Judgment :- 1. The short point that arises for consideration is: What are the conditions to be satisfied for impleading one as an additional defendant in a suit under Order I R.10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 even if the plaintiff opposes? Defendants 1 to 4 in a suit for realisation of amounts advanced as shipping loan, term loan and packing credit, filed by the 1st respondent-Bank are the petitioners in the Civil Revision. The grievance of the petitioners is against the order of the trial court dismissing their application to implead the Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation Ltd. as an additional defendant in the suit. The petitioners are exporters. The 1st respondent-Bank had insured with the ECGC the credit advanced to the petitioners for rupees seven lakhs under the Packing Credit Guarantee (PC). The petitioners in their written statement filed in the suit disputed the claims made in the plaint on various grounds. It is stated in the written statement that the default in repayment arose because of the abeyance in export due to reasons beyond the control of the defendants and that the credit has been insured with the ECGC. A contention that because of the above insurance a substantial portion of the plaint claim stands discharged, has also been taken. In the written statement the defendants did not raise a contention that the ECGC should be impleaded or that the suit was not maintainable without the ECGC on the party array. No issue was raised regarding the maintainability of the suit without the ECGC as a defendant. After the suit was included in the ready list the defendants filed the impleading application in question. The 1st respondent-plaintiff filed a counter-affidavit contending that the ECGC is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the suit and that it is willing to take the risk, if any, in not impleading the ECGC and pointing out that the application for impleading was filed for delaying the trial of the suit. The trial court dismissed the application for impleading. It was under the above circumstances that defendants 1 to 4 approached this Court with this Civil Revision. 2. The trial court dismissed the application for impleading. It was under the above circumstances that defendants 1 to 4 approached this Court with this Civil Revision. 2. Shri N. Viswanatha Iyer, the learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that the credits given to the petitioners exporters were insured with ECGC under the Packing Credit Guarantee (PC) and the 1st respondent-Bank was entitled to recoup the loss resulting from the abeyance of the business of the petitioners and hence the ECGC is a necessary party to the suit. According to the learned counsel, under Order I R.10(2), the trial court was bound to implead the ECGC as a defendant as their presence is necessary for the effective and complete adjudication and settlement of the questions involved in the suit. Shri C. P. Damodaran Nayar, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent-bank, contended that the Packing Credit Guarantee is for the benefit of the bank who is the insured and as per the scheme, the ECGC will give cover for 66.23 per cent of the maximum liability for loss, if any, sustained by the bank due to failure of the exporter to pay the bank the insured debt. It was then contended that the Packing Credit Guarantee did not absolve the petitioners from the liability to repay the loan given to them and as per the scheme the respondent bank was bound to sue the petitioners, realise whatever that can be realised and share the same between the bank and the ECGC in the proportion of 1:2. The Packing Credit Guarantee issued by the ECGC in this case was made available to the court by the learned counsel. According to the learned counsel, the presence of the ECGC is not necessary for deciding the real controversy involved in the case and hence the 1st respondent-plaintiff cannot insist that ECGC should be impleaded as a defendant. 3. 0.1 R.10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, reads: "(2) Court may strike out or add parties. According to the learned counsel, the presence of the ECGC is not necessary for deciding the real controversy involved in the case and hence the 1st respondent-plaintiff cannot insist that ECGC should be impleaded as a defendant. 3. 0.1 R.10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, reads: "(2) Court may strike out or add parties. The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added." The plaintiff is the dominus litis and hence in the normal course, one cannot be impleaded as additional party if the plaintiff does not want. But, under Order I R.10(2) of the Code, the Court has a discretion. The discretion is to add the name of any person as a party who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before Court may be necessary for an effective and complete adjudication and settlement of all the questions involved in the suit. So, a person who is a necessary party will have to be added as a party even if it is opposed by the plaintiff because justice cannot be done without him in the party array. It must be for the effective adjudication of the 'real controversy' between the parties that the Court should exercise its discretion under 0.1 R.10(2) of the Code. The party sought to be impleaded should have a direct interest, a legal interest and not a mere commercial interest. Only in exceptional cases should the court implead one as an additional party without the consent of the plaintiff because the rule does not prevent the plaintiff from proceeding against a defendant without litigating with everybody who may ultimately be indirectly affected. If the decision in the case is going to be a judgment in rem, it can be treated as an exceptional case and a party who is likely to be affected can be allowed to be impleaded. If the decision in the case is going to be a judgment in rem, it can be treated as an exceptional case and a party who is likely to be affected can be allowed to be impleaded. In this case, the 1st respondent plaintiff does not want any relief against the ECGC.' The 1st respondent's claim against the ECGC will not absolve the defendants - petitioners from their liability to the Ist respondent. The petitioners had no case in their written statement that the ECGC should be impleaded as an additional defendant. Over and above all these for the determination of the 'real controversy' in the case the ECGC need not be on the party array. Hence the dismissal of the application for impleading does not call for any interference by this Court and that too in revision. 4. Before parting with the case, it is only proper that I refer to some of the authorities referred to at the hearing. In Banarai Dasa v, Panna Lal (AIR. 1969 Punj. 57) Sarkaria J. (as he then was) considered the scope of Order I R.10(2) and held: "I would prefer to steer a middle course and draw the golden mean. As a rule, the Court should not add a person as a defendant in a suit when the plaintiff is opposed to such addition. The reason is that the plaintiff is the dominus litis. He is the master of the suit. He cannot be compelled to fight against a person against whom he does not wish to fight and against whom he does not claim any relief. If opposition by the plaintiff to the addition of parties is to be disregarded as a rule, it would be putting a premium on the undesirable practice of third parties intruding to ventilate their own grievances, into a litigation commenced by one at his own expense against another. The word 'may' in sub-rule (2) imports a discretion. In exercising that discretion, the Courts will invariably take into account the wishes of the plaintiff before adding a third person as a defendant to his suit. Only in exceptional cases, where the Court finds that the addition of the new defendant is absolutely necessary to enable it to adjudicate effectively and completely the matter in controversy between the parties, will it add a person as a defendant without the consent of the plaintiff." (para. Only in exceptional cases, where the Court finds that the addition of the new defendant is absolutely necessary to enable it to adjudicate effectively and completely the matter in controversy between the parties, will it add a person as a defendant without the consent of the plaintiff." (para. 9) In the above case, Sarkaria J. has referred to Moser v. Marsden ((1892) 1 Ch. 487) an English case where the scope of Order XVI R.11 of the Supreme Court which is in pari materia with Order I, R.10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code was considered. In Moser's case, the plaintiff, the patentee of a machine, brought an action against the defendant for using a machine which he alleged was in infringement of his patent. One Montifort, the maker and patentee of the defendant's machine, wanted himself to be impleaded as a defendant on the ground that the judgment in the case would affect his rights and that the defendant in the case would not efficiently defend the case. Rejecting the request for impleading, Lord Justice Lindley observed: "It cannot be said that the case comes within that part of the rule which provides that the Court may order the names of any parties, whether plaintiffs or defendants, 'who ought to have been joined,' to be added. In no sense can it be said that Montforts ought to have been joined as a party to this action. But reliance is placed on the following words of the rule, which provide for adding the names of parties 'whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter'. But what is the question involved in the action? The question, and the only question is whether what Marsden is doing is an infringement of the plaintiff's patent Can it be said that the rule prevents the plaintiff from proceeding against a defendant without having to litigate with everybody who may be in any way affected, however indirectly, by the action? It appears to me that it does not. The counsel for the applicant grounded his argument on the allegation that Montforts' interest would be affected by the decision in this action. It appears to me that it does not. The counsel for the applicant grounded his argument on the allegation that Montforts' interest would be affected by the decision in this action. It is true that his interest may be affected commercially, by a judgment against the defendant, but can it be said that it would be legally affected?' Can' we stretch the rule so far as to say that whenever a person would be incidentally affected by a judgment he may be added as a defendant?" (Para. 5) In Mahadev Rice and Oil Mills v. Chennimalai Gounder (AIR. 1968 Mad. 287) it has been held: "Avoidance of multiplicity of legal proceedings is no doubt a salient rule. Such avoidance must be in relation to the lis in question and cannot embrace all possible conceivable litigation that the parties may indulge in later which are totally unconnected with the main issues in the suit. Another infallible test is that anew party can be added in order to decide all questions arising in the suit or involved in the suit. If, therefore, such questions can be decided without the proposed party, the judicial discretion vested in Court to implead parties under 0.1, R.10(2), Civil P. C. ought not to be, exercised; if so exercised, it would amount to a patent exercise of jurisdiction when.it is not there." (para. 3) In G.D.F. Luis v. T.P.H. Fernandez (AIR. 1977 Goa 4) it has been held: "He cannot be compelled to fight against a person against whom he does not wish to fight and against whom he does not claim any relief. The word'may' in sub-rule (2) imports a discretion. In exercising that discretion, the Courts will invariably take into account the wishes of the plaintiff before adding a third person as a defendant to his suit." (para. 3) In Motiram R. Coal Co. v. District Committee (AIR. 1962 Pat. 357) it has been held: "It is quite clear, therefore, that the court ought not to bring in any person as defendant against whom the plaintiff does not desire to proceed unless a very strong case is made out, showing that in the particular case justice cannot be done without his being brought in." (para. 8) 5. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs.