JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. 1. This is an application in revision under section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. It is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned II Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad, exercising the powers of a Small Cause Court, decreeing a suit filed by the plaintiff-opposite party for the ejectment of the applicant from the premises in suit as well as for recovery of Rs. 1000/- as arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation for the period 15-1-1979 till the defendant vacates the premises at the rate of 2000/- per month. 2. Briefly, the plaint case was that the plaintiff was the owner and landlady of the premises in suit of which the State Bank of Patiala, Ghaziabad, was the tenant. The building under tenancy was a new building to which the provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act XIII of 1972 for short) were not applicable. The plaintiff did not wish to continue the tenancy of the applicant, and, therefore, she determined the tenancy of the defendant by means of a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, asking the defendant to vacate the premises within one month of the service of notice. The defendant, however, did not vacate the premises and hence the suit for the reliefs mentioned above. The suit was contested by the applicant, inter alia, on the ground that the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is applicable to the building in question and that as the defendant had deposited the entire amount contemplated under section 20 (4) of that Act, no decree for ejectment could be passed against it, in any case. 3. Before the appellate court it appears that a plea was raised on behalf of the plaintiff that the building under tenancy being, on the undisputed facts, a 'public building' within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (a) of the aforesaid Act, the said Act was not applicable to the premises in any case regardless of whether the building was a new building or an old building. This plea has found favour with the court below. This plea has found favour with the court below. On the further finding that the tenancy of the defendant had been duly determined by means of the aforesaid notice served on it by the plaintiff-opposite party under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the court below decreed the suit for the ejectment of the applicant as well as for the recovery of certain amounts as arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. 4. In the revision Sri Raja Ram Agarwal, learned counsel for the applicant did not attempt to challenge the finding of the court below that the applicant, namely, the State Bank of Patiala, being a subsidiary of the State Bank of India the building under tenancy was a public building within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (a) read with Section 3 (o) of the aforesaid Act. Indeed he made his submissions on the premise that the building in question is a public building In support of the revision Sri Agarwal submitted two points for my consideration : (1) On a true and proper construction of the applicable provisions of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and the scheme underlying it, it must follow that notwithstanding the fact that Section 2 (1) (a) excludes from the operation of the Act 'Public building', the protection afforded to private tenants under section 20 is equally available to the tenants of 'public buildings'. (2) The amendments made in Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act as well as in the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, providing for trial of suits by lessors for the eviction of lessees from a building by a Small Cause Court irrespective of the pecuniary valuation of the suits, is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory and amounts to violation of the guarantee of equal protection of the laws enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. Sri Agarwal concentrated mainly on the first point. In regard to the second point he submitted that though he was not giving up the point, the same stood concluded by a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Civil Revision No. 171 of 1980, decided on 23-4-1982. 6. 5. Sri Agarwal concentrated mainly on the first point. In regard to the second point he submitted that though he was not giving up the point, the same stood concluded by a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Civil Revision No. 171 of 1980, decided on 23-4-1982. 6. Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party, on the other hand submitted that the exemption under section 2 (1) (a) of a public building from the operation of the Act is absolute and unambiguous and there was nothing in the Act or the scheme or legislative history of the Act and its amendment in the year 1976 which might countenance the contention of the applicant. Indeed, he argued, the submissions of the learned counsel for the applicant could not be accepted without disregarding the plain and unequivocal language of the applicable provisions of the statute. I shall now elaborate the submissions of the learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Raja Ram Agarwal put his case thus : While it is true that Section 2(1) (a) specifically excludes 'public buildings' from the operation of the Act, the enactment is nonetheless a beneficial piece of legislation designed to protect the tenants from the hazards of eviction on the mere whims and fancies of landlords. This became necessary because of a notorious derth of residential and non-residential buildings in urban areas of the State. It gives effect to this avowed policy. Section 20 of the Act was enacted providing for an absolute bar to the institution of suits for ejectment except on specified grounds mentioned therein. Section 21 enables a landlord, instead of resorting to the time-consuming remedy of a suit for eviction to take recourse to a speedier remedy by filing an application before the Prescribed Authority for an order of eviction. But there again the order of eviction can not be passed except upon strict proof that he bonafide requires the house for the use of himself and his family and further that he would suffer greater hardship. It cannot have been intended, it was urged, to deprive a tenant of a public building from the ordinary protection available to tenants of a private building under section 20. It cannot have been intended, it was urged, to deprive a tenant of a public building from the ordinary protection available to tenants of a private building under section 20. It was contended that the only intention of enacting Section 2 (1) (a) was that in regard to public buildings, the Rent Control authorities ought not to be able to exercise powers of regulating allotment which are exercisable in respect of private buildings. Counsel submitted that if in giving effect to this intendment the Legislature omitted to supply an express proviso or exception in section 2 (1) (a) and Section 3 fo), it must be attributed to careless drafting and nothing more. 7. I am unable to agree. It can hardly be gainsaid that legislative intent has primarily to be gathered from the provisions of the statute themselves. Now, by way of statutory support Shri Agarwal relied mainly, if not wholly, on sub-section (8) of Section 21 which provides that nothing in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 shall apply to a building let out to the State Government or to a local authority or to a public sector corporation etc., unless the Prescribed Authority is satisfied that the landlord is a person to whom clauses (ii) or (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (8) is applicable. Counsel made this statutory provision the sole basis of his argument and submitted that this provision holds a key to the true interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. It was urged that sub-section (8) of Section 21 presupposes that but for this Sec. 21 (l)(a) would have applied to public buildings also notwithstanding the absolute exemption contained in section 2 (1) (a). As a necessary corollary, it was urged, it must follow that Section 20 is also applicable to public buildings notwithstanding Section 2 (1) (a). Learned counsel contended that Sections 20 and 21 together constitute an integral part of a single scheme of protection. If Section 21 (8) points to the conclusion that an application in 21 (l)(a) could not be filed against the class of lessees of public buildings mentioned in section 21 (8), it must follow inevitably that Section 20 also applies to public buildings. 8. I am unable to accept the above contention. If Section 21 (8) points to the conclusion that an application in 21 (l)(a) could not be filed against the class of lessees of public buildings mentioned in section 21 (8), it must follow inevitably that Section 20 also applies to public buildings. 8. I am unable to accept the above contention. In my opinion the exemption enacted in section 2 (1) (a) is express and unambiguous and I cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel without doing violence to the plain language employed by the statute. The intendment behind an enactment has primarily to be culled out from the statutory provisions themselves and the scheme underlying it as disclosed, again, by the statutory provisions themselves. In my view sub-section (8) of Section 21 does not at all countenance the applicants's contentions. Neither the language of that provision, nor its legislative history bears out the interpretation canvassed by the applicant's learned counsel. In my judgment there is no statutory basis at all for the wide premises on which submissions of the applicant's counsel are founded. 9. I may briefly note the history of the relevant statutory provisions Section 2(1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 as it stood prior to the amendment introduced by the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 (U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976) stood as follows : "2 (1) (a). Nothing in this Act shall apply to (a) any building belonging to or vested in the Government of India or the Government of any State or any local authority." Section 3 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 as it stood prior to its amendment by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 did not contain any definition of public building. 10. The position, therefore, was that prior to the coming into force of the U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 both sections 20 and 21 were applicable also to buildings which were taken on lease by or on behalf of the Central or a State Government or any local authority or a public sector corporation. 10. The position, therefore, was that prior to the coming into force of the U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 both sections 20 and 21 were applicable also to buildings which were taken on lease by or on behalf of the Central or a State Government or any local authority or a public sector corporation. For, by virtue of section 2 (1)(a) the operation of the Act was excluded only in regard to the buildings belonging to or vested in the Government of India or the Government of any State or any local authority, or, under clause (b), to any tenancy created by grant from the State Government or the Government of India in respect of a building taken on lease or requisitioned by such Government. This is evident from the perusal of Section 2 (1) (a) and (b) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 as it stood prior to its amendment by the U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976. The result was that prior to 1975 in regard to building let out to the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation, no suits could be filed for ejectment except on the grounds mentioned in section 20. The landlords, on the other hand, were equally at liberty and enjoyed the privilege of filing applications under section 21 (1) (a) for an order of eviction even where the State Government or the Central Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation, were the lessees of the building in question. 11. The position, however, underwent a radical change with the amendment of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 by the aforesaid amended Act of 1976. After the amendment Section 2 (1) (a) reads thus- "2 (1)............Nothing in this Act shall apply to- (a) any public building; or" 12. For the first time public buildings were defined by the insertion of clauses (o)and (p) in section 3 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. After the amendment Section 2 (1) (a) reads thus- "2 (1)............Nothing in this Act shall apply to- (a) any public building; or" 12. For the first time public buildings were defined by the insertion of clauses (o)and (p) in section 3 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Section 3 (o) reads thus :- "Public building" means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State), and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation." Section 3 (p), which is also relevant for the present case, says :- "Public Sector corporation" means any corporation owned or controlled by the Government, and includes any company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the Government." It will be seen that by the change of law the exemption under section 2 (1) (a) was extended to apply also to the buildings taken on lease by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government etc. and not merely to the buildings belonging to or vested in the Central or State Government etc.. 13. Now by the same Amending Act 28 of 1976 sub-section (8) which was the sheet-anchor of the applicant's contention, was inserted in section 21 of the Act and it reads thus- "21 (8). Nothing in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall apply to a building let out to the State Government or to a local authority or to a public sector corporation or to a recognised educational institution unless the Prescribed Authority is satisfied that the landlord is a person to whom clause (ii) or clause (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) is applicable." 14. Curiously clauses (ii) and (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 21 were deleted by the same Amending Act, 1976. The result of deletion of these clauses was that even in regard to clauses (ii) and (iv) of the said explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 21, the landlord could not file applications for orders of eviction in respect of buildings let out to the State Government etc. The result of deletion of these clauses was that even in regard to clauses (ii) and (iv) of the said explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 21, the landlord could not file applications for orders of eviction in respect of buildings let out to the State Government etc. One may say that the net result of the insertion in sub-section (8) and the deletion of clauses (ii) and (iv) was that what was given to the landlords by one hand was taken away by the other. Even the limited right which may have been intended by the Legislature to be conferred upon the landlords under sub-section (8) of Section 21 in regard to cases to which clauses (ii) and (iv) applied was taken away because the said clauses themselves were deleted from the statute book. Thus, prior to the amendment introduced in 1976 the landlords had an unqualified right to bring applications for orders of eviction against the State Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation also under Section 21 just as they could in regard to private lessees. As a result of the amendment, however, it appears that the Legislature intended to limit this right or privilege to those landlords only to whom clauses (ii) and (iv) of the first Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 21 applied. This intention, however, failed to materialise or achieve its purpose because of an unqualified deletion of clauses (ii) and (iv) from the statute book. This may be due to an accidental omission or slip on the part of the draftsman. 15. However, be that as it may, the insertion of sub-section (8) in Section 21 cannot, in my judgment, by any stretch lead to the conclusion that the Legislature intended that notwithstanding the absolute exemption from the operation of the Act to public buildings owned or let out to the Central or the State Government etc. the protection which was available to the Government under Section 20 and the liability for eviction to which it was subject under Section 21 prior to the amendment of the Act was still available to it. the protection which was available to the Government under Section 20 and the liability for eviction to which it was subject under Section 21 prior to the amendment of the Act was still available to it. As mentioned above, the only purpose of sub-section (8) of Section 21 appears to have been while curtailing the privilege of the landlords to bring applications for orders of eviction against the Government or its agencies, to preserve that privilege only in regard to the landlord to whom clauses (ii) and (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) were applicable. Nothing else appears to have been intended by sub-section (8) of Section 21, though the objective failed because of the unqualified deletion of the said clauses themselves. 16. In any case whatever view one might take of the legislative exercise pertaining to sub-section (8) of Section 21, it cannot by any stretch or canon of interpretation have any bearing upon the applicability of the bar created under Section 20.As already observed, I cannot hold that the protection of Section 20 is available to the applicant even though the building under tenancy is totally exempt from the operation of the Act without offending the plain language of Section 2 (1) (a) read with clauses (o) and (p) of Section 3 of the Act. In my humble view the acceptance of the submission of the learned counsel would clearly amount to wholesale legislation in the garb of statutory construction. Support was also sought by the learned counsel from sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the aforesaid Amending Act which reads thus- "26. (3) When an order of eviction under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Principal Act in respect of a building let out to the State Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation or a recognized educational institution has been passed before the commencement of this Act but such tenant has not actually evicted and continues to be in possession of the building at such commencement, then the order of eviction so passed by the Prescribed Authority or by an appellate authority shall, on the tenant's application to the prescribed authority in accordance with sub-section (4), stand discharged and no such order of eviction shall be executed." 17. In my opinion the aforesaid provisions do not advance matters for the applicant any further. In my opinion the aforesaid provisions do not advance matters for the applicant any further. Section 26 enacts a transitory provision. Sub-section (3) of Section 26 merely provides that orders of eviction passed under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Principal Act in respect of a building let out to the State Government etc. shall not be given effect to or enforced, if such tenants had not been actually evicted before the commencement of the Amending Act and the orders of eviction shall stand discharged. This was done in furtherance of the change in law effected by the Amending Act whereby the right or privilege of the landlords to apply under Section 21 (1) (a) for an order of eviction in respect of the buildings leased with the State Government was taken away. In the absence of such a provision the orders of eviction already passed could have been enforced in view of the provisions of the General Clauses Act. Section 26 (3) of the Amending Act goes no further. It does not, in any way, support the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant. 18. I also do not see any warrant for accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the legislative intent behind Section 2 (1) (a) was that whereas all other provisions of the Act such as those relating to power of allotment of the buildings under tenancy shall not be applicable to 'public buildings' the beneficial provisions like Section 20 shall continue to be applicable equally to the public buildings as it does to buildings leased with private individuals. In my opinion the proposition is too wide to be accepted on the language of the Act. The language by the learned counsel for the parties was neither raised before the Full Bench nor decided by it. It is hence not necessary to dwell further on this point. The above discussion disposes of the first point urged in support of this revision. In regard to the second point, learned counsel for the applicant fairly conceded that the same stands concluded by the decision of this Court in the above noted case in which the validity of these provisions was considered and upheld. Learned counsel was, however, unable to advance any argument on the correctness of the view taken in that Division Bench decision. 19. Learned counsel was, however, unable to advance any argument on the correctness of the view taken in that Division Bench decision. 19. As already mentioned, learned counsel did not challenge the correctness or legality of the other findings recorded by the court below. I have examined the said findings and I do not find that the same call for any interference. The tenancy of the applicant having been validily determined, the suit was rightly decreed. 20. In the premise, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs. The execution of the decree is, however, stayed for a period of three months. Revision dismissed.