JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, M. - These two second appeals by Hamidulnisa and Liyakat Ali arise out of suit No. 19 of 1976 Liyakat Ali v. Hamidulnisa etc. and No. 18 of 1976 Liyakat Ali v. Jumai etc. respectively, both under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for declaration of Bhumidhari as well as Sirdari rights. Both the suits were decreed by the learned trial court for Bhumidhari land only in suit No. 18 of 1976 and for all land in suit No. 19 of 1976 by the judgment and decree dated August 19, 1977 but in the trial appeal the learned Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizabad confirmed to decree in suit No. 19 of 1976 against Hamidulnisa while the other suit against Jumai as dismissed entirely, giving rise to these second appeals. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. 3. In suit No. 18 of 1976, Liyakat Ali claimed to be Bhumidhar of the plot number 46 and Sirdar of plot number 189 on the basis of a sale-deed dated March 27, 1965 from Abdul Rehman while Smt. Hamidulnisa had already been declared rightful Bhumidhar and Sirdar on the ? share of Niamat Ali comprising of the above plots in consolidation proceedings. In suit No. 18 of 1976, Liyakat Ali claimed to be Bhumidhar of plot No. 222-A and Sirdar of plots No. 57 and 222-B while Jumai had already been declared rightful Bhumidhar and Sirdar on the various shares as per order of the S.O.C. dated March 20, 1967 in consolidation proceedings. The plaintiff's claim against Hamidulnisa rested on the ground that she had got her name entered in Chakbandi by playing fraud on the authorities and so there was no bar under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act and the question of title could be looked into by revenue court under Section 229-B of the Act. His claim against Jumai rested on the ground of a sale-deed dated March 27, 1965 from Abdul Rehman and a compromise which was filed before the consolidation officer but this compromise had been rejected by the S.O.C. being against the interest of Hamidulnisa and this view as upheld by the Hon'ble High Court in judgment dated January 13, 1969. His claim against Jumai rested on the ground of a sale-deed dated March 27, 1965 from Abdul Rehman and a compromise which was filed before the consolidation officer but this compromise had been rejected by the S.O.C. being against the interest of Hamidulnisa and this view as upheld by the Hon'ble High Court in judgment dated January 13, 1969. The two suits were quite separate and not at all connected except for common relatives being parties but the learned trial court consolidated the two cases, considered the evidence in both the cases and mixed up the findings creating confusion. In fact, both the cases are independent of each other and there can be no leading cases. The only common feature can be the questions of law which are, whether the bar under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act applies, whether the decisions by the consolidation authorities and High Court act as res judicata against these suits, whether the suits are barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, whether the suits are barred by limitation and the question of possession arising out of the last two issues relating to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and limitation. 4. The learned counsel for Hamidulnisa argued that the decision of the courts below was based on wrong reliance on the statement of Jumai taken before the consolidation officer, that the statement of Jumai was again taken by the learned trail court but he was not confronted with his earlier statement and so the earlier statement in another court could not be relied upon in view of Section 145 of the Evidence Act and the ruling reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1712. He argued that there was mis-reading of evidence as admission by Jumai about another person's claim could not be taken as admission of Hamidulnisa as was done by the courts below. In fact, the case before the consolidation officer to which this earlier statement belonged, had Jumai and Hamidulnisa as adversaries and so the statement of Jumai interpreted as admission by Hamidulnisa was clearly a mis-reading of evidence. The learned counsel further argued that the question of Hamidulnisa being daughter of Niamat Ali and been finally decided by the judgment of the S.O.C. dated March 20, 1967, D.D.C. dated October 4, 1967 and the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court dated January 13, 1969. The learned counsel further argued that the question of Hamidulnisa being daughter of Niamat Ali and been finally decided by the judgment of the S.O.C. dated March 20, 1967, D.D.C. dated October 4, 1967 and the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court dated January 13, 1969. Hence the statement by Jumai in the same case before the consolidation Officer could not be made the basis of a different finding. He further argued that the learned Additional Commissioner had not considered the oral evidence to arrive at a finding on possession and that the bar under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act was applicable, in support cited a ruling reported in 1972 R.D. 326 in which the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court held that Section 27(2) and Sections 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act operate in different fields and do not override or infringe on each other and that Section 27(2) of the Act can be applied only if the bar under Section 49 does not apply. He further argued that the learned Additional Commission carved out a new case for the plaintiff by holding that the plaintiff had natural rights by continued adverse possession when there was no such plea nor issue framed apart from the finding of possession being based on no evidence. He argued that since the case was pending till January 13, 1969 before the Hon'ble High Court consolidation proceedings had to be deemed pending and there was no question of counting adverse possession before this date. He also argued that Liyakat Ali himself as PW-1 had stated that all the land he had obtained only by sale-deed from Abdul Rehman, and this also ruled out any consideration of adverse possession, that no defendant had admitted the plaintiff's case and the observation of the courts below about the defendant's admission was incorrect and based on no evidence but on surmises. Lastly, he argued that the sale-deeds were filed on September 22, 1975 and were not proved and so could not be read in evidence. This factual position is found correct. 5. Lastly, he argued that the sale-deeds were filed on September 22, 1975 and were not proved and so could not be read in evidence. This factual position is found correct. 5. The learned counsel for Jumai argued on similar lines on law points that bar of Section 49 was applicable, that the said compromise had been deemed inadmissible upto the stage of the High Court and could not be relied upon and that any transfer by sale by Abdul Rehman could not affect the rights of Jumai determined in consolidation proceedings. 6. The learned counsel for Liyakat Ali argued that Hamidulnisa had obtained entry in her name on the basis of fraudulent pedigree and Jumai had sold all his share as was seen from the sale-deed. He argued that Jumai's statement in consolidation court had to be relied upon as by a senior member of the family and other oral evidence had also been considered, that Hamidulnisa did not appear as witness, so adverse inference against her was drawn. He argued that if fraud is the basis of order obtained from the consolidation court, then the bar under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act does not apply, in support, he relied on the ruling reported in 1976 A.W.R. 585. He further argued that Liyakat Ali being in possession from the date of the sale-deed in 1965, had matured his rights by adverse possession as six years were completed before October 14, 1971. 7. I have gone through the two judgments of the courts below and found them based on little application of mind. These two judgments are full of mis-interpretations of Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act, Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act, Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and limitation, misreading and mis-interpretation of evidence and surmises. The learned trial court has merely considered the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court for deciding the issue on res-judicata, when the court itself framed the issue (s) as below : "Do the decisions of the consolidation court and the Hon'ble High Court act as res-judicata to the present suits?" Incomplete consideration resulted in mis-understanding and the court decided the issue in the negative. The learned Additional Commissioner also did not pay any attention to the issue. The learned Additional Commissioner also did not pay any attention to the issue. In fact, all material points involved in the present suits were taken case of the S.O.C. in his judgment dated March 20, 1967 and its consideration should have resulted in a different finding. In respect of the issues relating to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, the learned trial court innocently mentioned that Section 34 of the Act does not bar a suit for declaration. The court did not realise that the question of possession had a bearing on this issue and if it was found that the plaintiff was not in possession, then it was necessary for him to have sought the relief of possession and the issue had to be decided on this basis. Similarly, the issue on limitation was not at all understood by the learned trial court. To give a finding on it, the court had to decided if the defendants and been in possession, had they been so in possession beyond the period of limitation. Since the defendants had challenged that they were in possession, therefore these issues were framed and had to be accordingly decided. The learned Additional Commissioner not feel the need to touch this point. 8. While it was no case of the plaintiff, the trial court found adverse possession of the plaintiff on plot No. 189 and decreed the suit for this Sirdari plot also and the learned Additional Commissioner also gave similar finding, going clearly beyond the plaint case. It was held by the Privy Council in the case reported in A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 57 that- "Where a claim has been never made in the defence presented no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea never put forward (A.I.R. 1925 Sind 2 confirmed)." This was reiterated in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2262. To the present case, it was not a question of evidence either, it was merely an observation of the court turned into a finding, for the judgment shows no documentary, evidence in support of the plaintiff's possession, the court has mis-read evidence stating that the defendants admitted the claim of the plaintiff when there is no such admission and the discussion evidence and finding all are continued in one sentence shortly before the order part. "As regards the Sirdari land since the plaintiff is continuously is possession over the same, he is entitled to be the Sirdar of List B." This is no finding in the eye of law. The learned Additional Commissioner also has mis-read the evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 2 for these witness have proved possession of Liyakat Ali on ? share of Abdul Rehman only and not on other land which actually includes the land in dispute. The share of Abdul Rehman as understood by the D.Ws. has been mis-constructed by the court. Even Liyakat Ali in his statement admitted on September 22, 1975 that all chaks were carved out in accordance with the decision of the consolidation authorities and possession was delivered to them accordingly. The plaintiff never showed how he regained possession of these disputed plots which had gone to Hamidulnisa and Jumai in Chak-bandi still without evidence the two courts below held the plaintiff in possession. 9. This analysis has become necessary to show that the findings of the two courts below, in view of the position of possession of the defendants, in respect of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and limitation will require reversal. 10. Coming to the most important question about the bar under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act the finding by the learned trial court is most disappointing, for it says that since the defendants have admitted the claim of the plaintiff therefore, he bar under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act is no applicable. This issue of law has to be decided on the basis of facts, viz. the plaintiff's claim with reference to the adjudications by the consolidation authorities, and cannot be decided on the basis f any admissions or compromises. The learned Additional Commissioner did not consider the question but could not appraise the relative effect of Section 27(2) and Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act. The ruling relief upon by the learned Additional Commissioner is by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice C.P. Trivedi in Yogendra Vikram Singh and others v. Krishna Kumar Singh 1976 A.W.C. 536 (H.C.Lko.). It was held that under Section 27(2) of the U.P.C.H. Act the entries could be challenged and proved to be not true and in such case the bar under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act would not apply. Justice C.P. Trivedi in Yogendra Vikram Singh and others v. Krishna Kumar Singh 1976 A.W.C. 536 (H.C.Lko.). It was held that under Section 27(2) of the U.P.C.H. Act the entries could be challenged and proved to be not true and in such case the bar under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act would not apply. Other views on this point would appear in the rulings reported in 1972 R.D. 326 (H.C.D.B.), 1978 R.D. 104 (B.R.), 1979 R.D. 170 (B.R.) and 1980 R.D. 43 (H.C.). The consistent view taken in these rulings is that the adjudication of rights by the consolidation authorities is final and if by clerical error or mistake or framed the final entries do not reflect the adjudication by the consolidation authorities, the entries can be rebutted. Thus mistakes in Amaldaramad can be corrected under Section 27(2) of the Act is held in 1978 R.D. 104. The same view has been taken in 1979 R.D. 170, holding the adjudication by the consolidation authorities as final and not challenge-able under Section 27(2). In fact, the ruling in 1980 R.D. 43 makes the position clear, holding the bat under Section 49 of the claim not consistent with the adjudication of the consolidation authorities, and further holding that: "The present suit is not for declaration of rights in land. It is for the declaration of the validity of the order passed by the D.D.C." It was held that the suit for declaration of the validity of the D.D.C's order was not barred, also implying that a suit for declaration of rights in land against the adjudication by the consolidation authorities is barred under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act. The Division Bench ruling further clarifies the position. It was held that: "Reading the two together, the position would be that a suit or proceeding for the correcting of entry on the ground that it is not true or correct will be entertain-able only if it is not barred by Section 49. If the civil or revenue courts are debarred from entertaining such a question, obviously they cannot possibly enter into the merits of the dispute and to adjudicate the correctness of the entries." "The widow of the deceased co-tenant of the grove plot in dispute instituted the instant suit for partition under Section 176 of the Z.A. Act. If the civil or revenue courts are debarred from entertaining such a question, obviously they cannot possibly enter into the merits of the dispute and to adjudicate the correctness of the entries." "The widow of the deceased co-tenant of the grove plot in dispute instituted the instant suit for partition under Section 176 of the Z.A. Act. The suit was contested by the defendant co-tenant on the ground that it was barred by a family settlement, and that under the personal law the plaintiff had no share or interest in the grove plot." These rulings make it abundantly clear that grounds of clerical error, other mistake or fraud can be considered to rebut the correctness of entries under Section 27(2), when such entries do not reflect the adjudication by the consolidation authorities and it is sought to make the entries consistent with such adjudication, i.e., when the bar under Section 49 of the Act does not apply. but the bar can never be considered removed or waived on the ground of any error or fraud in adjudication. The Division bench ruling of the Hon'ble High Court confirms this view and has to prevail over the divergent views. 11. One more aspect could be considered. The so called fraud relates to Hamidulnisa being the daughter of Lodi instead of Niamat. But this aspect was considered and was thrashed out on more cogent reasons by the S.D.O. than could be got hold of by the learned trial court or the Additional Commissioner in the instant case where the sole basis was statement by Jumai which had already been discarded by the S.O.C. in the case when that statement was given, as unacceptable. It is fantastic to discard the finding of the S.O.C. maintained till the High Court and against the finding of the S.O.C. to accept the solitary statement of Jumai as binding. 12. In consequence, I find that all the findings of issues on bar under Section 49, bar of res-judicata, bar under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and limitation are liable to be reversed. The judgment and decree of the learned Additional Commissioner in the suit Liyakat Ali v. Hamidulnisa deserves to be set aside while the other suit already dismissed, being consistent with the above findings, the decree in respect of Liyakat Ali v. Jumai need not be disturbed. 13. The judgment and decree of the learned Additional Commissioner in the suit Liyakat Ali v. Hamidulnisa deserves to be set aside while the other suit already dismissed, being consistent with the above findings, the decree in respect of Liyakat Ali v. Jumai need not be disturbed. 13. In the result, the appeal by Hamidulnisa is allowed with costs through-out and the related judgment and decree is hereby set aside. The other appeal by Liyakat Ali has no force and is, accordingly, dismissed. 14. This order shall govern second appeal Nos. 80 and 40 of 1978-79, Pratapgarh.