ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This petition is directed against an order passed by the learned IX Additional District Judge, Kanpur dated 2-9-1980, allowing a revision filed by the respondent No. 1 and setting aside an order, dated 15-2-1979, passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, cancelling an allotment order dated 28-6-1976, passed in favour of the said respondent and releasing the premises in question in favour of the petitioners. 2. The dispute is about premises No. 120/57, Lajpat Nagar, Kanpur of which the petitioners are admittedly the owners and landlords. One Sri R. C. Batra was a tenant in the premises. He vacated the premises in or about Oct. 1975. On 30th Oct. 1975. the then owner and landlord of the premies, namely, Sri Labh Chand submitted an application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer stating that Sri R. C. Batra was moving out of the premises which are hence likely to fall vacant. It was further stated that for the reasons disclosed in the application the owner needed the premises for his own use and occupation. His need was genuine and pressing and that the premises may consequently be released in his favour. Upon this application the Rent Control and Eviction Officer appears to have notified vacancy and invited applications in respect thereof for allotment. On 3-2-1976 Smt. Kamla Kapoor (respondent No.1 herein) applied for allotment. By an order dated 25-6-1976 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the-release application of the then landlord and on 28-6-1976 allotted the premises to Smt. Kamla Kapoor aforesaid. On 30-6-1976 the then landlord Sri Labh Chand filed an appeal against the order dated 25-6-1976 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejecting his application for release. It is important to mention here that the said appeal was not directed against the order of allotment passed in favour of Smt. Kamla Kapoor. On 19-10-1976 Labh Chand sold the premises in, dispute to Smt. Kartar Devi Gulati Charitable Trust of which the petitioners are the trustees. The said trust was founded and registered on 25-9-1976 with the object of carrying out various social, cultural, educational and other charitable purposes. On 15-11-76 the appeal of Sri Labh Chand was dismissed for non-prosecution. On 19-10-1976 Labh Chand sold the premises in, dispute to Smt. Kartar Devi Gulati Charitable Trust of which the petitioners are the trustees. The said trust was founded and registered on 25-9-1976 with the object of carrying out various social, cultural, educational and other charitable purposes. On 15-11-76 the appeal of Sri Labh Chand was dismissed for non-prosecution. Thereafter on 17-11-1976 the said trust applied under S. 16 (1)(b) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for release of the premises on the assertion that the same were needed for fulfilment of the various objects of the trust. This application was opposed by Smt. Kamla Kapoor on a variety of grounds, inter alia, that the allotment order passed in her favour had already become final. This application remained pending until on 28-11-1978 when the petitioners. applied for amendment of their original application dated 17-11-1976 so as to include a prayer for review of the order of allotment passed the favour of Smt. Kamla Kapoor. By means of the amendment application the allotment order passed in favour of Smt. Kamla Kapoor was sought to be challenged, inter alia, on the ground that there was non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of R. 9 (3) which obligates the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to issue notice to the landlord before the matter of allotment is considered. 3. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer considered the entire evidence on the record and held that the allotment order in favour of Smt. Kamla Kapoor was null and void having been passed in disregard of a mandatory provision, namely, R. 9 (3) in that no notice was given to the landlord before the making of the allotment order. He further found that as the allottee had not been delivered possession till then legally vacancy continued to exist and the request of the landlord for release could be considered. He then considered the claim of the petitioners-landlords for release and held that their need was genuine and bona fide. On these findings he allowed the application of the petitioners for release and set aside the allotment order. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order Smt. Kamla Kapoor filed a revision under S. 18 of the Act which has been allowed by the impugned order. On these findings he allowed the application of the petitioners for release and set aside the allotment order. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order Smt. Kamla Kapoor filed a revision under S. 18 of the Act which has been allowed by the impugned order. The revisional Court has held that R. 9 (3) was not attracted because in its opinion the landlord had not intimated the vacancy to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. It further held that the allotment order having merged in the appellate order dated 15-11-1976, dismissing she appeal of Labh Chand for non-prosecution, the allotment order was not open to challenge. The revisional Court also held that though no period of limitation has been provided in the Act for filing an application for review challenging an order of allotment on the ground of non-compliance of R. 9 (3), the application should have been moved within a reasonable time, which according to the revisional court was 30 days from the date of the order. On the question of bona fide need the revisional court disagreed with the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and held that the petitioners have failed to prove that they need the accommodation genuinely. On these findings the revision was allowed and the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer set aside. 5. For the petitioners the first contention raised was that the revisional court committed a patent error of law in holding that R. 9 (3) was not attracted to the case on the erroneous premise that the, landlord had not intimated the vacancy under S. 15 of the Act. It was vehemently contended that the aforesaid premise was ex facie wrong. In the application dated 30th Oct. 1975, filed for the release of the accommodation, the landlord had specifically stated that the tenant Sri Batra was moving out of the house which was hence likely to fall vacant. The assertion made in the application clearly amounted to an intimation of vacancy under S. 15 and consequently, it was urged, the landlord became entitled to the notice under R. 9 (3). 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and given the matter a careful consideration, I find that the above submissions are well founded. A true copy of the aforesaid application dated 30-10-1975 has been annexed to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit filed on 19-11-1982. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and given the matter a careful consideration, I find that the above submissions are well founded. A true copy of the aforesaid application dated 30-10-1975 has been annexed to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit filed on 19-11-1982. In para 3 of this affidavit it has been categorically asserted that no notice was issued to the landlord under R. 9 (3) nor was order of allotment passed in the landlord. The respondents have not controverted the assertions of the supplementary rejoinder-affidavit. Indeed, it was not disputed before the Courts below that no notice under R. 9 (3) was issued to the landlord. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer (for short R. C. & E. O.) set aside the allotment order on the finding that no notice whatever was sent to the landlord under R. 9 (3). Relying, however, on a decision of this Court reported in 1979 All Rent Cas 308 (Brij Mohan Sharma v. District Judge, Pauri Garhwal) the revisional Court held that R. 9 (3) was attracted only in a case where the landlord complies with S. 15 (1) of the Act by sending an intimation of vacany in writing to the District Magistrate and inasmuch as, in the view of the revisional court, the landlord had not complied with that provision, he was not entitled to a notice under R. 9 (3). 7. The factual premise on which the revisional Court based its decision was demonstrably wrong. Assuming that R. 9 (3) is attracted only where the landlord complies with S. 15 (1) which provides that every landlord shall on a building falling vacant give notice of the vacancy in writing to the District Magistrate in the present case the landlord had clearly discharged that obligation through the intimation which was contained in the aforesaid application dated 30-10-1975. As mentioned above, the landlord had while applying for the release of the accommodation categorically stated that the disputed house which was in the tenancy of Sri Batra was going to fall vacant as Sri Batra was moving out. This clearly amounted to compliance with the statutory obligation which is cast on the landlord under S. 15 (1). 8. As mentioned above, the landlord had while applying for the release of the accommodation categorically stated that the disputed house which was in the tenancy of Sri Batra was going to fall vacant as Sri Batra was moving out. This clearly amounted to compliance with the statutory obligation which is cast on the landlord under S. 15 (1). 8. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, however, made an attempt to demonstrate that the said intimation could not be regarded as full compliance with S. 15 (1), inasmuch as it did not contain the entire particulars which are specified under R. 9 (1). I, however, find that all the relevant and material particulars were there in the intimation of the vacancy by the landlord. If all the material particulars are mentioned in the intimation sent by the landlord, it would be sufficient compliance. The mere omission to mention in the intimation some inconsequential particulars, specified in R. 9 (1) cannot lead to the conclusion that the landlord has not complied with the statutory obligation envisaged under S. 15 (1), which requires no more than all simple intimation in writing that the building is going to fall vacant. 9. In my view, the landlord had substantially complied with S. 15 (1) by disclosing all the relevant and material particulars in the aforesaid application dated 30-10-1975 and consequently he had clearly become entitled to be given a notice under R. 9 (3), which enjoins the District Magistrate to issue a notice to the landlord intimating him the date fixed A or consideration of the various applications for allotment. 10. That R. 9 (3) is mandatory in character and its non-compliance renders the allotment order invalid in law is now firmly established by a long live of decisions of this Court. To cite a few of them, see 1977 (UP) RCC 121 and 1977 (UP) RCC 534, 1978 All Rent Cas 352, 1979 All Rent Cas 94: (1978 All LJ 1181). 1979 All Rent Cas 144, 1979 All Rent Cas 443 and 1982 (UP) RCC 734. 11. The position, therefore, is that the order of allotment passed in favour of the respondent No. 1 was clearly invalid having been passed in breach of a mandatory provision of the statute. 12. 1979 All Rent Cas 144, 1979 All Rent Cas 443 and 1982 (UP) RCC 734. 11. The position, therefore, is that the order of allotment passed in favour of the respondent No. 1 was clearly invalid having been passed in breach of a mandatory provision of the statute. 12. The revisional Court has, however, held on a variety of grounds that the validity of the allotment order could not be challenged by the petitioners. The first ground mentioned is that the order of allotment stood merged with the appellate order dated 15-11-1976, dismissing the appeal of the previous landlord Sri Labh Chand for non prosecution. The ground is clearly unsustainable. Undisputedly the appeal of Sri Labh Chand was directed only against the order dated 25-6-1976 passed by the R. C. & E. O. rejecting his application for release. The appeal was not directed against the order of allotment. Obviously therefore the dismissal of that appeal could not result in the merger of the allotment order. 13. The second ground stated by the appellate Court is that the application for setting aside the allotment order ought to have been moved within a reasonable time, which according to the appellate Court, was 30 days from the date of the order. The appellate Court has observed that though no period of limitation is prescribed for such an application, it ought to be moved within 30 days of the order. 14. In my opinion, this ground too is not sustainable. The revisional Court was not justified in fixing artificially a period of 30 days. What is reasonable time would depend on the facts of each case. There is no period of limitation prescribed for such an application. However. it can hardly be disputed that in appropriate cases the R. C. & E. O. may decline to entertain such an application where it is filed after undue delay or on the ground that it would be unjust to disturb the possession of the allottee, who may have, in the meantime entered into possession over the property in pursuance of the allotment order within the knowledge of the landlord. 15. In the present case, however. 15. In the present case, however. the R. C. & E. O. opted to entertain the application on the ground that the allotment order had not been given effect to, in that the allottee had not till then been put in possession over the house in pursuance of the allotment order a consideration which cannot, by any stretch, be said to be irrelevant or improper. 16. Further S. 35 of the Act has made S. 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to all proceedings under it. Consequently the R. C. & E. O. did have power to overlook the delay and entertain the application, particularly when it was founded upon a ground which struck at the root of his jurisdiction to allot the premises. It has to be borne in mind that the complaint on the basis of which the application was made was as regards non-compliance with the mandatory provision incorporating a fundamental principle of judicial procedure and natural justice. 17. In these circumstances the R. C. & E. O. having entertained the application, the revisional Court exercising a restricted jurisdiction conferred upon it under S. 18 (which is analogous to S. 115 of the Civil PC) clearly transgressed the bounds of its jurisdiction in interfering with the order passed by the R. C. & E. O. The revisional Court rightly observed that no period of limitation was prescribed for such an application but it went wrong in interfering with the order of the R. C. & E. O. on the supposed ground that the application ought to have been filed latest within 30 days of the allotment order. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. however, vehemently contended that R. 33 prescribes a period of limitation of 30 days for such an application and in support he placed reliance on a decision of this Court in 1976 (UP) RCC 359. 19. I am unable to accept the contention. R. 33 is specifically limited to applications which are mentioned in R. 32. An application to set aside an ex parte order of allotment is not among the applications which are mentioned in R. 32. 19. I am unable to accept the contention. R. 33 is specifically limited to applications which are mentioned in R. 32. An application to set aside an ex parte order of allotment is not among the applications which are mentioned in R. 32. Coming to the aforesaid decision cited by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, I find that the observations contained therein are clearly obiterous inasmuch as in that case the landlord had admittedly moved the application within 30 days and the only objection raised on behalf of the allottee was that the application ought to have been moved within seven days as provided under (a). The question whether R. 33 (1) was attracted to such an application or not was not raised and consequently the said decision would be no authority for the proposition that R. 33 applies even to applications not specifically covered by R. 32. Further, even in that case the learned Judge held that S. 5 of the Limitation Act was also applicable and that for sufficient cause an application can be entertained even if filed beyond the period of 30 days. 20. I have examined the provisions of the Act as well as the rules made thereunder and I do not find that any period of limitation has been prescribed for an application such as that which is under consideration. The power to set aside an ex parte order is, however, to be found in R. 22 which provides that the authorities under the Act shall have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Courts under the Civil PC when trying a suit in respect of the power to proceed ex parte, and to set aside, for sufficient cause an order passed ex parte as well as the power referred to in S. 151 of the Civil PC to make any order for the ends of justice. 21. Even apart from the statutory provisions every tribunal has inherent jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte order passed without due service of notice on a necessary party. See Sub-Divisional Officer (Compensation Officer) Mirzapur v. Raja Srinivas Prasad Singh, AIR 1966 SC 1164 . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed thus (at. 21. Even apart from the statutory provisions every tribunal has inherent jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte order passed without due service of notice on a necessary party. See Sub-Divisional Officer (Compensation Officer) Mirzapur v. Raja Srinivas Prasad Singh, AIR 1966 SC 1164 . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed thus (at. p. 1169) "Every Court and tribunal is entitled to reopen a proceeding which has proceeded ex parte, not because a party has failed to appear but because a notice has not been sent to a necessary party. A decision reached behind the back of a necessary party to whom notice must be sent is not binding upon such a party and the court may in such a case reopen the proceedings to give the party a chance to state its case." 22. Both the revisional Court as well as the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 place strong reliance on S. 16(7) which runs thus- "Every order under this section shall, subject to any order made under S. 18 be final. Relying on this provision, it was contended that the allotment order not having been challenged by way of a review or revision, became final and immune from being assailed on that ground. I cannot agree. The order of allotment having been passed in violation of a mandatory provision of law, namely, R. 9 (3) cannot be said to be an order passed under S. 16. An order passed purportedly under S. 16 cannot be clothed with the finality contemplated under S. 16 (7) if the same has not (been) passed in accordance with the procedure of a fundamental character prescribed by or under the Act. Where, as here, however, the order is passed in disregard of mandatory provision, it cannot be said that it has become un-reviewable because of sub-sec. (7) of S. 16. 23. My conclusion, therefore, is that the R.C. & E. O. did have jurisdiction to set aside the order of allotment, which was on the undisputed facts invalid in law, having been passed without notice to the landlord under R. 9 (3) and the revisional Court was, having regard to the ]imitated jurisdiction which it was called upon to exercises, in error in setting aside the order passed by the R. C. & E. O. The R. C. & E. O. had not, in my opinion, committed any error of jurisdiction. 24. The next question which falls for consideration is whether the revisional Court was right in setting aside the order passed by the R. C. & E. O. releasing the accommodation in favour of the petitioners. Here again, I find that the revisional Court has committed a patent error of jurisdiction in interfering with the order passed by the R. C. & E. O. releasing the accommodation. The R. C. & E. O. had held that the need of the landlord was bona fide and genuine. That was a finding of fact with which the revisional Court had no jurisdiction to interfere unless some error of jurisdiction was discovered. In the present case, however, the revisional Court has interfered with the finding of the R. C. & E. O. on the question of bona fide need of the landlord merely upon a re-assessment of the evidence which was not permissible under the law. No error of jurisdiction was pointed out. 25. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, however, strenuously argued that a second application for release was not maintainable. It was urged that the application for release filed by Sri Labh Chand having been rejected by the R. C. & E.O. and the said order having been affirmed with the dismissal of Sri Labh Chand's appeal for non-prosecution, the petitioners could not, as successors of Sri Labh Chand, file a second application for release. 26. I am unable to accept the contention. The matter of allotment having been thrown open with the setting aside of the order of allotment previously passed in favour of the respondent No. 1, the petitioners could apply for release on the basis of fresh facts and developments which had come into existence since the dismissal of the first application. While it is true that the landlord cannot apply for release again on a ground or basis which has once been adjudicated, I see no bar in the Act or the scheme underlying it to the landlord's applying for release on the basis of new facts or grounds which came into existence since the disposal of the first application, so long as the matter of allotment has not become final. In my opinion, so long as certain rights have not come to be vested in a third party and so long as the matter of allotment has not been finally adjudicated, it ought to be open to the landlord to put forward his claim for release on the strength of facts and circumstances which have come into existence since the rejection of the first application for release. In the present case the position is that the order of allotment has been set aside and the matter of allotment has been reopened. Under these circumstances the R. C. & E. O. rightly held that the application for release could be considered and the revisional Court was wrong in holding otherwise. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, however, placed reliance on two decisions of this Court, namely, 1982 All Rent Cas 543 (S.N. Srivastava v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad) and 1982 All Rent Cas 470 (Subhash Chand Jain v. 6th Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Saharanpur), neither of which, in my view, assists the respondent. In the case of S.N. Srivastava (supra) a learned Judge of this Court held that it is not permissible to the transferee-landlord to make a fresh application for release after the rejection of the application of the transferor-landlord and after the allottee having been put in possession. The decision is clearly distinguishable. In that case the order of allotment had become final after the rejection of the application of the transferor-landlord for release. Not only had the allotment order become final, but the allottee had also been put in possession in pursuance thereof. The transferor-landlord had exhausted all his remedies against the order of allotment. Further, the transferee-landlord had applied for release afresh on the selfsame facts. Obviously on these facts no other 'view was possible. namely, that the second application was barred. In the present case the matter of allotment is still at large. The transferees are claiming release on fresh developments and facts which have not been adjudicated upon on any previous occasion, directly or indirectly. 27. The decision in Subhash Chand Jain's case (1982 All Rent Cas 470) is equally unhelpful. In that case also it was found that the order of allotment had been validly passed and become final. Consequently, it was held that the landlord could not claim a right to file an application for release. 28. 27. The decision in Subhash Chand Jain's case (1982 All Rent Cas 470) is equally unhelpful. In that case also it was found that the order of allotment had been validly passed and become final. Consequently, it was held that the landlord could not claim a right to file an application for release. 28. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the IX Additional District Judge, Kanpur is quashed and that passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer dated 15-2-1979 is restored. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs of this petition.