JUDGMENT : B.K. Behera, J. - Accepting the case of the prosecution that the Appellant, while functioning as a public servant as Range Officer, Forest Range Office (Kendu Leaf), Khariar, in the year 1973, dishonestly and fraudulently misappropriated and converted to his on use a part of the sums entrusted with him under two accounts namely, P.L. Account and 70 Forest Accounts, in between March 7, 1973 and November 3, 1973, the learned Special Judge, Sambalpur, has convicted the Appellant u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (the 'Act' for short) and sentenced him thereunder to undergo rigorous I imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- and in default of payment thereof, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months. The Appellant also stands convicted for criminal breach of trust in respect of that amount u/s 409 of the Indian Penal Code (the 'Code' for short) and sentenced there under to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. The learned Judge has directed that the sentence would run concurrently. 2. To bring home the charges to the Appellant, the prosecution had examined fifteen witnesses. The Appellant's case was that he had not misappropriated the amount, investigation had not properly been conducted and a number of items of expenditure supported by vouchers had not been taken into account. He had examined one witness in his defence. 3. Mr. N.C. Panigrahi, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, challenges the order of conviction in respect of both the offences as bad in law due to want of valid sanction and as being factually unfounded. Mr. R.K. Patra, the learned Additional Government Advocate, has submitted that none of the contention raised on behalf of the Appellant can be accepted. 4. As provided in Section 6 of the Act, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable u/s 5(2) of the Act alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction of the authority competent to remove him from his office. As has been submitted at the Bar, the Conservator of Forests (P.W. 15) was the authority competent to remove the Appellant from his office. P.W. 15 had accorded sanction vide Ext. As has been submitted at the Bar, the Conservator of Forests (P.W. 15) was the authority competent to remove the Appellant from his office. P.W. 15 had accorded sanction vide Ext. 26, the sanction order and in his evidence, he had testified: ...I went through the detailed report submitted by S.P. Vigilance, Berhampur and the report of the D.F.O., Khariar Road Kendu Leaf Division dated 4-11-1973 and found that there was a prima facie case of misappropriation against the accused and therefore, sanctioned his prosecution. Ext. 26 is the sanction order.... Ext. 26 does not disclose as to what were the materials placed before the sanctioning authority. The report of the Superitendent of Police, Vigilance, referred to by P.W. 15 in his evidence had not been produced and proved. The Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, had not been examined either. The Divisional Forest Officer (P.W. 13) had not stated that he had given a report to P.W. 15 for the purpose of sanction. The Inspector of Vigilance (P.W. 14), who had investigated into the case, had merely stated that he had received the sanction of P.W. 15 from the office of the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Berhampur. 5. In Major Som Nath v. Union of India and Anr. 1971 S.C.D. 1126 the Supreme Court has held: ...For a sanction to be valid it must be established that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence with which the accused is proposed to be charged. Though it is desirable that the facts should be referred to in the sanction itself, none-the-less if they do not appear on the fact of it the prosecution must establish aliunde by evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authorities.... In the case of Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh the Supreme Court has laid down: ...The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to government servants against frivolous prosecutions and must therefore be strictly complied with before any prosecution can be launched against the public servant concerned.... In the same case, their Lordships have observed and held: ...In the instant case no evidence has been led either primary or secondary to prove as, to what were the contents of the note mentioned in Exhibit P-16 which was placed before the Sanctioning Authority. In the same case, their Lordships have observed and held: ...In the instant case no evidence has been led either primary or secondary to prove as, to what were the contents of the note mentioned in Exhibit P-16 which was placed before the Sanctioning Authority. The evidence of P.W. 2 or P.W. 7 is wholly irrelevant because they were not in a position to say as to what were the contents of the note which formed the subject-matter of the sanction by the Standing Committee of the Corporation. The note referred to above was the only primary evidence for this purpose. Mr. Rao vehemently argued that although the Resolution. Exh. P-16 does not mention the facts, the Court should presume the facts on the basis of the evidence given by P.W. 2 and the order implementing sanction which mentions these facts. This argument is wholly untenable because what the Court has to see is whether or not the Sanctioning Authority at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same and any subsequent fact which may come into existence after the resolution granting sanction has been passed, is wholly irrelevant.... 6. Applying the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court and keeping in mind the vague evidence led by the prosecution without producing the reports of the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and the Divisional Forest Officer, if any and without examining the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, it must be held that the prosecution had failed to establish that the sanctioning authority had accorded sanction for the prosecution of the Appellant u/s 5(2) of the Act after proper application of mind. The order of conviction recorded against the Appellant u/s 5(2) of the Act must, therefore, the set aside on this ground. 7. The Appellant also stood prosecuted u/s 409 of the Code. When a person is prosecuted u/s 409 of the Code, he would be governed by the procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure as to previous sanction for his prosecution. The provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act postulate a situation when a public servant is prosecuted for an offence of criminal misconduct falling under any of the clauses specified in Section 5 of the Act. The provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act postulate a situation when a public servant is prosecuted for an offence of criminal misconduct falling under any of the clauses specified in Section 5 of the Act. There is no justification to import into Sub-section (1) of Section 6 something which the Legislature did not expressly include therein. If the Legislature has not chosen to include Section 409 within the ambit of Section 6 of the Act, it would not be competent for the Court to hold that even in respect of fin offence punishable u/s 409 of the Code, sanction u/s 6 of the Act would be necessary. A statute should be interpreted according to the plain meaning of the words and should not be given a wider meaning than what the words actually denote. The prosecution of the Appellant u/s 409 of the Code could not be said to be invalid for want of sanction u/s 6 of the Act. 8. It is not necessary to examine as to whether the alleged act of criminal breach of trust had been committed by the Appellant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty and therefore, sanction was necessary for his prosecution as provided in Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as this provision has application to the case of a public servant removable by the State Government. The Appellant was removable by the Conservator of Forests who was his appointing authority. 9. The next question to be examined is as to whether the order of conviction u/s 409 of the Code can be maintained. To constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, the prosecution must prove two essential facts, viz., (i) the factum of entrustment and (ii) the factum of misappropriation of the entrusted property. See Janeshwar Das Aggarwal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh. In a case where entrustment is proved or admitted, it would be for an accused person to account for the money entrusted with him and the prosecution may not be in a position to show as to how exactly the money has been misappropriated or converted by an accused person to his own use, but the evidence and circumstances must lead one to a reasonable conclusion that an accused person in order to cause wrongful gain to himself or wrongful loss to another, has committed misappropriation. 10. 10. The Appellant stood charged u/s 409 of the Code for having committed criminal breach of trust in respect of Rs. 9,350/- out of the amounts of Rs. 1,96,900/- and Rs. 21,790/- entrusted with him between the March 7, 1973 and November 3, 1973. The case of the prosecution with regard to entrustment and criminal misappropriation by the Appellant had been put through the mouth of the Accounts Supervisor (P.W. 11) who had testified thus: ...The Rangers used to take money in shape of cash or cheque from Division office by granting advance voucher. At the end of every month, they furnish paid vouchers in respect of the amount spent and the unspent amount remain in their cash balance They were taking advances under two heads-one P.L. Account and the other 70 Forest Account. Advances given are noted in the Divisional Office Cash Book and Personal Ledger Account. In the P.L. Account Register separate pages have been allatted to different Range Officers. The payment to the accused in March, 1973 began an 24-3-1973. During the period from 24-3-1973 to 20-9-1973 the accused was given Rs. 1,96,900-00 in shape of cash and cheque. He has submitted work done vouchers to the tune of Rs. 1,88,564.41. He had balance of Rs. 8,335-59. Ext. 17 are the entitles at pages 16 and 17 in the P.L. Account showing the advances and recoupements against the accused during the said period (marked on admission). The aforesaid balance of Rs. 8335-59 is still outstanding against the accused. In 70 Forest Account Register, separate pages have been allotted to the different Range Officers. During the period from 19-2-1973 to 20-9-1973 the accused was given advances to the extent of Rs. 21,790-30, under 70 Forest Account. He has accounted far a sum of Rs. 18,288-71 towards that advance. The balance amounting to Rs. 3501-29 is still autstanding against the accused. The advances for September, 1973 were adjusted in October 1973 and vouchers were submitted in that month. The 70 Forest. Account is meant for expenses incurred towards pay, D.A. and cantingencies etc., whereas the P.L. Account is meant for Accounts far Kendu Leaf head. Ext. 18 are the entries at pages 40 to 43 of the 70 Forest Account Register. (marked an admission). These accounts have been mentioned in. the Cash Book.... According to this witness all the advances shown in Exts. Ext. 18 are the entries at pages 40 to 43 of the 70 Forest Account Register. (marked an admission). These accounts have been mentioned in. the Cash Book.... According to this witness all the advances shown in Exts. 17 dhd 18 had been entered in Exts. 12. to 14. Speaking about the detection of misapprapriatian, this witness stated: On 3-11-1973 I had come to Khariar Road Range Office with the D.F.O. and A.C.F. The cash chest of the accused was verified and only Rs. 0-40 were found in it as against the Book Balance or Rs. 8100-64 under P.L. account and Rs. 3501-29 under 70 Forest Account. The balance of Rs. 8100-64 was at the end of September, 1973. From the beginning of October 1973 till 3-11-1973 there is no entry in P.L. Account register of the Range Office. The discrepancy between our figure of Rs. 8335-59 and the Range Office figure Rs. 8100-64 is on account of the fact that the accused had submitted voucher which we had not taken into account because of objection. The Divisional Forest Officer (P.W. 13), who had deposed about the detection of shortage, had testified: ...The accused has also given in writing Ext. B to us. I did not accept the statement therein that Forest Advance vouchers upto Rs. 4000/- (Items 21 and 22) were lost. I did not accept his statement therein that acquittance roll for Rs. 2000/-, contingencies motor cycle etc., for Rs. 900/- were lost. He stated therein that he had a cash balance of Rs. 601-29. I prepared this report Ext. 19 after the inspection, and sent its copy to the Conservator of Forests. I received this letter Ext. 15 along with its enclosures from P.W. 10. I did not take into account the vouchers submitted with Ext. 15 as they were not mentioned in the Range Cash Book. I received Ext. 15 on 16-1-1974. 11. Evidence was led through P.Ws. 11 and 13 and some of the forest officials, whose evidence has been referred to by the learned Special Judge in his judgment, that complaint had been made by them before P.W. 13 that the members the staff had not received their pay for September, 1973. In the first place, as has been submitted at the Bar, the Appellant had not been charged for misappropriation of this amount. In the first place, as has been submitted at the Bar, the Appellant had not been charged for misappropriation of this amount. Secondly, as submitted by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, no evidence had been led by the prosecution that the Appellant had, in fact, drawn the pay for the members of the staff for the month of September, 1973. In the absence of evidence indicating that the Appellant had drawn the pay for the members of the staff, it could not be assumed that he had not made payments to them in order to make good the shortage in respect of the amounts entrusted with him on the two accounts. In addition, there was no written complaint of any member of the staff in this regard nor was there any report made by the Divisional Forest Officer to the Conservator of Forests. 12. Reference has been made in the judgment to the evidence of some of the forest employees, namely, P.Ws. 2, 7 and 8, to the effect that the Appellant had taken some advance vouchers from them and this, according to the prosecution, was done to show that he had not misappropriated the amounts in question and other expenditure had been made. There was, however, no clear and cogent evidence that any such voucher was a fake and false one. 13. Much advantage had been sought by the prosecution of the fact that in Exts. 13 and 14, the P.L. Account Register and the 70 Forest Account Register, the Appellant had owned responsibility in respect of these amounts. It must, however, be kept in mind that the account registers contained entries only upto the end of September, 1973. As has been submitted by the learned Counsel for both the sides, the office must have incurred a number of items of expenditure during the month of October and in November upto 3-11-1973 when P.W. 13, being accompanied by P.W. 11, visited the office of the Appellant and detected the alleged shortage. It is, no doubt, true that It was for the Appellant to make the entries in the books of account relating to different items of expenditure and he had not done so, but from mere negligence in the perfdrmance of duties, an inference of criminal misappropriation cannot be drawn. It is, no doubt, true that It was for the Appellant to make the entries in the books of account relating to different items of expenditure and he had not done so, but from mere negligence in the perfdrmance of duties, an inference of criminal misappropriation cannot be drawn. A person cannot be held liable for criminal misappropriation, in the absence of criminal animus on his part owing to serious breach of duty and utter negligence. See Surendra Nath Satpathy Vs. The State Basudev Mohapatra v. State of Orissa 38 (1972) C.L.R. 232, Subash Chandra Bebarta Vs. State of Orissa and Another, and Rajib Lochan Behari v. State of Orissa 1983 (1) Crimes 349 . 14. It is important to note that the Appellant had produced a number of vouchers before the Divisional Forest Officer (P.W. 13) showing many items of expenditure during this period. Of this, due notice had not been taken by the appropriate authorities and in my view, full and proper investigation had not been made to find out as to whether the vouchers were genuine or false. 15. In his cross-examination. P.W. 11 had stated thus: ...On 3-11-1973, when his account was checked, the accused produced vouchers to the extent of Rs. 2939 85 P and further stated that two vouchers to the extent of Rs. 4000/- were missing leaving balance of Rs. 1160 79P. The accused submitted this statement Ext. B to the above effect on which he has signed at Ext. B/a and D.F.O. at Ext. B/b and I have signed at Ext. B/c. The accused has further submitted vouchers to the tune of Rs. 601-29 towards 70 Forest Account and mentioned that in Ext. B and stated in Ext. B that acquittance and contingency vouchers to the tune of Rs. 2900-00 were missing.... P.W. 13 had admitted in his evidence that the Appellant had submitted certain vouchers stating that he had incurred expenditure therein in October, 1973, but he (P.W. 13) did not accept the vouchers as they did not bear any dates. According to him. Exts. 1 to 8 and 10 and 11 were those vouchers. He had further stated that the Appellant had produced ten more vouchers which also he did not accept. According to him the vouchers had not been accounted for in Accounts Register. P.W. 13 did not accept the statement made in Ext. B that vouchers upto Rs. According to him. Exts. 1 to 8 and 10 and 11 were those vouchers. He had further stated that the Appellant had produced ten more vouchers which also he did not accept. According to him the vouchers had not been accounted for in Accounts Register. P.W. 13 did not accept the statement made in Ext. B that vouchers upto Rs. 4000/- had been lost. He did not also taken into account the vouchers submitted with Ext. 15. It would be clear from his evidence that he did receive a letter from the Appellant on November 20, 1973 (Ext. 20) along with an annexure showing the list of vouchers unaccounted for and Ext. 21 was that annexure. Ext. 21 was the list of vouchers which had also been sent to him a long with Ext. 15. He had admitted in his cross-examination that he had made no enquiry to ascertain if the vouchers submitted by the Appellant on November 3, 1973 were genuine. He did not even ask the Appellant to verify and submit the duplicate vouchers of contingent bills to the tune of Rs. 900/-; as mentioned in Ext. B. 16. The Inspector of Vigilance (P.W. 14), who had investigated into the case, had stated that he had taken charge of the cash book and some vouchers of the Range Office of which the Appellant was the Range Officer. His evidence would further show that under Ext. 24, he had seized the P.L. Account Cash Book, Contractors Disbursement Register and twenty-three vouchers and a letter of the Appellant dated November 16, 1973. On July 15, 1974, he seized the P.L. Account Register and 70 Forest Account Cash Books. Forest Advance vouchers and some other paid vouchers from the office of the Appellant as per Ext.16. The Appellant had examined a Sub-Inspector of Vigilance (D.W. 1) in his defence who had stated: On 21-10-1973 I was the O.I.C. of Nawapara P.S. On that day I seized some documents from the possession of the accused as per seizure list Ext. C (subject to objection). I prepared the seizure list in duplicate by carbon process and Ext. C is the copy which I handed over to the accused. Ext. C was prepared by the A.S.I. (Harihar Sahu) in my presence. C (subject to objection). I prepared the seizure list in duplicate by carbon process and Ext. C is the copy which I handed over to the accused. Ext. C was prepared by the A.S.I. (Harihar Sahu) in my presence. As would appear from his cross-examination, he had seized the documents in connection with the investigation of a criminal case and he had signed Ext. C and had verified the documents which he had seized. He had also taken signature of the Appellant in Ext. C. This criminal case, according to him, had been started against the Appellant on the report of a Forester. 17. All this would show that the plea of the Appellant that there had been no misappropriation and that many items of expenditure had been incurred in October, 1973 and in November upto the time of the visit of P.W. 13 could not be thrown out as unreal and unfounded. P.W. 13, as earlier indicated had not made due and proper enquiry to find out as to whether the vouchers produced before him or sent to him were genuine. As it appears, no full and proper investigation had been made in this regard. The plea raised by the Appellant at the time of trial cannot be said to be an after thought. No specific evidence had been led by the prosecution of any act of misappropriation by the Appellant. If the Appellant had been negligent maintenance of accounts in that entries had nor been made by him in the relevant registers after September, 1973, disciplinary action could be taken against him. This is however, a matter for the appropriate authorities to consider and not for this Court to decide. In my view, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients to bring home the charge to the Appellant. The defence plea raised by the Appellant not only at the stage of trial, but also before P.W. 13 on November 3, 1973 and thereafter is a reasonable and probable one. It is not necessary for an accused person to establish his plea beyond reasonable doubt, as is the case with the prosecution. If an accused person gives a reasonable and probable explanation, it is for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the explanation is false. See Shri Rabindra Kumar Dey Vs. State of Orissa, . It is not necessary for an accused person to establish his plea beyond reasonable doubt, as is the case with the prosecution. If an accused person gives a reasonable and probable explanation, it is for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the explanation is false. See Shri Rabindra Kumar Dey Vs. State of Orissa, . In view of what has been stated above, it could not reasonably be said that the charge u/s 409 of the Code had been established against the Appellant. 18. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of conviction and sentences passed against the Appellant u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and u/s 409 of the Indian Penal Code is set aside. Final Result : Allowed