mind the submission is quite correct. To my mind the above legal provision totally embodies the general principle namely that order passed by the Court can partake the character of a decree unless by the order the rights of the parties are adjudicated upon one way or the other. That is the real import of the concept of decree which is evident from the very definition of the word "decree" obtaining in section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. 13. The next question then arises is what is the modality by which the Court would direct the trial Court to perform its duty of bringing the suit to its logical and legal conclusion. In the facts of the instant case I find no difficulty for the Executing Court to treat this application to be a part of the suit and to proceed with the suit as if no decree was passed. In the instant case, the decree was passed long before sub-section (2) of section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code was deleted. Even the application for execution was admitedly filed before the amending Civil Procedure Code came into force. In the instant case, the decree was passed long before sub-section (2) of section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code was deleted. Even the application for execution was admitedly filed before the amending Civil Procedure Code came into force. If that was so, the Court had the power to treat the present application for execution to be a part of the suit itself. 14. Mr. Agarwal contended that Executing Court had the power to treat the application to be a suit but that would be an independent suit and not the continuation of the same previous suit. According to him, the execution application can be treated as suit. I see no question of Executing Court reviving the suit in which the decree was passed. I am not at all satisfied about the correctness of this contention. The contention assumes that the previous suit has been disposed of. I have found that the previous suit has not been disposed of; but before some Court an application was made for execution of the decree which in the eyes of law, was never passed. Sub-section (2) of section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code provided as follows :--- "The Court may, subject to any objection as to limitation or jurisdiction, treat a proceedings under this section as a suit or a suit as a proceeding and may, if necessary, order payment of any additional Court-fees." I do not see any reason why the execution proceedings cannot be treated as the continuation of disposed of suit. To my mind the provisions of the said sub-section (2) of section 47 read with provisions of section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code enjoined a duty upon the Executing Court to direct the suit to proceed against both the defendents on the assumption that no decree was passed in thus suit. Neither on principle nor on an authority I find no jurisdiction to hold that such a modality should not be followed. 15. Even assuming that sub-section (2) of section 47 of the unamended Civil Procedure Code could not be invoked, to my mind, the provisions of section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, all by themselves, were sufficient for investing the Court with the jurisdiction to direct a undisposed of suit to be disposed of in accordance with law. 15. Even assuming that sub-section (2) of section 47 of the unamended Civil Procedure Code could not be invoked, to my mind, the provisions of section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, all by themselves, were sufficient for investing the Court with the jurisdiction to direct a undisposed of suit to be disposed of in accordance with law. Resorting to inherent power is necessary in the case such as the instant case because it was the fault of the Court in passing an inexecutable decree against defendant No. 1 and in forgetting that some kind of decree has got to be passed against defendant No. 2. If by virtue of the mistake commited by the Court the plaintiff has been misled the penalty for such court's error cannot be visited upon the party who invoked the court's jurisdiction for getting justice. If the Executing Court has found that the trial Court had passed a decree which was a nullity there is no reason why person in whose favour the nullity of a decree was passed should be driven to file separate suit. There is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code which prescribes or forbids the Court from picking up the old threads and from starting with suit where it was left of. In this connection, it is to be noted that the execution application was filed in the same Court by which the so called decree was passed. Different consideration would have arisen if this decree had been transfered to another Court for execution. The transferee in such a case would probably have to remain content by pronouncing that the decree was nullity leaving the decree-holder to take appropriate proceedings for enforcing his rights. 16. Even assuming that the Executing Court was wholly helpless in the matter of giving any assistance to the original plaintiff, either under unrepealed section 47 or under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, it need not be assumed that the original plaintiff had no other alternative remedy. 16. Even assuming that the Executing Court was wholly helpless in the matter of giving any assistance to the original plaintiff, either under unrepealed section 47 or under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, it need not be assumed that the original plaintiff had no other alternative remedy. Once the Executing Court finally pronounced the decree to be a nullity he could certainly move the original Court by an appropriate application--- a) inviting its application to the fact since the decree previously passed by itself was found by a Court of contemption jurisdiction to be a nullity, the original suit had remained undisposed of; b) requesting the Court to start proceedings a new with a view to bring that suit to its function by passing an appropriate executable decree, if necessary, by taking evidence and after hearing the parties in accordance with the provisions of law. If the plaintiff made such an application, the Court would be to my mind duty-bound to entertain the same and to proceed with the suit, on the basis that the same stood revived, from the point from which it was wrongly left off. 17. Mr. Agarwal, however, came out with a two-fold caveat against the above course. Firstly, that the moment the Court had passed the decree, in the instant case on 24-1-1973, the Court became functus officio so far as that suit was concerned. Subsequently application by the plaintiff to proceed with the suit was, therefore, inconceivable and not maintainable. Secondly, he contended that there is no provision for such a modality of procedure in the Civil Procedure Code. 18. The concept of the Court being functus officio upon passing of an decree is, to my mind, a somewhat slippery concept. It is no doubt the result of the total reading of the procedural law governing rights of parties. But the concept itself rests upon a few postulates. One such postulates is that Court becomes functus officio after the passing of the decree provided that decree is a valid decree and has become final. Suppossing an appeal was pending against the decree and operation of the decree is not stayed it can be legitimately argued that during and inspite of the pendency of the appeal, the trial Court had become functus officio vis-a-vis the suit. Suppossing an appeal was pending against the decree and operation of the decree is not stayed it can be legitimately argued that during and inspite of the pendency of the appeal, the trial Court had become functus officio vis-a-vis the suit. But suppossing the appeal is allowed, the decree is set aside and the matter is remanded to the trail Court for disposal according to law, what happened to the plea that the trial Court had become functus officio. It vanishes in the thin air. That is why I started this para with the statement that this functus officio concept is a somewhat slippery concept. I have stated above that the validity of the decree is one of its postulates for the purpose of invoking the concept of functus officio. You cannot say that no valid decree is passed by the Court to bring the proceeding of the suit to an end but still, the Court has become functus officio. The fact that the decree purporting to have been passed by the Court was not a valid decree can be discovered by recourse to appellate proceeding as mentioned above. It can be discovered even by the same Court, in given circumstances, in its review jurisdiction. Likewise, in given circumstances, it can also discovered in collateral proceeding such as an independent suit or the execution proceedings. The result of all these proceedings is one and the same; the original suit stands revived with the result that the Court which had become functus officio by virtue of its decree ceases to be functus officio and once again becomes seized of this suit. 19. The second coveat of Mr. Agarwal need not detain us long. The question is: Where in the provision in the Civil Procedure Code for this? One answer is : What is there in the Code which inhabits such course? This is not an idle rhetoric. The Code itself enjoins upon the Court the duty to bring the suit to its logical conclusion by passing a valid decree. Until such a decree is passed every reasonable proceeding, not specifically prohibited by the Code, aiming at pursuation of the Court to pass such a decree, must be held to be one warranted by the Code. 20. The Code itself enjoins upon the Court the duty to bring the suit to its logical conclusion by passing a valid decree. Until such a decree is passed every reasonable proceeding, not specifically prohibited by the Code, aiming at pursuation of the Court to pass such a decree, must be held to be one warranted by the Code. 20. I have dwelt upon and have dismissed this question at some length because so far as I am aware, this aspect of procedural law has not been examined by any Court. My attention was not invited by either of the learned Advocate to any authority discussing the questing or deciding it, one way or the other and inspite of the fact that the hearing of the petition was adjourned by me sufficiently to enable them to examine the precedents, if any; on the point. Since the question cannot be decided by reference to any authorities, I must decide the same on the basis of principle. 21. It follows that upon finding that the decree under execution was no decree at all, the Executing Court should have given appropriate direction to the parties so that the suit which remained incomplete got itself disposed of according to law. The original Suit No. 94 of 1971 was filed in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Wadgaon and the Darkhast for execution of the decree also was filed in the same Court which held that the decree was a nullity. The Court have have thus seen that the suit in its own Court had remained undisposed of. The Court should have, therefore, given direction to both the parties to proceed with the suit. To my mind it was the duty of the Court to follow this course because in the absence of such a direction the suit on its file would be deemed to be remaining undisposed of ad infinitum. If the Court failed to perform its above duty it can be legitimately said that to some extent atleast the Court would be guilty of dereliction of duty. The Court has passed an order just pronouncing that the decree was a nullity; in other words that the Original Suit No. 94 of 1971 has remained undisposed of. Against the order involving such pronouncement the present writ petition is filed in this Court and the question arises as to what course I should adopt. The Court has passed an order just pronouncing that the decree was a nullity; in other words that the Original Suit No. 94 of 1971 has remained undisposed of. Against the order involving such pronouncement the present writ petition is filed in this Court and the question arises as to what course I should adopt. I can myself direct the petitioner to move the trial Court so that the Court would continue with the suit. In the alternative I can to follow one or the other two courses in the exercise of my powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. I can direct the Executing Court to exercise its powers under section 47(2) of the Civil Procedure Code as it stood before its deletion to treat the application for execution as a part of the proceedings in the main suit itself and to proceed with the suit so as to pass a valid decree in the same. In the alternative I can direct the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) who would be executing jurisdiction in Civil suit No. 94/71 to proceed with the suit on the basis that no decree was passed by him in the suit, that is to say, to proceed with the suit just at the point before compromise was recorded by him. 22. Mr. Agarwal, however, contended that such a course is not open for me in my jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution and he contended that my power of superintendence did not extend the reviving of disposed of suit or to give direction to the lower Court to continue with the suit. The contention has got to be rejected firstly for the reason that I am not directing revival of the suit at all. The revival of the suit postulates that the suit was disposed of. I found in the instant case that neither in the eyes of law nor as a matter of fact has suit been disposed of. I am not, therefore, directing the revival of any suit at all. The contention cannot be accepted also because I do not see the limitation on any power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution is as restrictive as Mr. Agarwal would suggest. Mr. I am not, therefore, directing the revival of any suit at all. The contention cannot be accepted also because I do not see the limitation on any power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution is as restrictive as Mr. Agarwal would suggest. Mr. Agarwal in this connection relied upon a well-know Supreme Court case (Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte and another)5, reported in A.I.R. 1975 s.c. page 1297. He particularly relied upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in the said case : "It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi judicial nature are not greater than the power Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority." I am not at all satisfied that the above dictum of law has any application to the facts of the present case at all. I find in the instant case that the trial Court as the Executing Court had certain functions to perform. One of the functions of the trial Court was to pass a valid decree in the suit. I find that the trial Court did not pass a decree at all. I find that the Executing Court should have treated this application for execution as a proceeding in the suit and should have continued with the suit. This function has not been performed by the Executing Court at all. When it is contended that my power is limited to seeing that the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority it extends atleast to this much namely to see that the Tribunal does perform its functions. As stated above I have found that the trial Court had shirked from its work and Executing Court did not apply its mind to the provisions under section 47(2) and or under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. As stated above I have found that the trial Court had shirked from its work and Executing Court did not apply its mind to the provisions under section 47(2) and or under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. I, therefore, do not see why I cannot give direction to the Court in question to perform its function of disposing of the suit in accordance with law and as to why my power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution should be unavailable for such a contingency. 23. In this view of the matter I am not inclined to adopt the first course mentioned above and to drive the plaintiff/petitioner to move the trial Court for proceedings with suit. I am of the opinion that even if the contention of defendant No. 1 about the compromise decree being a nullity was accepted, still was imcumbent upon the Court to proceed with the suit against both the defendants. I may make it clear that when the suit starts afresh from the point where it was wrongly left by the trial Court, it will be open for both or either of the defendents to raise such pleas relating to the legal consequence of the compromise arrived at between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 as may be found fit by them. It will be equally open for the plaintiff to contend that so far as defendant No. 1 is concerned there has been already an agreement arrived at between them which could be governed by the provisions of the order XXII, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. When such contentions are argued, the Court trying the suit shall adjudicate upon them in accordance with the provision of law. 24. The petition is, therefore, allowed but only to the extent as mentioned above. The Rule is made absolute to the extent mentioned above. The trial Court is directed to treat Civil Suit No. 94 of 1971 as not having been disposed of by the Court and to proceed with the hearing of the suit afresh after giving notices to all the parties. There shall be no order as to costs of this suit. 25. Mr. Agarwal asked for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. There shall be no order as to costs of this suit. 25. Mr. Agarwal asked for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. If I had jurisdiction to grant a certificate to him to file an appeal to the Supreme Court I would have certainly been inclined to give such a certificate after hearing Mr. Walawalkar in that behalf, because, to my mind, the question relating to the mondality to be followed by the Court with a view to doing justice to both the parties within the frame-work of the present procedural law, in the case when a decree is found by the Executing Court to be nullity, is something as regards which a final pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court would be of a very great help for all the courts in India. However, I cannot accede to Mr. Agarwal's request because I do not have my jurisdiction to grant such certificate having regard to the provisions of Article 133(3) of the Constitution of India. 26. The trial Court is directed to expedite the suit and to dispose of the same in any event before 30th September, 1982. -----