M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THE nine petitioners herein were at the time of filing of the petition members of the Board of management of Bekkalekale service Co-operative society ltd. , Maddur Tlk. , Mandya Dist. The petition was filed on 18th April 1976. The petitioners were aggrieved by the order of supersession passed under sub-sec. (1) of S. 30 of the Karnataka co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') by the 1st respondent-Deputy registrar of Co-operative societies, Mandya. The said order of supersession dt. 30. 3. 1976 is produced as Ex-D to the petition. While superseding the management, the 2nd respondent Co-operative Extension officer, III Circle, Maddur Tlk. , was appointed administrator with effect from the date he assumes charge. ( 2 ) IT would be relevant to state that the 2nd respondent did not assume charge as Administrator pursuant to the impugned order on account of the stay granted by this Court on 21. 4. 1976. Therefore, the elected body of the Cooperative society in question has continued to function as Board of management of the Society. ( 3 ) THE brief facts which are not in dispute may be stated and they are as follows: -"the 1st respondent-Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Mandya divn. , issued a show cause notice dt. 31. 12. 1975 levelling as many as eight charges of acts of mis-management acts of commission and omission in the proper management of the society by reason of which he proposed to supersede the Board of management of the society and put the society in charge of an Administrtor as contemplated under S. 30 of the Act. He also invited the board of management to submit its explanation within 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice. A true copy of the notice is produced at Ex.-A to the petition. The petitioners showed cause in writing explaining the charges levelled against them and a true copy of the explanation is produced at Ex.-B to the petition. A true copy of the notice is produced at Ex.-A to the petition. The petitioners showed cause in writing explaining the charges levelled against them and a true copy of the explanation is produced at Ex.-B to the petition. They denied all the charges and pointed out that some of the charges related to the acts of commission and omission for the year 1961-62 and 1971-72 and the petitioners were not then the members of the Board of Management of the society and in any event any irregularities that might have been committed by the previous management had since been rectified by the petitioners after having taken charge and there were no losses incurred by the Society during the period of their office. The detailed explanation which is in Kannada was sent to the 1st resondent Deputy Registrar of Co-operative societies. On receipt of the explanation, 1st respondet passed an order on 17. 2. 1976 rejecting the explanation and superseding the Board of management. A true-copy of that order is produced at Ex-C. That order, however, came to be quashed by this Court in W. P. No. 1. 931 of 1976 by venkataramaiah, J. , as he then was in this court by his order dt. 3. 3. 1976 solely on the ground that the order was not a speaking order as there was no discussion of the explanation offered by the petitioners in regard to the charges levelled against them. He, however, reserved liberty to the 2nd respondent Registrar therein to dispose of the case afresh in accordance with law. It is thereafter, the impugned order ex.-D, as earlier stated, was passed against which the present petition is directed more or less on the same grounds. " ( 4 ) NO statement of objections has been filed on behalf of the respondents. Learned Government Pleader has raised a preliminary objection in regard to the maintainability of this petition, as there is an appeal provided under the statute against the, impugned oder and the petitioners having not availed themselves of that statutory remedy cannot invoke jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. This preliminary objection must be overruled, because this Court had entertained the earlier writ petition notwithstanding that no appeal had been preferred and allowed the petition for the reasons given which have been referred to in the course of this order earlier. This preliminary objection must be overruled, because this Court had entertained the earlier writ petition notwithstanding that no appeal had been preferred and allowed the petition for the reasons given which have been referred to in the course of this order earlier. For the same reason, it would be unfair for this court to drive the petitioners from pillar to post. The objection raiised is really technical. In my view the appeal is not an efficacious alternative remedy and therefore not availing of that is not a bar for this court to entertain the petition in its discretionary jurisdiction. Therefore the objection is overruled. ( 5 ) THE learned Govt. Pleader has relied on the records which, he has produced into Court for Court's perusal. ( 6 ) MR. Keshavamurthy, learned counsel for the petitioners strongly contended that the order is vitiated, because it is politically motivated and malafide in as much as the petitioners as well other members of the Board of management of Co-operative societies in Mandya Dist. mostly belonged to what was then known as Congress (O) party, while the Govt. , in power at the relevant time was the Congress (1) party and therefore, the 1st respondent was pressurised by the Govt. to supersede the management of this and other societies in the district. This allegation of malafide is bound to be rejected for the reason that it is too vague and indefinite and no specific person in the Govt. is attributed with the commission of the act of malafide. In fact, the State Govt. , is not even made party to these proceedings making it impossible for anybody specifically to deny the vague charges made, snot so much against the Govt. but against the Congress (I) party which is said to have been in power at the relevant time. ( 7 ) IT was next urged by Mr. Keshava murthy that the impugned order was vitiated in as much as it was passed in violation of the rules of natural justice. It has been his argument that the petitioners were not given a oral hearing and therefore, as the impugned order visited on each of the petitioners with civil consequence of the loss of the elected; office, the order was contrary to the maxim audi alteram partem. It has been his argument that the petitioners were not given a oral hearing and therefore, as the impugned order visited on each of the petitioners with civil consequence of the loss of the elected; office, the order was contrary to the maxim audi alteram partem. In support of this, he relied upon a decision of this Court rendered by a Division Bench in Jagdish patil v. State of Karnataka (1 ). In the said case, the Division Bench had occasion to consider S. 30-A of the Act, which empowers the State; Govt. to appoint a special officer for a period not exceeding two years who shall perform the functions assigned to him under that section notwithstanding the Committee of management elected by the members of Cooperative society. Puttaswamy, J, speaking for the Bench relying upon earlier decisions of this Court rendered under S. 30 of the Act, held that there was requirement or need for issuance of notice to the management before the appointment of Special Officer as the appointment of Special Officer amounted to loss of office to the members of the board of management duly elected who were visited with civil consequences. In fact Sri Keshava murthy drew my attention specially to the passage extracted from the decision of the Supreme Court in Swadeshi cotton Mills v. Union of India (2 ). Undoubtedly the decisions relied upon by Mr. Keshava Murthy do lay down the law with which none, can have any quarrel. But those decisions do not support his contention that in a case of supersession under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 30 the Act the board of management should be given an oral hearing even though such a oral hearing is not provided in that section itself. Nor was it asked for by the Board of management as conceded by Sri Keshava Murthy. For long the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that whenever a person is sought to be visited with a civil consequence he must have an opportunity to defend the charges on the basis of which the civil consequence, is visited. In other words that he, must be given an opportunity to make his representation. He should know the case against him clearly and he must have an opportunity to meat that case made out against him. In other words that he, must be given an opportunity to make his representation. He should know the case against him clearly and he must have an opportunity to meat that case made out against him. It is in respect of these two principles that a person visited with a civil consequence must be clearly given notice of the case which he should meet and an opportunity to meet that case which the Swedeshi cotton Mills case has explained, and nothing more. When the statute does not specifically confer the right of oral hearing it cannot be claimed as of right under the maxim audi alteram partem. In fact, even when the statutory right to move the Central Govt. in the revision was presse,d into service in regard to the need for a oral hearing under the Mineral Concession Rules of 1960 (See Rule 55 of the said Rules) the Supreme Court in the MP Industres ltd. v. Union of India (3) held that the section as it was worded merely contemplated an opportunity to the revision petitioner of making his representation against the case made out or the statement filed by the State Govt. against the revision petitioner and that did not involve giving of a oral hearing and such oral hearing would depend upon the facts of each case and was at the discretion of the revisional authority. In other words, the sealed law is an opportunity in every case need not necessarily be a oral hearing. It could be an opportunity inviting written representation only. Therefore, this argument advanced for the petitioners must fail. More so when the petitioners did not ask for oral hearing at any time. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, the last ground which is not different than the ground urged in the earlier writ petition that the impugned order is passed without proper application of mind and without considering the detailed explanation offered by the Committee must be upheld. I must add, having regard to the contents of the order at Ex. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, the last ground which is not different than the ground urged in the earlier writ petition that the impugned order is passed without proper application of mind and without considering the detailed explanation offered by the Committee must be upheld. I must add, having regard to the contents of the order at Ex. D, apart from being cursory, the 1st respondent has proceeded to dispose of the representation of the petitioners in a callous and indifferent manner despite the caution administered by this court when the earlier petition was disposed of The discussion par,t of the impugned order is as follows: - the explanation offered by the board of Directors of the said society are examined in detail with reference to the charges levelled against them and the following are the finding of the undersigned: charge No. 1: The replies furnished by the Board regarding this charge of not recovering the overdue amount since 1961-62 is not acceptable and unconvincing. Hence the charge is proved. Charge No. 2: Regarding this charge, the Board of management have admitted the charge and thus the charge is proved. Charge No. 3: The replies of the board regarding this charge is not convincing and evasive and the charge is proved. Charge No. 4: Regarding this charge of not taking action for recovery of overdue loans except filing disputes by the Board, the explanation offered is unconvincing and evasive and the charge is proved. Charge No. 5: Regarding this charge of payment of Honorarium the reply furnished by the Board is far from satisfactory as it is in violation of S. 56 of KCS Act 1959 and hence the charge is proved. Charge No. 6: Regarding the charge of amendment of bye-law relating to rate of interest, the replies furnished by the Board is admitted". Charge No. 7 : Regarding this charge for not recovering the amount shown in the Audit Report, the replies furnished by the Board is partly accepted. Charge No. 8 : Regarding the charge of not sending a compliance report by the Board is not acceptable as the compliance report is stated to be sept during January, 1976 and not, earlier. Thus the charge is proved". For instance charge No. 1 relates to something that had occurred in 1961-62, that is, non-recovery of certain loans advanced in that year. Thus the charge is proved". For instance charge No. 1 relates to something that had occurred in 1961-62, that is, non-recovery of certain loans advanced in that year. The explanation offered is that the said 17 loans had indeed been recovered ; at least: 12 of which had been! fully recovered and in respect of two proceedings were pending in court and properties of the debtors had been attached. There is no discussion of this explanation in considering charge No. 1. Consideration of the explanation means not the expression of mere opinion formed by the authority concerned whether to accept the explanation or to reject it. But the reason given must be implicit evidencing the application of mind as to why the explanation is accepted or rejected. When that reasoning is absent, then this court must infer that there is no application of mind and there is no proper consideration of the explanation. Similarly, charge No. 2 is said to have been admitted while actually a persual of Ex.-B clearly indicates (which is not disputed by the learned Govt. Pleader) that charge no. 2 was denied by the petitioners and on the other hand, it was stated that the loan was actually advanced without adequate security by the previous management and that the previous management itself had cancelled and recovered the loans from the grantee of the loan. The reasons given to the charges are the same as the reasons given to the first two charges. There is no evidence intrinsic in the order which is indicative of the fact that there is proper judicial applicacation of mind in passing the, order of supersession under S. 30 (1) of the, Act. For this reason, the order is not sustainable in law arid therefore is liable to be quashed. ( 9 ) IN the result rule issued earlier is made absolute. The impugned order at Exhibit-D is quashed. ( 10 ) NO usefu] purpose will be served in reserving liberty to pass fresh order on the same charges on account of the lapse of time. ( 9 ) IN the result rule issued earlier is made absolute. The impugned order at Exhibit-D is quashed. ( 10 ) NO usefu] purpose will be served in reserving liberty to pass fresh order on the same charges on account of the lapse of time. If there is any ground for the Department to consider that the Society needs an Administrator on account of the lapse on the part of the present Board of Management, it is always at liberty to take appropriate action, but reviving the old charges which are more than ten years old would be contrary to the scheme of the Act and be a mockery of the Cooperative movement. There will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .