SAEHAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the appellant is directed against the order dt. 19. 7. 1979 passed by the District Judge, Bellary on I. A. Nos. 6 and 7 in I. C. No. 2 of 1971 on his file. The present appellant was adjudged as insolvent and he was directed to apply for discharge within two years. The order was passed on 14. 12. 1971. The present appellant, however, did not do so. Subsequently by I. As 6 and 7, he made the application for extension of time arid for discharge on condoning the delay in the year 1978. The learned District judge, considering the ground made out in I. A. No. 6 for condonation of delay, rejected the same, as it did not disclose sufficient ground to condone the inordinate delay. In tha,t view, he dismissed I. A. No. 7 also and thereafter, he passed an order of annulment under s. 43 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Aggrieved by the said order, the present appeal is instituted by the original petitioner. ( 2 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously urged before us that the learned District Judge laboured under a wrong impression that he had no powers to extend the time, when once the time allowed under the order was over. It was in that view, he submitted that the learned District Judge dismissed the I. As and passed the annulment order and hence, he submitted that the appeal was entitled to succeed. The other side is unrepresented. The sole point therefore, that arises for our consideration in this appeal is, whether the learned District Judge was justified in not extending the time for applying for discharge. ( 3 ) IT is no doubt true that the learned District Judge, in the course of his order, has observed that since the time granted under the order of adjudication was two years and that period was over in the year 1973 itself, he had no power to extend the time, on an application made in the year 1978. ( 3 ) IT is no doubt true that the learned District Judge, in the course of his order, has observed that since the time granted under the order of adjudication was two years and that period was over in the year 1973 itself, he had no power to extend the time, on an application made in the year 1978. This reasoning of the learned District judge is no doubt not well founded the High Court of Madras by a Full bench decision in Palani Goundan vs. Official Receiver of Coimbaitore (1) has ruled that:--"a Court has jurisdiction to extend the time originally fixed under s. 27 of the Provincial Insolvency act, for an application by the debtor for discharge, after the expiry of that time but before an order of annulrnent is passed under S. 43 of the act. "we respectfully agree with the observation. ( 4 ) THUS, it is obvious that the Court has jurisdiction to extend the time even after the period fixed for an application for discharge is already over. Hence, there is no substance in the observation made by the learned District Judge to the contrary. ( 5 ) THE question, however, still persists, whether the cause shown for condoning the inordinate delay from 1973 to 1978 is sufficient to condone the delay. The first ground mentioned in affidavit is that he was not aware that the period was fixed for two years in the proceeding. That cannot be countenanced, because, the application for insolvency was made by the petitioner appellant and he received the order of the Court. He is expected to know what is contained in the order. The second ground made out is that the official receiver did not take possession, so he waited. This again is an instance of ignorance of law. Mere ignorace of law cannot be a good ground for condoning the delay. On the other hand, the official receiver has reported to the court that he went to the debtor-insolvent to take possession of the land. For that he did not co-operate. Hence, there is no substance in that contention also. It is for these reasons that the learned district Judge has rejected the application for condonation of delay. We are fully aware that the term "sufficient cause" should be liberally construed. For that he did not co-operate. Hence, there is no substance in that contention also. It is for these reasons that the learned district Judge has rejected the application for condonation of delay. We are fully aware that the term "sufficient cause" should be liberally construed. Even construing liberally the said term, we are unable to hold that the cause shown is sufficient for condoning the delay. Hence, we have no good ground to interfere with the order of the learned District Judge, rejecting the application for condonation of delay. If that be so, there is no merit in this appeal and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. In the result, the appeal faib and is dismissed --- *** --- .