JUDGMENT ASHWINI KUMAR SINHA J. 1. This second appeal is by some of the heirs of defendant no. 1 and is against the judgment of reversal. 2. The plaintiffs brought a suit for eviction against defendant no. 1 on the ground that he was a defaulter. The default was said to be the period from April, 1967 to May 1968. 3. The trial court dismissed the suit and held that there was no default. It also held that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendant. It further held that notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was not valid. 4. Thereafter plaintiffs preferred an appeal and the lower appellate court allowed the plaintiffs' appeal. It held that the defendants were the defaulters. It also held that after the death of the original defendant no. 1 and also in view of the denial of relationship of landlord and tenant by the original defendant, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and defendants. It further held that the plaintiffs had a perfect title over the house in question by virtue of their purchase and having held as such the lower appellate court directed the plaintiffs to pay the court fee of Rs. 14,000/- (on the value disclosed in the sale deed) and further directed that if the court fee was paid within the time granted by the court, the appeal of the plaintiffs would stand allowed. The lower appellate court further held that the defendants were mere trespassers. 5. With these findings, the lower appellate court allowed the plaintiffs' appeal. 6. It is pertinent to state here that the plaintiffs have paid the required court fees, as directed by the lower appellate court within the time granted by the court. The learned counsel appearing for the present appellants also stated that the plaintiffs had already paid the court fees as directed by the lower appellate court. Thus, the appeal in lower appellate court was allowed. 7. Before I proceed to consider the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, it is desirable to state a few facts. The premises in question bas Holding No. 554 (previously Holding No. 1140) and is in ward No. 9 of Hazaribagh town. Admittedly, it formerly belonged to one Gobind Sahu. 7. Before I proceed to consider the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, it is desirable to state a few facts. The premises in question bas Holding No. 554 (previously Holding No. 1140) and is in ward No. 9 of Hazaribagh town. Admittedly, it formerly belonged to one Gobind Sahu. The plaintiffs case was that the plaintiffs purchased the house by a registered deed or sale deed on 2.7.1965 from the original owner Gobind Sahu for a consideration of Rs, 14,000/- and since then the plaintiffs became the Owners of the said house and have title and possession over the same. The plaintiffs' further pleaded that they had got their names mutated with regard to the said house in the office of Hazaribagh Municipality and have been paying the municipal tax and obtaining receipts. 8. The plaintiffs' case was that the plaintiffs were living jointly with their respective husbands (who are own brothers) and it was the husband of plaintiffs no. 1 (Md. Moulvi) who was looking after the said house and realising the rent etc. for and on behalf of the plaintiffs. 9. According to the plaintiffs, the original defendant (Nand Kishore Prasad) was a month to month tenant with regard to the house in question excluding one room under the then landlord. The plaintiffs pleaded that thy informed the original defendant (Nand Kishore Prasad) about the aforesaid sale deed in their favour by the original owner Gobind Sahu, immediately after the execution of the said registered sale deed in 1965. The plaintiffs case, further was, that they were owners, of the house in question having full title thereon by virtue of purchase and the defendant paid the house rent to them through Md. Moulvi (husband of plaintiff no. 1) which was accepted by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs case was that the monthly rent payable by the original defendant (Nand Kishore Prasad) was Rs. 18/- and that the defendant was a month to month tenant. The plaintiffs further pleaded that despite demands the defendants did not pay the rent for 14 months (i.e. from April, 1967 to May, 1968) at the rate of Rs. The plaintiffs case was that the monthly rent payable by the original defendant (Nand Kishore Prasad) was Rs. 18/- and that the defendant was a month to month tenant. The plaintiffs further pleaded that despite demands the defendants did not pay the rent for 14 months (i.e. from April, 1967 to May, 1968) at the rate of Rs. 18/- per month and hence the defendant had defaulted for more than two successive months and thus the defendant was liable for eviction under section 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, as applicable on the date of the suit. 10. The plaintiffs also pleaded that the notice under section 106 of the Act, terminating the tenancy of the defendant was served upon the defendant. Thereafter the present suit was instituted. 11. The suit was contested by the defendant and the defence was that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Further defence was that the defendant used to pay rent to Md. Moulvi (husband of plaintiff no. l) but later Md. Moulvi in order to put illegal pressure upon the defendant, illegally refused to accept the rent and thereafter the defendant began to remit the same through money order but even after remittance by money order, Md. Moulvi continued to refuse to accept the rent, although the defendant went on remitting the rent through money order every month. Further defence was that the defendant was entitled to adjustment of Rs. 1163/- which he had spent for the repair of the house. In this view of the matter, the defence, in short, was that the defendant was not a defaulter and was not liable to be evicted from the house in question. 12. Further defence was that the question of termination of the tenancy did not arise at the instance of the present plaintiffs as there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the defendant and the present plaintiffs. The defendant also pleaded that notice under section 106 of the Act, was invalid in law and hence the suit was not maintainable. 13. The defendant pleaded that he had no knowledge of any sale in favour of the present plaintiffs. The defendant admitted that it was Md. Moulvi who realised the rent of the house in question but the defendant pleaded that it was not on behalf of the plaintiffs. 13. The defendant pleaded that he had no knowledge of any sale in favour of the present plaintiffs. The defendant admitted that it was Md. Moulvi who realised the rent of the house in question but the defendant pleaded that it was not on behalf of the plaintiffs. The defendant further pleaded that the defendant was informed, by the original owner Gobind Sahu that he had sold the house to Md. Moulvi. 14. The defendant having pleaded that it was, in fact, Md. Moulvi who was collecting the rent from the defendant and having denied knowledge about the sale by the original owner to the present plaintiffs, the present plaintiffs filed an application for adding Md. Moulvi as a party to the suit. By order of the Court Md. Moulvi (husband of plaintiff no.1) was added as defendant no. 2. The plaintiffs took steps in order to avoid any technical objection at the time of the hearing. This Md. Moulvi, added as defendant no–2, filed a written statement and supported the case of the present plaintiffs. 15. The trial court, besides other findings, also held that after the sale in favour of the present plaintiffs, the plaintiffs became owners of the holding in question and they were entitled to receive the rent. It also held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between Md. Moulvi and the defendant. The trial court held that the defendant in remitting the rent by money order every month for the months in dispute, had discharged his onus and if the plaintiffs did not accept the same it was not the fault of the defendant and the defendant could not be said to be defaulter In the eye of law. It also held that as the notice under section 106 of the Act, indicated that the defendants had to quit from 1st of November, 1967, the notice was defective in the eye of law because the tenancy was a monthly one. 16. As already stated above, the lower appellate court held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant after the death of the original defendant and also because the original defendant had denied the relationship. It also held that in that view of the matter the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, were not applicable. As already stated above, the lower appellate court held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant after the death of the original defendant and also because the original defendant had denied the relationship. It also held that in that view of the matter the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, were not applicable. The lower appellate court held that as the remittance of rent by money order was not of the full amount of rent in arrears on every occasion and in every month in which such remittance was made, the defendant was a defaulter in the eye of law and sending the rental by money order for the month for which it was due could not save the defendant from being a defaulter in the eye of law. It is pertinent to state here now that the original defendant died after the judgment of the trial court and before the plaintiffs preferred the appeal in the lower appellate court. The plaintiffs therefore, made the heirs and legal representatives of the original defendant as respondents in their appeal before the lower appellate court. These substituted heirs of the original defendant took the same pleas as taken by the original defendant and contested the appeal in the lower appellate court on the same grounds. 17. As already stated above, the appeal filed by the plaintiffs in the court of appeal below was allowed and the present second appeal has been filed by only some of the heirs of the original defendant. 18. The learned counsel appearing for the defendants appellants has firstly, submitted that on a mere perusal of the plaint was enough to hold that the plaintiffs were the landlords and the relationship of landlord and tenant was already accepted and, in that view of the matter, the court of appeal below was wrong to hold that the provisions of the Bihar Buildings Control did not apply to the case. The learned counsel further submitted that the very fact that the defendant admitted Md. Moulvi (husband of plaintiff no. 1) as the agent of the plaintiffs, it could not be said that the relationship of landlord and tenant was denied. The learned counsel further submitted that the very fact that the defendant admitted Md. Moulvi (husband of plaintiff no. 1) as the agent of the plaintiffs, it could not be said that the relationship of landlord and tenant was denied. Secondly, the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that no decree for, ejectment could be passed against the substituted heirs of the original defendant without allowing them to file a written statement denying the title of the plaintiffs with regard to the house in question more so, when the question of deciding title with the plaintiffs was not a issue before the trial court. These were the only two submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. 19. Before I deal with the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, it is pertinent to explain the word "tenant". 20. Under the definition in section 2(f) "tenant" includes "a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour". Therefore, even if the tenant dies after the termination of the tenancy, he leaves behind an estate heritable by his heirs and legal representatives. Consequently such heirs and legal representatives have right to prosecute the case on the death of the tenant. 21. In the present case the original tenant is dead. The decree for eviction passed by the lower appellate court is against the heirs and legal representatives of the original defendant. It is true that in view of the principle of law as just stated above the estate was heritable but the original defendant himself had denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and himself. He had not accepted the present plaintiffs as his landlord rather he had set up a plea that it was Md. Moulvi (husband of plaintiff no. 1) who was his landlord. The substituted heirs and legal representatives of the original defendant came up for the first time before the lower appellate court and, as stated above, they took the same stand as was taken by the original defendant. In other words, these substituted heirs and legal representatives (out of whom some are the appellants in the present second appeal) also denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between them and the plaintiffs and also adopted the same written statement as originally filed by the original defendant. In other words, these substituted heirs and legal representatives (out of whom some are the appellants in the present second appeal) also denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between them and the plaintiffs and also adopted the same written statement as originally filed by the original defendant. Thus, the question of estate of the tenant being heritable in favour of the substituted heirs and legal representatives of the original defendant in the present case does not arise. This being the position I hold that there is no substance in the first submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not open to the substituted heirs (the appellants) of the original defendant to take a somersault and plead for the first time in this Court that the relationship of landlord and tenant must be held to be established on a mere reading of plaint itself. The plaintiffs did file the suit against the original defendant (tenant) as landlords but the original defendant categorically denied the relationship and rather pleaded that the landlord was Md. Moulvi and not the plaintiffs. The substituted heirs having adopted the written statement and having denied the relationship of landlord and tenant at all the previous stage, cannot be allowed in law to change their stand for the first time before this Court. 22. The lower appellate court has taken an erroneous view of law when it has held that as the remittance of the rent by money order was not of the full amount of rent in arrears, defendant was a defaulter. The point is already settled in the case of Raj Kumar Prasad vs. Uchit Narain Singh 1980 BBCJ 391 =A.I.R. 1980 Pat 242(F.B) reported in A.I.R. 1980 Patna 242 (Full bench) where it has been held that it is not correct to say that there cannot be valid payment of rent unless the remittance by postal money order is of the full amount of rent in arrears on every occasion and in which such remittance is made. The Full Bench case overruled an earlier case reported in A.I.R. 1978 Patna 292. Though this view of the lower appellate court is erroneous in law, yet the decree for eviction has not been granted on this ground. The Full Bench case overruled an earlier case reported in A.I.R. 1978 Patna 292. Though this view of the lower appellate court is erroneous in law, yet the decree for eviction has not been granted on this ground. The lower appellate court having held, that valid and legal title vested in the plaintiffs by purchase and having held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the substituted heirs of the original defendant and the plaintiffs, the substituted heirs of the original defendants were mere trespassers. As already stated above, neither the original defendant nor the substituted heirs of the original defendant have set up any title in themselves. I hold that opportunity to establish title having been given to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs having established title in the house in question, there was no reason to deny the equitable reliefs to the plaintiffs and it is in that view of the matter that the plaintiffs were asked to pay the court fees on the value of the property and the plaintiffs, in fact, have paid the court fee within the time as directed by the lower appellate court. I further their hold that on the facts of the case, as already stated in detail above, the finding of the lower appellate court to the effect that the heirs and legal representatives of the original defendants were• mere trespassers is neither unreasonable nor perverse. 23. So far as the second submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is concerned, it was open to the substituted heirs of the original defendant to contest the question of title before the lower appellate court. It is not that the question of title has been gone into in their absence and hence there is no force in the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants that without allowing the substituted heirs to file a written statement no decree for ejectment could be passed against them. 24. Thus both these submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants fail. 25. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.