JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition has been filed against the order passed by the Munsif, Abu Road dated February 1, 1983. 2. The facts which have given rise to the present proceedings are that Mohammad Sharif was the landlord and Abdul Rehman was the tenant of the premises in dispute, which are situated at Abu Road. The landlord brought a suit for ejectment against his tenant Abdul Rehman and a decree for ejectment was passed by the trial court which was upheld by the first appellate court. The tenant filed a second appal No. 139 of 1981 in this Court, which was admitted and an interim stay order was passed in the beginning. But on September 21, 1981 final stay order was passed by this Court after hearing the learned counsel for both the parties and in their presence, staying the dispossession of the tenant appellant Abdul Rehman from the premises in dispute. The executing court postponed the execution case on various dates until December 18, 1982 when a warrant for possession was issued on the ground that a copy of the stay order passed by this Court was not on the record of the execution proceedings Soon thereafter possession of the premise, in dispute was delivered by the executing court to the decree-holder Mohd. Sharif. It is alleged by the petitioner that after the delivery of possession was given by the executing court, the petitioner was taken as a tenant by Mohd. Sharif in the disputed premises on January 1, 1983 and that he was in possession of the said premises in his capacity as a tenant thereof. 3. The original tenant, Abdul Rehman applied to the executing court that proceedings regarding delivery of possession be set aside as a stay order was passed by the High Court on September 21, 1981 and produced a copy of the said stay order before the executing court and urged that the proceedings in execution of the decree passed by the lower court, regarding delivery of possession after the date the stay order was passed were a nullity. A prayer was also made under Section 151 C.P.C. for re-delivery of possession to Abdul Rehman. A prayer was also made under Section 151 C.P.C. for re-delivery of possession to Abdul Rehman. The executing court by its order dated,January 27, 1983 directed that possession be re-delivered to the original tenant, Abdul Rehman in view of the fact that a stay order was passed by the High Court on September 21, 1981 and the executing court set aside the proceedings regarding delivery of possession to the landlord. 4. Thereafter the petitioner filed an application before the executing court on January 31, 1983, stating that he is a bona fide transferee without knowledge of the earlier proceedings regarding delivery of possession and as he was admitted is a tenant in the premises in dispute he could not be evicted therefrom without compliance of the provisions of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. The executing court, after hearing learned counsel for both the parties, rejected the application of the petitioner and directed the Nazir of the court to proceed to restore possession of the premises in dispute to the original tenant, Abdul Rehman, if necessary after breaking open the lock under Order 21 Rule 35 (3) C P C This order is being challenged by Abdul Sattar by means of this revision petition. 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is a bona fide transferee for value and he has been properly inducted as tenant in the disputed premises, as such he could not be dispossessed in pursuance of the order of the executing court dated January 27, 1983 directing re-delivery of possession under Section 151 C P. C. to the original tenant. The other argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the application filed by the original tenant, Abdul Rehman, under Order 21 Rule 35 (3) C. P. C. or his counter filed in reply to the application of the petitioner should have been treated as an application under Order 21 Rule 97 C. P. C. and an enquiry should have been held in accordance with the provisions of Rule 98 as there was resistance or obstruction to the delivery of possession, by the petitioner claiming to a third party. It was finally argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as the petitioner has been lass fully inducted as a tenant in the disputed premises, even if any delivery of possession is to be made, then the procedure prescribed under Order 21 Rule 36 should be followed and only symbolic possession should be the given, without dispossessing the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the original tenant, Abdul Rehman argued that in the present case possession was delivered to the landlord Mohd. Sharif by the executing court in utter disregard of the stave order passed by this Court on September 21, 1981 and that the entire proceeding regarding delivery of possession to Mohd. Sharif being in contravention of the stay order passed by this Court, were a nullity and the original tenant is entitled to restoration of possession, as he must be placed by the executing court in the same position in which he was at the time of stay order passed by this Court on September 21, 1981 or delivery of possession was ordered by The executing court on December 18, 1982. It was also argued that the petitioner was not a third party but was a person claiming under the landlord and being the representative of the landlord, restoration of possession from the petitioner was justified. It was also argued that the executing court was made aware of the stay order passed by this Court on September 21, 1981 soon thereafter and as such executing court postponed the proceedings in the execution case for over one year and that the executing court was not justified at all in issuing a warrant for delivery of possession on December 18, 1982, in spite of the assertion on the part of the counsel for the original tenant before him that a stay order has been passed by the High Court. It was then argued that no rights at all accrued to the petitioner under the Rent Control Act as the possession having been delivered by the landlord to the petitioner pendente lite, the position of the petitioner was that of a representative of the landlord and once the court passed an order on January 27, 1983 under Section 151 C.P.C, directing re-delivery of possession from the landlord and the proceedings relating to delivery of possession in December, 1982 were set aside the executing court was bound to restore possession to the original tenant, after dispossessing the petitioner. 7. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. It is not in dispute and cannot be disputed that in Civil Second Appeal No. 139 of 1981, preferred by Abdul Rehman, the original tenant a stay order was passed by this Court on September 21, 1981 after hearing learned counsel for both the parties and in the presence of both the learned counsel. Thus, it was very much in the knowledge of the landlord as early as in September, 1981 that this Court has passed an order staying the execution of the decree for eviction and dispossession of the original tenant. The order-sheet of the executing court dated October 3, 1981 and of subsequent dates were read before me and it appears from those orders chat the executing court was well aware of the fact that a stay order was passed by this Court. It was only because this fact regarding passing of a stay order by this Court was conveyed to the executing court in October 1981 that long dates were given and the execution case was postponed for over one year and 2 months without taking any proceedings therein. It would take it from these facts that the executing court had the requisite knowledge on October 3, 1981 of the stay order passed by this Court dated September 21, 1981. It is note-worthy that on October 3, 1981 or on any subsequent date for a period of over one year, the executing court did not even call upon the original tenant, who is the judgment-debtor, to produce a copy of the stay order passed by this Court. Rather, the dates were postponed and even the decree holder landlord did not object to long dates being given, without any proceedings worth the name. Rather, the dates were postponed and even the decree holder landlord did not object to long dates being given, without any proceedings worth the name. Even when the matter came up before the executing court on December 18, 1982, learned counsel appearing for the original 'tenant asserted that a stay order has been passed by the High Court, then the landlord did not say that a stay order had not been passed. But the executing court did not even allow the original tenant reasonable time to produce a copy of the stay order, if such a copy thereof was not on its record. But the executing court immediately ordered issuance of warrant of possession in utter violation of the stay order passed by this Court. Even the earlier proceedings of the executing court go to show, as I have observed above, that it was aware of the fact that execution proceedings were stayed by this Court. Once the executing court has obtained knowledge of the stay order passed by this Court, then all proceedings taken thereafter by that court are illegal and are a nullity, as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (1) Mulraj v. Murti Raghunathji Maharaj ( AIR 1967 SC 1386 ). Wanchoo, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, in the aforesaid case observed as under: "As soon therefore as the executing court has come to know of the order either by communication from the court passing the stay order or by an affidavit from one party or the other or in any other way the executing court cannot proceed further and if it does so it acts illegally .......... ....In the case of a stay order as it is addressed to the court and prohibits it from proceeding further, as soon as the court has knowledge of the order it is bound to obey it and if it does not it acts illegally, and all proceedings taken after the knowledge of the order would be a nullity.... .. . ...The court may receive knowledge either on receipt of an order of stay from the court that passed it or through one party or the other supported by an affidavit or in any other way. .. . ...The court may receive knowledge either on receipt of an order of stay from the court that passed it or through one party or the other supported by an affidavit or in any other way. ' As I have observed above taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, I take it that the executing court had the requisite knowledge on October 3, 1981 of the stay order passed by this Court and once that knowledge had come to the executing court prior to December 18, 1982, it must be held that the executing court was bound to obey the order passed by this Court and if it acted in utter contravention of the stay order passed by this Court, then certainly it acted illegally and all proceedings taken thereafter are a nullity. Thus, the delivery of possession of the property in dispute from the original tenant, Abdul Rehman to the landlord Mohd. Sharif in December 1982 was a nullity. Therefore the original tenant is entitled to redelivery or restoration of possession and he should be placed in the same position in which he was on December 18, 1982, when the executing court passed the illegal order regarding delivery of possession. The landlord, Mohd. Sharif was fully aware of the fact that a stay order was passed by this Court on September 21, 1981 and also of the fact that delivery of possession in contravention of the stay order of this Court was unlawful and was bound to be set aside when all the facts would be disclosed, yet in order to avoid redelivery of possession from him, he wrongfully transferred possession of the property in dispute to Abdul Sattar, by taking him as a tenant in the disputed premises; then it must be held that the executing court must reach the transferee from the person in wrongful possession and get the possession of the property delivered from him to the original tenant in order that the illegality committed by it may be vacated it is an established principle of law that no party can be allowed to move or reach the court and I have no doubt that the landlord Mohd. Sharif, with full knowledge of the existence of the stay order passed by this Court on September 21, 1981, in the presence of his counsel, tried to overreach the court by taking wrongful possession over the disputed property through the executing court and then by taking Abdul Sattar as a tenant and transferring possession to him with the ulterior motive that possession may not be restored to the original tenant, even if the executing court desired to effect restoration of the possession in order to undo the wrong committed by it. 8. There is another aspect of the matter. In Mulraj's case (1) their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that even if the executing court had no knowledge of the stay order passed earlier, but the fact comes to its notice subsequently that a stay order had been passed at the time when the delivery of possession was ordered, then executing court is not powerless to undo the injustice that was caused to the party, in whose favour the stay order existed, during the period till the court has knowledge of the stay order. Their Lordships were of the view that Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is always available to the court executing the decree in such cases and when the stay order is brought to its notice, the executing court can set aside all steps taken by it between the time the stay order was passed and the time it was brought to its notice, if that is necessary in the ends of the justice and the party concerned asks it to do so. Their Lordships observed as under in this connection:- "The court has the power in our view to set aside the proceedings taken between the time when the stay order was passed and the time when it was brought to its notice, if it is asked to do so and it considers that it is necessary in the interests of justice that the interim proceedings should be set aside." In the present case, the original tenant, Abdul Rehman requested the executing court to undo the mischief which was caused to him on account of the wrongful delivery of possession to the landlord, in spite of the existence of the stay order of this Court and requested the executing court to redeliver the possession to him. On this application, after hearing the concerned parties, the executing court passed an order on January 27, 1983 setting aside the proceedings regarding delivery of possession and directed redelivery of possession of the executed premises to the original tenant Abdul Rehman, under Section 151 C.P.C. In that view of the matter, the course adopted by the executing court in the present case has the sanction of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mulraj's case (1) and that court rightly realised that the injustice which was done to the original tenant Abdul Rehman in disregard of the stay order must be set right. It would be without any meaning if the court in such circumstances cannot restore possession to the original tenant Abdul Rehman, because during the intervening period the landlord wrongfully passed on possession of the disputed premises to the petitioner. As their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in Mulraj's case (1) that the executing court is not powerless to undo the injustice caused on account of the contravention of the stay order, I am of the view that the possession has to be followed in the hands of the landlord and also of the petitioner, who has been wrongly put into possession by the landlord during the pendency of the proceedings in an attempt to over-reach the court and in order to cause obstruction to the re-delivery of possession in order to restore the possession to the original tenant. Abdul Rehman so that it may be brought in the position in which it existed at the time when the stay order was pasted by this Court a September 21, 1981. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decisions in (2) Shamlal Dhingra v. Smt. Jaswant Kaur and another ( AIR 1980 Del. 171 ). (3) Mahabir Parshad v. M/s. Delhi Traders Private Ltd. and others ( AIR 1977 Del. 45 ), and in (4) Dabendra Nath Sarkar v. Smt. Parul Bala Ghosh and another ( AIR 1953 Cal. 233 ) in support of his contention that a subsequent bonafide tenant is entitled to retain possession on reversal of decree for eviction. In the aforesaid cases possession was sough, to be restored under Section 144 CPC on the reversal of the decree by the appellate or revisional court. 233 ) in support of his contention that a subsequent bonafide tenant is entitled to retain possession on reversal of decree for eviction. In the aforesaid cases possession was sough, to be restored under Section 144 CPC on the reversal of the decree by the appellate or revisional court. I may point out that there are other cases which have taken a contrary view from that expressed in the aforesaid decisions. In (5) Subhash Chander v. Rehmat Ullah (1973 R.C.J. 688), a learned judge of the Delhi high Court held that once a decree for possession obtained by the landlord is set aside, it would be inequitable to keep the tenant out of possession and postponement of the restitution order would create unnecessary hardship to the tenant. In that case after an ex parte decree for delivery of possession was passed, the landlord applied for warrant of possession and took physical possession of the premises. On the same date when he took possession he transferred it to another tenant. It was held that the creation of the alleged tenancy in respect of the premises prima facie appears to have been created to create obstacles in the way of the tenant to obtain possession if he succeeds in having the ex-parte order set aside. In (6) Jagdish Lal Arora v. N.E. Pariera and others ( AIR 1977 Del. 12 ), another learned judge of the Delhi High Court considered the matter at length and came to the following conclusion : "A combined reading of the three sets of provisions referred to above hardly leaves any doubt that any transfer of possession of immovable property during the pendency of a suit which involves any right to such property, would be incapable in law of affecting the rights that flow in relation to the property from a decree that may be passed in the suit. It is also evident that where a defendant has been deprived of the possession of the property in execution of a decree for such possession and the decree was eventually set aside, the party who is deprived of possession is entitled to the possession being restored to him unless the justice of the cause points to the contrary and the party that has taken the benefit is under an obligation to restore possession and the court is fully empowered, as indeed obliged, to order restitution by evicting not only the party which has taken the advantage but all those whose possession is relatable to such a party. In such cases the transferee from the party, who obtained the advantage, or a further transferee from such a transferee, would be within the reach of the Court irrespective of whether such transferee or transfers were acting in good faith and without any knowledge of the earlier proceedings. The power and the obligation of the court to restore the property to the person who has been deprived of it, in such cases would transcend all limitations except those founded in justice of the cause. If therefore, either the person who took he benefit or any transferee from such a transfers resisted or obstructed the execution of an order of restitution, would not have the protection of Rule 99ORDER21 of the Code of Civil Procedure." (emphasis added). 10. I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view. It may be pointed out that the aforesaid two decisions of the Delhi High Court were not brought to the notice of the Division Bench of that court which decided Shyamlal Dingra's case (2). In (7) Narayan Laxman Ayarkar and others v. Vishnu Waman Dhawale and another ( AIR 1957 Bom. 117 ), it was held that as the person applying for restitution was entitled to actual possession, the court was competent to pass an order of restitution against the transferees who were the representatives of the persons to whom possession was delivered. In (7) Narayan Laxman Ayarkar and others v. Vishnu Waman Dhawale and another ( AIR 1957 Bom. 117 ), it was held that as the person applying for restitution was entitled to actual possession, the court was competent to pass an order of restitution against the transferees who were the representatives of the persons to whom possession was delivered. The same view was taken in (8) Shanker Lal Jakodia v. Ram Kishan Baldeo Prased and others( AIR 1976 All 250 ), wherein it was held that a third person inducted by the landlord as a tenant during the pendency of the appeal was a representative of the landlord and could be dispossessed in order to restore possession in restitution, on the reversal for ejectment. 11. However, it is not necessary for me to express any final opinion as to whether the view taken by the Delhi High Court in Shamlal's case (2) could be followed in face of the decisions referred to above, because the case before me is not one relating to restitution under Section 144 C. P C. but one where possession was being restored under Section 151 C. P. C., because in the present case possession was illegally transferred to the landlord, not in lawful execution of the decree, but by an unlawful act on the part of the executing court, in disobedience of the stay order passed by this Court dated September 21, 1981 and as their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in Mulraj's case (1), the executing court had every right to deliver possession by setting aside the illegality committed by that court. Where possession was delivered under an illegal order or an order which is a nullity, the same does not vest any right in the person to whom such possession is given and any other person to whom possession is transferred by such a person also has no vested right or interest is the property, and his possession is likewise illegal as that of the parson who had obtained possession in pursuance of the illegal order. As the possession of the decree-holder was wrongful, having been obtained under an illegal order of the executing court, the possession of the petitioner, who is his transferee, is likewise illegal and as such the petitioner did not acquire any lawful right or interest in the disputed property which could be protected under the Rent Control legislation. Section 13 of the Rajasthan Act would not afford any protection to the petitioner as he did not acquire any valid tenancy right, because his possession over the disputed property was wrongful. Moreover, the petitioner is not being dispossessed in pursuance of a decree or order pissed in favour of the landlord or any person claiming through him but to undo a wrong committed by the executing court. 12. So far as the question of restitution is concerned, the guiding principle has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (9) Binayak Swain v. Ramesh Chandra Panigrahi and another (AIR 19b6 SC 948), wherein it has been observed as under : "We are of the opinion that the appellant is entitled to restitution notwithstanding anything which happened subsequently as the right to claim restitution is based upon the existence or otherwise of a decree in favour of the Plaintiff at the time when the application for restitution was made. The principle of the doctrine of restitution is that on the reversal of a decree, the law imposes an obligation on the party to the suit who received the benefit of the erroneous decree to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost. This obligation arises autocratically on the reversal or modification of the decree and necessarily carries with it the right to restitution of all that has been done under the erroneous decree, and the Court in making restitution is bound to restore the parties, so far as they can be restored, to the same position they were in at the time when the Court by its erroneous action had displaced them from." (emphasis added) 13. I would also like to observe that Rule 102ORDER21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that nothing in rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor his transferred the property after the institution of the suit. I would also like to observe that Rule 102ORDER21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that nothing in rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor his transferred the property after the institution of the suit. in which the decree was passed or to the dis-possession of any such person. The petitioner is a transferee pendente lite within the meaning of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and as such rule 98 of Order 21 C. P C. is not applicable. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the proceedings should have been taken under Rule 98 cannot, therefore, be upheld. Rule 93 itself provides that where the court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf or by any transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceedings, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property. In that instant case there is no necessity of an enquiry to be made under rule 98 because as I have pointed out above, the landlord Mohd. Sharif had obtained possession under an illegal order passed by the executing court in December, 1982 and he transferred possession to the petitioner of the disputed property on January 1, 1983, according to the petitioner's own case. The possession of the petitioner is illegal in the same manner as that of Mohd. Sharif and the original tenant is entitled to obtain possession even after dispossessing the petitioner. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to certain other decisions in which the question has been considered as to whether a person offering resistance or obstructing delivery of possession was bound by the decree, brit those cases are not relevant for the present case. In the present case the petitioner is a transferee pendente lite from the person who is wrongfully in possession and he must be considered to be a representative of the transferor' for the purposes of the proceedings relating to restoration of possession. 15. In the present case the petitioner is a transferee pendente lite from the person who is wrongfully in possession and he must be considered to be a representative of the transferor' for the purposes of the proceedings relating to restoration of possession. 15. So far as last argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, that possession could be delivered only in accordance with the provisions of Order 21 Rule 36 C P. C., I may observe that again it is not a case where the tenant was in occupation at the time when the suit was filed or even when decree was passed or that he was a person who was not bound by the order of redelivery of possession passed by the executing court, in order to set aside the illegality committed by it earlier in delivering possession to the landlord in contravention of the stay order passed by this Court. The provisions of Order 21 Rule 35 (3) are applicable to the present case as the original tenant is entitled to restoration of possession in the same condition in which the parties stood on December 18, 1982, when the illegal order directing delivery of possession was passed by the executing court. The illegal portion of the proceedings of the executing court relating to delivery of possession to the landlord have to be removed and the situation as it existed prior thereto has to be restored. I am, therefore, of the view that the original tenant Abdul Rehman is entitled to obtain actual possession of the premise; in dispute even after dispossessing the petitioner, who claims to be the subsequently inducted tenant of the landlord Mohd. Sharif. Both Mohd. Sharif as well as Abdul Sattar are bound to restore the situation as it existed on December 18, 1982, when the illegal order was passed by the executing court regarding delivery of possession in utter contravention of the stay order of this Court. 16. In the result, the revision petition has no merit and the same is dismissed. *******