A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision must succeed and the impugned order of the learned Magistrate passed under 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 must be quashed. ( 2 ) IT is settled law that the satisfaction of the Magistrate as to the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace concerning land or water or the boundaries thereof or regarding any alleged right to user of such land or water is the sole foundation of the jurisdiction to proceed under section 145 or section of 147 Chapter XII of the Code of 1898, which is still the Code operating in Sikkim. Section 532 of the Code of 1872, corresponding to section 147 of the Code of 1898, did not contain any reference to any likelihood of breach of peace, as the present section 147 does, but provided that the Magistrate could proceed there under, if a dispute arise concerning the right of any land or water, or any right of way,t whether or not there was any likelihood of breach of peace. But it was nevertheless settled, as would appear from the old Calcutta Division Bench decision delivered by Phear, J. in Rosik Lall Nundi v. Karlik Shaut, that the jurisdiction which is given to the Magistrate by this section is a jurisdiction which is intended for the purpose of preserving the public peace and that the object of the section is not to prevent the mischief or injury which may accrue by reason of the disturbance or assertion of the right to the persons who are disputing about it A fortiori, therefore, there can be no scope for any doubt that under section 147 or section 145 of the Code of 1898, which expressly postulates the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace satisfaction all to the existence of such a dispute alone can vest the Magistrate with jurisdiction to proceed there under. Even though no citation should be necessary, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhinka v. Charan Singh, where it has been observed (at 966) with reference to section 145 of the Code that the foundation of his jurisdiction is an apprehension of the breach of the peace and the observation of the Privy Council in Dinomoni Chowdhrani v. Brojo Mohini Chowdhrani, to the effect that these orders are merely police orders made to prevent breaches of the peace has been quoted with approval. ( 3 ) BUT though there has been no dispute during this long period of more than a century that the satisfaction of the Magistrate as to the apprehend on of the breach of peace is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Chapter XII of the Code or under the corresponding provisions of the preceding Code there was difference of opinion among the different High Courts as to whether such an apprehension must also continue to exist at the time of the passing of the final order. This, however, has now-been set at rest by the Supreme Court in R. H. Bhutani v. Mani. J. Desai where Shelat, J. , speaking for the three Judge Bench, has ruled (at 1447) that it is not necessary that at the time of passing the final order, the apprehension of breach of peace should continue or exist. If there is such an apprehension of breach of peace as to justify a Magistrate to invoke the jurisdiction under Chapter XII of the Code and the Magistrate, on being to satisfied, proceeds there under, it is not necessary that he must go on entertaining and/or recording such apprehension at all stages of the proceedings and his final order cannot be assailed on the ground that at the time of the passing thereof no such apprehension existed or has been recorded. Therefore, the impugned order in this case, even in spite of its absolute silence as to the existence or the continued existence of any such apprehension, is not assailable on that score. ( 4 ) THERE has been, however, no difference of opinion as to the necessity of the existence of such an apprehension at the time when the Magistrate initiates the proceedings. ( 4 ) THERE has been, however, no difference of opinion as to the necessity of the existence of such an apprehension at the time when the Magistrate initiates the proceedings. But though the express terms of 147 require the Magistrate, while initiating the proceeding to make an order stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and even though there are good number of decisions of different High Court to the effect that unless such satisfaction and the grounds therefore are noted in the preliminary order initiating the proceedings all subsequent proceedings would stand vitiated, I have not and this I say with respect been able to persuade myself to adopt such a formal and technical approach. We have traveled a very long distance from the days when literal approach was the rule and we have now been asked to commit ourselves to purposive approach. Tendency of the Courts towards technicality, as pointed out by Vivian Bose, J. in the Supreme Court decision in Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta is to be deprecated and It is the substance that counts and must take precedence over mere form. Therefore, if a Magistrate proceeds to take action under Section 147 and there are materials on record to show that there were grounds for his satisfaction as to the likelihood of breach of the peace, a mere failure on the part of the Magistrate to formally record his satisfaction and the grounds there for cannot vitiate the final order. If the Revisional Court is satisfied from the materials on record that the Magistrate was Justified in taking action under the Section, it should hot and would not set aside the order simply because the Magistrate failed to record the proceedings in a formal roamer as laid down by the Section. If there were grounds justifying he satisfaction of the Magistrate, then his failure to make a formal record of his satisfaction and to state the grounds there for cannot affect his jurisdiction. This view finds support from the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kapoor Chand v. Suraj Prasad and also of the Orissa High Court in Murali Patel v. Purusottam Bhatt of the Patna High Court in Newa Lal Sharma v. Bikku Sharma and several other decisions. This view finds support from the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kapoor Chand v. Suraj Prasad and also of the Orissa High Court in Murali Patel v. Purusottam Bhatt of the Patna High Court in Newa Lal Sharma v. Bikku Sharma and several other decisions. ( 5 ) IN this case, however, the Magistrate has recorded in the initiating order that he was satisfied as to the likelihood of breach of peace. But is such satisfaction absolutely subjective and beyond judicial review? If, as already noted even when there is no such record of satisfaction, an order is to be upheld if the revisional Court finds that the materials on record justify such satisfaction, then a fortiori even when there is such a formal record of satisfaction, the revisional Court should be entitled to see whether there were any material at all to justify such satisfaction. The view that once a Magistrate was recorded his satisfaction as to the apprehension of breach of the peace, the Revisiooal Court is dis-entitled from examining as to whether there was any material at all for such satisfaction, would give the Magistrate absolute, uncontrolled and unguided power to initiate proceeding under Section 147 and to affect the rights of the parties by orders passed there under and such view would make the law arbitrary and unreasonable. Disputes relating to immoveable properties and rights in respect thereof are for the Civil Courts to decide and the Magistrates have been given this quasi civil jurisdiction to decide these disputes only as an incidental to their primary duty to preserve law and order and to prevent the breach of peace. If a mere record of satisfaction as to the apprehension of breach of peace, without any material whatsoever to support such satisfaction, is sufficient to vest the Magistrate with jurisdiction to interfere with civil rights and such satisfaction, howsoever reached, is beyond the power of supervision and superintendence of the Revisional Courts, then exercise of such jurisdiction would be abhorrent to all sense of justice. It is true that in the Supreme Court decision in R. H. Bhutani v. Mani J. Desai, (supra,) which was a case under Section 145 of the Code, the Supreme Court has observed (at 1448) that T1the satisfaction, is of the Magistratet and T1the question whether on the materials before him he should initiate the proceedings or not is, therefore, in his discretion which, no doubt, has to be exercised in accordance with the well recognized rules of law in that behalf and the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied himt But even though the discretion is vested in and rests with the Magistrate, since, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, such discretion un-doubted has to be exercised in accordance with welt-recognized rules of law in that behalf there must be some authority to examine that it has been so exercised because, if there is no such authority to review as to whether the discretion has been so exercised, the mandate to exercise the discretion in accordance with the well recognized rules of law in that behalf would amount only to a pious sermon. Since the order passed by the Magistrate can be challenged under the Code in revision only, it would be for the revisional Courts to examine whether the discretion has been exercised according to well-established norms and rules. Further, according to the Supreme Court decision noted above, what the High Court in revision cannot do is to go into the question of sufficiency of material which satisfied the Magistrate, if there are some materials, as distinguished from no material at all, it would not be open to the High Court to reappraise and reassess their quality and weight and to hold that those were not sufficient to justify the satisfaction of the Magistrate as to the apprehension of breach of peace. But if there is no material at all as distinguished from insufficient materials, it would be the plainest duty of the High Court to intervene in revision. ( 6 ) I have, therefore, gone through all the materials record including the application made by the Respondent No. 1 to the Magistrate for initiating the proceeding, the report of the Panchayat relied on by the Magistrate and the entire evidence recorded by him. ( 6 ) I have, therefore, gone through all the materials record including the application made by the Respondent No. 1 to the Magistrate for initiating the proceeding, the report of the Panchayat relied on by the Magistrate and the entire evidence recorded by him. But I have not found that in any of them and at any stage it was even remotely suggested that the alleged dispute between the parties as to the right of user of water caused or was likely to cause any breach of the peace and, as I see it, all throughout, the case was that the petitioner had not allowed the Respondent No. 1 to use water from a channel, which, according to the Respondent No. 1, was used lay him before. This if, true, might give rise to a civil action or a criminal prosecution, but there is to material at all to suggest that the alleged dispute, at any point of time, caused or was likely to cause any breach of peace. The impugned order of the learned Magistrate, therefore, plainly amounted to illegal assumption and exercise of jurisdiction and must be get aside. ( 7 ) THE learned Sessions Judge in his report has also pointed out that the learned Magistrate, who passed the impugned order as Deputy District Magistrate, was neither the District Magistrate nor a Magistrate of the First Class and, therefore, the impugned order was without jurisdiction as, under Section 147, only a District Magistrate, A Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class can exercise jurisdiction. The expression Deputy District Magistratet is unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure. , The learned Magistrate, who was so designated, could not be an Additional District Magistrate, as under Section 10 (2) of the Code, only a Magistrate of the First class can be so appointed and admittedly the learned Magistrate had no First Class Power. The expression Deputy District Magistratet is unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure. , The learned Magistrate, who was so designated, could not be an Additional District Magistrate, as under Section 10 (2) of the Code, only a Magistrate of the First class can be so appointed and admittedly the learned Magistrate had no First Class Power. Could he be equated with a Sub-Divisional Magistrate under the Code as under Section 13 of the Code a Magistrate of the Second Class also can be appointed as Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or did he succeed temporarily to the office of the Chief Executive Administration of the District within the meaning of the Section 11 of the Code, in which case he could, under that Section, exercise all the powers and perform all the duties respectively conferred and imposed by this Code on the District Magistrate? It is true that if he was not the District Magistrate or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class, nor an officer succeeding temporarily to the office of the District Magistrate under Section 11, he was not empowered to exercise jurisdiction under Section 147 and the learned Sessions Judge was right that in such a case the impugned order was void. That is the clear provision of Section 530 (j), to which, however, the learned Sessions Judge has made no reference, where under if any Magistrate, not being empowered by Law in this behalf makes an order under Chapter XII, his proceedings shall be void. But as there is nothing on recording to show that the learned Magistrate designated as the Deputy District Magistrate, was or was not a Sub-Divisional Magistrate within the meaning of the Code and did or did not succeed temporarily to the office of the District Magistrate within the meaning of Section 11, I am not inclined to quash the impugned order on that ground. But as already indicated hereinbefore, for the reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned order is absolutely unsustainable and most be set aside. ( 8 ) THE revision is, therefore, accepted and the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate is quashed. The records to go down at once. --- *** --- .