M. N. RAY, J. ( 1 ) THIS Rule, which was directed against an order of remand made by the Tribunal in Case No. 4, B. C. A. of 1976 dated 22nd April, 1977, under the provisions of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), was obtained without any interim order, on 27th May, 1977. ( 2 ) THE petitioner has stated that he has agricultural lands as mentioned in the petition and one Shri Abdul Sabur Mullick, respondent No. 4 was a Bargadar in respect of them. It was his case that the said respondent No. 4 having failed to deliver his share of produce in the year of 1379 B. S. the petitioner instituted a proceeding before the Junior Land Reforms Officer concerned, being respondent No. 2 for realization of his share of produce, which was registered as Case No. 31 (P) of 1973-74. It has further been stated and that would appear from the order in Annexure 'a' that such case was allowed and the respondent No. 4, on being found liable, to deliver to the applicant, his share of produce viz. 83 kgs. of paddy and 9 pawns of straw for the year 1379 B. S. , the money value whereof was Rs. 65/- per quintal of paddy and Rs. 45/- per kahon of straw. ( 3 ) HE has stated that respondent No. 4, failed to deliver either the produce or the money value of them as indicated above, so the petitioner, instituted a proceeding for termination of cultivation of the Bargadar under section 17 (1) (c) and 17 (1) (d) of the said Act and the said case was numbered as 101 (P) of 1975, in the Court of the Bhag Chas Officer. In such proceedings, the respondent No. 4 filed his exceptions and he has stated amongst others, that he was not a defaulter and was willing to deposit the money. The petitioner has stated that respondent No. 2 while disposing of the case as above held that the respondent No. 4 failed to comply with the order of 1st August, 1974 as made in Case No. 31 (P) of 1973 under section 16 (4) of the said Act and he also found, that there was no bar to terminate the cultivation of the suit lands under section 17 (1) (d) of the said Act. Such order was made on 15th October, 1976 and thereby, the respondent No. 4 was directed to vacate the lands in question by the end of Phalgun, 1382 B. S. ( 4 ) IT has been alleged by the petitioner that thereafter, he has got possession of the land in question, in execution of the order of termination as mentioned above. At this point of time, it must be recorded that although this Rule has been made ready as regards service on 3rd March, 1976 only the respondent, State of West Bengal and none else, has appeared and opposed the prayer as made. In fact, respondent No. 4 has not appeared. ( 5 ) IT would appear that being aggrieved by such determinations by the Bhag Chas Officer concerned the respondent No. 4 preferred Bhag Chas Appeal No. 4 of 1976, before the Sub-Divisional Officer, respondent No. 1 and the said officer allowed the said appeal and directed remand of the case to the respondent No. 2, by his order dated 7th February, 1977 as disclosed in Annexure 'd' to the petition. The order of remand as would appear from the order as impeached, was made as it was held and found that in a proceeding for termination in question, it was mandatory to pass a conditional order in terms of the Proviso to section 17 (1) (c) of the said Act. It would also appear from the said appellate order that in course of hearing, it was contended on behalf of the appellant in the appeal, who is respondent No. 4 in this proceedings, that Proviso to section 17 (1) (c) of the said Act stipulates that the order of termination will have to be a conditional one in the sense that it must be given effect to, if the Bargadar delivers to the owner, his share or pays the money value, within such time or terms as the officer may specifies. Such provisions have been found, by the learned Tribunal, to be mandatory and he was of the view that before the order of termination as made in this case, opportunities in terms of the Proviso to section 17 (1) (c) of the said Act, should or must have been given or made available to the person, who was required to comply with the order of termination. ( 6 ) THERE was no affidavit-in-opposition filed to the petition of motion. But Mr. Ghosh, appearing for the respondent No. 3 as mentioned above, argued the case on the basis of the records as produced. ( 7 ) MR. Saha, appearing in support of the Rule, claimed and contended that the Bargadar, respondent No. 4 not having complied with the order of 1st August, 1974 as made in Case No. 31 (P) of 1973-74 and also having failed to deliver the share of the produce for 1379 B. S. in compliance with section 16 (2) of the said Act, his Barga cultivation in respect of the lands in dispute was liable to be terminated under section 17 (1) (c) of the said Act and in the proviso to the same, there was no bar in passing of the order of termination and the appellate order as made by respondent No. 1 was thus made in contravention of section 17 (1) (c) of the said Act. He also claimed that the respondent No. 1 wrongly interpreted the said section 17 (1) (c) and the proviso thereunder, in holding that the passing of a conditional order as mentioned above, was a condition precedent to the passing of the order of termination and as such, such authority had acted illegally and in irregular exercise of jurisdiction, in setting aside the orders as made by respondent No. 2. It was also claimed that the respondent No. 1 not being a Court, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, were not applicable and as such, the order of remand was also improper and without jurisdiction. Mr. Saha further claimed that under section 16 of the said Act, if at all the Bargadar could have asked for or demanded or claimed some time, but there was no question of granting him any instalment for complying with the order as made and that was the only safeguard for a Bargadar, for necessary compliance and since there has been no mentioning of any instalment, the mentioning of such instalment in the Proviso to section 17 (1) (c), was not only illegal, irregular, and bad, but the same was ultra vires the provisions as contained in stature itself. It was his specific submissions that since under section 16, the liability has been fastened on a Bargadar to deposit his share of produce and on his failure, the consequences are automatic, so the further opportunities as given through the Proviso to section 17 (1) (c) and more particularly by making provisions for instalments, was improper. He claimed that a proviso cannot override or overstep the provisions as contained in the parent section and to establish that, he referred to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition), and more particularly to the chapter dealing with construction of provisos, where it has been quoted that difficulties sometimes arise in construing provisos. It will, however, generally be found that inconsistency can be avoided by applying the general rule that the words of a proviso are not to be taken "absolutely in their strict literal sense", but that a proviso is "of necessity ?????limited in its operations to the ambit of the section which it qualifies", as observed in the case of (1) Loyed and Scottish Finance Ltd. , v. The Modern Cars and Carravans (Kingston) Ltd. , (1966) 1 QB 764. ( 8 ) UNDER sub-section (1) of section 16, if the owner supplied the plough, cattle, manure and seeds to the Bargadar, he would be entitled to have 50% of the share of the produce and in all other cases, he would be entitled to have 25% of the share of the produce. Under sub-section (2) of that section and Rule 3 (1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Bargadars) Rules 1956 a Bargadar who tendered the produce of the land to the owner within the days as specified from the date of threshing of the produce and sub-section (3) provides that when the share of the produce is accepted, the acceptor shall give to the other a receipt therefore, in such form as may be prescribed. In view of the provisions as above, there is no other methods for the purpose of delivering of the produce, which would be admissible and those provisions of sub-section (3), would prevail over any other law, customs, usage or contracts, if those are inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act. In view of the provisions as above, there is no other methods for the purpose of delivering of the produce, which would be admissible and those provisions of sub-section (3), would prevail over any other law, customs, usage or contracts, if those are inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act. Section 16 (4) and Sub-Rule (3) (a) of Rule 3 of the Rules as mentioned above, have also laid down that the application for deposit of the share of produce may be made by the Bargadar within 30 days from the date of refusal of accept in the share or the grant of the receipt and when on application under section 16 (4) being made by the Bargadar, his adversary denies the relationship and file objection, it has been held in case of (2) Ram Prosad Roy v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , 1978 (1) CLJ 643, that the objection as regards relationship and jurisdiction should be decided first. It should be noted further, that a Bhag Chas Officer allowing a person to make the deposit of paddy under section 16 (4) of the said Act does not adjudicate whether or not the said person was really a Bargadar and by such deposit, only obligation to deliver the owner's share if he is a Bargadar, his discharged and bu such deposit as observed in the case of (3) Niharbala v. State of West Bengal 1980 (1) CHN 477 no right of the depositor would accrue. ( 9 ) SECTION 17 deals with the grounds for termination of cultivation by a Bargadar and sub-section (1) thereunder, specifically lays down that the termination of cultivation of Land by Bargadar shall not be caused except in execution of an order made by the competent authority appointed in that respect by the State Government. Such termination may be allowed on any of the grounds a specified in (a) to (d) of section 17 (1) of the said Act. It is true that if the Bargadar fails to cultivate the land, his cultivation is liable to be terminated. But he can explain away his failure in this respect by reasonable excuses. If he uses the land for any purpose other than agriculture, his cultivation may also be terminated. It is true that if the Bargadar fails to cultivate the land, his cultivation is liable to be terminated. But he can explain away his failure in this respect by reasonable excuses. If he uses the land for any purpose other than agriculture, his cultivation may also be terminated. Such provisions has been made to compel the Bargadar to cultivate the land with a view to secure the maximum yield from the land, which is one of the objects of the said Act. There is also no doubt, in case of failure of the Bargadar to cultivate a land, the authority as appointed under the said Act, should examine if the cause for such failure was reasonable or not, having regard to the principles of equity and natural justice. Sub-section (2) of section 17 further provides that if a person fails to bring under personal cultivation of any land, the cultivation of which by Bargadar has been terminated by him for bringing it under personal cultivation or appoint new Bargadar within two years, the prescribed authority shall sell it and the procedure, terms and conditions for such sell, have been laid down in Rule 5 of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Bargadar) Rule, 1956. The proviso under section 17 (1) (c) also limits the right of the owner of the land to terminate cultivation by a Bargadar for bringing it under his personal cultivation. It should also be noted that Mr. Ghosh made his submissions mainly placing reliance on the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (4) of section 16 and also on the basis of the interpretation of the sections as indicated hereinbefore. ( 10 ) ON the basis of the celebrated decision a proviso is something engrafted on a preceding enactment and the same is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language or the main enactment, and its effect confined to that case. The proper way to regard a proviso is as a limitation upon the effect of the principal enactment. A proviso, which is in effect and in substance a proviso, can only operate to deal with the case which but for it would have fallen within the ambit of the section to which the proviso is a proviso. The proper way to regard a proviso is as a limitation upon the effect of the principal enactment. A proviso, which is in effect and in substance a proviso, can only operate to deal with the case which but for it would have fallen within the ambit of the section to which the proviso is a proviso. It is true that a proviso cannot deal with any field than the field which the section itself deals with and the duty of the Court also must so restricted a to bring it within the ambit and purview of the section itself. Furthermore, when a proviso is capable of a wider connotation and is also capable of narrower connotation, if the narrower connotation brings it within the purview of the section then the Court must prefer the narrower connotation rather than the wider one. But and this is equally clear that a Legislature may enact a substantive provision in the garb or guise of a proviso is incapable of making it applicable to the section, then the Court, if the proviso has a clear meaning must look upon the proviso as a substantive provisions enacted by the legislature and give effect to it as such. It is also true that the language of the main enactment is clear and unambiguous, a proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within its expressed terms. It is also true that a proviso is to be strictly construed and it has no existence apart from the provisions which it is designed to limit or qualified. Generally speaking a proviso is intended to restrain the enacting clause and to except something which would have otherwise been within it or in some measure to modify the enacting clause. It is a rule of interpretation that the appropriate function of a proviso is to restrain or modify the enacting clause, or preceding matter and it should be confined to what proceeds unless the intentions that it shall apply to some other matters is apparent. The object of the proviso sometimes, however, is to curtails to some extent the very wide jurisdiction conferred upon the Court by the main body of the section. The object of the proviso sometimes, however, is to curtails to some extent the very wide jurisdiction conferred upon the Court by the main body of the section. Ordinarily, a proviso is no doubt designed to restrict rather than to enlarge the provision to which it is appended, but is this is not an inflexible rule and there are cases in which the language might well lead to the conclusion that the Legislature intended to exercise its enacting power. If after a careful examination of the proviso, the provision to which it is attached and the Act as a whole, the Court comes to the conclusion that the Legislature intended to create a liability, it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the intention even though it is embodied in a proviso and in such matter, the substance and not the form must be looked at for, as pointed out by Craise on Statute Law, that which is in form a proviso may in substance be a fresh enactment adding and not merely qualifying that which comes before. ( 11 ) AS stated hereinbefore, a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which its stand as a proviso and thus the sections in question, must be read along with the proviso as a whole and it is impossible to read the section as sit were contained in water tight compartment. It may be that read as a whole the effect of the proviso is to qualify the words which immediately precede if, whether proviso to all preceding matter or only to those immediately preceding. But, one thing is certain that one does not construe a section in the light of a proviso. The object of a proviso would thus be to cut down or qualify something which has go before. It would be contrary to the ordinary operation of a proviso, to give it an effect it cut down those power beyond what compliance with the proviso renders necessary. Where the enactment clause in general in its language are object, and a proviso is afterwards introduced that proviso is construed strictly and take no case, out of the enacting clause which does not fall fairly within its terms. Where the enactment clause in general in its language are object, and a proviso is afterwards introduced that proviso is construed strictly and take no case, out of the enacting clause which does not fall fairly within its terms. In short, a proviso carries special exceptions only out of enacting clause and those also set out in such exception, must establish it as being within the words as well as within the reason thereof. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provisions of a statute only embraces the field which is converted by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provisions to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. A proviso could not also by mere implication withdraw any part of what the main provisions has given. A proviso to a section is not independent of the section calling for independent consideration or construction detached from the construction to be placed on the main section as it is merely subsidiary to the main section and is to be construed in the light of the sections itself. The object of the proviso, as mentioned above, being to carve out from the main section a class or category to which the main section does not apply; and in so carving out the Court has always to bear in mind what is the class referred to in the main section and it must also be remembered that the carving out intended by the proviso is from the particular class deal with by the main section and from on other class. Thus a proviso cannot possibly deal with an entirely different topic or subject. The proper function of a proviso would thus be that it should thus qualify the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment. It is a rule of law that a proviso should receive a strict construction and it is not open to the Court to add words to a proviso with a view to enlarge the scope of the same. A proviso must be restricted to the scope reasonably conveyed by the words used therein. It is a rule of law that a proviso should receive a strict construction and it is not open to the Court to add words to a proviso with a view to enlarge the scope of the same. A proviso must be restricted to the scope reasonably conveyed by the words used therein. ( 12 ) UNDER section 16 of the said Act, provisions have been made for the apportionment of the share of produce, between the owner and the Bargadar and the Bargadar has also given some rights in the matter of deposit of the share of produced and also to receive receipt for such deposit or to demand such receipt, including the necessary consequences for refusal to accept the deposit or to issue receipt for the same by the owner. There are also provisions in the section for disposal of the deposit of produce and to hold the sale proceeds. The provisions of section 17 enable the owner, to take steps to have the cultivation of a Bargadar terminated on the ground as stipulated, which include amongst others, the failure of the Bargadar, to tender, within the prescribed period to the owner, the share of the produce as due under section 16 (2) or the failure of the Bargadar to deposit, within the prescribed period, such share of the produce, with such Officer or Authority as may be prescribed under section 16 (4), in case the owner refuses to accept the share of the produce as tendered by him. No order of termination can really be passed under section 16 and the provisions of section 17 as mentioned above, really enable the owner to have an order for termination of Barga cultivation in an appropriate case. The proviso to section 17 (1) (c) of the said Act was not added or substituted subsequently and the name was really enacted by the Legislature along with the parent section. Thus, following the Rules of construction of a proviso, it can be observed that the proviso in this case was intended to be a part of the parent section and as such, it was the intention of the Legislature that before ordering a termination as in section 17, the defaulting Bargadar should get two classes of opportunities as mentioned in the proviso, to protect himself from the rigours of the termination of his Barga cultivation. The defaults of the provisions of section 16 by the Bargadar as mentioned above, only gives the owner, the right or to reach the threshold to terminate the cultivation by a Bargadar. Such being the position, the arguments of Mr. Saha in my view, should fail, so also the Rule, and I order accordingly. The Rule discharged. There will be no order as to costs.