Labiri, J.:- This writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution involves a short question as to whether the peti­tioner who has been dismissed from his services on the alle­gation that be had been "found in habit of wilful absence from duties contravening the provisions of Rules 3(ii) of the Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964" was visited with the penalty in a manner which incurred violation of constitutional and statu­tory provisions. The impugned order reads as follows :- “The following Government servants who have been found in the habit of wilfully absent from duties con­travening the provisions of Rule 3(ii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1964 are hereby dismissed from their services with effect from the dates of their absence as indicated against their names below :- 1. Shri R.S. Nunia, Tractor Operator with effect from 17.11.76 2. Shri R.C. Thanga, Asstt. Tractor Operator with effect from 1.10.76 As per service condition of the temporary servant vide Go­vernment of India's decision (9) under Rule 5 of CCS(TS) Rules, 1965 one month's pay in lieu of one month's notice is granted. Sd/- S. K. Biswas Director of Agriculture Mizoram, Aizawl. 2. The following facts have not been disputed by the Respondents: (1) That the petitioner was a civil servant at all relevant time. (2) That the impugned order of dismissal was on acc­ount of misconduct of the petitioner as he was allegedly in the habit of wilfully absenting himself from his duties; (3) That the aforesaid conduct of the petitioner was found to be "misconduct" coming within the purview of rule 3(ii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 ; (4) That no enquiry under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965; (5) That the procedure for imposing penalties envisaged in the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 vide rules 14 onwards, was not com­plied with in the instant case. 3. Mr. Bezbaruah, learned Sr. Standing Counsel, Gavt. of Mizoram, tried to salvage the impugned order of dismissal by taking resort to the ultimate paragraph of the order where the petitioner was shown as a temporary servant. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner could be discharged under rule 5(9) of the Central Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. However, in the instant case this is not a discharge simpliciter but an order stigmatizing the petitioner for misconduct as a penalty. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner could be discharged under rule 5(9) of the Central Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. However, in the instant case this is not a discharge simpliciter but an order stigmatizing the petitioner for misconduct as a penalty. It is apparent from the impugned order that it was not a discharge simpliciter as it contains positive and affirma­tive allegation of misconduct against the petitioner. Such an order has far-reaching consequences. Apart from disabling & civil servant from getting re employment and/or fresh employ meet, it imputes indelible stigma on account of which he surely has to suffer in society and other fields of activities as well. The alleged misconduct is surely a "misconduct" contemplated under rule 3 of the Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964. On a bare perusal of the order it appears clear that the petitioner was stigmatised disabling him to obtain fresh or new employment with the Government and it would be difficult for him to pro­cure any other employment. The order of dismissal was a pen­alty contemplated under the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules. The Government as well as the petitioner was bound by the rules. There cannot be any debate that dismissal from service is considered to be a major penalty under rule 11 of the Rules of 1965 aud without following the procedure for imposing penalty as prescribed in Part VI of the said Rules, the petitioner could not nave been dismissed from his service. The impugned order is had because the order of dismissal was made in breach of the mandatory provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and in breach of the principles of natural justice and fair play. It is an admitted fact that in the instant case there was no enquiry at all not to speak of the enquiries prescribed in Part-VI of the Rules of 1965. As such the impugned order is positively violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution which we extract:- "(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of thoie charges". 4. We are of the opinion that it was not a discharge limpliciter as contemplated under rule 5 (9) of the Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules. 4. We are of the opinion that it was not a discharge limpliciter as contemplated under rule 5 (9) of the Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules. It was, as the recital in the impug­ned order itself suggests a case of "dismissal from service" on account of the petitioner being in the "habit of wilfully absent from duty". An inquiry therefore was a must to afford to the petitioner "reasonable opportunity of being heard" in respect of the said charge to fulfil the mandatory requirement of Article 311(2). It is too late in the day to lay down again the funda­mental principles behind Article 311 (2) as the matter has been crystalised by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a lein of decisions. In Binapani Dei's case ( AIR 1967 SC 1269 ) the rationale of the basic requirement of "justice and fair play" in disciplinary proceedings was succinctly stated and explained. The principle that the party to whose prejudice an order is proposed to be passed is entitled to a hearing, it was stated, applied alike "to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with the authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences". Duty to act judicially in such matters arise, accor­ding to their Lordships, from the very nature of function in­tended to be performed and therefore opportunity should be available to the concerned civil servant "to correct or to con­trovert any evidence in the possession of the authority which is sought to be relied upon to his prejudice". Speaking in the same vein their Lordships observed in A. K. Kraipek ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ) that "procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision" and that arriving at a just decision is the aim of both judicial and administrative enqui­ries. In Nand Kishore Prasad ( AIR 1978 SC 1277 ) the Court held that disciplinary proceedings were of quasi-judicial character and the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice mandated that the domestic tribunal should arrive atits conclu­sion on the basis of some evidence. There cannot be any doubt, therefore, that Article 311 applies to all Government servants holding permanent, temporary or officiating posts although the protection thereof is evidently limited to the case of 3 major penalties of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. 5. There cannot be any doubt, therefore, that Article 311 applies to all Government servants holding permanent, temporary or officiating posts although the protection thereof is evidently limited to the case of 3 major penalties of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. 5. A departmental enquiry is not merely an empty forma­lity. It should be followed strictly as the life and property of an individual depends on dismissal, removal and/or reduction in rank. We are tempted to quote a recent decision in which their Lordships in Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay vs. Dilipkumar Raghavendra Nath Nadkarni ( AIR 1983 SC 109 ) expressed how Article 21 is inextricably mixed up with the object of Article 311 of the Constitution and any breach causing preju­dice or sufferings to a Government servant tantamounts to breach of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 21 of the Consti­tution. Their Lordships observed as follows :- "......Article 21 which mandates that no one shall be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The expression 'life' does not merely connote animal existence or a continued drudgery through life. The expression 'life' has a much wide meaning. Where therefore the outcome of a departmental enquiry is likely to adversely affect reputation or livelihood of a person, some of the finer graces of human civilisation which make life worth living would be jeopardised and the same can be put in jeopardy only by law which inheres fair procedures. In this context one can recall the famous words of chapter II of Bhagwad Gita: Sambhavitasya Chakeertir Marnad Atirichyate". 6. Mr. Bezbaruah's contention that termination of services of an employee based on contract can be made without holding an enquiry cannot be supported in view of the provision of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and the rules just alluded. If misconduct, such as negligence etc. are attributed and on that ground the service of a public servant is dismissed, even a temporary servant is entitled to protection under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution read with the Rules. If misconduct, such as negligence etc. are attributed and on that ground the service of a public servant is dismissed, even a temporary servant is entitled to protection under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution read with the Rules. Madan Gopal vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 531 ; State of Bihar vs. Gopi Kishore Prasad, AIR 1960 SC 689 ; Union of India vs. P. K. More, AIR 1962 SC 630 ; Sukhbans Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1711 ; State of Maharastra vs. Veerappa R. Saboji, AIR 1980 SC 42 , are authorities for the proposition, though a temporary servant, the petitioner was dismissed from his service on account of misconduct under rule 3 (ii) of the Rules of 1964 and accordingly the Respondents were bound to hold enquiry in accordance with the law. 7. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the impugned order of dismissal is invalid and set it aside. However, it would be open to the Respondents to initiate fresh proceedings if they are so advised but the petitioner shall be entitled to the benefits to which he is entitled under the law from the date of order of dismissal as a result of the same being set aside.