JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendant,s second appeal from a decree declaring that the allotment order dated the 29th January 1966 in respect of the accommodation in suit was illegal, null and void and without jurisdiction. 2. The plaintiff-respondent, who was a minor, had obtained a decree for ejectment against the tenant and applied for release of the accommodation from allotment under the provisions of U.P. Act No. III of 1947 on the ground that the accommodation, in which he was residing, had become dilapidated and some part of it had even fallen down and had become uninhabitable and dangerous. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application for release on the grounds in the own words of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, that "the release to Smt. Kalawati may create future complication in the right of civil litigation", that "Smt. Kalawati can carry out major repairs where she is already residing" and that "she can also make it habitable and may live there as usual.". The two courts below have found that the aforesaid considerations for the rejection of the release application were irrelevant, and the need of the plaintiff and his mother for the accommodation in suit having been established to be genuine, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was bound to release the accommodation from allotment. It is clear from the facts found by the courts below that the plaintiff was treated to be the landlord of the accommodation for purposes of issuing the allotment order and there was and could be no dispute as to his title as landlord of the accommodation in so far as the proceedings before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer were concerned. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the civil court had no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the propriety or correctness of the allotment order and the suit was barred under S. 16, U.P. Act No. III of 1947. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant, I find that there is no merit whatsoever in this second appeal. An allotment order under S. 7, U.P. Act No. Ill of 1947 could be passed only when an accommodation fell vacant. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant, I find that there is no merit whatsoever in this second appeal. An allotment order under S. 7, U.P. Act No. Ill of 1947 could be passed only when an accommodation fell vacant. Two kinds of orders were contemplated by 7 of that Act : (1) an order directing the landlord to allot the accommodation, and (2) a direction to the landlord not to allot the accommodation to any person. A release application, as it was called, was made under R. 6 of the Rules framed under that Act. That rule provided that "when the District Magistrate is satisfied that an accommodation, which has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant, is bona fide needed by the landlord for his own personal occupation" the District Magistrate may permit the landlord to occupy it himself. It is .well settled that if an application for release of an accommodation, which had fallen vacant or was about to fall vacant, was made by the landlord, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could not proceed to allot the accommodation without first dismissing that application and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could dismiss that application only if it was established before him that the accommodation was not bona fide needed by the landlord for his own personal occupation. In the present case, the finding recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in his order dated the 5th January, 1966, rejecting the release application, (of which a certified copy was passed on to me as the copy filed in the court below formed part of File "C", which had been weeded out) shows that the landlord bona fide needed the accommodation for his personal use and occupation. The order dismissing the release application was thus based on irrelevant considerations and was invalid in law. That being so, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to make the allotment of the accommodation, which he made in favour of the defendant-appellant. There is a further feature of the case, to which I cannot help adverting to. The allotment order was passed in the year 1966 under a temporary Act which has since been repealed. The appellant could not enter into possession in pursuance of the allotment order. There is a further feature of the case, to which I cannot help adverting to. The allotment order was passed in the year 1966 under a temporary Act which has since been repealed. The appellant could not enter into possession in pursuance of the allotment order. By its very nature, an allotment order is meant to meet the pressing need of a person for accommodation. Surely, the defendant-appellant must have made some arrangement for meeting his need for accommodation during the last 17 years that the suit has been pending now. Apart from the extraordinary delay in the decision of this case, which has, by now, become a rather regrettable feature of the administration of justice in our country, the allotment order cannot be said to have survived the repeal of U.P. Act No. III of 1947 by U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 with effect from the 15th July, 1972, particularly when that order had been declared to be a nullity by the trial court's judgment dated the 8th May, 1970 in this case, which had even been confirmed by the lower appellate court's judgment dated the 27th March, 1972. None of the saving clauses of sub-s. (2) of S. 43, U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 would appear to make the order enforceable even if the decrees under appeal were set aside and the allotment order revived by the decree of this court. The appeal can, in this view of things, be deemed to have become infructuous. 5. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.