S. B. Wad ( 1 ) IN this Writ Petition, which is a third W. P. , the petitioner has challenged legality of the departmental proceedings held against him and the order of compulsory retirement passed by the Director General, Pandt Deptt. on 1. 6. 1981. Two earlier petitions filed by the petitioner are CW 477 of 1972 and C. W. 799 of 1981. ( 2 ) ON 24. 8. 1966 and on 11. 9. 1966, he allegedly made journey from Pathankot to Gurdaspnr and then from Jullundur to Pathankot and Gurdaspnr. It is alleged that he travelled in first class, without paying first class fare by using his duty card and thereby causing a pecuniary loss of Rs. 14. 55 to Government. The petitioner was working as a Superintendent of Post Office in the Pandt Deptt. A criminal case was registered against him by the Railway Police. On 25. 9. 1966 lie was suspended. The criminal proceedings were there after dropped. However, his suspension was continued for a contemplated proceedings. A departmental proceeding u/r 14 of thec. C,s. (C. C. A.) Rules, 1965 was started against him with a chargesheet on 31. 5. 1967. On 18. 9. 1967 the petitioner filed an application with a list of sixty documents, for inspection and production. The petitioner wanted these documents for his defence and for cross-examining the prosecution witnesses. Thereafter on 25. 9. 19 67, the order of suspension was revoked on the representation of the petitioner. On 19. 10. 1967 the Enquiry Officer disallowed inspection and production of 42 documents vitully concerned with the case. Enquiry Officer did not assign any reason. This was patently in breach of sub- rule 12 ofr. 14 of the said rules. On 25. 6. 1969 a notice to show cause was issued by the disciplinary authority as to why the punishment of compulsory retirement should not be awarded to him. ( 3 ) IN reply to show cause notice the petitioner filed a detailed statement of defence comprising of about 140 typed pages. In this statement he pointed out as to how there was no evidence for some charges and as to how the other charges could not be established on the basis of the evidence produced by the depaitment. ( 3 ) IN reply to show cause notice the petitioner filed a detailed statement of defence comprising of about 140 typed pages. In this statement he pointed out as to how there was no evidence for some charges and as to how the other charges could not be established on the basis of the evidence produced by the depaitment. He also brought to the notice of the disciplinary authority how the entire proceedings were vitiated on account of the fact that vital documents required for his defence and cross-examination of prosecution witnesses were denied to him. He also cited number of rulings of the High Court and Supreme Court in support of his defence. The Chairman, Pandt Board rejected the petilioner defence and on 15. 11. 1969 passed an order compulsurily retiring the petitioner. The petitioner preferred the statutory appeal. The advice of the Union Public Service Commission was sought. The U. P. S. C. advised that the punishment of compulsory retirement was too severe and punishment of reduction in pay by two stages with cumulative effect was adequate, considering the minor default by the petitioner. The appellate authority did not agree and rejected the appeal on 11. 4. 1972. ( 4 ) THE petitioner thereafter filed C. W. Pn. 477 of 1972, The petition was allowed by Ranganthan,j, on20. 4. J979,and the order of compulsory retirement was quashed on the ground that the Chairman, Pandt. Board was not a competent authorily to pass such an order. The learned Judge noted all the submissions of the petitioner but did not find it necessary to decide them in view of his conclusion that the order of the Chairman was without Jurisdiction. ;thc learned Judge directed the Disciplinary Authority to go into the whole matter and review the decision.- ( 5 ) THEREAFTER, the petitioner was reinstated in service on 11. 2. 1980 but he was not paid his dues. Therefore on 4. 2,1981, petitioner filed a petition for contempt of this Court being C. C. P. No. 30 of 1981. This. court issued notice to respondents on 18. 3. 81 After show cause notice the counsel for the Respondents showed me a letter on 20. 7. 1981 whereby the department had agreed to pay full pay and allowances for the entire period of absence. When the Contempt Petition was filed in this Court the Pandt Board on. 13. 3. This. court issued notice to respondents on 18. 3. 81 After show cause notice the counsel for the Respondents showed me a letter on 20. 7. 1981 whereby the department had agreed to pay full pay and allowances for the entire period of absence. When the Contempt Petition was filed in this Court the Pandt Board on. 13. 3. 1981 passed a similar order compulsorily retiring the petitioner. The said order was challenged on. all the previous gtoiiiid. s by the petitioner in CW 799 of 1981. However, the said order dated 13. 3. 1981 was with drawn by the Deptt. and the petition became infructuons. On 1. 6. 1981 a fresh order of compulsory retirement was passed by the Director General, PAT Deptt. The present petition arises out of the said order. ( 6 ) AFTER issuing the show cause notice the DB of this Court directed the counsel fur the Respondents to produce the original record. After seeing the record the Bench directed the petitioner to file the statutory appeal to the Central Govt. and directed the respondents to expeditiously dipose of the appeal, by the next dale of hearing. This order was passed on 8. 12. 81. There after four adjournment were sought by Respondents informing the Court that the matter was under consideration by the U. P. S. C. When the Bench found that even after seven months no decision was rendered in the appeal the petition was asmited on 14-7-1982 the bech had directed expeditious disposal of the statutory appeal because the proceedings were pending for more than twelve years and the normal date of superannuation of the petitioner, namely, 31. 12. 82 was fast approaching. ( 7 ) THE order of compulsory retirement passed on 1. 6. 1981 is challenged on the following grounds: (1) The order was passed out of vindictiveness by Mr. S. K. Ghosh who simullaneously is Secretary, Ministry of Communication, Director General, Post and Telegraphs and Chairman of the Pandt Board. The order was passed because the petitioner had filed an application for contempt of court. The order- was, therefore, mala fide, (2) The order was arbitra. ry and also a non-speakulg order, (3) Denial of vital documents to petitioner in violation of mandatory Rule- 14 (12) vitiated the entire departmental proceedings under Rule 14. The order was passed because the petitioner had filed an application for contempt of court. The order- was, therefore, mala fide, (2) The order was arbitra. ry and also a non-speakulg order, (3) Denial of vital documents to petitioner in violation of mandatory Rule- 14 (12) vitiated the entire departmental proceedings under Rule 14. This has resulted into denial of the reasonable opportunity of defence to the petitioner, (4) The order was passed in contravention of the directions of this Court in CW 477 of 1972, and no consequent benefits were given to him ( 8 ) THERE is no doubt that the impugned order is a non-speaking order. Being a quasijudicial order the order must be a reasoned order. The law on the point has been very clearly laid down by various decisions of High Courts and the Supreme Court. A final order passed by the Disciplinary Authority must discuss the Department s case, the petitioner s defence, the evidence of both the parties, the reasons why the Department s evidence is more acceptable than that of the delinquent. . The authority must record separate findings on each of the charges. These are not only the requirements of a fair trial but the procedure prescribed by Rule 14 also requires the same. In the impugned order the Director General lias stated that he lias "applied his mind" and "on an objective assesment" held that the charge against the Petitioner is proved. Mere use of words "application of mind" and "objective assessment" does not make an order a speaking order. It must be disclosed in the order itself as to how the mind worked, on what material and how the finding discose that the The older must further disclose that the evidence lias been objectively assessed both for the conclusion of guilt and the appropriateness of punishment. As observed by Punjab and Haryana High Court in Rajinderpal v. State, 1972 (2), S. L. R. 130 "application of judicial mind has to be seen from the order itself and not that the reasons are to be guessed from the scrutiny of Executive files. " The petitioner had filed a detailed statement of defence not only showing the defects in the evidence but also illegalities in the procedure followed during the enquiry. He had also cited several decisions of the High Courts and Supreme Court. " The petitioner had filed a detailed statement of defence not only showing the defects in the evidence but also illegalities in the procedure followed during the enquiry. He had also cited several decisions of the High Courts and Supreme Court. The Disciplinary Authority lias not even referred to the said defences raised by the petitioner. Justice Ranganathan, while allowing W P. 477 of 1972 had directed that the whole matter should be reviewed in tlie light of the submissions and contentions of the Petitioner. It was, therefore, all the more necessary for the impugned order that the direction of this Court has been and truthfully complied with. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside. ( 9 ) THE second submission of the Petitioner, namely, breach of statutory Rule 14 and denial of opportunity of being heard, has also to be accepted. Rule II (1) permits a delinquent Government servant to inspect the documents. Sub-Rule (iii) further permits him to give a notice for discovery and production of document not mentioned along with the Articles of Charge, but he must indicate the relevancy of the documents. Rule 12 obliges an E. O. to procure the documents for which an application is given by the delinquent. The E. O. can refuse such a requisition of documents if it is of the opinion that they are not relevant to the case, but the proviso lays down a mandatory requirement for recording reasons in witing showing how the documents are irrelevant. . In AIR 1971 (Delhi) 133 Surat Singh v. S. R. Bakshi, this Court has held that a delinquent is entitled to two types of documents, one relied by the prosecution and the other asked by him for his defence. The non-supply of documents for his defence and for cross examining the prosecution witnesses, vitiates the whole enquiry. In this case admittedly no reasons were recorded by the E. O. while disallowing production of 42 documents for which the list was given by the petitioner showing relevancy of each of the documents. In case of document at serial 48 (Annexure P-7) the E. O. himself claimed that the document was a priviledged document. Annexure P-; is a copy of the E. O. order of the dated 19. 10. 1967. In case of document at serial 48 (Annexure P-7) the E. O. himself claimed that the document was a priviledged document. Annexure P-; is a copy of the E. O. order of the dated 19. 10. 1967. A bare perusal of the order will show that 42 documents are not shown to the Petitioner with one word comment "irrelevant" or not relevant". In the counter-affidavit to the writ petition there is a simple denial of this allegation without producing any material to show to the contrary. I, therefore, hold that the enquiry was conducted in breach of Rule 14. The petitioner was denied the opportunity to defend his case and to effectively crossexamine the prosecution witnesses. The enquiry proceedings are thus ab initio void and are set aside. ( 10 ) THE provision of appeal in the statutory Rules is to ensure that the enquiry is conducted according to the Rules and the finding is reached on the basis of evidence. The Appellant Authority should ensure that there is a fair trial. It is also the function 196 of the Appellant Authority to see that the punishment is commensurate with the misconduct. While giving the advice it is also the duty of the UPSC to examine all these aspects of a departmental enquiry. When the first order of compulsory retirement was passed in 1967 the Appellate Authority took three years to decide the appeal. UPSC was of the view that the punishment was too harsh and suggested lenient penalty, but the Appellale Authority did not agree. The scales of punishment should be so arranged that punishment serves as a deterrance to others. Suppose if a delinquent had misappropriated or commited a breach of trust involving a lac of rupees the punishment like compulsory retirement or dismissal would have been appropriate. A severe punishment like compulsory retirement loses its teeth if it is awarded in negligible cases of loss of fourteen rupees. From the first order of compulsory retirement to the present order, twelve years have elapsed. Effect of deterrance is lost by such a protracted trial. But where, as in the present case, the proceedings are ab initio void the long delays do incalculable harm to a delinquent as well as to Government. A delinquent is denied all chances of promotion, deputations and other service benefits. Effect of deterrance is lost by such a protracted trial. But where, as in the present case, the proceedings are ab initio void the long delays do incalculable harm to a delinquent as well as to Government. A delinquent is denied all chances of promotion, deputations and other service benefits. If the order is finally set aside, the petitioner is to be reinstated and all the consequential benefits are to be restored without the actual work done by the delinquent. I do not also understand as to why was it necessary to refer the matter again to UPSC in 1981, particularly when the department had maintained the original penalty and had not made any change in it. The UPSC had already advised that a punishment of compulsory retirement should not be imposed. The unnecessary reference to UPSC had delayed the matter further and the petitioner has reached his normal age of superannuation without any decision by the Appellate Authority. ( 11 ) I do not agree with the Petitioner that Shri S. K. Ghosh has passed the order with any personal malice or vindictiveness. There is no material on record to hold that the order is mala fide on this ground. ( 12 ) FOR the reasons stated above the departmental proceedings together with the impugned order are declared void and are set aside. The petitioner would be entitled to al the consequential reliefs, financial and otherwise. All the said benefits should be restored to the Petitioners within two months from today. The ptitioner has sufferred for the last 15 years and had even to file a contempt Petition in this court I had stayed my hands in the contempt Petition because of the assurance given by the Respondent to restore the benefits immediately. it would be an unpleasant duty for this court to take other steps if the promise already made to the court and the directions given now, are not complied with within time. Since the Petitioner has now retired, his pension papers will also have to be finalised quickly