JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - In this case a piquant situation has arisen inasmuch as the writ petition omits vital facts and also does not mention some dates which would have been crucial for deciding the petition. The difficulty has been further aggravated by the Respondents not choosing to file a counter affidavit. The controversy involved in the case relates to the interpretation of some important provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). This raises interesting questions of law which, however, cannot be completely adjudicated without entering into a modicum of facts. An attempt has been made by me to glean all relevant material from the two orders, one of which has been impugned by the Petitioner. On the basis of such skeleton facts the possible questions of law which would arise can be dealt with and guidelines with regard to their legal aspects can be indicated, though for the final adjudication on the factual part a remand of the case cannot be avoided. 2. Briefly stated the facts are that Jagannath Respondent No. 3 is the landlord of the shop in question which was originally in the tenancy of one Karim Bux. A suit for ejectment was filed against him and during the pendency of the suit he died and thereafter one Shabbir (Respondent No. 4) son of Babu and Smt. Hafizan (wife of Abdul Aziz) were substituted as his legal representatives and they became tenants-in-common of the disputed shop. The suit for ejectment was decreed, though the legal representatives of Karim Bux contested the case upto the High Court which gave a decision against them on 8-11-1976. The decree for ejectment was not put to execution but in the meantime the Petitioner Rashid (now substituted by Smt, Sakina) applied for allotment of the shop and an allotment order was actually passed in his favour on 28-1-1977. The landlord came to know about it when notice was served on him on 3-2-1977 and he filed a review application on 7-2-1977 on the allegation that in order to defeat the decree of ejectment the successors-in-interest of the original tenant, namely, Shabbir and Smt. Hafizan continued to occupy the accommodation and got a collusive application for allotment moved by the Petitioner Rashid, who was the brother-in-law of Shabbir. It was alleged that this had been done in order to circumvent the landlord's attempt to get the shop released in his own favour and the Inspector of the Rent Control Department also had submitted a false report in collusion with the allottee and the sitting tenant. The landlord filed a review application with the allegations that Shabbir had neither given any intimation of vacancy nor delivered possession to him, that the shop in dispute was really not vacant nor likely to fall vacant, that Shabbir and the Petitioner Rashid played fraud on the allotting authority by concealing the fact that the Petitioner was related to Shabbir and in such circumstances the allotment order had been fraudulently secured. It was, therefore, prayed that the allotment order be cancelled and the shop be released in favour of the landlord. As already mentioned, the landlord had filed the review application on 7-2-1977. It appears that on the same date he had also made an application for release of the shop in his own favour and supported this application by filing an affidavit. 3. The Petitioner Rashid filed objections against the review application stating that he had already taken possesion on 3-2-1977 in pursuance of the allotment order and Shabbir and Smt. Hafizan had no concern with the shop, that the objector had not committed any fraud and the allotment order had been passsed in accordance with law. It was stated that the objector had taken vacant possession from the landlord and the review application was not competent. The review application was dismissed by Respondent No. 2 District Supply Officer/Delegated Authority, Meerut by his order dated 12-3-1979. Thereafter the landlord preferred a revision u/s 18 of the Act which was allowed on 18-10-1979 by the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut, Respondent No. 1 and the order passed by the District Supply Officer was set aside. The court also quashed the allotment order passed in favour of the Petitioner. The revisional authority came to the conclusion that the shop was neither vacant nor about to fall vacant and hence the allotment order was without jurisdiction. 4. The main question which has been canvassed before me is as to whether on the facts of the case it could be held that the shop in question had become vacant or was about to fall vacant. 4. The main question which has been canvassed before me is as to whether on the facts of the case it could be held that the shop in question had become vacant or was about to fall vacant. Obviously in the event of a finding that no such situation either of being vacant or likely to fall vacant had arisen the allotment order cannot be sustained. On the other hand, if these conditions precedents were satisfied the allotment order would be valid. Another allied question to which scant attention appears to have been paid by the first authority and the revisional court is that a specific allegation had been made by the landlord that the allotment order had been fraudulently secured and the allottee had been set up by the successor-in-interest of the original tenant and it was merely a device to avoid the eviction decree. I am inclined to lay great stress on this aspect of the case because in my opinion no judgment debtor should, as far as the ends or justice can effectuate, be allowed to succeed in taking recourse to the subterfuge of allotment and make an ejectment decree passed by a regular court ineffectual. I can find no justification for the fact that in the impugned order no finding has been recorded on this specific allegation. The first authority in a very facile and casual manner assumed that there was no fraud without considering the allegations made and the facts and circumstances of the case which on an over-all consideration alone could have enabled that authority to decide correctly as to whether the allotment order was vitiated by fraud or not. Prima facie, unless there is a categorical finding that there was no relationship between one of the tenants-in-common (judgment-debtor) and the person set up for obtaining the allotment order, the nexus between the two would be too proximate not to invite a finding that the object of the allotment was to render ineffective the decree of eviction. However, the matter has to be investigated thoroughly on facts and it is only after scrutiny of the entire material and such evidence as may be adduced by the parties that it can be decided as to whether fraud had been committed. The law is very well settled that an allotment order cannot be validly passed if it is secured by collusion or fraud. The law is very well settled that an allotment order cannot be validly passed if it is secured by collusion or fraud. It is also well settled both 'on general principles of natural justice and the specific provisions of the Rent Control Act that no allotment order should be passed without notice to the landlord and without hearing him. The same principle is enshrined in Clause (5) of Section 16 of the Act which premits the landlord to apply for review and in case he is able to satisfy the authority concerned that the order of allotment was not passed in accordance with law, such authority may review the order. It is significant that in the instant case there is no clear finding as to whether notice was served on the landlord before passing of the allotment order. The District Supply Officer does refer to the chequred history of the case before an attempt was made to serve the landlord but ultimately it has not been conclusively decided as to whether the landlord had eventually been served with a notice or not and if so, at what stage. That again is a question which calls for decision by the relevant authority after remand. 5. The fundamental question of law which would emerge for decision would be as to whether the shop in dispute had become vacant or was about to be vacant so as to justify the passing of the allotment order. There is consensus of authorities that the fact that a decree for eviction had been passed with respect to an accommodation does not per se create vacancy, actual or likely, which may form the basis of an allotment order. The decree for ejectment is more or less a neutral act and something more eventful has to happen, a kind of step-forward which would really create a situation susceptible for an allotment order. That is why in cases where the applicants rush for release or allotment only on the passing of a decree for execution, either allotment orders are not passed, or, if passed, are not legally approved. That is why in cases where the applicants rush for release or allotment only on the passing of a decree for execution, either allotment orders are not passed, or, if passed, are not legally approved. On the other hand, if a decree for eviction is followed by some other significant development, such as the issuing of a warrant for ejectment by the executing court, or the landlord actually taking possession in pursuance of the decree or judgment-debtor intimating to the Prescribed Authority his intention to vacate the accommodation then the jurisdiction to pass an order of release or allotment accrues. Section 16(1) of the Act provides: 16. Allotment and release of vacant building-(1) Subject to the provisions of the Act, the District Magistrate by order- (a) require the landlord to let any building which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant, or a part of such building but not appurtenant land alone, to any person specified in the order (to be called an allotment order); or (b) release the whole or any part of such building, or any land appurtenant thereto, in favour of the landlord (to be called a release order); Provided that in the case of a vacancy referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 12, the District Magistrate shall give an opportunity to the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, of showing that the said Section is not attracted to his case before making an order under Clause (a). 6. The above provision is attracted only where the accommodation is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant. It is undisputed that in the instant case no application for execution of the decree for ejectment had been made and possession had also not been delivered to the landlord. The controversy revolves round the question as to whether intimation to vacate the accommodation had been given by the legal representatives of the original tenant, who were in actual occupation of the shop. The order of the first authority is silent on the point. The revisional court, however, has observed that only one of the tenants-in-common, who were in occupation after the death of the original tenant, namely, Shabbir had intimated to the District Supply Officer his intention to vacate the shop. The order of the first authority is silent on the point. The revisional court, however, has observed that only one of the tenants-in-common, who were in occupation after the death of the original tenant, namely, Shabbir had intimated to the District Supply Officer his intention to vacate the shop. According to the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the landlord this intimation of his intention to vacate by only one of the tenants-in-common would not entitle the authority concerned to treat the accommodation as vacant and pass an allotment order. It has been strenuously urged on behalf of the landlord Respondent that it was not denied by the Petitioner, and in fact an averment had been made in the writ petition itself, that the intimation to vacate had been given by only one of the tenants-in-common namely, Shabbir. Great emphasis was laid on behalf of the Petitioner on the assertion made in the writ petition that the other tenant-in-common, namely, Smt. Hafizan was dead and consequently the intimation given by Shabbir concluded the matter and was sufficient to furnish the condition precedent to the passing of an order of release or allotment u/s 16 of Act. This allegation, no doubt, has been made for the first time in the writ petition and I am not able to find any indication of the same in the two orders, which are the subject matter of the writ petition. On the other hand, the tenor of the objections filed by the Petitioner as reflected in the order of the Prescribed Authority suggests that no such assertion of facts was made there. However, it would be hazardous to record any definite finding unless the matter is considered after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties. 7. There can be no doubt in the proposition that intimation of vacancy given by actually one of the tenants-in-common is not enough to confer jurisdiction on the authority concerned to pass any allotment. The intimation to vacate must be on behalf of all the tenants who are in occupation of the accommodation. More or less similar situation had arisen in the case of Niren Kumar Das v. District Judge, Pilibhit 1977 AWC 148 . In Niren Kumar's case one of the co-tenants had given intimation to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that he was going to vacate the accommodation. More or less similar situation had arisen in the case of Niren Kumar Das v. District Judge, Pilibhit 1977 AWC 148 . In Niren Kumar's case one of the co-tenants had given intimation to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that he was going to vacate the accommodation. It was observed that he was a co-tenant along with Respondent No. 6 and since similar intimation as the one given by Respondent No. 5 had not been given by the Respondent No. 6 also, the accommodation had neither fallen vacant nor was likely to fall vacant. In that case a decree for ejectment had been passed but no application for execution of the decree had been made. An identical situation has arisen in the instant case and if it is ultimately found by the courts below that both the tenants-in-common were alive on the date when the intimation of vacancy was given and only one of them had given such intimation, the allotment would be clearly without jurisdiction. It is also necessary to mention that merely stating in the writ petition that Smt. Hafizan had died would not conclude the controversy. The exact point of time when she died would be relevant for determining as to whether an intimation by her on that date when the question of vacancy or prospective vacancy arose was conclusive. It can hardly be argued with any force that the mere passing of an ejectment decree makes the accommodation either vacant or about to fall vacant so as to confer jurisdiction for passing an allotment order. In Sri. Deoji Bhai v. Vth Addl. D.J. Kanpur 1979 ACR 201 it was ruled that in a case where a decree for eviction had been obtained against a tenant, the premises could not be said to be likely to fall vacant so long as the executing court had not issued a warrant for delivery of possession. The case of Niren Kumar Das (supra) is also an authority for that proposition which in turn relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Lachmi Narain v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer Lucknow 1962 AWR 161 . The case of Niren Kumar Das (supra) is also an authority for that proposition which in turn relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Lachmi Narain v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer Lucknow 1962 AWR 161 . In that case it was held that so long as the executing court had not issued a warrant for delivery of possession it could not be said that the shop was about to fall vacant and the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue an order of allotment. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Babu Lal Vs. Sheonath Das, AIR 1967 SC 1329 in which the provisions of U.P. Act 3 of 1947 were interpreted. It was held that u/s 7(2) thereof the District Magistrate was competent to pass an allotment order on the ground that a decree for ejectment had been passed and the sole tenant had stated before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that he was going to vacate the accommodation in a month's time. It was not disputed by the landlord that a decree for ejectment had already been passed. In view of these two statements it was held that the accommodation was on the point of being vacant or was about to fall vacant. In the instant case before me also the question of intimation of vacancy by the tenants in common had loomed large and the ultimate legal position would depend on the finding as to the nature of the intimation given by one or both of the tenants-in-common. Hence, unless there is a finding of fact on this question in favour of the Petitioner the allotment order cannot be sustained. 8. My attention was also drawn to another decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar v. The I Additional District Judge, Nainital 1981 AWC 148 and it was pointed out that in that case the landlord had applied for release of the accommodation on 25-4-1973 whereas the decree for ejectment in his favour was passed on 9-5-1973 and it was held that since the decree for ejectment was under contemplation it was open to the landlord to have moved the District Magistrate for notifying the vacancy u/s 16(1)(a) of the Act. Placing strong reliance on this decision it was contended on behalf of the Petitioner that in the instant case when a decree for ejectment had been admittedly passed and intimation to vacate the shop had also been made by one of the tenants-in-common the shop must be legally deemed to be about to fall vacant and consequently the revisional authority committed an apparent error of law in quashing the allotment order. In my opinion Ashok Kumar's case (supra) is materially distinguishable on facts and the major consideration which weighed with the Supreme Court perhaps was that on the date when the release order was actually passed in favour of the landlord possession had been delivered to him. On scanning the facts of that case I find that one application was made by the landlord on 25-4-1973 and thereafter in July 1973 he applied for release again when he had taken possession and the release order was passed on 18-11-1974. In these circumstances it could not be possibly contended that the accommodation had not fallen vacant, the decree for ejectment having been passed on 9-5-1973. Thus, in my opinion the case of Ashok Kumar (supra) does not promote the Petitioner's contention in justification of the allotment order. It is, therefore, right that the revisional authority on that interpretation of law should have quashed the allotment order but the difficulty has arisen because the revisional authority has not discussed the various factual controversies which were of a preliminary nature and on a determination of which alone the relevant law could be properly applied to the facts of the case. Hence the ends of justice demand that the present case should go back to Respondent No. 2 and the various preliminary questions of facts to which I have adverted in the earlier part of my judgment should be decided by him after giving opportunity to the parties to adduce such evidence as they desire. The questions which have to be decided are: 1. Whether notice had been given to the landlord before passing an order of allotment? 2. Whether both the tenants-in-common, who were the legal representatives of the original tenant, were alive on the date of intimation of the intention to vacate the shop? 3. The questions which have to be decided are: 1. Whether notice had been given to the landlord before passing an order of allotment? 2. Whether both the tenants-in-common, who were the legal representatives of the original tenant, were alive on the date of intimation of the intention to vacate the shop? 3. Whether the allegations of the landlord is correct that the allotment had been fraudulently secured and the Petitioner had been set up as an applicant for allotment in order to defeat the decree for ejectment. 4. Whether the Petitioner was related to Respondent No. 4 Shabbir. 9. On a decision of these issues ultimately the legality of the allotment order can be properly determined. 10. In the result the writ petition is allowed, the order of Respondent No. 1 dated 18-10-1979 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) and the order of Respondent No. 2 dated 12-3-1979 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) are set aside. The case would go back to the Respondent No. 2 i.e. District Supply Officer/Delegated Authority, Meerut, who will decide the case afresh after giving notice to the parties. No order is made as to costs.