N. Ibotombi Singh, J.- By our short order passed on 5.8.83, we held the order of suspension dated 12.7.82, Annexure A-2, passed by the Commissioner of Upper Assam Division, Jorhat, invalid and quashed the same, stating that reasons would follow. We now set out the reasons. 2. At the material time, the petitioner was holding the post of Executive Engineer, Electrical of Assam Public Works Department and was posted as such at Gauhati. The petitioner belongs to the Assam Engineering Seivice Class-I, and as such, the appointing authority of the petitioner is the Governor of the State of Assam. A report was called for from the Executive Engineer, Electricity, by the respondent No. 2, Commissioner, Upper Assam Division, regarding the termination of the services of one Pramesh Chandra Kalita, an officiating peon of the Public Works Department, Electricity Division. As the petitioner failed to submit the report despite several reminders, the Res­pondent No. 2, by his Memo. No. GAU/PA/64/78/176 dated 4.6.82, asked the petitioner to explain as to why disciplinary proceeding should not be contemplated against him. It appears that the petitioner did not send report to the Respondent 2. The Respondent No. 2, in exercise of power conferred by the Gover­nor under Notification No. ABP. 186/82 dated 3lst May, 1982, placed the petitioner under suspension with immediate effect by his order dated, 12.7.82 (Annexure 'I') impugned in the present proceeding. The petitioner challenges the order of suspension on various grounds. It is also alleged in the petition that the petitioner furnished written report to the Respondent No. 3 on 28.6.82, Secretary to the Government of Assam, P.W.D., stating the facts and circumstances under which the services of Pramesh Chandra Kalita were terminated. The petition was resisted by the Respondents. The Respondent No. 2, Commissioner, Upper Assam Division, Jorhat, bas not filed counter affidavit. An affidavit is filed on behalf of Respondent No. 3, sworn by the Under Secretary to the Government of Assam, P.W.D., opposing the petition. In the affidavit of Respondent No. 3, it is denied that the petitioner furni­shed a report to the Respondent No. 3 in connection with the matter of termination of services of Shri P. C. Kalita, office peon, as alleged in the petition. 3. In the affidavit of Respondent No. 3, it is denied that the petitioner furni­shed a report to the Respondent No. 3 in connection with the matter of termination of services of Shri P. C. Kalita, office peon, as alleged in the petition. 3. The short question that arises for our consideration is whether Respondent No. 2 complied with the provisions of Rule 6(1) (a) of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964. 4. Rule 6(1) (a) relevant for the purpose of this case is reproduced below: "6. Suspension.-(1) The Appointing Authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority rity empowered by the Governor in that behalf may place a Government servant under suspension. (a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contem­plated or is pending, or (b) * * * Provided that where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the Appointing Authority such authority shall forthwith report to the Appointing Authority the circumstances in which the order was made." 5. A perusal of clause (a) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of the said Rules makes it abundantly clear that the authorities specified in sub-rule (1) may place a Government servant under suspension, where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contem­plated or is pending. Contemplated or pendency of a disciplinary proceeding against the Government servant is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of suspension. The power of suspending a Government servent vested in the authority specified under sub-Rule (1) of Rule 6 of the said Rules is thus circumscribed. Unless the condition precedent is fulfiled, the authority concerned has no power to place the Government under suspension. The order of suspending a Government servant in exercise of the power under sub-rule(1), ibid, is partly an administrative order. What has been held to be quasi-judicial is the enquiry instituted against the Government servant on the charges of misconduct, an enquiry during which under the Rules it is necessary to have an expla­nation of the Government servant to the charges, recorded in his presence statements of witnesses in support of the allegations and the examination of witnesses, if any, adduced in his defence and then to come to a finding. None of these steps is nece­ssary before suspending a Government servant and the order of suspension can be passed if the authority concerned on getting the complaint or the allegations of misconduct, consider that the alleged charge does not appear to be groundless, and that it is necessary to suspend a Government servant where a disci­plinary proceeding is contemplated. Despite the apparent wide power of suspension under the said Rules, it is now well settled that the authority concerned is to keep in view several factors in exercise of its powers, such as, where continuance in the Office of the Government servant would prejudice the investigation, trial or an enquiry, or where the allegations against him are such that in the interest of maintenance of purity of the administration or the upkeep of proper standards of disci­pline and morale in the service, it is considered expedient to place him under suspension. It is necessary that the authority concerned passing the order must address its mind to relevant aspects and come to the bonafide conclusion that a disciplinary proceeding against him is under contemplation. 6. No doubt suspension is not a punishment by itself; but it cannot be denied at the same time that in such cases the officers placed under suspension suffer a lot. Apart from this, suspension of a Government servant is liability on the part of the Government in the sense that not only the person concerned is required to be paid substantial allowance but also a substitute in his place is to be taken. The idea behind placing an officer under suspension is not to inflict punishment which can be done only when the charges are proved but to safeguard against further loss to the Government, manipulation of records, intimidation of witnesses or embarrassment to Government in the public eye as in the case where moral turpitude is invoived. The Government of Assam, therefore, issued an Office Memorandum No. ABP. 186/69 dated Shillong, the 2nd March. 1971, laying down instructions for guidance of all concerned as to enable them to consider as to whether it is appropriate to place a Government servant under suspension keeping in view the factors indicated above. 7. The Government of Assam, therefore, issued an Office Memorandum No. ABP. 186/69 dated Shillong, the 2nd March. 1971, laying down instructions for guidance of all concerned as to enable them to consider as to whether it is appropriate to place a Government servant under suspension keeping in view the factors indicated above. 7. This Court in Santi Kumar Ganguli vs. The State of of Tripura and others, 1982 (1) G. L. R. 211 (Single Bench), had occasion to consider the meaning and scope of the expre­ssion "Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemlated" appearing in Clause (a) of Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 10 of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, which is parimateria with Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 6 of the said Rules. The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume II, page 83, was referred to for ascertaining the meaning of the word 'contemplate'. One of the meanings is to have in view as a purposse; to intend purposes." The Court held : "The dictionary meaning of the word 'contemplate' leads us to conclude that whenever it is in the mind of the appointing authority that a formal disciplinary proceeding shall be held or there exists a contin­gency for such a proceeding, one can say that a formal disci­plinary proceeding is contemplated. To contemplate in the con­text is to have in view, to expect, or to take into account as a contingency". It was further held : "A disciplinary procee­ding is contemplated when on an objective consideration of the materials, the appointing authority considers the case as one which might lead to a formal disciplinary proceeding. The for­mation of such an opinion may be on the basis of inspection of the records, though further investigation in some cases may be considered necessary to collect more materials for formal disciplinary proceeding. The Disciplinary Authority at that stage can have in view of a contingency for disciplinary proceeding and suspend the Government servant, in exercise of its power under Rule 10 (1) (a) of the said Rules." 8. Some relevant principles which govern the exercise of disciplinary power of the authority under the statute or the statutory Rules have to be borne in mind while passing the order of suspension. Some relevant principles which govern the exercise of disciplinary power of the authority under the statute or the statutory Rules have to be borne in mind while passing the order of suspension. It is a settled principle that the authority in which discretion is vested must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictation of ano­ther or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations, and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not act to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. See De Smith-Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, 4th Edition, P. 285. If any of these principles is vio­lated, it will be a plain case of excess or abuse of discretion­ary power. See also H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law, 5th Edition at P. 355 : "The common theme of all the passages quoted is that the notion of absolute or unfettered discretion is rejected. Statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it was upon trust, not absolutely-that is to say it can validly be used in the right and proper way which Parliament when conferring it is presumed to have intended". The decision of the House of Lords in Padfield vs. The Minister of Agriculture and Food (1958) A.C. 997, which is the landmark in the current era of judicial activism in this area of administrative law may be referred to. The following observation of the Supreme Court in S.G. Jaisinghani vs. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427 at p.1434 is instructive : "...... the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable aad the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision in the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. (See Dicey- "Law of the Constitution" - Tenth Edn., Introduction ex). "Law has reached its finest moments," stated Doughlas, J. in United States vs. Wunderlich, (1951) 342 US 98 "when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler ___Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered". It is in this sense that the rule of law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. Discretion, as Lord Mansfield stated it in classic terms in the case of John Wilkes, (1770) 4 Burr 2528 at p. 2539 "means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour: it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful". 9. We now proceed to examine the case before us in the light of the principles of law above. The impugned order of suspension made on 12.7.82 by the Commissioner of Upper Assam Division, Jorhat, reads as:- “In exercise of the powers conferred by the order of the Governor vide Notification No. ABP. 186/82/3 dated 31st May, 1982, Shri Dhiren Kumar Barthakur, Executive Engineer, P.W.D. (Electrical) Division, Jorhat is hereby placed under suspension with immediate effect." 10. The impugned order above does not ex-facie show in what connection and for what purposes, he has been placed under suspension with immediate effect. No reason has been given for the order of suspension, nor has the satisfaction of the existence of the condition envisaged under sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of he said Rules, been recorded in the order itself. The question then arises is whether the said Rules does or does not require either recording of satisfaction or the reasons therefor. No reason has been given for the order of suspension, nor has the satisfaction of the existence of the condition envisaged under sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of he said Rules, been recorded in the order itself. The question then arises is whether the said Rules does or does not require either recording of satisfaction or the reasons therefor. In Swa­deshi Cotton Mills vs. S.I. Tribunal, AIR 1961 S.C. 1381 , it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that if the statute does not require either recording of satisfaction or the reasons therefor, an order made without recording as to the fulfil­ment of the condition on which the exercise of power depends does not make the order invalid; in such cases it is the fact of satisfaction of the authority which gives rise to jurisdiction and not the record of the satisfaction. The diffe­rence only is that if the satisfaction has been recorded, a pre­sumption will arise that the authority was really satisfied and the person who disputes the existence of such satisfaction will have to establish the non-existence thereof, whereas if the satis­faction has not been recorded and the person challenges. The exis­tence of satisfaction, the authority will have to establish that it was in fact satisfied before passing the order. This principle will apply where the order in question is executive or in the nature of subordinate legislation. But when a power is conferred to take action on being satisfied as to certain conditions 'for reasons to be recorded', action cannot be taken simply on being satisfied without recording the reasons of satisfaction, even though the satisfaction required is only subjective and the exercise of the power is administration; in such a case mere recording of satis­faction as to the existence of these conditions is not enough but the reasons which led to that satisfaction must be recorded, otherwise the exercise of the power will be in excess of juris­diction. 11. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of the said Rules des not require either recording of satisfaction or the reason therefor and as such the order is not fatal by itself. The impugned order, however, does not ex-facie show the reason for placing him under suspension. 11. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of the said Rules des not require either recording of satisfaction or the reason therefor and as such the order is not fatal by itself. The impugned order, however, does not ex-facie show the reason for placing him under suspension. That being so, as the petitioner challanges the exis­tence of the condition precedent, the Commissioner of Upper Assam Division, Jorhat, has to establish that he was in fact satisfied of the existence of the condition precedent envisaged in sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of the said Rules before passing the order. As already adverted to, the Respondent No. 2 Commissioner of Upper Assam Division, Jorhat has not filed affidavit in this respect. In Para 7 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Respon­dent No.3, that past conduct of the petitioner is stated. It is averred the on two earlier occasions, the authority placed the petitioner under suspension. On the 1st occasion, he was placed under suspension on 2.8.79 pending disciplinary proceeding but was reinstated on 14.11.79 pending finalisation of disciplinary proceeding and the said disciplinary proceeding is under process. On the 2nd occasion, he was placed under suspension on 10.2.82 but the operation of such suspension order was stayed by the High Court on 16.2.82 in Civil Rule No. 115 of 1982. The disciplinary proceeding is also now pending. In the paras 5 and 6 of the counter affidavit, it is stated that the Respondent No. 2 called for report from the petitioner about the circumstances under which the services of Shri P.C. Kalita, office peon had been terminated, and the Commissioner called for report from him, in exercise of power vested in him under the statutory Rules and Regulations and in accordance with the directions of the Government asking him to call for report from the petitioner. On the failure to obtain reply from the petitioner, respondent No. 2, in his capacity as Commissioner of Division, called for explanation from the petitioner to explain his failure as per Annexure 1A to the petition. In para 9 of the counter affidavit after referring to the contentions of para 7 of the counter affidavit, the deponent stated that the order of suspension was issued by the Respondent No. 2 in his capacity as the Commi­ssioner of the Division in exercise of power conferred by the Government Notification No. ABP.187/82/3, dated 31.5.82. In para 9 of the counter affidavit after referring to the contentions of para 7 of the counter affidavit, the deponent stated that the order of suspension was issued by the Respondent No. 2 in his capacity as the Commi­ssioner of the Division in exercise of power conferred by the Government Notification No. ABP.187/82/3, dated 31.5.82. It then concluded with the sentences: "The petitioner was suspended pending disciplinary proceeding." 12. On reading together the statements of the counter affidavit in paras 5 to 7 and 9, it would appear that how here is stated that the Respondent No. 2 reached his finding that was necessary to place the petitioner under suspension in view the petitioner's failure to submit report called for from him and, therefore, disciplinary proceeding was under contemplation on that account. The averments made in the paras above, on the contrary, would reveal that in exercise of the disciplinary power, he has been allowed to be influenced by consideration that cannot be lawfully taken into account, namely, the petitioner's past conduct, his suspension from service on earlier two occasions. It is an application of a wrong legal test to the case, taking irrelevant considerations into account and failing to take relevant consideration into account. Such an error which is apparent on the face of the record is subject to judicial review. In relation to inferior tribunals, such an error may be held to go to jurisdiction. See (i) Anisnimic Ltd vs. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 2 A.C.147; (ii) R. vs. Southampton, JJ. ex. P. Green (1976) Q.B. 11; (iii) Bariun Chemicals Ltd. and another vs. Company Law Board and others, AIR 1967 SC 295 : (iv) Rohtas Industries Ltd. vs. S.D. Agarwal and another, AIR 1959 SC 707 ; and Education Secretary vs. Tameside B.C (HL) 1977 A.C. 1014. 13. The affidavit of the Respondent No. 3 also does not Mention that the Respondsnt No. 2 forthwith reported to the appointing authority the circumstances under which the impugned order was made, in compliance with the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of the said Rules. 13. The affidavit of the Respondent No. 3 also does not Mention that the Respondsnt No. 2 forthwith reported to the appointing authority the circumstances under which the impugned order was made, in compliance with the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of the said Rules. Failure on the pact of the Respondent No. 2 to report forthwith to the appointing authority of the petitioner, coupled with averments made in paras 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the counter affidavit, reinforced our conclusion that the Respondent No. 2 has taken into account irrelevant considerations and failed to take relevant considerations into account, in the exercise of discretion on the basis of incorrect legal prin­ciples which vitiated the order of suspension. 14. In course of hearing, despite several opportunities being given to the counsel for the respondent, the relevant file with the noting thereof which have bearing on the question as to whether the patitioaer submitted written report to the respondent 3 on 25.6.82, Secretary to the Government of Assam, stating the facts and circumstances under which the services of Shri P.C. Kalita were terminated, could not be produced before the Court. The Respondent No 3, in the counter affidavit refuted the averment of the petitioner that he seat report to the Respondent No. 3 on 28.6.82 and the statement was based on record. That being so, the official record became relevant. Only a part file was produced before us which did not reflect the entire facts of the case. In the circumstances, we are constrained to draw adverse in­ference against the Respondents in regard to the report said to have been submitted by the petitioner on 28.6.82. 15. On the materials on record, in our view, there is error apparent on the face of the record as discussed above; and the order of suspension dated 12.7.82 Annexure II to the petition is invalid and is liable to be set aside. 16. In the result, the petition is allowed. We hold the order of suspension invalid and quash the same. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Dr. T. N. Singh, J. 17. 16. In the result, the petition is allowed. We hold the order of suspension invalid and quash the same. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Dr. T. N. Singh, J. 17. New bearings in Service Jurisprudence emerging from the recent decisions of the apex court as also of this Court have prompted me to explore the new direction by adding few words to the exhaustive judgment prepared by my learned bro­ther with which I express my full concurrence especially in so far as the decision on facts is this case in concerned. I would however, like not only to test the validity of the impugned order with respect to the requirement expressly stated in the relevant Rule 6(1) but would like to say a few words about the require­ment itself. For, according to me, contemplation or pendency of the disciplinary proceeding with supporting reasons must be spelled out in the order passed thereunder. There cannot be any doubt about the legal position as has been pointed out in the leading judgment, that sub-clause (a) of the Rule lays down the conditions-precedent for the exercise of the power of suspension and therefore, as the settled law is, if in the exercise of the power irrelevant matters are taken into consideration or relevant matters are left out of consideration, in the context of the requirement of sub-clause (a), the decision to suspend in exercise of the power conferred by the rule cannot be accepted as a valid decision. But, when the statute prescribed such nexus requirement in the shape of one or more prerequisites it is also open to the court, in my opinion, to adjudge and determine the content and complexion of the nexus. Because, as has been recently held in Dilip Kamar's case ( AIR 1983 SC 109 ), Art. 21 being attracted to a disciplinary proceeding the reasonableness of the procedure also, apart from the action of the authorities which impinges upon the right to livelihood of the civil servant, becomes justiciable. This view was taken by one of us (Dr. Singh, J) in a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Laldula and others, Civil Rule Nos. 71-73/78, decided on 23.8.83). This view was taken by one of us (Dr. Singh, J) in a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Laldula and others, Civil Rule Nos. 71-73/78, decided on 23.8.83). I also took the view in Upendra Bhagat (Civil Rule No. 120/76, decided on 24.8.83) that the constitution obligated the court to read nexus requirement in a manner which will make the same not only truly reasonable but also effective and meaningful and the "reasonable man's test" should be adopted in such a case not only as respect the act but also its effect. 18. In my view the drastic nature of the act or the effect even of the power of suspension contemplated by Rule 6 is manifested in the character of the donees of the power. While the proviso takes care of situations in which the power is exe­rcised by a subordinate authority there is no safeguard provided against, exercise of the power by an interloper. Became, the power can be exercised by "any other authority empowered by the Governor" who may be an officer totally unconnected with the department concerned. Care has to be taken therefore to see that exercise of the power by this class of donee is not misused. It is for this reason that although Rule 6(1) does not in term make obligatory the recording of reason for the exercise of the power I would like to read in the rule such a requirement as "con­templation" or "pendency" even if mentioned in the order would not make it less barren or reasonable. Because, if the reasons are recorded in the order itself and are thereby communicated also to the civil servant sought to be suspended it may be possible for him to make a representation immediately to his appointing authority explaining the circumstances which may appear in the order against him to enable such authority to revoke the suspension which acts to the detriment not only of the suspended civil servant by reducing the corpus of his remuneration to a mere "subsistance allowance" but also of the State which is deprived of his services and has to suffer itself a second penalty of non-productive expenditure. The necessity to revoke a suspension order in appropriate cases at the earliest opportu­nity has indeed been recognised in the Executive Instructions referred to in the leading judgment apparently for the reason that the period of suspension not being limited by the rule itself, at times and in particular cases, the power may show its true complexion of its unlimited extent and dubious content. Indeed, sub-cl. (5) of Rule 6 itself contemplates cases of revoca­tion and therefore it would be legitimate for the court to read such requirement in sub-cl-(1) which will make it possible for the suspended officer to avail this remedy speedily and effectively. 19. It is true that right to work enshrined in Art. 41 is not enforceable because apparently of the fact that it is depen­dant upon the resources of the State which only the Legisla­tive and Executive can mobilise and monitor but the court is not thereby denied the jurisdiction to see if any executive or legislative action tantamounts to extraction of "forced labour" the prohibition of which is guaranteed under the first part of Art. 23 (1). In my opinion an indefinite or prolonged suspension is likely to take the complexion of "forced labour". Because, the suspended civil servant will be deprived not only of the opportunity to earn wages according to his Capacity and talent but as he will be merely paid a meagre "allowance" and at the same time prevented by the disciplinary rules from engaging in any other activity or avocation he will be forced to earn merely a meagre and idle living. In Sanjit Roy ( AIR 1983 SC 328 ) it was held that payment of anything less than the prescri­bed minimum wage amounted to "forced labour" and the action was violative of Art. 23. In Chandrabhan ( AIR 1983 SC 803 ) the Court held payment of subsistance allowance of Re. 1/-P.M. to be "illusory and meaningless" and accordingly the particular Service Rule providing the same was struck down as violative of Arts. 14,16,21 and 311 (2). Their Lordships observed that public employment was the property (wealth) of the nation to be shared equally and that the "bare minimum" allowed under the Rules normally could not be reduced. 1/-P.M. to be "illusory and meaningless" and accordingly the particular Service Rule providing the same was struck down as violative of Arts. 14,16,21 and 311 (2). Their Lordships observed that public employment was the property (wealth) of the nation to be shared equally and that the "bare minimum" allowed under the Rules normally could not be reduced. I venture to add that equal opportunity to public employment envisaged by their Lordships in terms of Art. 16 carry the concept of not idle, but gainful and purposeful employment, necessary for husbanding the national wealth. A violation of Art. 16 may take place as a result of denial of "equal opportunity" envisaged thereunder in a case where a person already in the "employment" of the State is denied work for a long spell and on that account full wages too in an unreasonable manner as such "employment" may demand of the holder for the time being of the same "office" to toil on the soil on which it will be possible to sowseeds of inequality. Prohibition against unequal treatment of citizens "in matters relating to employment" is contemplated in general terms under Art. 16; It must therefore protect notionally the interest of the citizens individually but also their interest inter-se in a manner that will harmonise the right available to them thereunder with the Directive Principles enshrined in Arts. 41 and 43 to enable the State to met out fair and equal treatment to its workers by providing work-cum-living wage. It may be remembered in this connection that in Minerva Mills ( AIR 1980 SC 789 ) what was the "essential feature" of the basic structure of the Consti­tution was pointed by and authoritatively declared-"harmony and balance between fundamental rights and directive principles". This essential feature must therefore inform the judgment of this court in testing the validity of the executive action at well as of laws bearing, indeed, in mind presumption of constitutionality attached to legislative measures. 20. In my opinion, therefore, to save Rule 6 (1) from the challenge not only of Art.21 but also of Art.23, or even Art. 16, it is necessary to read in this rule for giving effect to the presumption of constitutionality, the requirement of recording of reasons and communication thereof to the civil servant sought to be suspended to satisfy the test of reasonableness. These observations I am making with the deliberate object of drawing the attention of rule-making authority to the constitutional defi­ciency of the Rule so that necessary action may be taken for amendment thereof not only to preempt challenge to the vires of the Rule but also to prevent inexpedient and illegalactions being taken in the exercise of the power conferred by it. 21. In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that the impugned order, which was passed by an authority totally unconnected with the work of the petitioner or of his depart­ment, being bald and devoid of reasons, is not sustainable in law and the same has therefore to be set aside on this count also.