JUDGMENT 1. THIS application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against an order of remand dated 2.8.82 passed by Sri S. K. Roy, member, West Bengal Co-operative Tribunal in Appeal no. 7 of 1982 setting aside the Award dated 15.1.1982 passed by Sri a. K. Chatterjee, Co-operative Development officer as Arbitrator in Dispute Case No. 1 of 1981 and remanding the case for fresh decision according to law and the observations made in the judgment, after taking evidence. 2. THE petitioner as proprietor of the business under the name and style of Modern agricultural Seeds at Chinsurah supplied against indents 1000 packets of Nabin J. R. O - 524 variety of jute seeds along with other varieties of jute seeds to the opposite party No. 1 Beldanga Block Cooperative Marketing society at Beldanga (hereinafter called the Society) in two consignments on 3. 3. 81 and 1. 4. 82 at a total price of Rs. 13,824/- out of Rs. 5120/- is said to have been paid to the petitioner. The society raised a dispute under Section 86 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 before the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Society, Murshidabad alleging that the society after the aforesaid purchase sold away the entire stock of nabin variety of jute seeds to the cultivators between 5. 3. 81 and 15. 4. 81, that the cultivators who utilised them complained of early or premature flowering and branching of jute plants and claimed damages for the loss caused thereby, that technical experts visited the fields and Nabin variety of jute seeds collected from the godown of the society were tested in the laboratory and found to contain 75% to 80% seeds of another variety being J. R. O. 632 and that the society suffered by paying damages to the cultivators and on account of loss of reputation and goodwill. On these grounds the society claimed Rs. 3,00.000/- as damages from the petitioner. The petitioner filed written statement denying his liability. On these grounds the society claimed Rs. 3,00.000/- as damages from the petitioner. The petitioner filed written statement denying his liability. He pleaded inter alia that he supplied the correct standard of jute seeds that early flowering and branching of Nabin variety Supplied by him might have been caused by occasional reins and colder and erratic climate in the area in march and April, 1981, that it did not cause any damage to the cultivators and the society did not pay anything to them, that the sample taken by the said testing officer in the absence of the petitioner was not of the seeds supplied by the petitioner and that there was no question of loss of reputation and goodwill of the society or it's suffering any damages. 3. THE dispute was referred to the Arbitrator on 14.8.81 and it appears that the arbitrator received the case records on 28.8.81. He gave the Award on 15.1.82 substantially accepting the society's case but granting Rs.25,000/- (at Rs. 25/- per packet of Nabin variety of jute seeds supplied by the petitioner)as damages against the petitioner. 4. THE petitioner appealed before the tribunal. The tribunal has overruled the appellant's objection that the dispute does not come within the scope of Section 86 of the Act. The tribunal has further observed as follows : - "it is first to be proved by the society that actually some of the seeds about which dispute was raised and supplied by the supplier were still with them and sample was taken at random from the stock. Secondly the Society is to prove further not only that the seeds supplied by description were not of the quality, but that caused damage to them by the sale of those. They have also to prove quantum of damages suffered by them. While the goods were purchased at Rs. 7. 50 to rs. 8/- per packet, it is unthinkable that the damages at Rs. 26/- per packet could be realised without proving the same by sufficient evidence the award of compensation of Rs. 25,000/-by the learned Arbitrator has no basis in it. It has not been proved by the society that demand for compensation was made by the cultivators and if so, to what extent. 26/- per packet could be realised without proving the same by sufficient evidence the award of compensation of Rs. 25,000/-by the learned Arbitrator has no basis in it. It has not been proved by the society that demand for compensation was made by the cultivators and if so, to what extent. When goods are not of the quality, when sold by description or of that brand, the Society had option to revoke the contract or to ask for damages when they have proved damages. It is for them to prove the things mentioned. Accordingly the appeal is allowed on contest. The case is remanded for fresh decision taking evidence and then disposal according to law and observations made in the body of this Judgment". The first point raised by Mr. Roychowdhuri, the learned advocate for the petitioner is that the dispute in question does not come within the purview of Section 86 of the Act and so it could not be legally referred to the Arbitrator. It is submitted that the petitioner does not coma within any of the categories mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 86 and that the petitioner cannot be brought within the ambit of the expression "or any person including a financing bank having transactions with the concerned co-operative society" in clause (d) of that sub-section. On the other hand it is contended on behalf of the respondent society that the aforesaid expression in clause (d) is comprehensive enough to bring the petitioner within its fold. 5. THERE can be no question that a dispute to be referred to the Registrar under Section 86 must be a dispute relating to the affairs of a co-operative society or of a liquidator of the society. The next condition is that the parties to the dispute must be among those referred to" in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of section 86. Undisputedly the petitioner does not come within any of the categories mentioned in clauses (a) to (c). Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 86 reads as follows :- "(d) Any other co-operative society or any person Including a financing bank having transactions with the concerned Co-operative Society or the liquidator of such society". 6. Undisputedly the petitioner does not come within any of the categories mentioned in clauses (a) to (c). Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 86 reads as follows :- "(d) Any other co-operative society or any person Including a financing bank having transactions with the concerned Co-operative Society or the liquidator of such society". 6. IN the earlier Act of 1940 clause (d) off section 86 (1) was as follows :- "(d) - Any other co-operative society or the liquidator of such society". In the Act of 1973 the words "or any person including of financing bank having transactions with the concerned co-operative society" have been inserted in between "any other co-operative society'' and "or the liquidator of such society". The "concerned co-operative society" obviously refers to the co-operative society relating no the affairs of which there Is a dispute. The expression "any person including a financing bank" is to some extent puzzling, if we go by the definition of "person" in Section 3 (32) of the Bengal General Clauses act. The definition is as follows : "person" shall include any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not". In legal theory a person is any being whom the law regards as capable of rights or duties. Any being that, is to say, can be a person whether human being or not. Thus understood, persons are of two kinds, natural and legal and the main classes of legal persons are corporations, institutions and funds or estate (vide Salmonds Jurisprudence 11th edn. Chapter 15). So the word "person" would include within its recognised meaning when used in the statute (when there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context) "a financing bank" as defined in Section 2 (t) of the Act and use of the word "including" which is a term of enlargement rather than of restriction appears to be anomalous. However, that may be, the word "transaction" (which has not been defined in the Act) according to the cod means a piece, especially of commercial business done. To transact means to perform, carry through (business); to carry on business. So the expression "any person Including a financing bank having transaction with" in clause (d) would mean any person including a financing bank having commercial or financial business with the concerned co-operative society. To transact means to perform, carry through (business); to carry on business. So the expression "any person Including a financing bank having transaction with" in clause (d) would mean any person including a financing bank having commercial or financial business with the concerned co-operative society. Such transaction in our view must have direct or reasonably proximate connection with the primary object of the society, appearing from the nature of the society and the rules or bye-laws governing it. 7. IN the present case, the society being a co-operative marketing society and not a "purchase and sale society" according to the classes of co-operative societies mentioned in rule 2 (3) of the West Bengal co-operative Societies Rules 1974, it is necessary to ascertain whether the transaction of buying and selling Jute seeds is within the scope of the primary object of the society appearing from the bye-laws by which it is governed. Bule 12 (1) (c)provides that every co-operative society shall make bye-laws in respect of matters including the object for which the society is established and the purpose to which its funds may be applied. It has been observed in D. M. Co-operative Bank -vs- Dulichand AIR 1969 SC 1320 at page 1326 (Paragraph 22) as follows : "while we agree that the nature of business which a society does can be ascertained from the objects of the society, it is difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever the society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects can be said to be part of its business. " Although the business transaction that can be validly entered into by the society is a component of its affairs, the dispute relating the affairs of a society [cannot include dispute concerning business transaction which falls outside the scope of its primary object. It is, therefore, necessary that the tribunal should go into this question and decide whether it can be said that the dispute in the present case comes within clause (d) of Section 86 (1) of the Act. 8. THE second point taken by Sri Roy-chowdhury is that the Arbitrator had ho jurisdiction to decide the dispute in question as it has not been decided within three months of receipt of dispute by the Registrar as required by Section 87 (4) of the act. 8. THE second point taken by Sri Roy-chowdhury is that the Arbitrator had ho jurisdiction to decide the dispute in question as it has not been decided within three months of receipt of dispute by the Registrar as required by Section 87 (4) of the act. The Tribunal will look into this aspect of the case and after going through the original records which are not before us decide the question of bar under Section 87 (4) of the Act if there was no extension of time for disposal under Section 87 (5) of the Act. The third point taken on behalf of the petitioner is that the claimant society not having adduced oral evidence in support of its claim should not have been given fresh opportunity to adduce evidence after the tribunal found that all the seeds that were supplied by the petitioner were sold away to the cultivators and samples were taken from the society's go down for testing, which supports the petitioner's case that the seeds supplied by the petitioner were not tested. in our view the society should not be allowed to adduce evidence to resile from the stand taken in the pleading or evidence already adduced or to change its front. Subject to such limitation, the parties may be permitted to lead further evidence (the arbitrator having failed to do his duty under Rule 133 (1)) if the tribunal decides the first two points against the petitioner, and finds it necessary to remand the case to the Arbitrator for adjudication on the quantum of damages, if any, payable-by the petitioner. 9. IT may be mentioned in this connection that the attention of the Arbitrator should be drawn in case of remand, to rule 133 (1) of the Rules requiring the arbitrator to make a Memorandum of statements of the parties who attend and of such witnesses as are examined or cross-examined and upon the evidence so recorded and after consideration of any documentary evidence produced by either party, make an award in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience. 10. WE cannot accept the submission that the tribunal has no power to order a remand. 10. WE cannot accept the submission that the tribunal has no power to order a remand. Although Sec. 133 (2)of the W. B. Co-operative Societies Act 1973, provides that the tribunal shall exercise all the powers conferred upon an appellate court under order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the exercise of inherent power to remand on the part of the tribunal, where specific provisions do not meet the necessities of the case, is, in our view, permissible. In Ghaznavi v. The Allahabad bank Ltd. 26 CLJ 49 (FB) at p 57, it has been held by Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, J. that in exceptional cases where defects of trial are so radical as to be incurable otherwise than by a retrial, it is incumbent on the Court of appeal to exercise its inherent power to make such order as in its opinion is required in the ends of, justice. The same principle will apply in the case of Appellate Tribunal exercising the powers of the appellate court. Reference may also be made to income-tax Officer, Cannanore -v- M. K. Mohammad Kunhi AIR 1969 S. C. 430 in which it has been held that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective and the powers which have been conferred by section 254 on the (Income-tax Appellate Tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully affective. We may also mention that where goods are sold by description and the breach of the implied condition that the goods should correspond with the description is treated by the buyer as a breach of warranty, the buyer is entitled to compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of thing from such breach or which in the ordinary course of thing flowed from the particular breach as usual consequences of the act. This position follows from sections 13 and 15 of the Sale of Goods act and Sec. 73 of the Contract Act. 11. This position follows from sections 13 and 15 of the Sale of Goods act and Sec. 73 of the Contract Act. 11. WE, therefore, conclude that as the tribunal has not decided question of law and fact which ought to have been decided and has thus failed to exercise jurisdiction, this case should go back to the tribunal for fresh decision. 12. IN the result, the decision of the Tribunal is set aside and it is directed to make a fresh decision according to law, and In the light of the observations made in this judgment. The application succeeds to this extent and is disposed of without any order for costs. Application disposed