JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This a defendant's Second Appeal from a preliminary decree for partition whereby the plaintiffs share in the two houses in suit was declared to be one half and the plaintiff was held entitled to division of the two houses into two portions and separate possession over the share allotted to her. The preliminary decree also directs that "regard shall be had for equities of parties and existence of deities in house No. 2A/75 at the time of preparation of final decree." 2. The plaintiffs husband Mahadeo Prasad and the defendant-appellant Thakur Prasad were brothers, being the sons of Bal Mukund. The plaintiff is the first respondent in the appeal in this Court. Respondent No. 2 is the plaintiff-respondent's daughter. She was impleaded pro forma defendant No. 4. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were defendant Nos. 2 and 3 in the suit and arc respectively the son and grand-son of the appellant who was impleaded as defendant No. 1 in the suit. According to the plaint case there was a partition between the two brothers Thakur Prasad and Mahadeo Prasad some 20 or 25 years before the suit, but the two houses in suit were not divided at that partition. The plaintiff,s husband Mahadeo Prasad died on the 1st August, 1954 and the plaintiff inherited his share as his sole heir in both the houses, which was one-half. This is followed by the allegation that mutation of her name was allowed by the Nagar Palika in spite of the defendants' objection, which was rejected, and in respect of the deposits of Mahadeo Prasad the plaintiff had been granted a succession certificate. In his written statement, the first defendant admitted the relationship between the parties and that they were members of a Hindu joint family. He pleaded that there was no partition whatsoever in the family. In his written statement, the first defendant admitted the relationship between the parties and that they were members of a Hindu joint family. He pleaded that there was no partition whatsoever in the family. His main defence was that, of the two houses in suit, house No. A-2/75 is a temple and Bal Mukund was the Pujari of the deity installed therein, that the temple "was given in his Supurdigi" by the owner thereof to Bal Mukund "to reside therein with no right to transfer the said premises", and that "it was expressly provided that in lieu of the Seva Puja of the deity installed therein, Sri Bal Mukund deceased will have only a right of residence." It was added that it was wrong on the part of the plaintiff to claim partition of that property. It was not the property of the Hindu joint family. With regard to the other house No. A-1/17 it was pleaded that it "is a very small dwelling house and it was agreed between the defendant Thakur Prasad and his brother Mahadeo Prasad, the plaintiffs husband, that it "will not be partitioned by metes and bounds", that "the same will be used in one entity by the members of the family" and that "in lieu of the said agreement the defendant no. 1 gave Rs. 2000/- " to Sri Mahadeo Prasad on 15th March, 1934, and the plaintiff had obtained succession certificate in respect of the said amount. The agreement was acted upon by the parties. The plaintiff was estopped from resiling therefrom. It was further pleaded that the defendant Thakur Prasad improved the properties at an expense of about Rs. 3000/- and in case the claim for partition were decreed he would be entitled to reimbursement of that amount. In paragraph 19 of the written statement the defendant Thakur Prasad pleaded that according to the aforesaid agreement the deceased husband of the plaintiff was given the second storey of the premises and he was using and enjoying the same throughout his life and now the plaintiff is enjoying the said portion of the premises. A further plea was added saying that the agreement was duly acted upon by the parties since February, 1934 and as such no question of partition of the said premises could arise. A further plea was added saying that the agreement was duly acted upon by the parties since February, 1934 and as such no question of partition of the said premises could arise. The defendant Thakur Prasad also alleged that he had paid all the taxes and, in the alternative, pleaded lastly that "in any case if a partition of premises No. A-1/17 is made, regard must be had to the condition and dimensions of the premises and in any case the aforesaid premises cannot reasonably and conveniently be petitioner by metes and bounds and as such if the said premises be partitioned the value of the share of the plaintiff be taken from the defendant no. 1 and the entire premises be given to the defendant no. 1" 3. As many as six issues were framed by the trial court. The first issue raised the question whether there was any oral agreement between the first defendant and Mahadeo Prasad, as alleged, and if so its effect. The second issue raised the question whether the first defendant Thakur Prasad had deposited Rs. 2,000/- as alleged. If so its effect. The third issue raised the question whether he spent Rs. 3,000/- in repairs and improvements and if so its effect. The fourth issue was whether the plaintiff has any right and share in house No. 2A/75, and the fifth issue was whether the house No. A-1/17 is not partible. Issue No. 6 raised the question as to what relief if any is the plaintiff entitled to. The trial court took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together for consideration and held that there was no agreement between the first defendant and Mahadeo Prasad and further that the first defendant did not deposit Rs. 2,000/- in favour of Mahadeo Prasad. On issue No. 4 which was taken up by the trial court next, it held that the plaintiff has a one-half share in house No. 2A/75 also. On issues Nos. 3 and 5, it held that the defendant Thakur Prasad did not spend Rs. 3,000/- on repairs and improvements of the house No. A-1/ 17 and that the house is quite partible. In the result, holding the plaintiff entitled to the relief claimed, it decreed the suit in the aforesaid terms. 4. On issues Nos. 3 and 5, it held that the defendant Thakur Prasad did not spend Rs. 3,000/- on repairs and improvements of the house No. A-1/ 17 and that the house is quite partible. In the result, holding the plaintiff entitled to the relief claimed, it decreed the suit in the aforesaid terms. 4. Before the lower appellate court, the first point pressed by the defendant-appellant Thakur Prasad was that the finding of the trial court on the question about the existence of oral agreement not to divide house No. A-1/17 was not correct. On a consideration of the evidence on the record, the lower appellate court held that the purchase of Government security bonds for Rs. 2,000/- by Thakur Prasad in the name of Mahadeo Prasad was proved by documentary evidence and that corroborated the defendant-appellant's case of oral agreement not to divide house No. A-1/17. The lower appellate court thus held that the learned Munsif erred in not believing the defendant-appellant's case on this point, but the lower appellate court further held on a consideration of the law that the agreement by Mahadeo Prasad not to divide the house did not bind the plaintiff-respondent. 5. It was then urged that the fact that the plaintiff-respondent had applied for succession certificate in respect of the security bonds for Rs. 2,000/- so purchased in the name of Mahadeo Prasad, showed that she must have accepted the agreement by Mahadeo Prasad not to divide the house. The lower appellate court negatived this contention by saying that the security bonds had become the absolute property of Mahadeo Prasad and the plaintiff-respondent being his heir she was entitled to apply for succession certificate in respect of the same and that did not lead to the inference that the agreement by Mahadeo Prasad was binding on her also. The lower appellate court added that it was not alleged by Thakur Prasad that the sum of Rs. 2,000/- was paid to Mahadeo Prasad as a price of his share and even so there could be no transfer by Mahadeo Prasad of his share without a registered sale deed in accordance with the provisions of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. As to the allegation that the agreement was acted upon and Mahadeo Prasad did not claim partition during his lifetime, the lower appellate court observed that the security bonds for Rs. As to the allegation that the agreement was acted upon and Mahadeo Prasad did not claim partition during his lifetime, the lower appellate court observed that the security bonds for Rs. 2,000/- were transferred to Mahadeo Prasad as consideration for his not claiming partition and the fact that he did not claim partition only led to the result that he became full owner of the security bonds for Rs. 2,000/- . It did not show that the oral agreement was binding on the plaintiff-respondent. 6. The lower appellate court then referred to Mulla's Hindu Law on the point and to the case of Rup Singh v. Bhabhuti Singh, ILR 42 All 30 : AIR 1920 All 341. It finally held that the agreement in question was not binding upon the plaintiff-respondent and she is entitled to claim a partition of the. property, namely, the house No. A-1/17. 7. With regard to house No. A-2/75, it was urged before the lower appellate court that the status of Bal Mukund was that of a shebait. It was further urged before it that the view of the trial court that the plaintiff-respondent and the defendant-appellant had become owners of the house by adverse possession was incorrect. The attention of the lower appellate court was drawn to Ext. A-2, a deed executed by Raj Narain and Annapurna Prasad on the 23rd August, 1890 in which it was stated that their great grand-mother had constructed a Shivala in the house which was entrusted to Bal Mukund and he was allowed to live there and to look after the worship of the deity and to maintain the house. According to the lower appellate court, the house and the Shivala were distinct entities and the document (Ex. A2) did not show that the house portion was also dedicated to the deity. None of the descendants of Raj Narain or Annapurna Prasad were alive and after the death of Bal Mukund the names of the defendant appellant and Mahadeo Prasad were recorded in the Municipal papers and after the death of Mahadeo Prasad the name of the plaintiff-respondent was recorded in his place. This according to the lower appellate court, showed that after the death of Bal Mukund, the defendant appellant and Mahadeo Prasad both were treating the house as their own property. This according to the lower appellate court, showed that after the death of Bal Mukund, the defendant appellant and Mahadeo Prasad both were treating the house as their own property. The ruling of the Supreme Court in Sree Sree Ishwar Sridhar Jew v. Sushila Bala, AIR 1954 SC 69 which was cited before the lower appellate court was, in its view, applicable only where the shebaits claim adverse possession against the two owner, but, in the present case, the true owners were to longer alive and there was none to claim the properties in dispute. According to the lower appellate court the status of the appellant was, according to his case, that of a shebait, but "a co-shebait, who is a party to the plan to claim the property in dispute by adverse possession, cannot complain of dishonesty by his co-shebait"; and rejected the contention raised on behalf of the defendant-appellant with these observations. It was then observed by the lower appellate court that there was no evidence about the dedication of house No. A-2/75 to the deity, but there is a small Shivala therein; that the whole house could not be turned into a temple and inasmuch as several tenants are living in various portions of the house in suit and the defendant-appellant and the plaintiff-respondent had been realising rent from them also showed that house No. A-2/75 was not a temple. The lower appellate court followed it up by the observation that in the present case the defendant-appellant and the plaintiff-respondent were both claiming the house No. 2-A/75 as their own after the death of Bal Mukund and, therefore, a person like the defendant-appellant, who is claiming the property by adverse possession along with the plaintiff-respondent, could not plead that the starting point of animus of adverse possession had not been established. 8. The last point urged before the lower appellate court was that the two houses were too small to be partitioned. The lower appellate court noticed that after the preliminary decree a commission was issued to the civil court amin for the preparation of a claim of partition. The map prepared by the amin showed that house No. Al/17 measured 22 feet 6 inches by 20 feet 6 inches. The contention was that the partition of such a small area would be too inconvenient. The map prepared by the amin showed that house No. Al/17 measured 22 feet 6 inches by 20 feet 6 inches. The contention was that the partition of such a small area would be too inconvenient. The lower appellate court rejected the contention with the observation that two houses were involved and each party could be allotted one house and the difference could be adjusted by payment of money compensation to the other. With these observations, the lower appellate court dismissed the appeal and maintained the trial court's decree. 9. The first point raised by Mr. G. P. Bhargava was that in respect of house No. A-1/17, the plaintiff-respondent, who is the widow of Mahadeo Prasad, is estopped from claiming partition in view of the agreement by Mahadeo Prasad, and the facts that she was after his death secured for her absolute use the security bonds for Rs. 2,000/- by obtaining a succession certificate, and has continued to live in and occupy the upper portion of the house in pursuance of the agreement. It was further claimed that if Mahadeo Prasad was bound by his agreement, the plaintiff-respondent who came as his heir and successor, was no less bound by the agreement. She did not claim any right in the property independently of Mahadeo Prasad. Indeed according to the theory of Hindu Law she only intercepted the estate of Mahajeo Prasad when she succeeded to him in the year 1954 under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act. If the property was joint family property governed by Mitakshara under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, she acquired in the property the salute interest which her husband had. It is not disputed that the interest of the husband in the property was subject to the restriction that he could not seek a partition by metes and bounds. The same restriction must operate on the interest which she acquired. The transmutation of that interest into full ownership under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, could not change the position, for her husband was also a full owner of his interest. 10. The same restriction must operate on the interest which she acquired. The transmutation of that interest into full ownership under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, could not change the position, for her husband was also a full owner of his interest. 10. It was, on the other side, urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that it is indisputable that she could have after becoming a full owner sold alienated the interest as she pleased and if that were so, it stands to reason that she must be held entitled to claim partition and separate possession over her share. 11. It cannot be disputed that the position of a widow possessed of property which was her limited estate before the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and which is transmuted into full ownership is different from the undivided interest which a male coparcener has had under the Mitakshara law as interpreted in the Varanasi School by which the parties presumably governed. A Mitakshara Coparcener cannot alienate his undivided interest in the joint family property. If he does so, in a case governed by the Varanasi School, the alienation is void. A Hindu woman, who has become a full owner by virtue of the provisions of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, may, however, sell the property so possessed by her and of which she has become a full owner, notwithstanding that the property possessed by her was the undivided interest of her husband in joint family property in which her husband was a coparcener. These are anomalies arising from an incomplete codification of the law. Be that as it may, the question has to be answered on the facts of the case as one finds them and not on hypothetical considerations which could arise if the facts were different. 12. These are anomalies arising from an incomplete codification of the law. Be that as it may, the question has to be answered on the facts of the case as one finds them and not on hypothetical considerations which could arise if the facts were different. 12. In the present case, the plaintiff-respondent could, indisputably, sell the property, which she came to possess on the death of her husband in the year 1954, under section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, and of which she had become a full owner on the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and that she could do without having the property divided by metes and bounds, or partitioned by a mere demand for partition, which, according to the Mitakshara law, amounted to partition by bringing about a severance of status between the coparcener's and fixation of their respective shares in the undivided property. If she did so the alienee could claim partition of the property purchased from her, even if her husband had, in his life-time, agreed not to divide the property by metes and bounds, and had done so not gratuitously, but for consideration, unless, of course, he had also agreed not to assign his interest in coparcenary property. This is declared to be the law in paragraph 319 of Mulla's Hindu Law (14th Edition page 406) and it is based on the decisions of the Calcutta, Allahabad and Madras High Courts. The decision of the Allahabad High Court, that has been relied upon, is that of a Division Bench in Rup Singh v. Bhabhuti Singh, ILR 42 All 30 : AIR 1920 All 341. The question, which arose in that case, was whether Rup Singh personally was bound by the provisions of the award not to claim during his lifetime separate possession by means of a partition by metes and bounds, over any of the property of which he himself and. the defendants to the suit were joint owners in the sense that they possessed the same as tenants in common within the meaning of that phrase in English Law. The Bench observed that Mr. the defendants to the suit were joint owners in the sense that they possessed the same as tenants in common within the meaning of that phrase in English Law. The Bench observed that Mr. Justice Trevelyan in his book on Hindu Law had correctly summed up the general effect of the decided cases when he said that except in the Bombay High Court, the authorities generally are agreed that members of a joint undivided Hindu family can bind themselves for their own lifetime not to. claim their right to partition. But the point to be noticed was that all the arguments in support of the proposition apply a fortiori to the case of members of such a family after the integrity of the joint fancily has been broken up by the ascertainment of the shares, after the parties have become tenants in common of the property and the appellant could not have it both ways. He was either a member of a joint undivided Hindu family with the respondents or he was not. It was the case of the respondents, and not of the appellant that Rup Singh, Bhabhuti Singh and Ratan Singh were still members of a joint family when the agreement of reference to arbitration was entered into. If the defendants' case had been accepted on the point, other considerations would have arisen, but the case being dealt with was that of Rup Singh that the joint ness of the family had been definitely broken up when Humum Singh separated. The Bench gave an illustration: suppose two brothers, who have ceased to be joint, to remain owners in equal shares of a certain dwelling house. "Can it seriously be contended that one brother would not be bound, for his own lifetime at any rote, by an agreement that he would, in return for good consideration, leave the other brother in sole possession and enjoyment of the house and refrain from claiming a partition by metes and bounds and the separate possession of his own share? But what is true of a single item of property must be true of all property owned by the brothers in equal shares, and whatever could be effected by a lawful agreement for consideration can equally be effected by a reference to arbitration followed by an award. But what is true of a single item of property must be true of all property owned by the brothers in equal shares, and whatever could be effected by a lawful agreement for consideration can equally be effected by a reference to arbitration followed by an award. The main difference is that in the case of an award the question of consideration does not arise, the settlement of a pending dispute and the avoidance of litigation are themselves good consideration for an agreement of reference to arbitration." 13. In the present case also, the plaintiff had pleaded that there was a partition between the defendant-appellant and his brother Mahadeo Prasad, but the two houses remained joint. The defendant-appellant also pleaded that there was no partition. He pleaded that the two brothers had continued to remain joint. He did not plead that the house No. A-1/17 had been allotted to him exclusively on a partition between him and his brother. His plea was that there was no partition but in consideration of the sum of Rs. 2,000/- for which security bonds were transferred to the name of Mahadeo Prasad, the latter agreed not to ask for a partition of the house although at the same time he could continue to reside in the upper portion and that after his death his widow had continued to reside in the upper portion. On the authority of Rup Singh's case (AIR 1920 All 341) (supra), the agreement, which has been found by the lower appellate court to be proved as a fact, was binding on Mahadeo Prasad so long as he lived. The question is whether it binds his widow as well. The agreement was made before the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act was enacted, and long before the Hindu Succession Act came. At that time, the plaintiff-respondent would have had no share and no right to claim a partition of any part or portion of the joint family property. Mahadeo Prasad had no son. His only issue was a daughter. Her position was no better than that of the plaintiff-respondent. The parties could not have contemplated the inroads made into the law by the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, or the revolutionary changes brought about by the Hindu Succession Act. Mahadeo Prasad had no son. His only issue was a daughter. Her position was no better than that of the plaintiff-respondent. The parties could not have contemplated the inroads made into the law by the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, or the revolutionary changes brought about by the Hindu Succession Act. The agreement entered into by Mahadeo Prasad was based on the assumption that under the Hindu Law as it then stood he had no heir in respect of his undivided interest in the house which was joint family property. His interest would have, on his death, lapsed to the other members of the coparcenary. Those other members were the defendants-appellants. It was only, in case Mahadeo Prasad had survived them all and the defendant-appellant had died leaving no son, grand-son or great grand-son, that the widow of Mahadeo Prasad or after her their daughter could have inherited the property. In either case, there was no question of being bound by the agreement entered into by Mahadeo Prasad not to divide the property. 14. If, on the other hand, Mahadeo Prasad held the property as a tenant in common, that is to say in case he had converted his undivided interest into a share by an act of partition in the Mitakshara sense, without, however, dividing the property by metes and bounds, any absolute restraint on alienation or restriction repugnant to the interest in the property would have been void under section 10 or 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, and on this aspect there a,Fe series of cases noted in Mulla's Commentary on the Transfer of Property Act under section 11 at page 103 of the Fifth Edition under Heading "Partition". The law seems to be well settled by the decided cases that an agreement not to partition, though it may be binding on the immediate parties, will not bind their successors in-interest. According to the Bombay High Court such an agreement is inconsistent with the Hindu Law and would not bind the parties themselves. The view taken in Chandra Shekhar v. Kundan Lal by the Allahabad High Court (1909) ILR 31 All 3 was that even an immediate party is not bound by an agreement not to partition for an indefinite time. According to the Bombay High Court such an agreement is inconsistent with the Hindu Law and would not bind the parties themselves. The view taken in Chandra Shekhar v. Kundan Lal by the Allahabad High Court (1909) ILR 31 All 3 was that even an immediate party is not bound by an agreement not to partition for an indefinite time. The result is that a restraint on partition may be imposed by agreement, but the restraint cannot be absolute and indefinite for all times to come. It has to be limited and, as held in Rup Singh's case (AIR 1920 All 341) (supra), it can bind the promisor for his lifetime but not beyond. It thus appears to me that the plaintiff-respondent was not bound by any such limitation or restriction on the right of partition as may have been placed by the agreement entered into by her husband Mahadeo Prasad with the defendant-appellant. Even otherwise the impact of the changes in the law would appear to be against imposing any restriction on her right of full ownership of the share which her husband Mahadeo Prasad would have had in the property in case a partition had been claimed by him in his lifetime. That share was indisputably one-half. The plaintiff-respondent is entitled to claim it by partition. 15. This leads me to the next question which was raised in the alternative, namely, whether the house No. A-1/17 is so small that a division of it cannot reasonably or conveniently be made, and, if so, whether in lieu of partition the value of the plaintiffs share could be ordered to be paid to her by the defendant-appellant and the whole of the house given to him. The lower appellate court has held that there are two houses available for partition, and, in that view of the matter, the property in suit could conveniently be divided by giving one house to one party and the other house to the other party and equalising their value by payment of money compensation. But I am of the view that house No. A-2/75 is not partible property, inasmuch as it is endowed property of the deity installed therein. That being so, the question whether the house No. A-1/17 can reasonably or conveniently be partitioned into two portions does directly arise for consideration. But I am of the view that house No. A-2/75 is not partible property, inasmuch as it is endowed property of the deity installed therein. That being so, the question whether the house No. A-1/17 can reasonably or conveniently be partitioned into two portions does directly arise for consideration. But a claim of this kind under the Partition Act could be raised at any time. I am not satisfied with the way that the trial court has considered it in the course of its findings on issues Nos. 3 and 5 and has held that the house is quite partible. From the Commissioner's report referred to by the lower appellate court, the over all dimensions of the house are only 22 feet 6 inches by 20 feet 6 inches. In view of all these facts, I would rather leave the matter open for a fresh decision in accordance with law in the proceedings for preparation of the final decree. With regard to house No. A-2/75 Ext. A-1 is the deed dated the 23rd August, 1890 by which Raj Narain and Annapurna Prasad entrusted the management of the affairs of the deity installed in the house to Bal Mukund the father of the defendant-appellant and Mahadeo Prasad. The deed says : "Hamari Perdaadi Shiba Merhuma ne ab kita Shivala v. Makan Vake Mohalla Bolochan Ghat Tayyar kiya jisper hamlog kabiz va mutasarrif rahe our Pujapath karte rahe. Ab hamara rahna atraf mein hone laga va marammat Makan va Shivala mein haraj hota tha aur Makan va Shivala ka aabad rahna va marammat hona zaruri tha. Arsa 15-16 baras se Pandit Bal Mukund, Sakin Mohalla Gai Ghat ke supurd kiya gaya aur marammat shikasht daredast taulluk Pandit Bal Mukund Mazkur kiye gaye vaste itminan Pandit Sahib mazkur ke yah tahrir munasib maalum hui, lihaza ikrar yah hai ki Pandit Sahib mazkur badastur Shivala va Makan per qabiz rahen our marammat karte rahen. Hamko koi aitraz nahi hai our na hoga our Pandit Bal Mukund ko bhi siwae seva puja va bood bass ke Akhtiyar inteqal kisi Qism ka na hoga. Iswaste Ikrarnama likh diya gaya. 23 August, 1890." 16. The only right conferred on Bal Mukund by this deed was to occupy the premises in lieu of the service of the deity and maintaining the property in good repairs. Iswaste Ikrarnama likh diya gaya. 23 August, 1890." 16. The only right conferred on Bal Mukund by this deed was to occupy the premises in lieu of the service of the deity and maintaining the property in good repairs. The boundaries of the property did not show the existence of two separate properties. The property was one and the same. It was described as a Shivala and a house, but that only means that the Shivala was in the house because above the boundaries given at the foot of the deed the property is described as a house. The deity was installed in the house. The original owner of the property was the great grand-mother of the executants. The opening recitals of the deed shows that the executants were themselves performing the Pujapath or attending to the duties of a shebait of the deity in relation to the whole property, and those were the duties and the rights entrusted by the executant's to Bal Mukund. It must follow that Bal Mukund was appointed shebait of the deity for attending to its Seva and Puja arld for maintaining its property in good repair. It is not unusual to have shebaits having a right of residence in the endowed property. I am unable to draw the distinction that has been drawn by the lower appellate court between the house and the Shivala. A part of the house was let out for the commercial purpose of keeping shops therein. A part of it must have been occupied by the shebait and there must be the sanctum sanctorum of the deity which must be the Shivala propel. Presumably, the Seva and Puja of the deity and the repairs of the property were being carried out from its income. The whole of the property that is the entire house including the sanctum sanctorum of the deity, the shops let 'out to tenants and the portion occupied by the shebait must all be deemed to be endowed property. At any rate, Bal Mukund was let into the property as a shebait. He could not claim any rights in the property adverse to the deity. At any rate, Bal Mukund was let into the property as a shebait. He could not claim any rights in the property adverse to the deity. The two courts below have entirely missed the point when they thought that adverse possession had to be claimed against the true owner, and since Raj Narain and Annapurna Prasad were no longer on the scene, the heirs of Bal Mukund did not have to claim adverse possession against any one and could have become the owners of the property in the nature of the house by their mere act of occupation of it as their secular property. The property belonged to the deity installed in the house and a person in the position of a shebait cannot be allowed to claim title by adverse possession over property on which he comes into possession as a shebait of the deity. This is the settled law as declared by the Supreme Court in Sree Sree Ishwar Sridhar Jew v. Sushila Bala, AIR 1954 SC 69 , wherein it was observed (at p. 72) : "If a shebait by acting contrary to the terms of his appointment or in breach of his duty as such shebait could claim adverse possession of the dedicated property against the idol it would be putting a premium on dishonesty and breach of duty on his part and no property which is dedicated to an idol, would ever be safe. The shebait for the time being is the only person competent to safeguard the interest of the idol, his possession of the dedicated property is the possession of the idol whose shebait he is, and no dealing of his with the property dedicated to the idol could afford the basis of a claim by him for adverse possession of the property against the idol. No shebait can, so long as she continues to be the shebait, ever claim adverse possession against the idol." 17. But the finding leads to the result that the parties to the suit can claim an interest in the shebaiti rights as heirs of Bal Mukund, for it is well settled that shebaiti rights are heritable property which devolve according to the law of succession applicable to secular property. But the finding leads to the result that the parties to the suit can claim an interest in the shebaiti rights as heirs of Bal Mukund, for it is well settled that shebaiti rights are heritable property which devolve according to the law of succession applicable to secular property. Since, however, the suit is for partition of the house No. A-2/75 as such, that relief cannot be allowed and so far as the shebaiti rights are concerned, they would be deemed to be ancestral property in the hands of the defendant-appellant. Probably, the plaintiff could claim some benefit out of it as the heir of her husband, but that is a matter which does not call for decision in the present case. The claim for partition of house No. A-2/75 as a piece of secular property must, however, fail and be dismissed as such on the finding that it is endowed property and the parties have only the shebaiti rights of management of the property coupled with the duties which go with that office. 18. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and decree under appeal are set aside. The plaintiffs share in House No. A-1/17 of Mohalla Gai Ghat Patan Darwaza, Varanasi, is declared to be one-half. The other house No. A-2/75 of Mohalla Kaineshwar Mahadeo. Trilochan, Varanasi, is declared to be property endowed to the deity installed therein. The parties have interest only in shebaiti rights pertaining to the deity and its property as the heirs of Bal Mukund. That house as such is not partible property. Partition of house No. A-1/17 shall be made by metes and bounds if the plaintiff claims it and the defendants do not object on the ground that it is impartible, but, in case either party claims that it cannot reasonably and conveniently be partitioned by metes and bounds, the question shall be decided by the trial court in the course of final decree proceedings in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 and 3 of the Partition Act, on the basis of the material already on the record or on such evidence as may be tendered before it by either of the parties on this point. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own respective costs throughout incurred so far.