Defendants 1 to 4 have challenged the correctness of the judgment and decree passed against them by the learned District Judge, Cachar at Silchar by which he upheld the decision of the learned Assistant District Judge No. 2, Cachar. The suit was for khas possession of the land described in the schedule of the plaint. According to the plaintiffs, they were the owners of the suit property over which the temple is situated. According to them, the temple was constructed more than a hundred year ago, and defendant No. 2 was initially appointed as the priest. As he indulged in corrupt practices, he was removed and one Hari Mohan discharged the duties of the priest for about 20 years. But Hari Mohan having left for Upper Assam, defendant No. 1 was requested to worship the diety. One of the service conditions was that defendant No. 1 would live in a house described in Schedule-II. After this defendant also took recourse to corrupt and immoral practices, and so he was removed from service and was asked to hand-over possession of the house on Schedule-II land. On his failure to do so, the present suit was filed by stating that defendants 5 to 11 are accomplices of defen­dants 1 to 4. These averments were denied by the defendants, though defendants 5 to 12 accepted that they had no right over the said temple or the land. The trial court accepted the case of the plaintiffs on being satisfied about their title inter alia because of a number of documents to sustain their claim. The learned District Judge has agreed with this finding. 2. The only point urged before me on behalf of the appellants is that the temple in question has to be regarded as a public temple as such defendant No. 1 was not removable by the plaintiffs. Shri Choudhuri has referred to a number of decisions to bring home the difference between "a public trust" and "a private trust". At first, is is emphasised that for creating an endowment no writing is necessary. Reference is made, in this connection, to the Tagore Law Lectures of B. K. Mukherjee's on "Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts". Shri Choudhuri has referred to a number of decisions to bring home the difference between "a public trust" and "a private trust". At first, is is emphasised that for creating an endowment no writing is necessary. Reference is made, in this connection, to the Tagore Law Lectures of B. K. Mukherjee's on "Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts". It is stated at page 105 of 4th Edition that the essential formalities for the creation of a religious or charitable endowment according to Hindu Law are : (1) the property in respect of which the endowment is made must be designated with precision; (2) the object or purpose of dediction should be clearly indicated, and (3) the founder must effectively divest himself of all beneficial interests in the endowed property. So far as these aspects are concerned, it is enough to say that there is absolutely nothing to satisfy any of these essentials in as much as nobody has specifically stated about any endowment or the purpose thereof or divesting of beneficial interests by the founder. Shri Choudhury, however, presses into service the decision in the Commissioner for Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments, Mysore vs. Shri Ratnavarma Heggade, (1977) 1 SCC 525 , which has held that in many cases a dedica­tion or endowment of property for a particular purpose has to be inferred from immemorial user of a property in a particular manner or from the conduct of a party". (See para 49). In Paragraph 55 it has been stated that such dedication may be implied from user permitted for public and religious purposes for sufficient length of time. The conduct of the property owner and other circumstances are taken into account in arriving at the inference of such a dedication. Reference is also made to Deoki Nandan vs. Murlidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133 wherein it was stated that the distinction between a private and a public trust is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific indi­viduals, in the latter they are general public or a class thereof. An endowment his, therefore, to be held to be private or public as per this rendering, keeping in view the fact whether the beneficiaries thereunder are specific persons or the general public or sections thereof. An endowment his, therefore, to be held to be private or public as per this rendering, keeping in view the fact whether the beneficiaries thereunder are specific persons or the general public or sections thereof. I am also referred to Narayan vs. Gopal, AIR 1960 SC 100 , wherein it was stated that once a long course of user by the public for the purpose of worship is established, and the fact of a separate endowment in trust for the diety is also proved, it would be fair to infer that the institution must have been dedicated for user by the public- particularly when the character of the temple, its construction, the arrangement of the various parts of the temple and the nature of dieties installed there are similar to what obtains in admittedly public temples. Finally reliance is placed on Shri Govindlalji vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638 , wherein it was observed that where evidence in regard to the foundation of a temple is not clearly available, the question whether a Hindu temple is public or private is determined by relying on certain other facts which are treated as relevant. These factors were mentioned in this connection : (1). Is the temple built in such an imposing manner that it may prima facie appear to be a public temple ? (2). Are the members of the public entitled to an entry in the temple ? (3). Are they entitled to take part in offering service and taking Darshan in the temple ? (4). Are the members of the public entitled to take part in the festivals and ceremonies arranged in the temple ? (5). Are their offer­ings accepted as a matter of right ? 3. Let it be seen in the above background of law, whether there are materials on record in the case at hand to sustain the plea of the appellants that the temple was public in nature. The only evidence which could be pressed into service in this connection by the appellants is a solitary statement of PW 2 in cross-examination that Manipuris come to temple and offer worship. The only evidence which could be pressed into service in this connection by the appellants is a solitary statement of PW 2 in cross-examination that Manipuris come to temple and offer worship. Though some strength is also sought to be derived from the statement of this witness that Manipuris construct Mandir and Mandaps in villages, to contend that this temple was also cons­tructed by Manipuris, such a conclusion cannot be drawn from the aforesaid statement of PW 2. Shri Choudhuri is, however, very emphatic that the very fact that all Manipuris offer worship in the temple would shew that the present is a public temple. 4. But from what has been stated about the legal position in this regard, it would need a bold man to come to the irre­sistible conclusion that a temple must be public in nature only because of She fact that public are allowed to offer worship in the same. Though immemorial user would definitely be a relevant piece of circumstance, but that would not be decisive. This would be borne out by what has been stated in Shri Govindlalji's case (supra) where this was accepted as one of the circumstances, and that too if the offering was to be as of right. As to the test general relating to the public or a section thereof being the beneficiaries, it may be stated that there is nothing to show if the Manipuris of the village were taken as beneficiaries apart from their being allowed to offer worship. The privilege of offering worship cannot by itself make the whole class of Manipuris 'beneficiaries', as in this expression are understood in law relating to creation of trusts. In Narayan (supra) long user by the public was accepted as a circumstance to infer dedication for public, in case there were to be a separate endowment or trust for the diety, which is missing in the present case. Further, there is nothing to show about the type of construction of the temple, nature of its arrangement and that of the deities. Nor do we know if the public were entitled to take part in the festivals connected with the temple nor even whether they were entitled to offer worship. 5. Further, there is nothing to show about the type of construction of the temple, nature of its arrangement and that of the deities. Nor do we know if the public were entitled to take part in the festivals connected with the temple nor even whether they were entitled to offer worship. 5. As such, the mere fact of long user by the Manipuris in the sense of their being allowed to offer worship cannot be accepted as a conclusive factor to hold the temple at hand to be public in nature. Shri Achirjee has buttressed the argument of his senior by referring to soms documsnts marked as Exts. B(1) to B(3). These are some letters showing grant of timber in the name of Dhanababu Sharma (defendant No. 2). As to these documents, it may be first stated that they were exhibited not in this case, but in T. S. 146/64, whereas the present appeal arises out of T. S. 40/70, which was subsequently numbered as T. S. 11/72. Secondly it is submitted by the learned Advocate General, Meghalaya, who has appeared for the respondents, that all that is shown by these documents is issue of permit in the name of Dhanababu who at one point of time was the priest of the temple in question. So, these documents cannot shed alight on the controversy at hand. There is sufficient force in the con­tention of the learned Advocate General. 6. This being all that has to be said on the contention of the appellants that the temple was not the private property of the plaintiffs because of which defendant No. 1 could not be removed from service, it has to be held that the appellants have failed to make out their case. Other material aspects of the case being covered by concurrent findings of facts, cannot be disturbed in this proceeding as it has not been brought to my notice if the findings had been arrived at by admitting any material evidence, or by admitting inadmissible evidence. 7. The result is that the appeal cannot be accepted and the same is therefore dismissed.