GIRIJADEVI v. HORMIS THALIATH — 1983 DIGILAW 105 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. This revision is against the order of the Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam, rejecting the petitioner's application to be impleaded as a party-defendant in O. S. No. 604 of 1982 on its file. 2. The petitioner and the 1st respondent in this revision are neighbouring owners of land having a compound wall to separate their respective plots of land. The petitioner is the owner of the western plot with a residential building thereon where she is residing with her family. The 1st respondent's plot is on the east of the petitioner's land. 3. The petitioner had filed O. S. No. 398 of 1981 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam, for an injunction against the 1st respondent from interfering with or altering the compound wall separating the plots of the petitioner and the 1st respondent. She had also applied for a temporary injunction for similar reliefs against the 1st respondent pending the suit. The 1st respondent entered appearance and after hearing both sides the Munsiff's Court passed an order permitting the 1st respondent to make such alterations to the compound wall as are in conformity with R.30(5) of the Kerala Municipal Buildings Rules. It is the petitioner's case that without complying to the requirements of the rule and without obtaining the requisite sanction from the Corporation of Cochin, the 1st respondent put up additional constructions on the compound wall raising its height to about 20 feet, thereby preventing the supply of light and air to the petitioner's building, almost completely. The petitioner complained about the unauthorised construction by the 1st respondent, to the Commissioner of the Corporation and the Commissioner after due notice to the 1st respondent and after hearing him passed an order under S.263 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act directing the 1st respondent to demolish the unauthorised construction. Thereupon the 1st respondent filed O. S.604 of 1982 on the file of the lower court for an injunction restraining the Corporation and its Commissioner from implementing the order for demolition of the additional construction on the compound wall. Even though there are allegations in the plaint in O. S. No. 604 of 1982 that it was at the instance of the petitioner that the Commissioner of the Corporation had passed the impugned order directing the demolition of the additional construction, the petitioner is not made a party to the suit. Even though there are allegations in the plaint in O. S. No. 604 of 1982 that it was at the instance of the petitioner that the Commissioner of the Corporation had passed the impugned order directing the demolition of the additional construction, the petitioner is not made a party to the suit. The suit is only against the Corporation and its Commissioner impleaded as defendants 1 and 2 respectively. The 1st respondent has also obtained an exparte interim order in I. A. No. 2502 of 1982 against the Corporation and its Commissioner from implementing the order for demolition of the additional construction. It was at this stage that the petitioner filed LA. No. 2856 of 1982 under 0.1, R.10(2), CPC. to get herself impleaded as additional 3rd defendant in O.S. No. 604 of 1982, to enable her to oppose the suit and the application for temporary injunction. I. A. No. 2856 of 1982 was dismissed by the lower court by order dated 11-10-1982 on the ground that the plaintiff is dominus litis and the petitioner has no right to get herself impleaded in the suit against the opposition of the plaintiff and the plaintiff cannot be compelled to fight a litigation against a person against whom he does not claim any relief. It is against this order of the lower court that the petitioner has come up in revision. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that the 1st respondent has made additional constructions on the existing compound wall in contravention of the Municipal Rules, the Municipal Rules are intended for the purpose of promoting health, safety and convenience of all the residents in the municipal area and a violation of the rule by an adjacent owner of land and building is a direct infringement of the rights of the petitioner safeguarded under the Rule itself. According to the petitioner she is entitled to insist that in making any construction, the 1st respondent-plaintiff complies with the requirements of the rule and the protection of the Rule is not denied to the petitioner. In support of the proposition, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relies on the decision in Hirendra Nath v. Calcutta Corporation (AIR. 1941 Cal. According to the petitioner she is entitled to insist that in making any construction, the 1st respondent-plaintiff complies with the requirements of the rule and the protection of the Rule is not denied to the petitioner. In support of the proposition, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relies on the decision in Hirendra Nath v. Calcutta Corporation (AIR. 1941 Cal. 386) wherein it is stated at page 389 as follows: "It must be assumed that in framing the statutory rules relating to the space to be left between buildings and their height, the Legislature had in view of the general convenience of all residents in the municipal area in order to ensure proper ventilation and sanitation for the ratepayers, and possibly adequate means of preventing the spread of fires from one building to another. In this view of the matter, it is impossible to say that the petitioner would not be affected by any breach of the existing rules, and, in my view, he has a clear right to insist that these rules should be strictly observed by the Corporation in reference to any plans for the extension of the Tagore building". The same view is expressed in the decision in Krishna Kali Mallik v. Babulal Shah & Others (AIR. 1965 Cal. 148) where Justice A. N. Ray (as he then was) stated at page 155, Para.42, as follows: "42. In the present case the defendants have an obligation under the Statute to build in accordance with Rules. That statutory obligation it is contended by the defendants, is enforceable by the Corporation only under some sections of the Act. The Corporation has the right to proceed against the offending building because of the benefit and the interest of the public safeguarded by the Act that buildings shall not be constructed in violation of the Statute. An illegal construction by the defendants materially affects the right to or enjoyment of the plaintiff's property. The defendants owe duty and obligation under the Statute not only to the Corporation as custodian of the owners of buildings but also to the plaintiff. This duty arises by implication under the Statute. An illegal construction by the defendants materially affects the right to or enjoyment of the plaintiff's property. The defendants owe duty and obligation under the Statute not only to the Corporation as custodian of the owners of buildings but also to the plaintiff. This duty arises by implication under the Statute. If the defendant constructs a building according to a plan which is illegal the adjoining owner has the right to ask for an injunction because there is an invasion of right to and enjoyment of property by the illegal construction and the defendant owes an obligation to the plaintiff to obey the law". The decision in AIR. 1965 Cal. 148 is followed in the decision in B. Raghunandan Sarvan v. Smt. Kanta Devi and another (AIR. 1975 All. 130), wherein at page 132 it is stated as follows: "When a Municipal Board makes bye-laws of the present nature, it does so for the purpose of promoting and maintaining health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the Municipality. Their violation will naturally affect adversely the health, safety and convenience of the citizens; it must therefore, be held that the bye-law casts an obligation on citizens not to act in violation thereof, and every citizen can claim an injunction to prevent the breach of the bye-law. A similar view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in AIR. 1965 Cal. 148 (supra) where, dealing with the rights of a resident in the locality to check the constructions which were going to be made without leaving adequate space as required under the bye-law. It was observed by A. N. Ray, J. that "it was impossible to say that the petitioner would not be affected by any breach of the existing rules, and in my view he has a right to insist that these rules should be strictly observed in reference to any plan". From these authorities it is clear that a construction in violation of the Municipal Building Rules is a direct infringement of the rights of the petitioner recognised and provided for in the Rule itself and the petitioner has a direct interest in the subject-matter of the suit where the 1st respondent seeks an injunction against the Municipal Corporation and its Commissioner from enforcing an order for demolition of a construction said to be opposed to the requirements of the Municipal Rules in that behalf. 5. 5. Learned Counsel for the 1st respondent Sri. M. K. Narayana Menon, submits that the plaintiff is the dominus litis with respect to his suit and it is for the plaintiff alone to decide who all should be impleaded as defendants in the suit. If the suit is defective for non-impleadment of necessary parties, the result may be the dismissal of the suit, but that is not a ground to allow third parties to be impleaded as defendants in the suit despite opposition by the plaintiff. Learned Counsel relies on the decision of this Court in Unichirakutty Amma v. Krishnan Nair (1964 KLT. 484) in support of his proposition. In that case, the suit was for partition and recovery of the plaintiff's share in a property gifted to her and her brothers defendants 1 and 2 by their mother the 3rd defendant. While the suit was pending, respondents 1 to 5 applied for impleading them in the suit on the ground that the property sought to be partitioned belonged to a tavazhi consisting of the 3rd defendant and all her descendants. The trial court impleaded the applicants as in its view such a course was necessary to avoid multiplicity of suits. T. K. Joseph J. in revision set aside the order of the trial court and dismissed the application of respondents 1 to 5 for impleadment on the ground that the presence of those respondents is not necessary for adjudication of the questions involved in the suit, and even assuming they are proper parties they cannot be impleaded against the opposition of the plaintiff. In arriving at this decision, the learned judge has followed the decision of the Madras High Court in Re. K. Ibrahim Haji (AIR. 1957 Mad. 699) wherein it was held: "The court should consider mainly whether the presence of the proposed parties would be necessary for adjudicating upon the questions that are involved in the suit and an order for addition of parties should not be made merely with a view to avoid multiplicity of suits if otherwise their presence is not necessary for determining the real questions involved in the suit". The learned judge found that the right, if any of respondents 1 to 5 will not be affected by the decision in the suit, they are free to establish their rights in a separate suit and if they are impleaded as parties to the suit the same will have to be converted into one for partition of all the tavazhi properties as a suit for partial partition may not lie and taking all these aspects into consideration, it was held there was no justification for adding respondents 1 to 5 as parties to the suit. This was a case where the persons who sought impleadment had no direct interest in the suit, as their rights were not in any way affected by the results of the suit to which they are not parties. 6. Strong reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the respondent on the decision of R. S. Sarkaria J. (as he then was) in Banarsi Dass Durga Prashad v. Panna Lal Ram Richhpal Dswal & Others (AIR. 1969 Punjab & Haryana p. 57). There the person who sought impleadment had earlier filed a suit against the defendant for specific performance of an agreement for sale of the suit property. The suit in which he applied to be impleaded as a party was for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession and enjoyment of a "chabutra" 41/2' Sq. ft. in area, and in the alternative for recovery of possession of the same. The learned judge in Para.5 of the judgment following the decision in Moser v. Marsden ((1892)1. Ch. 487) held that no person can be added as a defendant against the opposition of the plaintiff merely because he would be incidentally affected by the judgment in the suit. In Moser's case the plaintiff was the patentee of a machine. He brought an action against the defendant for using a machine which he alleged was an infringement of his patent. The patentee of the defendant's machine, applied to be added as a defendant, alleging that a judgment in the action would injure him and that the defendant would not efficiently defend the action. It was held that the applicant not being directly interested in the issues between the plaintiff and the defendant, but only indirectly, and commercially affected, the court has no jurisdiction to add him as a defendant. It was held that the applicant not being directly interested in the issues between the plaintiff and the defendant, but only indirectly, and commercially affected, the court has no jurisdiction to add him as a defendant. The judgment in that case turned on the interpretation of Order XVI, R.11, R.S.C., which is in parirnateria with O.1, R.10(2) C.P.C. Following this decision, the learned judge held: "Under sub-para (2) of 0.I, R.10, Civil Procedure Code, as already observed, a person may be added as a party to a suit in two cases only, i.e. when he ought to have been joined and is not so joined, i.e. when he is a necessary party, or, when without his presence the questions in the suit cannot be completely decided. In my opinion, there is no jurisdiction to add a party in any other case merely because that would save a third person the expense and botheration of a separate suit for seeking adjudication of a collateral matter, which was not directly and substantively in issue in the suit into which he seeks intrusion". In Para.8 of the judgment the learned judge refers to the difference of judicial opinion among the High Courts on the question as to whether the Court has power under O.1, R.10, C.P.C. to direct a person to be impleaded as a defendant when the plaintiff is opposed to his addition as a party and in Para.9 the learned judge states as follows: "9. I would prefer to steer a middle course and draw the golden mean. As a rule, the Court should not add a person as a defendant in a suit when the plaintiff is opposed to such addition. The reason is that the plaintiff is the dominus litis. He is the master of the suit. He cannot be compelled to fight against a person against whom he does not wish to fight and against whom he does not claim any relief. If opposition by the plaintiff to the addition of parties is to be disregarded as a rule, it would be putting a premium on the undesirable practice of third parties intruding to ventilate their own grievances into a litigation commenced by one at his own expense against another. The word 'may' in sub-rule (2) imports a discretion. If opposition by the plaintiff to the addition of parties is to be disregarded as a rule, it would be putting a premium on the undesirable practice of third parties intruding to ventilate their own grievances into a litigation commenced by one at his own expense against another. The word 'may' in sub-rule (2) imports a discretion. In exercising that discretion, the Courts will invariably take into account the wishes of the plaintiff before adding a third person as a defendant to his suit. Only in exceptional cases, where the Court finds that the addition of the new defendant is absolutely necessary to enable it to adjudicate effectively and completely the matter in controversy between the parties, will it add a person as a defendant without the consent of the plaintiff". The decision in AIR. 1969 Punj, and Haryana p. 57 is followed in Kaka Singh v. Rohi Singh and Others (AIR. 1978 Punj. & Haryana p. 30). The suit in that case was by the sons against their father for a declaration that the suit property is the joint family property of the father and the sons and also for an injunction restraining the father from alienating the plaintiff's 4/5 share in the property. A stranger applied to get himself and two others impleaded as party-defendants contending that the father had agreed to sell the property to them. The learned Judge, Narula G. J. differed from the view expressed by the Madras High Court in Krishnamachari v. Dhanalakshmi (AIR. 1968 Mad. 142) wherein it was held that 0.1, R.10(2) of the CPC. confers upon the Court a very wide jurisdiction and the Court should not be disposed to a curtailment of the powers vested in it by the rule. Following the decision in AIR. 1969 Punj. & Haryana p. 57 and the other decisions referred to in the judgment, the learned judge held: "4. Howsoever much equitable the claim of the petitioner may be, it appears that, in view of the binding judgments of different Benches of this Court it is not possible to allow the petitioner and respondents Nos. 6 and 7 to be impleaded as parties to the suit." The decision in AIR. 1971 Punj. Howsoever much equitable the claim of the petitioner may be, it appears that, in view of the binding judgments of different Benches of this Court it is not possible to allow the petitioner and respondents Nos. 6 and 7 to be impleaded as parties to the suit." The decision in AIR. 1971 Punj. 400 is referred to as laying down the law: "That what has to be seen in allowing or disallowing an application under 0.1, R.10 of the Code is whether the addition of a new party would be consistent with the scope of the inquiry as necessitated in the pending suit and that in the absence of such a party it would not be possible to completely and effectively dispose of the controversy in the pending suit and not that some other suit may be avoided". The decision in B. Somaiah v. Smt. Amina Begum (AIR. 1976 Andh.182) is referred to as laying down: "that where a person applies to be made a party what the Court ought to see is whether there is anything in the suit which cannot be determined, owing to his absence or whether there would be prejudice by his not being added as a party".' In Sreedhar Pant & Others v. State of Orissa and Others (AIR. 1979 Orissa 55), the plaintiffs sought a declaration against the State of Orissa that the suit-land is an alluvial accretion, to their ryoti land and also for an injunction against the defendant-State and its Officers (defendants 1 to 3) from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession' of the land. Certain third parties sought to be impleaded as party-defendants alleging that the suit-land had been leased to them by the Tahsildar and they are in possession of the land even after the expiry of the lease. The trial court allowed them to be impleaded. The Orissa High Court following its earlier decision in Narahari v. Ghanashyam (AIR. 1963 Orissa 186) and the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Banarasi Dass v. Panna Lal (AIR. 1969 Punj. & Har. 57) held that the third parties are not entitled to be impleaded in the suit. In Para.6 of the judgment the learned judge stated thus: "6. The sine qua non for any person being impleaded as a party to a suit is that he should have a direct or tangible interest in the subject-matter. 1969 Punj. & Har. 57) held that the third parties are not entitled to be impleaded in the suit. In Para.6 of the judgment the learned judge stated thus: "6. The sine qua non for any person being impleaded as a party to a suit is that he should have a direct or tangible interest in the subject-matter. If the questions involved in the suit can be decided without the proposed party, the judicial discretion vested in the court to implead parties under 0.1, R.10(2) Code of Civil Procedure should not be exercised. Before directing a party to be impleaded the court must be satisfied about the genuineness of his interest, in the litigation". In Rasiklal Shankerlal Soni v. Natverlal Shankerlal Updhyaya & Others (AIR. 1975 Guj.178) the suit was for specific performance of an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant for sale of the suit property. The only relief claimed was that the defendant should be ordered to execute the document of sale in pursuance to the agreement for sale. The plaintiff was willing to take such title as the vendor had in the property. No relief for possession of the suit property was claimed. The defendant's sisters sought to be impleaded in the suit claiming that they are entitled to inherit the suit property under Hindu Law and that the agreement for sale executed by the defendant was not binding on them. On the facts of the case the Gujarat High Court held that the sisters of the defendant are not entitled to be impleaded in the suit as their rights whatever that might be are not affected by the results of the suit. It was held at page 180: "Where a person sued for specific performance of an agreement of sale impleading the executant of the agreement as a party, there is no necessity to determine the question of vendor's title. The fact that the title, which the purchaser may acquire might be defeasible by a third party as for example, by the persons claiming right to the property under Hindu Law, is no ground for refusing specific performance, if the purchaser is willing to take such title as the vendor has." In this view of the matter, the applicants were found to be not necessary parties to the suit as their interests are not in any way affected by the results of the suit. Following the decision in AIR. 1969 Punj. & Har. p. 57 it was held that under Order I, R.10(2) a person may be added as a party to the suit only in two cases namely: (1) when he ought to have been joined and is not joined that is whenever he is a necessary party and (2) when without his presence the suit cannot be completely adjudicated. The decision in Shivshankarappa Mahadevappa v. Shivappa Parappa (AIR. 1943 Born. 27) was distinguished on the ground that the suit in that case was not only for specific performance of an agreement for sale but also for possession of the suit property, the persons in possession of the property were likely to be directly affected by the results of the suit, and it was appropriate that they were impleaded as parties to the suit. 7. In Dollfus Mieg Et Compagnis S. A. v. Bank of England (1950 (2) AER. 605), the question arose under the corresponding provision of the English Rule RSC. 0.16, R.11, under which the Governments of United States of America and France applied to be added as defendants in an action by a French Company against the Bank of England, claiming delivery of sixty-four gold bars which had been looted from the plaintiffs by the Germans during their occupation of France, recovered from Germany by the Allies armies and deposited with the Bank of England by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, as members of a Tripartite Commission for the restitution of Monetary Gold. The bank applied for an order to set aside the writ and all subsequent proceedings in the action on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action as the bars were in the possession and under the control of the three Governments concerned and the action impleaded two foreign sovereign States, viz., the United States of America and France, who declined to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. The case proceeded on the basis that the bars were returnable in specie to the three Governments on demand and Jenkins J. made the order asked for. The case proceeded on the basis that the bars were returnable in specie to the three Governments on demand and Jenkins J. made the order asked for. The Company appealed and at the end of the argument before the Court of Appeal fresh evidence was submitted by the Bank that while the action was pending, one of its subordinate officers had inadvertently disposed of some of the bars in the course of the Bank's business. After considering the evidence the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and gave the Bank leave to appeal to the House of Lords. The applicants, the Governments of U.S.A. and the Republic of France then moved the Court for an order that they be joined as defendants on the ground that in view of the fresh evidence their presence as defendants was necessary to enable the court to adjudicate effectually and completely in the matter. Wynn-Parry J. in the course of his judgment at page 608 stated: "The general rule is, I think, accurately stated in The Annual Practice, 1949, P. 253, in these words: "Generally in common law and chancery matters a plaintiff who conceives that he, has a cause of action against a defendant is entitled to pursue his remedy against that defendant alone. He cannot be compelled to proceed against other persons whom he has no desire to sue"." In support of the general rule the learned judge has referred to the decisions in Norris v. Beazley (1877 (2) CPD. 80) and McCheane v. Gyles (1902) (1) Ch. 911). A few exceptions to the general rule are stated at page 609 as follows-: "There are, however, certain exceptions to the general rule, conveniently divided in The Annual Practice, 1949 P. 254, into three classes, and prefaced in my view, accurately with the words: "Generally speaking, intervention can.only be insisted upon in three classes of case." The first of these three classes is a representative action where the person' seeking to intervene is one of a class whom the plaintiff claims to repre-sent and the intervener is unwilling that the plaintiff should represent him. In such a case the intervener can insist on being added as a defendant. The second class of case is where the proprietary rights of the intervener are directly affected by the proceedings. In such a case the intervener can insist on being added as a defendant. The second class of case is where the proprietary rights of the intervener are directly affected by the proceedings. The third class of case concerns actions for specific performance of contracts where third parties have an interest in the question of the manner in which the contract should be performed". The learned judge at page 610 after referring to the decision in Vevasseur v. Krupp ((1878) 9 Ch.D. 351) where a third party was allowed to intervene in an action for infringement of patent, where the property involved in the action belonged to him; stated: "The authorities furnish instances of when intervention will be allowed and when it will not, and from those authorities the general rule embracing the three classes in question has been evolved, but in no case has the court attempted to lay down in an exhaustive statement all the cases in which the court will allow or refuse applications for the joinder of new defendants". At the same page, the decision in Moser v. Marsden (1892 (1) Ch. 487), is referred to as establishing the proposition that an indirect interest in the subject-matter of the suit is not sufficient to implead the intervener. At page 611 the learned judge stated as follows: "It seems to me that the true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicants' rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject-matter of the action if those rights could be established. That is the approach which I have made. Viewing the matter in this way, it is impossible in my judgment, to say that the applicants have only an indirect interest of the nature which fell to be considered in Moser v. Marsden. They appear to me to have something more, namely, a right, which, although it may arise indirectly, viz., by the invocation of the doctrine of immunity and through the defendant Bank as bailee, nevertheless results in a direct interest in the subject-matter of this action, and is a right nearly akin to the proprietary right which was under consideration in Vavasseur v. Krupp. There is no authority directly bearing on the point, but, on the analysis which I have made of the nature of the applicants' interest in the matter, I have come to the conclusion that I ought not to say that I have no jurisdiction to entertain the application on the short ground which counsel for the plaintiffs put forward, viz., that the applicants could not show a proprietary right, and therefore, did not come within the second of the three classes of case to which I have referred, but that I am dealing with a right of such a nature, as, on an application by the applicants in the position of the present applicants, should result in an order that they be joined as defendants, provided it can be shown that in their absence the claim to the right will not effectually be put forward." Referring to RSC. 0.16 R.11, the learned judge observed at page 6121 "It is to be observed that the passage in R. S. C. 0.16 R.11, on which I am asked to rely: "or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter" are alternative to the earlier words, "the names of any parties, whether plaintiffs or defendants, who ought to have been joined", and that, therefore, they must be intended to extend the jurisdiction of the court, and it is not necessary, to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under the latter words, to show that the intervener ought to have been joined. I think those words confer on the court a wide jurisdiction, and, having regard to the review of the cases which I have made, it is a jurisdiction which I ought not to treat as cut down more than I must do by the guidance which I find from those cases. I find nothing in those authorities which would prevent me from taking the view that there is a general discretion in the court, if it thinks right, having regard to all the circumstances, to bring in an intervener so that the questions involved in the action may be completely adjudicated on and settled". In the decision in Amon v. Rappael Tuck & Sons Ltd. (1956(1) AER. page 273), Devlin J. following the decision in 1950 (2) AER. In the decision in Amon v. Rappael Tuck & Sons Ltd. (1956(1) AER. page 273), Devlin J. following the decision in 1950 (2) AER. 605 stated at page 290: "Likewise a defendant who seeks to join another defendant does not inevitably have to show that the new defendant will be directly affected by an order in the action as it is constituted. He may succeed if he can snow that he cannot effectually set up a defence which he desires to set up unless the new defendant is joined with it, or unless the order made binds the new defendant. It is not that the construction of the rule differs according to circumstances. The construction of the rule is, and must be, the same in all circumstances; but the test that is appropriate to determine whether a party is necessary or not may vary according to circumstances". In Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum & Others, (AIR. 1958 SC. 886), the main question in controversy was the true scope of sub-rule (2) of R.10 of 0.1, C.P.C. The suit was for a declaration that the plaintiff was the lawfully wedded wife of the defendant. The defendant filed a written statement admitting his marriage to the plaintiff. It was at that stage that a petition was filed by another lady and her son to be impleaded as party defendants in the suit on the allegation that they are the wife and son of the defendant and as members of his family they are interested in denying the rights and status of the plaintiff as the lawfully wedded wife of the defendant. After an elaborate consideration of the decisions in Moser v. Marsden (1892 (1) Ch. 487), Dollfus Mieg Et. Compagnis S. A. v. Bank of England (1950 (2) A.E.R. 605) and also the decisions in Prayaga Doss Jee Varu v. The Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, (ILR. 50 Mad. 34), Secretary of State v. Murugesa Mudaliar (AIR. 1929 Mad. 443), and United Provinces v. Mst. Atiga Begum (AIR. 194J F.C.16), the Supreme Court stated in Para.8 at page 891, thus: "It is no use multiplying references bearing on the construction of the relevant rule of the Code, relating to addition of parties. 50 Mad. 34), Secretary of State v. Murugesa Mudaliar (AIR. 1929 Mad. 443), and United Provinces v. Mst. Atiga Begum (AIR. 194J F.C.16), the Supreme Court stated in Para.8 at page 891, thus: "It is no use multiplying references bearing on the construction of the relevant rule of the Code, relating to addition of parties. Each case has to be determined on its own facts, and it has to be recognised that no decided cases have been brought to our notice, which can be said to be on all fours with the facts and circumstances of the present case. There cannot be the least doubt that it is firmly established as a result of judicial decisions that in order that a person may be added as a party to a suit, he should have a direct interest in the subject-matter of the litigation whether it raises questions relating to movable or immovable property". The Supreme Court at Para.13 of its judgment has summarised the conclusions arrived at on a consideration of the law relating to the addition of parties. Conclusions 1 to 3 are extracted below: 1. That the question of addition of parties under R.10 of O.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the court, but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case; but in some cases, it may raise controversies as to the power of the court, in contradistinction to its inherent jurisdiction, or, in other words, of jurisdiction in the limited sense in which it is used in S.115 of the Code; 2. That in a suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation; 3. Where the subject-matter of a litigation, is a declaration as regards status or a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the court is of the opinion that by adding that party, it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy." On the facts of the present case there cannot be any dispute that the petitioner has direct interest in the subject-matter of the suit. The Municipal Building Rules are intended for the benefit of all residents in the municipal area and a violation of the rule by an adjoining owner of land, is a direct infringement of the rights of the petitioner recognised by the rules. A decree for permanent injunction against the defendants namely the Municipal Corporation and its Commissioner, if granted would adversely affect the petitioner's right to have the construction if any in violation of the Municipal Rules demolished and removed. The decision in AIR. 1969 Punj. & Haryana p. 57 and the other decisions following the same, and referred to above do not preclude the impleadment of a third party whose interests in the subject-matter of the suit will be directly affected by the decision in the suit. As laid down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC. 886, all persons who have a direct interest in the subject-matter of the suit, can be impleaded as parties to the suit. The present case would therefore fall under the exception to the general rule, that in the normal course no party will be impleaded as a defendant in the suit when the plaintiff opposes such impleadment. This is a case where the rights of the petitioner recognised by the Municipal Rules will be adjudicated upon in her absence if she is not impleaded as a party defendant in the suit. The result is, I set aside the impugned order of the court below, allow I.A. No. 2856 of 1982 and direct the petitioner to be impleaded as additional third defendant in O.S. No. 604 of 1982 on its file. The C.R.P. is allowed with costs.