This defendant's second appeal is from the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Manipur in Civil Appeal No. 51 of 1972, allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court which dismissed the suit. 2. The respondent No. 1 Selkhulal Khongjai instituted original suit No. 67 of 1971 against the present appellant and the proforma-respondent for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the suit land on the basis that the suit land was settled in his favour by the allotment order No. ASSO/IE/7/SO dated 24.1.70 and he had paid the premium thereof. Where­after his name was entered in the Jamabandi as its pattadar and he was in actual possession of the suit land from before the time of allotment and continued to possess the same there­after until he was forcibly dispossessed by the defendants, who had no right or title to the suit land in the middle of May, 1971. The defendants contested the suit by filling a joint written statement wherein they denied inter alia that the plaintiff was the owner of the suit land under patta No. 7/67 (New); or that the plaintiff was in actual possession since before the allotment and continued to possess the same thereafter; or that the defendants and their men forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff from the suit land. They also averred inter alia that the defendant No. 1 had reclaimed the suit land about 14 years earlier that since then he had been possessing the same without any interruption; that he submitted a number of applications to the concerned authorities for its allotment to him on the basis of his long possession being fully qualified to be an allottee under the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as "the Act" and the Rules framed there­under, hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"; that the plain­tiff was minor and this fact was admitted by the plaintiff as well as her mother in criminal case No. 29 of 1971 under sections 447 and 506 I. P. C. and he was shown to be a minor in his School Register and that as soon as the defendant No. 1 knew about the allotment of the suit land to the plaintiff he filed a Revenue Revision Case under section 95 of the Act for setting aside the allotment order on the ground that the plaintiff (allottee) was a minor student and non-agriculturist and hence the allotment order was illegal under the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms (Allotment of Land) Rules, 1962, hereinafter referred to as the "Allotment Rules"; that right and title of the defendant No. 1. over the suit land had been perfected by adverse possession and that the plaintiff had no cause of action. 3. The trial Court settled as many as 11 issues of which the following may be extracted : "1. Is the plaintiff a minor ? If so, is the suit main­tainable in its present form ? 2. Whether the plaintiff was a minor and non-agricul­turist and a student at the time of allotment of the said land ? If so, is the order of allotment illegal and void ab initio and not binding on the defendant ? 3. Is the plaintiff the owner of the land u/p No. 7/67 (New) I.E. ? 4. Whether the plaintiff was in the actual possession of the suit land from before the allotment and continued to possess the same thereafter ? 7. Has the suit any cause of action ? 8. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 3. Is the plaintiff the owner of the land u/p No. 7/67 (New) I.E. ? 4. Whether the plaintiff was in the actual possession of the suit land from before the allotment and continued to possess the same thereafter ? 7. Has the suit any cause of action ? 8. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? The learned trial Court has found and held that the plaintiff is a minor and cannot bring the present suit in the present form, that he is not competent person to be an allottee and hence the said allotment order (Ext.E/1) is illegal and void and not binding on the defendants and it would not create any legal right and liability in favour of the minor plaintiff and he could not be the legal owner of the suit land, that the plaintiff was not in actual possession of the suit land before of after the allotment; that the defendant No. 1 has been in possession of the suit land since 1961 till 1972 and not from May 1971 as alleged and as such not liable to be evicted; that even assuming the allotment order to be good, no deli­very of possession was made in favour of the plaintiff in res­pect of the suit land and the defendants having been in posse­ssion thereof there was no cause of action for the suit on the part of the plaintiff; that the defendant No. 1 did not acquire any title by adverse possession and the suit not barred thereby and that the minor plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. The suit was dismissed with costs. 4. The suit was dismissed with costs. 4. The learned lower appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit for declaration of his title and for possession of the suit land after eviction of the respondents therefrom with costs in both the courts holding inter alia that the plaintiff was above 18 years on the date of institution of the suit and not minor and the suit is maintainable in the present form; that the allotment order is not invalid on the ground of the plaintiff being a minor and non-agriculturist student which constituted no disqualification; that the allotment order cannot be questioned in the civil Court under section 159 of the Act; that delivery of possession is not a condition precedent to the acquisition of right by virtue of the allotment, the only condition being the payment of premium: that the order of the Revenue Court staying the execution of the allotment order was infructuous, the plaintiff having already been in possession of the allotted land since before allotment and if the allotment order is subsequently cancelled it for the Government to take necessary action against the allottee, but until the allotment order is set aside the plaintiff-allottee had a right to defend his title and possession; and that the defendants had acquired no title to the suit land by forcible dispossession of the plaintiff. 5. Mr. R. K. Nokulsana Singh, the learned Advocate appearing for the present appellant assails the appellate order on the following legal grounds, namely. (1) That the minor plaintiff's suit is not maintainable under Order 32 Rule 2 C. P. C. ; (2) That there having been no delivery of possession of the allotted land, the plaintiff acquired no title to the suit land by virtue of the allotment order. (3) That Revenue Court having stayed the execution of the allotment order, the learned lower appellate Court erred in holding that the plaintiff derived title; and (4) That the learned lower appellate Court acted in viola­tion of Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. in accepting additional evidence of the plaintiff's mother and the Doctor and the documentary evidence of the X'Ray plate and judgment being primarily based on these additional evidence, it is liable to be set aside." 6. The learned counsel for the respondent Mr. The learned counsel for the respondent Mr. R. K. Sana-jaoba Singh's answers respectively are that the plaintiff-respondent having not been a minor at the time of institution of the suit as found by the learned lower appellate Court there is no infirmity in the suit; that delivery of possession has not been made a condition precedent for acquisition of title by virtue of allotment order under the Act and the Rules and that at any rate the plaintiff having been in possession of the allotted land since before the allotment there is no infirmity in the title acq­uired by the plaintiff-respondent therefrom; that the argument on the basis of the order staying the execution of the allotment order is not available to the appellant inasmuch as the revision petition has since been dismissed; and that learned lower app­ellate Court committed no error of law and procedure in allo­wing the parties to adduce additional evidence and the defendant-appellants themselves having produced such evidence. 7. Under Order 32 Rule 2 C.P.C., where a suit is instituted by or on behalf of a minor without a next friend the defen­dant may apply to have the plaint taken off the file, with costs to be paid by the pleader or other person by whom it was presented. The learned lower appellate Court having clearly found as a fact that plaintiff on the date of the institution was above 18 years and not a minor on the date of institution of the suit, this finding of fact is not available in second appeal. 7A. The next and the most important question that requires judicial determination in this case is whether by virtue of an allotment order passed by competent revenue authority under the Act and the Rules the allottee acquires title to the allotted land irrespective of its delivery of possession to him. The Act extends to the whole of the State of Manipur except the hill areas thereof, provided that the State Government may, by noti­fication in the official Gazette extend the whole or any part or any section of the Act to any of the hill areas of Manipur also as may be specified in such notification. Admittedly, the Act is applicable to the suit land. Section 14 of the Act deals with allotment of land. Admittedly, the Act is applicable to the suit land. Section 14 of the Act deals with allotment of land. Under sub-section (1) of that section, the Deputy Commissioner may allot land belonging to the Gove­rnment for agricultural purposes or for construction of dwelling bouses, in accordance with such rules as may be made in this behalf under the Act and such rules provide for allotment of land to persons evicted under section 15 of the Act. The allot­ment Rules are the Rules providing for allotment of land. As defined in Rules 2 (b) 'allottee' when used with reference to land the possession whereof has been taken by the person in whose favour it has been allotted in accordance with these rules, includes any person succeeding to the rights of the allottee. Under sub-rules (1) & (2) of Rule 11 of the Allotment Rules an allottee of land for agricultural purposes shall pay premium therefor at the prescribed rate. Under sub-rule (4) the premium or the first installment thereof, as the case may be, shall be paid on or bsfore the date of taking possession of the land and each subsequent installment shall be payable on tae same date in the succeeding years. Under sub-rule (5) any amount payable under this rule shall, if it remains unpaid after the due date, be recoverable in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. Under rule 12 of these rules notwithstanding anything contained in rule 11, no premium shall be payable by the class of per­sons mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of the Rules. Rule 15 prescribed the conditions of allotment and under it allotment of land under sub-section (1) of section 14 shall be subject to the conditions prescribed under this rule (Rule 15). Under clause (ii) of Rule 15, an allottee on giving three months' notice before the end of an agricultural year and on payment of all Government dues in respect of the allotted land up to the end of the said agricultural year may surrender the land allotted to him. On such surrender being made, the land shall revert to the Government. Under clause (1) the land shall not be transferred by the allottee within ten years from the date of allotment without the written consent of the Deputy Commissi­oner. On such surrender being made, the land shall revert to the Government. Under clause (1) the land shall not be transferred by the allottee within ten years from the date of allotment without the written consent of the Deputy Commissi­oner. Under clause (v), the allottee shall be liable to pay such amount as land revenue as may be assessed under the Act and the rules made thereunder. Under clause (vii), allotment shall be liable to be cancelled if, except in cases falling under clause (iv), the land is not used within 2 years of the date of allot­ment for the purpose for which it was allotted or if the allottee commits a breach of any of the conditions of allotment or the provisions of these rules and the Deputy Commissioner may re-enter on the land provided that no such cancellation or re-entry shall be made unless the allottee is given a reasonable oppo­rtunity of being heard. Under rule 16, notwithstanding anything contained in rules 5 to 15, the Deputy Commissioner may, by an order in writing, suspend or remit payment of any premium or any pait thereof if in his opinion the allottee has not suffi­cient means to make such payment. 8. It is admitted by the learned counsel of the parties that there is no statutorily prescribed form of allotment, but the Government does use a printed form for the purpose. Ext. A/1 is the allotment order in the printed form No. A. S. S.O/I.E/7/80 dated the 24th January 1970. It reads : "The undermentioned persons are allotted with the lands shown against each of their names as detailed in the schedule below, for agricultural purposes under sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act 1960. The allotment are made subject to the conditions laid down in Rule 15 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Reforms (Allotment of Land) Rules, 1962. The allottees shall pay premium as shown against each of their names in the schedule below at the rate of Rs. 108.00 (Rupees one hundred and eight) only per acre as sanctioned under the Government of Manipur, Revenue Department Order No. 138/1/65-R dated 22.10.1965 within one month from the date of receipt of the order to the S. D. C., I. E. T. The allottee shall pay Land revenue as is assessed under the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960. Delivery of possession will be made by the Assistant Survey and Settlement E. T. on production of the receipt for depositing premium." In the schedule the allottee's name h shown in the column showing the name and address of the allottee. The genuineness of the allotment order Ext. A/1 has not been disputed in any manner. The appellant has all along proceeded on the basis of existence of the allotments order. The contention however is that no title has been derived under it as the delivery of possesion of the allotted land has not been given to the plain­tiff-respondent. Mr. R. K. Nokulsana Singh submits that the allotment order itself clearly states that delivery of possession will be made by the Assistant Survey and Settlement officer, E. T. on production of the receipt for depositing premium. The delivery of possession must be constituted as a condition precedent to the acquisition of title to the land and as in this case no deli­very of possession was given the plaintiff respondent derived no title. To buttress his submission he refers to Rule 126 of the Rules, whereunder where an order is passed under the Act directing any person to deliver possession of land of directing the eviction of any person from land, such order shall be executed by the competent authority in the manner prescribed under that Rule. This contention is untenable in view of the provisions of section 14(1) of the Act and the allotment rules referred to above, and the conditions of the allotment form. As stated in the allotment form delivery of possession will be made on production of receipt of depositing premium. The deposit of premium must, therefore, precede the delivery of possession. We have seen that under sub-rule (4) of rule 11 of the allot­ment Rules, the premium or the first installment thereof, as the case may be, shall be paid on or before the date of taking possession of the land and each subsequent instalment shall be payable on the same date in the succeeding years. Under sub-rule (5), any amount payable under rule 11, if remains unpaid after the due date, be recoverable in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. Thus, the liability for payment of premium and for payment of land revenue is fastened to the allottee as soon as the allotment order is made. Under sub-rule (5), any amount payable under rule 11, if remains unpaid after the due date, be recoverable in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. Thus, the liability for payment of premium and for payment of land revenue is fastened to the allottee as soon as the allotment order is made. Under Rule 11 (3) premium may be paid in lump sum or in installments with interest. Delivery of possession follows the payment of premium which follows the allotment order. In Apambi Kabuimi vs. The Chief Commissioner of Manipur, AIR 1965 Manipur 3 , the Settlement Officer settled the land on the petitioner by his order dated 7.2.1962 and called upon the petitioner to pay the premium and the revenue within a fixed period. The said premium of Rs. 562.50 np was paid by the petitioner on 8.2.1962, the very next day after the order and the land revenue of Rs. 22.50 np was also paid on 20.3.1962. The Hon'ble Judicial Commissioner, Manipur in Civil Writ Application No. 17/68 observed on those facts : "Thus a contract has been entered into by the Government with the petitioner and the petitioner has performed her part of the contract by payment of the pre­mium and the land revenue which were accepted by the respondents 1 and 2. By such a contract, the petitioner got right to the Government property so long as she observed the conditions as provided in the order of settlement". This decision is still holding the field. In this analysis delivery of possession is not a condition precedent to acquisition of right over the alloted land. There is no doubt that the foundation of the right to the allotted land is the act of allotment, which is also the foundation of the legal liability to pay the premium and the land revenue. The Patta is the embodiment of the right. The analysis may also be that the application for allotment is the offer and allotment is the acceptance of the offer and conclusion of the contract on which the right to the land and the liability to pay premium and revenue are founded, so that if the premium is not paid, partly or wholly, it can be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. Premium need not be paid by certain classes of persons, but nevertheless they earn right to the land allotted to them. Premium need not be paid by certain classes of persons, but nevertheless they earn right to the land allotted to them. It cannot, therefore, be held that the vesting of right under the allotment order has been deferred until the delivery of possession of the land allotted. Nor can it be said that the liability to pay premium arises even before the vesting of the right under the allotment order. The logical sequence is that the application for allotment is the offer and the allotment order is the acceptance and the right and title under the allot­ment order, including the right of possession, are created as soon as the order is made, which also creates the liability of payment of premium and revenue. At any rate, the vesting of right and title under the allotment order cannot be held to have been deferred until delivery of possession. This is why the rules envisage the recovery of premium with interest as an arrear of land revenue. Of course, the right acquired by virtue of the allotment order shall be subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules and the Allotment Rules. 9. Section 159 of the Act excludes jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and provides : "159. No suit or other proceeding shall, unless other­wise expressly provided for in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, lie or be instituted in any Civil Court with respect to any matter arising under and provided for by this Act: Provided that if in a dispute between parties a question of title is involved, a civil suit may be brought for the adjudication of such question. Provided further that the Civil Court shall have juris­diction to decide any dispute to which the Government is not a party relating to any rights. Thus, jurisdiction of the Civil court is excluded with respect to any matter arising under and provided for by the Act. Allotment of land is provided under section 14 of the Act. Under section 93 (1) of the Act save as otherwise expressly pro­vided, an appeal shall lie from every original order passed un­der the Act and under sub-section (2) a second appeal shall lie against any order passed in first appeal. Allotment of land is provided under section 14 of the Act. Under section 93 (1) of the Act save as otherwise expressly pro­vided, an appeal shall lie from every original order passed un­der the Act and under sub-section (2) a second appeal shall lie against any order passed in first appeal. Under section 95 of the Act, the tribunal or the Deputy Commissioner may, either on his own motion or on the application of any party, call for the records of any proceedings before any revenue officer subor­dinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or the propriety of any order passed by such revenue officer, and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit. Thus, the Act itself provides for first appeal, second appeal as well as revision against orders passed under the Act. To that extent, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded. The validity of the allotment order on the ground that the all­ottee was a minor and non-agriculturist student at the relevant time may not therefore be challenged in a civil suit. In the instant case the learned lower appellate Court has held that the validity of the allotment order made by the Deputy Commi­ssioner under the provisions of the Act cannot be questioned in the civil Court under section 159 of the Act, because this is a matter arising under and provided for by the Act. No provision has been shown to the effect that no allotment can be made to a minor. Rule 6 of the allotment Rules prescribes the order of preference for allotment of land for agricultural purposes and it does not exclude a minor. Rule 3 of the allotment Rules prescribes eligibility for allotment of land. Under it no one who is not an Indian national shall be eligible for allotment of land under section 14. Under the explanation to it for the purposes of this rule a person shall be deemed to be an Indian nati­onal in the case of an individual, only if he is a citizen of India. It has not prescribed majority as a condition for 'eligibility'. It has not been shown that the allottee in this case was not an Indian national at the time of allotment or even afterwards. 10. It has not prescribed majority as a condition for 'eligibility'. It has not been shown that the allottee in this case was not an Indian national at the time of allotment or even afterwards. 10. Counsel for the respondent points out that the plain­tiff-respondent had been in possession of the suit land since before the allotment order and he continued to be in possession until he was forcibly dispossessed by the defendants. The lower appe­llate court has found that he was more than 20 years in Sept­ember 1973 and so in 1964 he must have been about 14 years and under the circumstances he could reclaim the land with the help of his father who died before the allotment and that is why the land was allotted in plaintiff's name. The Court acce­pted the case of the plaintiff that the land was reclaimed by him and he was in cultivating possession and after the allotment also he continued to possess the said land till may 1971 when he was forcibly dispossessed. The Court clearly found that in pursuance of the allotment order the premium has already been paid and the appellant had already been in possession. These are findings of fact. The submission that the plaintiff-respondent could not have derived any title under the allotment order as delivery of possession was not given to him must therefore be rejected. 11. The submission that because of the stay of execution of the allotment order the plaintiff could not have derived title thereunder has to be rejected on two grounds. First, the plain­tiff-petitioner having already been in possession and he having paid the premium the question of further delivery of possession to him would not ordinarily arise. Rule 126 of the Rules would not militate against this position. Secondly, the revision petition in which the stay order was passed has admittedly been dismi­ssed and the stay order stood cancelled, and consequently the stay order has ceased to exist. Even assuming, but not accepting, that the acquisition of right was suspended it must be deemed to have revived from the moment of dismissal of the petition. This argument, therefore, is no longer available to the appellant. 12. The last question is whether the lower appellate Court acted contrary to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 C. P. C. in accepting additional evidence as it did. Mr. This argument, therefore, is no longer available to the appellant. 12. The last question is whether the lower appellate Court acted contrary to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 C. P. C. in accepting additional evidence as it did. Mr. R. K. Nokulsana Singh contends that the examination of the petitioner's mother and the Doctor and the acceptance of documents, that is, the X' Ray plates was contrary to Order 41 Rule 27 C. P.C. This Rule provides for production of additional evidence in appellate Court. Under sub-rule (1), the parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or docu­mentary, in the appellate Court. But, if (a) X X X X (aa) XXX (b) the appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judg­ment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. Under sub-rule (2) wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission. In its order dated 1.9.73 the court said that it had perused the evidence on record and considered the facts of the case and in order to enable it to pronounce order on issue no. 1 it was necessary to examine the mother of the appellant and to have on record the copy of admission form which was alleged to have been filed for the appellant at the time of his admission into School. So, the appellant was ordered to examine his mother on the next day and the respondent was directed to file copy of the admission form or any document showing the age of the appellant. On 17.11.1973, it appears the appellant sought permission to file additional evidence which was objected to. The Court heard the parties and recorded in the order "Age of the appellant is a material factor in determining the relevant question in controversy. These documents were not in existence before passing of the decree. So they are admitted under Order 41 Rule 27 clause (2) C. P. C. Respondents also seek permission to file additional evidence. For the some reason, their application is also allowed. Under the circumstance I make no order as to costs." it is submitted by Mr. These documents were not in existence before passing of the decree. So they are admitted under Order 41 Rule 27 clause (2) C. P. C. Respondents also seek permission to file additional evidence. For the some reason, their application is also allowed. Under the circumstance I make no order as to costs." it is submitted by Mr. R. K. Sanajaoba Singh that these documents were the X'Ray plates and Ext. D/1. Memo No. 35/1/72-ED dated 20.3.1974, issued by H. G. Sharma, Officer-in-charge, M. S. L. C. Exam. Government of Manipur, stating that the plaintiff-respon­dent was found to be a candidate of the previous M. S. L. C. Examination, 1971-72 from the Kangpokpi High School Centre under Roll No. 11367, but was actually absent as per record available in that office. His age was 14 years on 1.1.72. Counsel for the appellant submits that admission of the these documents was contrary to law inasmuch as the appeal could have been decided on the basis of the evidence produced before the lower Court and he relies on AIR 1965 SC 1008 , AIR 1975 SC 479 AIR 1976 SC 195 3 and Mr. Sanajaoba relies on AIR 1979 SC 553 . 13. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Lal-Pancham and others, AIR 1965 SC 1008 , it has been held that under Order 41 Rule 27 the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. It has further been held that the power under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 of Order 41 cannot be exercised for adding to the evidence already on record except upon one of the grounds specified in the provision. It has further been held that the power under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 of Order 41 cannot be exercised for adding to the evidence already on record except upon one of the grounds specified in the provision. In Soonda Ram and another vs. Rameshwarlal and another AIR 1975 SC 479 , where in a suit for eviction of the tenant on ground of bonafide personal requirement of the landlords, the tenant had adduced evidence to show that the landlord had more shops than the one in question and did not require it bona­fide for their personal use and the issue was decided on app­raisal of the evidence adduced by the parties, the High Court was held to have been justified in not permitting the tenants to adduce any additional evidence at the second appellate stage as no such prayer had been made in the first appellate court. In Natha Singh and others vs. The Financial Commissioner. Taxation AIR 1976 SC 195 , it has been reiterated that the discretion given to the appellate court to receive and admit additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 is not an arbitrary one but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitations specified in that provision. If the additional evidence is allowed to be adduced contray to the principles governing the reception of such evidence, it will be a case of improper exercise of discretion and the additional evidence so brought on the record will have to be ignored. The true test to be applied in dealing with applications for additional evidence is whether the appellate court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it, with­out taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. In Syed Abdul Khader vs. Kami Reddy and others, AIR 1979 SC 553 , it has been reiterated that it is well establi­shed that Order 41, Rule 27, C. P. C. does not confer a right on the party to produce additional evidence. But if the court hearing the action requires any document so as to enable it to pronounce judgment, it has the jurisdiction to permit additional evidence to be produced. 14. Mr. R. K. Sanajaoba Singh, submits that the above three cases ase distinguishable on facts. But if the court hearing the action requires any document so as to enable it to pronounce judgment, it has the jurisdiction to permit additional evidence to be produced. 14. Mr. R. K. Sanajaoba Singh, submits that the above three cases ase distinguishable on facts. In Municipal Corporation case (supra) the High Court held that it was not possible to dispose of the case satisfactorily on the materials on record. There were some documents on record which if unexplained would support in a large measure the contention of the plaintiffs that defendants 2, 3 and 4 obtained an order by fraud and also that the order was malafide. The Supreme Court observed that the observations of the High Court that certain document would support the plaintiffs' contention of fraud only if they were not explained would show that according to it they fur­nish a prima facie evidence of fraud, and there was nothing to show that the defendents or any of them wanted to be afforded an opportunity for explaining the documents. In the instant case the Judge clearly observed in its order that for proper adjudication of the dispute it was necessary to examine the mother of the plaintiff and the documents for pronouncement of judg­ment in the appeal. In this respect the court's view deserves respect unless, of course, it is shown that it was unreasonable. Before the trial court the tendered evidence was some statement of the plaintiff's mother made before a criminal court. It was therefore, reasonably necessary to examine her to ascertain the truth or otherwise of those statements. The determination of age of a person by medical examination is accepted mode of proof. So also is by production of the school Admission Register. It cannot therefore be said that the learned lower appellate court did not bona fide require the additional evidence for proper adjudication of the dispute between the parties. No infirmity can, therefore, be found in his decision in this regard. The additional evidence thus having lawfully been adduced and consi­dered the finding of facts based thereon are not liable to be challenged in this second appeal. The submission that the findings that the plaintiff was not a minor at the relevant time is perverse being based on illegally adduced additional evidence is, therefore, to be rejected. 15. The additional evidence thus having lawfully been adduced and consi­dered the finding of facts based thereon are not liable to be challenged in this second appeal. The submission that the findings that the plaintiff was not a minor at the relevant time is perverse being based on illegally adduced additional evidence is, therefore, to be rejected. 15. In the reasult, the second appeal is found to be with­out merit and hence it is dismissed with costs.