Gokul Narain v. State of Rajasthan — 1983 DIGILAW 114 (RAJ)

S.K. MAL LODHA J.— These two connected revisions directed against the order dated January 27, 1978, of the District Judge, Jodhpur. The learned District Judge has passed an order under sec. 54 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act (No. XXXV of 1959) which will hereinafter, for the sake of brevity, be referred to as the Act). 2. The material facts leading to these revisions may initially be noticed first. In S. B. Civil Revision No. 253 of 1978, Gokul Narain is the petitioner whereas in S. B. Civil Revision No. 260 of 1978, State of Rajasthan is the petitioner. 3. Gokul Narain (hereinafter the claimant) owned a bouse situate in Girdikot, Jodhpur. The State of Rajasthan framed a scheme for the construction of over-bridge to city tower road In that connection, a Notification under s. 52 of the Act was issued on August 12, 1964. Under that scheme, part of the claimants land was proposed to be acquired. The claimant contested the Notification under s. 52 of the Act. As the claimant did not agree to receive the compensation by agreement, the State Government referred the case to the Collector. Jodhpur for determining the amount of compensation On receipt of notice from the Collector, Jodhpur, the claimant filed a claim for Rs. 2,51,004/-. A sum of Rs. 2,07,004/- was claimed as cost of the land at the rate of Rs. 28/- per sq. ft. as the land measured 10350 sq. ft. and Rs. 44.000/-as cost of 11 Godowns @ Rs. 4,000/- each an amount of Rs. 10, 000/- was claimed as compensation, for Baori which was partially acquired. 4. The Addl. Collector, recorded the statements of Govind Das, Shyam-Lal, Roopchand, Madan Mohan Parihar, Father of Roi and the claimant in support of the claim. The Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur examined its Oversear Jagmala Ram. The claimant also produced doel Mentary evidence in support of his claim. The Additional Collector, by his order dated June 30, 1976, awarded a sum of Rs. 70,699.82 as compensation. The amount was awarded @ Rs. 6. 50 per sq. ft. for the land and a sum of Rs. 3423/- for the built portion including the compound wall. Neither the claimant nor the State of Rajasthan remained satisfied with the award. Both were aggrieved, by the State of Raj and Misc. Appeal No. 65/76 was filed Misc. 70,699.82 as compensation. The amount was awarded @ Rs. 6. 50 per sq. ft. for the land and a sum of Rs. 3423/- for the built portion including the compound wall. Neither the claimant nor the State of Rajasthan remained satisfied with the award. Both were aggrieved, by the State of Raj and Misc. Appeal No. 65/76 was filed Misc. Appeal No. 64 of 1976 was filed by Gokul Narain (the claimant). Both the appeals were filed under s. 54 of the Act. 5. The learned District Judge, Jodhpur, increased the rate of the land from Rs. 6. 50 to 8. 50 per sq. ft. He therefore, by his order dated January 27, 1978 dismissed the appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan and partially accepted the appeal of the claimant Gokul Narain. 6. The claimant Gokul Narain has filed revision under s. 115, C.P.C. praying that the order dated January 27, 1978, of the learned District Judge, may be modified and the amount of compensation may be enhanced so as to award the amount as prayed for in his claim, which was filed before the Additional Collector. The State of Rajasthan has filed revision praying that the amount of compensation awarded may suitably be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act as enhancement of the compensation by the learned District Judge by Rs. 20, 700/-, is illegal and contrary to s. 53 of the Act. 7. I have heard Mr. A.L. Chopra, learned counsel for the claimant Gokul Narain and Mr. H. N. Calla, Govt. Advocate and Mr. D. K. Parihar, learned counsel for the Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur. 8. Both the revisions have been filed under sec. 115, C.P.C. against the appellate order of District Judge, which he has passed under s. 54 of the Act. 9. The first question that arises is whether the order of the learned District Judge passed under s. 54 of the Act, can be revised by this Court, Mr. A.L. Chopra, learned counsel for the claimant submitted that the District Judge hearing an appeal under s. 54 of the Act. is a court subordinate to the High Court. He placed reliance on Bhanwri Singh v. Dy. A.L. Chopra, learned counsel for the claimant submitted that the District Judge hearing an appeal under s. 54 of the Act. is a court subordinate to the High Court. He placed reliance on Bhanwri Singh v. Dy. C.M.E. Loco Shops, Western Railway, Ajmer (1), Patel Chunibhai Jivabhai v. the State of Gujarat (2); Bimla Rani Kohli v. M/s. Bandu Motor Finance Pvt. Ltd. (3) and Jan Mohammad Khan v. Mohamood Ali Khan (4). S. 54 of the Act reads as under:- "54. Appeal to the District Judge against decision of the Collector:- Any party aggrieved by the decision of the Collector determining the amount of compensation may within sixty days from the date of such decision appeal to the court of the District Judge having jurisdiction." 10. It is clear from s. 54 of the Act that an appeal lies to the court of the District Judge having jurisdiction against the decision of the Collector determining the amount of compensation. The expression used in S. 54 of the Act is court of the District Judge. In the heading of the section, the words District Judge have been mentioned. 11. In Bhanwri Singhs case (supra), the question that arose was whether the order of District Judge on appeal under s. 17 of the Payment of Wages Act (No. IV of 1936) can be revised by the High Court under s. 115, C.P.C. S. 17 of the Payment of Wages Act (No. IV of 1936) provides that an appeal may be preferred before the District Court. It was held that the District Court when it acts under sec. 17 of the Payment of Wages Act (No. IV of 1936) is not a persona designate, and, therefore, a revision lies to the High Court under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. 12. A contention was raised in Patel Chunibhai Jivabhais case (supra) that no revision lies under s. 115 C.P.C. against the order passed under s. 8 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act (No. XXXIII of 1948). S. 8 thereof provides that an appeal shall lie to the District Court. It was held by the learned Judge that the District Court is a court which is subordinate to the High Court, and that s.8 does not say that the appeal shall lie to the District Judge. 13. S. 8 thereof provides that an appeal shall lie to the District Court. It was held by the learned Judge that the District Court is a court which is subordinate to the High Court, and that s.8 does not say that the appeal shall lie to the District Judge. 13. Before a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bimla Rani Kohlis case(supra) the question that cropped up for determination was whether the decision of District Judge passed under s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act, 1887 (as amended in 1957) are revisable under s. 115, C.P.C. It was observed that from the sec. 15(2), 16 and 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, it is clear that the jurisdiction exercised by the Small Cause Courts is the same as that of Civil Courts and the District Judges power under the section is one in relation to decision of civil suits and hence it is not different from that of the ordinary civil court, and that the procedure to be adopted by the District Judge is also that under the Civil Procedure Code. It was held therein that considering the nature of the powers exercised by the District Judge under s. 25, of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act they are not exercised by him persona designate but they will be considered to be exercised by the District Judge as a court exercising civil jurisdiction and hence revisable under s. 115, C.P.C. 14. The only authority that remains to be considered is Jan Mohammood Khans case (supra), wherein the question that fell for decision was whether an order passed by District Judge affecting Waqf Property is revisable under s. 115, C.P.C. It was held that the District Judge exercises powers as Kazi and does not act as a persona designate and if his orders suffer from any jurisdictional error, the High Court can revise the same under s. 115, C.P.C. The expression used in s. 54 is Court of the District Judge. What the legislature contemplated by this expression can easily be gathered from secs. 55 and 56 of the Act. What the legislature contemplated by this expression can easily be gathered from secs. 55 and 56 of the Act. S. 55 of the Act says that if there is any dispute as to the apportionment of compensation among persons claiming to be entitled thereto, the State Government is required to refer such dispute for the decision of the Court of the District Judge having jurisdiction. 15. It will be relevant to read s. 56 of the Act in extenso:- "56, Appeals to the High Court.- An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the decision of the District Judge under s. 55 and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act No. V of 1908) with respect to appeals from original decree shall, so far as may be, apply to appeals under this section." Under s. 56 of the Act, an appeal has been provided to the High Court from the decision of the District Judge under s. 55 of the Act. It needs to be emphasized that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code with respect to the appeals that are filed under s. 56 have been made applicable in like-manner to that of the appeals from original decrees as far as applicable. In my opinion, s. 56 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the Court of District Judge while hearing an appeal under s. 55 of the Act exercises the same powers as that of a subordinate appellate court to the High Court and is also required to follow the procedure as laid down therein. The powers and functions of the Court of District Judge while hearing appeals u/s. 54 of the Act are that of the Civil Appellate Court. While hearing an appeal under s. 54 of the Act and deciding it, the court of District Judge exercises powers as a court of law and not merely as a persona designate, whose determinations are to be treated as judgments of a legal tribunal, Having considered the reasoning given in the aforesaid decision relied on Mr. Chopra, and the powers and functions that the court of District Judge has to exercise and perform as the case may be, while hearing and disposing of an appeal under s. 54 of the Act, 1 am of opinion that the court of District Judge exercises the powers and functions of a court exercising civil jurisdictional. Chopra, and the powers and functions that the court of District Judge has to exercise and perform as the case may be, while hearing and disposing of an appeal under s. 54 of the Act, 1 am of opinion that the court of District Judge exercises the powers and functions of a court exercising civil jurisdictional. The expression the Court of District Judge, as used in ss. 54 and 55 of the Act, means District Court. A District Court is a court subordinate to the High Court. The expression Court of District Judge used in s. 54 is not District Judge persona designate The orders passed by a court of District Judge in an appeal under s. 54 of the Act, is revisable by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under s. 115, C.P.C. provided the conditions laid down therein are satisfied. 16. Learned counsel for the claimant submitted an application under O. XLI, r. 2, read with s. 141, and s. 151, C.P.C. on March 7, 1983 for making amendments as stated in it in the grounds of revision. The main amendment sought was in respect of non-payment of solatium. Subsequently, learned counsel stated that he does not want to press the aforesaid application. 17. Now, I proceed to examine the order on merits. The Additional Collector awarded the amount of compensation to the claimant on the rental basis. He calculated the value of the land at the rate of Rs. 6.50 per sq. ft. On appeal, the learned District Judge disagreed with the basis adopted and thought proper to base his decision for the purpose of awarding of compensation on the private negotiations and the awards given to the neighbours. The claimant Gokul Narain had challenged the basis adopted in the award of compensation @ R. 6.50/-per sq. ft. before the learned District Judge. Learned counsel for the claimant urged that the learned District Judge has committed an illegality at any rate a material irregularity in basing decision on the aforesaid two grounds and enhancing the amount from Rs. 6.50/per sq fit. to Rs. 8 50 per sq. ft. The State of Rajasthan has assailed the order of the District Judge on the ground that the amount of compensation should have been determined on the basis of market value and no other method should have been resorted to. 18. 6.50/per sq fit. to Rs. 8 50 per sq. ft. The State of Rajasthan has assailed the order of the District Judge on the ground that the amount of compensation should have been determined on the basis of market value and no other method should have been resorted to. 18. The rival contentions raise an important question regarding mode for determining the value of the land which has been acquired under s. 52 of the Act. The further question will be whether the learned District Judge has adopted correct basis for- modifying the amount of compensation awarded by the Additional Collector, and if he has not done so, whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the order under revision can be interfere with, under s. 115, C.P.C. It may be stated that s. 52 of the Act deals with compulsory acquisition of land. S. 53 of the Act provides for compensation for compulsory acquisition of land. The principles for determining the amount of compensation under s. 53 of the Act have been enunciated in sub-sec. (6) of s. 53 of the Act. "S. 53(6) of the Act is as under (6). In determining the amount of compensation, the Collector shall be guided by the following principles, namely, (a) no allowance shall be made on account of the acquisition being compulsory; (b) the value of the land shall be taken to be the market value of the land on the date on which the notice calling upon the owner to show cause why the land should not be acquired is issued under sub-sec. (2)of s. 52 hereinafter referred to as "the date of notice" such market value being determined on the basis of the use of the land on that date; (c) the special suitability or adaptability of the land for any purpose shall not be taken into account of that purpose is a purpose to which it would be applied only in pursuance of statutory powers, or for which there is not a market apart from the special needs of a particular purchaser or the requirements of any department of Government or any local or public authority; (d) where the value of the land is increased by reason of the use thereof or of any premises thereon in a manner which could be restrained by any court, or is contrary to law, or is detrimental to the health of the inmates of the premises, or to public health, the amount of that increase shall not be taken into account." 19. It is not in dispute that because acquisition is compulsory and allowance should be made on that account for the purpose of determining the compensation. It was rightly not submitted that suitability or adaptability of the land for the purposes enumerated in clause (c) of Sub-s. (6) of s. 53 of the Act should be taken into account while determining the amount of compensation. 20. No. contention was raised by the learned counsel for the claimant that increase in value of the land should also be taken into consideration. The contention in this regard is, that the value of the land should have been determined in accordance with the market value, it being determined on the basis of the use of the land on the date of the notice which in this case is August 12, 1964. It may be mentioned that under s. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the market value is required to be determined. In s. 23 of the Act of 1894, there are no restrictions which are contained in cl. (a) (c) and (d) of sub-s. (6) of s. 53 of the Act and, therefore, all the tests or principles applicable for the purpose of determining the market value on the date of notice in respect of and for the purpose of awarding compensation under s. 23 of the Act of 1894 will not hold good. (a) (c) and (d) of sub-s. (6) of s. 53 of the Act and, therefore, all the tests or principles applicable for the purpose of determining the market value on the date of notice in respect of and for the purpose of awarding compensation under s. 23 of the Act of 1894 will not hold good. The value of the land for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation under sub-s. (6) of s.53 of the Act is the market value of that land as the date of notice which has to be determined on the basis of use of the land on that date. 21. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Raghubans Narain Singh v. The Uttar Pradesh Govt. (5) while considering the meaning of market value as used in s.23 of the Act of 1894, held that market value on the basis of which compensation is made under s. 23 of the Act means the price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller for a property having due regard to its existing condition, with all its existing advantages, and its potential possibilities when laid out in its most advantageous manner, excluding any advantages due to the carrying out of the scheme for the purposes for which the property is compulsory acquired. 22. In State of Kerala v. P.P. Hassan Koya(6), Shab, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed as under:- "An instance of a sale which is proximate in time to the date of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act in respect of land which is similarly situate and with similar advantages and which is proved to be a transaction between a willing vendor and a willing purchaser would form a reliable guide for determining the market value. The value which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to receive from a willing purchaser in respect of a house including the nature of the construction, its age, situation, the amenities available, its special advantages and a host of other circumstances. When the property sold is land with building, it is often difficult to secure reliable evidence of instances of sale of similar lands with buildings proximate in time to the date of the notification under section 4. When the property sold is land with building, it is often difficult to secure reliable evidence of instances of sale of similar lands with buildings proximate in time to the date of the notification under section 4. Therefore, the method which is generally resorted to in determining the value of the buildings especially those used for business purposes, is the method of capitalization of return actually received or which might reasonable be received from the land and the buildings." The only question that was canvassed in Smt. Tribeni Devi v. The Collector, Ranchi (7) was regarding the market value of the property as on the date of the notification issued under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In that connection, their Lordships laid down the general principles for determining compensation and expressed themselves in the following words:- "The general principles for determining compensation have been set out in Ss. 23 and 24 of the Act. The compensation payable to the owner of the land is the market value which is determined by reference to the price which a seller might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser, but as this may not be possible to ascertain with any amount of precision, the authority charged with the duty to award compensation is bound to make an estimate judged by an objective standard. The land acquired has, therefore, to be valued not only with reference to its condition at the time of the declaration under s 4 of the Act but its potential value also must be taken into account. The sale-deeds of the lands situated in the vicinity and the comparable benefits and advantages which they have, furnish a rough and ready method of computing the market value. This however is not the only method. The rent which an owner was actually receiving at the relevant point of time or the rent which the neighbouring lands of similar nature are fetching can be taken into account by capitalising the rent which according to the present prevailing rate of interest is 20 times the annual rent. But this also is not a conclusive method." 23. The rent which an owner was actually receiving at the relevant point of time or the rent which the neighbouring lands of similar nature are fetching can be taken into account by capitalising the rent which according to the present prevailing rate of interest is 20 times the annual rent. But this also is not a conclusive method." 23. It was held in the Dallar Company, Madras v. Collector of Madras(8), that the main criterion to determine the market value is what a willing purchaser would pay to a willing land lord and in such cases the actual transaction with respect to the specific land of recent date is a guide book that courts may not neglect when called upon to fix the precise compensation. It has still to be considered as to what extent these principles can be availed of while determining compensation under sub-s. (6) of s, 53 of the Act, for, the value of the land is the market value of that land which is to be determined on the basis of the use of the land on that date. 24. Mr. A.L. Chopra learned counsel for the claimant urged that the claimant examined Madan, Mohan who was prospective purchaser. It was also pressed for my consideration that rent notes etc. were produced by the claimant and which have been duly proved on record to show the rental value of the property in question. There were godowns on the part of the land which were acquired. The land was being used for commercial purpose beside situate in commercial locality. Learned counsel for the claimant has examined Shyama Lal and Roopchand neighbour to show as to what use the land was put on the date of the notice. Besides the-aforesaid witnesses father Roop Rao was examined regarding the value of the property on the date of the notice. According to Mr. A.L. Chopra the important and the only criterion for determination of the market value of the property on the date of the notice under cl. (b) of sub-s. 6 of s. 53 of the Act, is use of the land on that date. 25 The Additional Collector, as appears from his order, concentrated on rental basis whereas the learned District Judge was influenced by the amount which was arrived at on the basis of private negotiations in other cases in that locality. (b) of sub-s. 6 of s. 53 of the Act, is use of the land on that date. 25 The Additional Collector, as appears from his order, concentrated on rental basis whereas the learned District Judge was influenced by the amount which was arrived at on the basis of private negotiations in other cases in that locality. The rate by private negotiation and the awards were considered the learned District Judge. Here, I may excerpt the following from the order of the learned District Judge:- ^^;fn okf"kZd fdjk;s ds vk/kkj ij Hkwfe dk ewY; fu/kkZfjr fd;k tkos vkSj 560 o`f) tSlk fd fo}ku vfrfjDr ftyk/khk dks ekuk gS] ugha ekuk tkosa rks ftl i)fr dks mUgksaus viuk;k gS mlds vuqlkj 560½ :i;s okf"kZd fdjk;s ds vk/kkj ij ;fn Hkwfe dk ewY; fu/kkZfjr fd;k tkosa rks og dkQh T;knk gksxk fdUrq tSlk fd eSaus Åij O;Dr fd;k gS] esjh jk; esa ;g i)fr viukuk mfpr ugha gS vkSj ftl nj ds vuqlkj vkl ikl dh Hkwfe dk ewY; fu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k gS mlh ds vk/kkj ij U;k;ksfpr nj le> dj vihykFkhZ dks Hkwfe dk ewY; fu/kkZfjr djuk mfpr gSA vr% eSaus vihykFkhZ dks Hkwfe ds ewY; ds fu/kkZj.k ds lEcU/k esa mudh fLFkfr dks ns[krs gq;s 8-50 :i;s izfr oxZ QhV ewY; fu/kkZfjr fd;k gSA D;ksafd mlds iM+kSl dh lEifr dk ftudh fLFkfr vihykFkhZ dh Hkwfe ls T;knk vPNh gS] 10½ ,oa 12½ :i;s izfr oxZ QhV ds fglkc ls fnyk;k x;k gSA** It is clear that while arriving at the rate for the award of compensation he took into consideration the rate on the basis of which compensation was ordered to be paid by private negotiations. 26. It was held in Samiullah V. Collector, Aligarh (9), that the Land Acquisition Officer under s. 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 performs a statutory duty, a duty the exercise of which in cases where land is to be acquired for a public purpose, concerns to public, since it affects the expenditure of public money and that in assessing compensation, he is bound to exercise his own judgment as to the correct basis of valuation and his judgment cannot be controlled by an agreement between the parties interested. This decision was relied on in Mathura Prasad V. State of W.B. (10). It is stated in para 18 of the report as under;— "It appears, however, that Ex. This decision was relied on in Mathura Prasad V. State of W.B. (10). It is stated in para 18 of the report as under;— "It appears, however, that Ex. 42 the Collector was not guided solely by the agreement between the claimant and the Improvement Trust Board; he had determined the value of the structures, the value of the fixtures, the value of the machinery, the value of the land, and had made an award, for the value determined by him. The valuation of the land was based on the agreement between the claimant and the Improvement Trust Board. The Collector accepted the agreement, which, he was not bound to but could accept and made an award on the basis of the agreed figure, The award had some evidentiary value. The land was being acquired for the Improvement Trust. The Improvement Trust is a statutory body, exercise of the power of which is controlled by the provisions of the Act. Even granting that the order made by the Collector pursuant to the agreement between the Board and the claimant is not regarded as an award, the order made by consent furnished good and cogent evidence of an agreement to purchase property at its market value at the date of the declaration under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Even if an order made by the Collector valuing land with the consent of the acquiring authority and the claimant may not strictly be regarded as an award made on a consideration of all the relevant materials, the agreement formally reached between the acquiring authority and the claimant agreeing to a certain amount to be as compensation for the land acquisition, is good evidence of the market value at the relevant time of the land under acquisition. The Tribunal relied upon Ext. 42 as furnishing good evidence of the market value at the relevant time of the land under acquisition. The Tribunal was of the view that a complete contract between the claimant and the Board was a good and sufficient evidence of the price of land. The Collector accepted the agreement and made an award on the basis thereof. It would require strong and cogent reasons to displace the value of the evidence furnished by the order, the award cannot be said to be "null and void". The Collector accepted the agreement and made an award on the basis thereof. It would require strong and cogent reasons to displace the value of the evidence furnished by the order, the award cannot be said to be "null and void". The Tribunal accepted the award and on the basis of that award determined the value of the adjacent land which was also sought to be acquired under the same notification. The Tribunal did not on that account commit any error of law which would justify the High Court in interfering with the conclusion recorded by the Tribunal." 27. The Supreme Court in Mirza Nausherean Khan vs. The Collector, Hyderabad (11) referred to the principle of belting and differential valuation vis-a-vis assessment of market value under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act (No. IX of 1309 Fasi) It observed: "There is no doubt that when we deal with value of an extensive plot of land in a city the strip that adjoins an important road will have a higher value than what is in the rear, for obvious reasons of potential user or commercial exploitation. While no general principle can be laid down in these matters, local circumstances guide the courts." It is a common knowledge that in the case of land to be acquired in areas where the plots are ordinarily used as building sites, values differ particularly on the ground of the position, size, shape, road frontage and depth and expert valuers report to belting in dealing with such cases. 28. The relevancy of previous awards was examined in State of Madras Vs. A.M. Manjan (12). It was held that if the land involved in the awards is comparable land in the reasonable proximity of the acquired land, the rates found in the said documents would be a reliable material to afford a basis to work upon for determination of the compensation on a later date. 29. In my opinion, it cannot be said that the learned District Judge has modified the amount of compensation on the basis of the criterion mentioned in clause (b) of Sub s. (6) of s. 53 of the Act, as he should have determined the market value of rent keeping in view the use of the land on that date. The rental value may also be taken into consideration as rental income depends on the use of the land. The rental value may also be taken into consideration as rental income depends on the use of the land. The value of the owner may thus be ascertained by capitalising the rent as one of the methods, though not the only method for, sometimes it may not lead to proper results. The basis which should guide in determination of market value on the date of the notice under clause (b) of sub s. 5 of S. 53 of the Act is use of the land on that date and for that purpose the relevant factors are (i) price offered within a reasonable time; (ii) rent and profits received shortly before the date of notice; (iii) prices paid for adjacent land; (iv) genuine offers made by intending bonafide purchasers for the property acquired shortly before notice; and (v) opinion of valuators or experts. 30. It has also to be borne in mind that the value awarded and accepted by parties in respect of small parts is not to be taken as criterion for determining the compensation where plots of large area are acquired. These are some of the guiding principles for determining compensation under sub s.(6) of s. 53 of the Act. 31. Now, the question is whether the order of the learned District Judge while modifying the award can be interfered with under s. 115, C.P.C. In this connection, Mr. A.L. Chopra, learned counsel invited my attention to M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur (13); Ajantha Transports v. M/s T. VK. Transports (14) and Damadi Lal v. Paras Ram (15). The word jurisdiction as used in s. 115, C.P.C. was examined in M.L. Sethis case (Supra) reasons given in Ajantha Transports case (Supra), can be availed of in case on hand. The question in that case was under s. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act (No. IV of 1939). The grounds for grant of permit are mentioned in s. 47 of Act No. IV of 1939 The question arose whether exercise of power on one or more irrelevant ground can be interfered within revision under s. 64-A of the Act No. IV of 1939, as amended by Tamil Nadu Act No. XVI of 1971 strong reliance was placed by Mr. Chopra on para 27, which runs as under:- "Relevancy or otherwise of one or more grounds of grant or refusal of a permit could be a jurisdictional matter. Chopra on para 27, which runs as under:- "Relevancy or otherwise of one or more grounds of grant or refusal of a permit could be a jurisdictional matter. A grant or its refusal on totally irrelevant grounds would be ultra-vires or a case of exercise of power. If a ground which is irrelevant is taken into account with others which are relevant, or a relevant ground, which exists, is unjustifiably ignored, it could be said to be a case of exercise of power under sec. 47 of the Act, which is quesi-judicial, in a manner which suffers from a material irregularity. Both will be covered by section 115 Civil Procedure Code." In Damadi Lals case (Supra), it was held that if the lower appellate court overlooks a very material part of the evidence bearing on the question and if a finding of fact is arrived at ignoring important and relevant evidence, the finding is bad in law and the High Court is within its jurisdiction in setting aside the finding of the appellate court on this point. 32. The contention of the learned counsel in both the revisions is that the learned District Judge has modified the amount of compensation in exercise of his powers under s. 54 of the Act by ignoring some relevant grounds inasmuch as he has adopted the rate settled by private negotiations end awards made in pursuance thereof for award of compensation According to them, it is a case of exercising the power under s. 54 of the Act by the learned District Judge with material irregularity when the learned District Judge had failed to determine the amount of compensation in the light of the relevant considerations and the principles mentioned in clause (b) of sub-s. (6) of s. 53, viz , the use of the land to which it was put on the date of notice, he has exercised jurisdiction with material irregularity. The Additional Collector proceeded to determine the market value on rental basis. This is not the only and correct method for determining the market value of the land on the basis of the use to which the land was put on the date of notice. The Additional Collector proceeded to determine the market value on rental basis. This is not the only and correct method for determining the market value of the land on the basis of the use to which the land was put on the date of notice. The learned District Judge did not approve of the method adopted by the Additional Collector for the purpose of determining the market value, and according to him the rate which was arrived at by private negotiations with the persons whose land was acquired in the vicinity and on the basis of which the amount of compensation was awarded, should have been taken into account for awarding compensation to the claimant. For the purpose of determining the market value of the land on the basis of the use to which the land was put, neither the criterion applied by the Additional Collector nor the one which was adopted by the learned District Judge, in my opinion are only relevant. 33. For the reasons aforesaid, the order of the learned District Judge can be interfered with by this Court under s. 115, C.P.C. 34. No other point was pressed for my consideration in these revisions. 35. The result is that both the revisions are allowed and the order of the District Judge dated January 27, 1978 is set aside and the order modifying the award is quashed and the case is remanded to the District Judge, Jodhpur, with the direction that he will re-admit both the appeals No 64/76 & 65/76 to their original number and re-decide them in accordance with law after affording an opportunity of hearing to all concerned in the light of the observations made hereinabove. 36. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs of the revision petitions.