Judgment :- Petitioner in this petition under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure claims right of way over the respondents' property. It appears, the petitioner's predecessor filed a suit O. S.256 of 1977 seeking establishment of right of easement and the suit was dismissed. After the petitioner acquired right to the adjoining property, he filed a suit O. S.91 of 1979 for declaration of his easement right and for injunction. That suit also was dismissed. Thereupon, he filed yet another suit O. S.715 of 1982 claiming an easement of necessity. It appears, the injunction application filed by him was dismissed and he has filed an appeal against that order A few years ago, the respondents attempted to put up a compound wall around their property. When they were about to build the wall at the place where the petitioner and his predecessors claim the right of way, they were obstructed and that portion was not built up. When the two suits ended, they wanted to build up that portion also and apprehending obstruction by the petitioner they filed a petition before the Revenue Divisional Officer (Sub Divisional Executive Magistrate), Fort Cochin seeking police aid. While that petition was pending, they moved this Court in O. P. 10113 of 1982 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a direction to the local police to afford police protection to enable them to build the compound wall. When the original petition came up for arguments, it was brought to the notice of the court that the petition filed before the Executive Magistrate was pending. It appears, the Liaison Officer suggested to the Executive Magistrate that the petition may be disposed of. Accordingly, the Magistrate disposed of the petition and passed the impugned order in Crl. M. P. 96/82 directing the S. I. of Police, Maltancherry to afford necessary protection to the respondents herein to complete the construction of the compound wall. The O. P. was dismissed on the ground that the claim involved adjudication of disputed questions for which there were no materials placed before the court. The impugned order of the Magistrate was unsuccessfully challenged before the Sessions Court in revision. Hence this petition. 2. The O. P. was dismissed on the ground that the claim involved adjudication of disputed questions for which there were no materials placed before the court. The impugned order of the Magistrate was unsuccessfully challenged before the Sessions Court in revision. Hence this petition. 2. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the Executive Sub Divisional Magistrate has no power at all to pass an order of this nature and in any event, he was not justified in passing such an order. Notice of the petition was given to the learned Public Prosecutor who submitted that the order was really passed in exercise of the power under S.144 of the Code. That being so, the task before me is limited to an examination of the power vested in the Magistrate under S 144 of the Code and to see whether the impugned order has been passed consistently with such power. 3. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of S.144 of the Code read thus: "144. Power to issue order in urgent cases of a nuisance or apprehended danger. - (1) In cases where, in the opinion of a District Magistrate, a Sub Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, such Magistrate may, by a written order stating the material facts of the case and served in the manner provided by S.134, direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity, or a riot, or an affray. (3) An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or to persons residing in a particular place or area, or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place or area." 4. A study of the above provisions shows that the Magistrate acquires jurisdiction to pass an appropriate order under these provisions only where there is sufficient ground for proceeding under the section and where immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable. A study of the above provisions shows that the Magistrate acquires jurisdiction to pass an appropriate order under these provisions only where there is sufficient ground for proceeding under the section and where immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable. If these conditions exist to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, he may pass a written order stating the material facts and serving the same in the manner provided by the Code, and give appropriate directions. The directions could be to any person to abstain from a certain act or it could be to any person to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or management. Such a direction could be issued only where the Magistrate is satisfied that the direction is likely to prevent or tend to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed or danger to human life, health or safety or disturbance of the public tranquillity or riot or affray. 5. For a lawful exercise of the power under S.144 of the Code, there must be material to show that immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable. In such a case appropriate order may be passed with a view to prevent one of several things namely, to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, to prevent danger to human life, health or safety, to prevent disturbance to public tranquillity, riot or affray. 6. Obviously, the section provides for temporary orders in urgent cases requiring intervention. The gist of the act, as observed by the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. S.D.M. Monghyr (AIR. 1971 SC. 2486) is urgency of the situation, its efficacy in the likelihood of being able to prevent some harmful occurrence. The emergency must be sudden and the consequences to be suffered grave. The Supreme Court has observed that without these conditions being satisfied, the exercise of power under this Section has -no justification. It is not an ordinary power flowing from administration but a power used in a judicial manner. 7. A perusal of the order passed by the learned Magistrate shows that he did not apply his mind at all to the question whether it was a case of urgency or emergency. It is only a situation of emergency, which enables a Magistrate to exercise jurisdiction under S.144 of the Code. 7. A perusal of the order passed by the learned Magistrate shows that he did not apply his mind at all to the question whether it was a case of urgency or emergency. It is only a situation of emergency, which enables a Magistrate to exercise jurisdiction under S.144 of the Code. That being so, he has to apply his mind to that question and to see whether the matter is of such urgency as to require an order under S.144 of the Code. The order shows that the Magistrate did not apply his mind in this regard. The learned Sessions Judge also did not advert to this aspect. The gap in the compound wall has been in existence for a long period. Particularly in the light of this circumstance, the learned Magistrate ought to have applied his mind and considered whether urgent executive action was necessary or whether it was sufficient for the party concerned to move the civil court. For this reason alone, the impugned order of the Magistrate confirmed by the Sessions Judge is liable to be quashed. 8. The form of the order also is erroneous. Under S.144 of the Code, the Magistrate can issue an appropriate direction. By such a direction he can call upon any person to abstain from certain act or to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or management. He cannot pass any other direction. Sub-s.(3) Requires this order to be directed to a particular individual or to persons residing in a particular place or area, or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place or area. The order passed by the learned Magistrate was not directed to any individual or individuals or public or any section of the public as contemplated. The direction issued by him was to the Sub Inspector of Police to render police aid. Such a direction is outside the purview of S.144 of the Code. In the circumstances, and subject to appropriate satisfaction on the part of the Magistrate, he could perhaps have passed an order directing the petitioner not to obstruct or prevent the construction of the compound wall by the respondents which even in his opinion was a lawful activity on their part. 9. In the circumstances, and subject to appropriate satisfaction on the part of the Magistrate, he could perhaps have passed an order directing the petitioner not to obstruct or prevent the construction of the compound wall by the respondents which even in his opinion was a lawful activity on their part. 9. Learned Public Prosecutor contended that if in spite of issuing a direction as contemplated in S.144 of the Code, the petitioner obstructs or attempts to obstruct, naturally the police authorities will have to intervene and the learned Magistrate had only anticipated such a contingency and issued a direction to the police and therefore the order should not be interfered with. I do not think this contention is sustainable. The purpose of S.144 is to enable the Executive Magistrate to issue appropriate directions to members of the public or individuals so as to ensure to certain consequences. The section does not contemplate issue of directions to the police. Where police intervention is justified under law, they have to intervene even without direction on the part of anyone. Merely because police may has to act in the event of certain situation developing after the issue of a lawful direction under S.144 of the Code, the Magistrate cannot anticipate such a situation and give a direction to the police under S.144 of the Code. If he has such a power under some other provision of law, he is free to act on the same. But no such provision of law has been brought to my notice. In fact, on the suggestion of the learned Public Prosecutor, the scrutiny has to be. restricted to S.144 of the Code. The impugned order is not one of the nature sanctioned by S.144, For this reason also, the order has to be set aside. 10. This order shall not prevent the Sub Divisional Magistrate from proceeding according to law on the basis of the petition originally filed by the respondents or on any petition which they may choose to file hereafter. With this observation, the Crl. M. C. is allowed.