JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, M. - This second appeal has been filed by Mangal Singh against the judgment and decree dated August 27, 1980 by the learned Commissioner, Garhwal Division, Pauri, confirming the judgment of the learned trial court dated October 26, 1979, cancelling the Sanad Bhumidhari in favour of the appellant Mangal Singh. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. 3. The first argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the judgment of the learned Commissioner is an omnibus judgement and is not a judgment in the eye of law. I agree that it is so. It does not disclose the oral and documentary evidence nor discusses it. It is not a speaking judgment. For this reason, it is necessary to fall back upon the judgment of the learned trial court. 4. It was a case of cancellation of the Sanad Bhumidhari issued in favour of Mangal Singh under Section 134 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act on September 16, 1972. The learned Tehsildar cancelled the Sanad on September 7, 1974 in subsequent proceedings under Section 137-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the first appeal by Mangal Singh was dismissed, in the second appeal, the Board remanded the case to the trial court for hearing all the three appellants, the learned trial court again after hearing cancelled the Sanad by its judgment dated October 6, 1979 and the first appeal as discussed above, was dismissed on August 27, 1980. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that all the three appellants Mangal Singh, Gopal Singh and Govind Singh, were recorded Sirdars since after the date of vesting July 1, 1965 and obtained the Sanad Bhumidhari in accordance with law. Smt. Urmila Devi Jain had stated that these three were only sub-tenants and being disabled person, they could not become Sirdars. The learned counsel argued that the father of the appellants Bachchi Singh was recorded Sirdar in column 4 in the settlement of 1932 and 1964. Prem Lal Jain, the husband of Smt. Urmila Devi Jain, was Hissedar. He further argued that Smt. Urmila Devi Jain was not living in the village and under Section 87 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, she must be deemed to have abandoned the holding. Prem Lal Jain, the husband of Smt. Urmila Devi Jain, was Hissedar. He further argued that Smt. Urmila Devi Jain was not living in the village and under Section 87 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, she must be deemed to have abandoned the holding. He argued that in case of grant of Sanad Bhumidhari to the recorded tenants, no case for Section 137-A arises. He further argued that the proceedings under Section 137-A are summary and are meant to decide title. In support, he cited a ruling reported in 1977 R.D. 315, wherein it is laid that in proceedings under Section 137, the Assistant Collector has merely to satisfy himself that the applicant is a recorded Sirdar or co-sirdar and has voluntarily without any use of fraud or coercion moved the application for grant of Bhumidhari Sanad and deposited the requisite amount in the treasury. If these three conditions are fulfilled, the Assistant Collector has no option but to grant the Bhumidhari Sanad. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the husband of Smt. Urmila Devi Jain had died in 1946 and she being a disabled person, the appellants could not acquire any Sirdari rights. In support, he cited a ruling reported in 1968 R.D. 300. He argued that the appellants had applied during the settlement of 1964 for being recorded as Sirtan but they were entered only Kabiz and by the order of A.R.O. dated November 10, 1964, they were not found in possession. The learned counsel further argued that under Section 134 of the Act, a Sirdar can obtain Sanad Bhumidhari and a Sirdar is defined under Section 131 which further refers to Section 19 and since the appellants were not Sirdars under any category of Section 19, they were not entitled to become Bhumidhars under Section 134. He cited a ruling reported in 1965 R.D. 279 in support of his contention that a person who had not become Sirdar under Section 19, could not purchase the Bhumidhari rights. Such persons could be only those referred to under Section 131-A and Section 19. He further cited a ruling reported in 1965 R.D. 97 in support of his contention that the trial court had to ascertain that the applicant had a prima facie right of title. 6. Such persons could be only those referred to under Section 131-A and Section 19. He further cited a ruling reported in 1965 R.D. 97 in support of his contention that the trial court had to ascertain that the applicant had a prima facie right of title. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants has shown that the Kumaon and Uttrakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act had come into force on July 1, 1965 vide notification dated June 14, 1965 and in view of the rule laid down in Fateh Singh v. Girja Shanker, 1979 A.W.C. 494 a Hissendar would become Bhumidhar under Section 8 of the Act and a recorded occupant become Asami under Section 10(e) of the Act and unless action for ejectment was taken in time, the Asami would become Sirdar under Section 36 of the Act. 7. In this connection, Section 47 of the Act is relevant by which various Sections of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act have been made applicable to the areas covered by the K.U.Z.A. and Land Reforms Act. These sections are 134 to 139, 152 to 195, amongst others and do not include Sections 19 and 131. Naturally, after July 1, 1965, for these areas the Sirdars were not those defined under Sections 131 and 19 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, but those defined under Section 44 of the K.U.Z.A and L.R. Act. The present appellants, no doubt, fall in the category 44(b). 8. It is also important to look into the provisions of Section 137-A under which the Sanad Bhumidhari is said to have been cancelled. The Sanad Bhumidhari can be cancelled under Section 137-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act on the following grounds: (a) that the certificate was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false suggestion, or by the concealment from the Assistant Collector of something material to the case; (b) that the certificate was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law of justify the grant thereof, though such allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently; (c) that a decree or order passed by a competent court in a suit or other proceedings with respect to the holding for which certificate has been granted shows that the applicant was not entitled to the certificate. The learned trial court has cancelled the Sanad Bhumidhari on the ground that Mangal Singh and others had full knowledge of the fact that Smt. Urmila Devi Jain was disabled and that an order was passed in dispute number 63/1 of 1964 in the settlement that they were not found in possession, still on the basis of unacceptable entries and by concealing the fact of Smt. Urmila Devi Jain being disabled, they had obtained the Sanad Bhumidhar. 9. However, the judgment shows that the trial court has entered into considering and analysing the detailed justification of their case by the two parties supported by various case laws and has almost decided the matter as if in a declaratory suit. It is not dispute that the appellants were recorded Sirdars. Whether this entry was based on any incorrect appraisal of law was certainly beyond the scope of Section 137-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The question of applicability of Section 157 of the Act to the case of Smt. Urmila Devi Jain is a matter to be looked into while declaring title of a person. The appellants had based their application on their recorded Sirdari. It was not for them to say that it may further be investigated whether the entry of Sirdar would be consistent with the supposed disability of Smt. Urmila Devi Jain. The appellant's case was always that they were in possession before vesting. It was also their case that Smt. Urmila Devi Jain had no disability. It was also their case that the land had long been abandoned. It was for the respondent to have got her title declared. A genuine dispute of title subsequently discovered cannot be termed fraud by making a false suggestion. It cannot be said that any fraud was played by the appellant by filing current Khatauni extract and obtaining the Sanad Bhumidhari. The result of any past litigation is not to be stated in the proceedings under Section 134 of the Act by the applicant and does not amount to concealment of something material to the case. Enquiry envisaged under Section 134 by the Assistant Collector is to satisfy himself about the prima-facie eligibility of the applicants. He does not have to decide any dispute of title, which unknowingly the learned trial court has done while deciding the case under Section 137-A. 10. Enquiry envisaged under Section 134 by the Assistant Collector is to satisfy himself about the prima-facie eligibility of the applicants. He does not have to decide any dispute of title, which unknowingly the learned trial court has done while deciding the case under Section 137-A. 10. Both proceedings under Sections 134 and 137-A are summary in nature and prima-facie satisfaction only is required in both the proceedings. A prima-facie position is not a proved position. It is that position which if unrebutted would result in the prayer being granted in accordance with law. On this basis, the enquiry had already been done by the learned trial court while granting the Sanad Bhumidhari. Only similar enquiry was required into the ingredients under Section 137-A as well. When the appellants were already recorded Sirdars, the question of any fraud or a false suggestion did not arise. Filing a forged copy of Khatauni would no doubt, amount to a false suggestion and fraud. Another instance can be that a larger share of a co-sharer is alleged than is actually due to him according to the pedigree succession. To say that the Sirdari entry had been got made through fraud is a farfetched suggestion, not directly related to the proceedings in question. Similarly, there was no untrue allegation for the Sirdari entry was there. Therefore, clearly the learned trial court went beyond the scope of Section 137-A in declaring or giving a finding that the appellants were not the Sirdars of the land in question. Unless the trial court declared that the appellants, were not Sirdars, there was no basis for cancellation of Sanad Bhumidhari. 11. Although both the parties have shown the provisions of law and case law in support of their respective claims of title, I do not find such consideration within the scope of the present appeal which must be confined to the merits of the proceedings under Section 137-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The title must be got declared by the aggrieved party in a competent court and not in any indirect manner through these summary proceedings. As regards the case for cancellation of Sanad Bhumidhari, I do not find any justification for the same and since the learned Commissioner has not given any finding worth the name, it becomes necessary to look into the finding of fact by the learned trial court. 12. As regards the case for cancellation of Sanad Bhumidhari, I do not find any justification for the same and since the learned Commissioner has not given any finding worth the name, it becomes necessary to look into the finding of fact by the learned trial court. 12. In the circumstances of the case, the judgments of the two courts below are liable to be set aside and the case under Section 137 A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act deserves to be dismissed. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the judgments of two courts below are hereby set aside and the case of Smt. Urmila Devi Jain stands dismissed.