JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - This is defendants' appeal. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that on June 15, 1964 he made purchase of the land shown by letters Aa Ba Sa Da in the sketch map appended to the plaint from Tribhuwan Singh and others-the Zamindars of the area. Certain construction was raised by him on a portion of the land purchased and that portion was transferred by sale by the plaintiff to the defendants on June 15, 1968. The portion in dispute shown by letters Ya Ra La Va in the sketch map appended to the plaint is claimed to have been retained by the plaintiff as vacant. In or about March, 1969 the defendants commenced digging foundation on this land for raising construction without having any authority in this behalf. This led to the suit giving rise to this appeal on March 24, 1969 whereby the plaintiff has claimed the relief of demolition and possession. In defence, it was pleaded that one Chikhuri Singh had his house on the disputed land. He died issueless. The defendant No. 5 was his employee and resided with him. Chikhuri Singh had requested the Zamindars to grant the house and the Sahen to the defendant No. 5. Subsequent to the death of Chikhuri Singh the house belonging to him had fallen down. About 30-32 years prior to the suit the defendant No. 2 raised a new construction on part of the land and the Sahen. It was asserted that, in view of S. 9 of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951, the land is to be considered as settled with the defendants. 3. The trial Court dismissed the suit on May 27, 1971 being of the opinion that the plaintiff had failed to establish his title to the disputed land and also that it was not proved that he had been in possession thereof. In appeal, the judgment and decree of the trial Court were reversed on April 5, 1975. The suit of the plaintiff was decreed on the basis of title observing that he had acquired right by virtue of the purchase made by him on June 15, 1964 from the ex-Zamindars for consideration. Aggrieved against the decree passed by the lower appellate Court, the defendants have preferred this appeal. 4. The suit of the plaintiff was decreed on the basis of title observing that he had acquired right by virtue of the purchase made by him on June 15, 1964 from the ex-Zamindars for consideration. Aggrieved against the decree passed by the lower appellate Court, the defendants have preferred this appeal. 4. Controversy does not exist on the point that the land in dispute is not situate within the municipal limits and that the U.P. Act 1 of 1951 has been applicable to this. It is also not in dispute that Tribhuwan Singh and others the Zamindars did not reside in the village where the disputed land is situated. I his is pointed also by the lower appellate Court in its judgment. The question arising is whether on June 15, 1964 the ex-Zamindars could be competent to convey title to the plaintiff and his brothers in respect of the disputed land. It is true that on June 15, 1968, the defendants made purchase of the land lying towards west from the plaintiff. Subsequent to the purchase made by him on June 15, 1964, the plaintiff had raised certain constructions as found by the Court below on that land situate to the west of the disputed land. Despite the purchase made from the plaintiff and his brothers on June 15, 1968, the defendants are not precluded from asserting that the plaintiff or his brother did not have right, title or interest in so far as the disputed land Ya Ra La Va situate to the east is concerned. The reason is that the land Ya Ra La Va is admittedly not covered under the sale dated June 15, 1968, which the defendants acquired from the plaintiff and his brothers. There is no question of estoppel or any thing of any kind operating therefore against the defendants in so far as the question of title to the disputed land is concerned. 5. From the averments contained in the plaint, it would appear that the suit is founded upon title. The plaintiff has claimed the relief for possession and also mandatory injunction seeking demolition on the plea that he acquired right to the disputed land by the purchase made by him on June 15, 1964, from the ex-Zamindars. The burden lay upon the plaintiff, therefore, to establish that he did acquire valid title under the said purchase. The plaintiff has claimed the relief for possession and also mandatory injunction seeking demolition on the plea that he acquired right to the disputed land by the purchase made by him on June 15, 1964, from the ex-Zamindars. The burden lay upon the plaintiff, therefore, to establish that he did acquire valid title under the said purchase. The plaintiff may succeed on the strength of his own claim, and not on the footing of the weakness in the defendants' case, if any vide M.M.B. Catholics v. Most. Rev. M.P. Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 and Brahma Nand Puri v. Neki Puri, AIR 1965 SC 1506 . The lower Appellate Court has proceeded to decree the plaintiffs suit on the basis of title alone. It does not find that the plaintiff had been in possession over the disputed land when the defendants allegedly started digging foundation on the same. Indeed, the finding recorded by the trial court is to the contrary, namely, that the plaintiff had not been in possession over said land. In view of S. 4/6(a) of the U.P. Act 1 of 1951, it does not appear that Tribhuwan Singh and others could have the right to make the transfer by sale on June 15, 1964, unless it can be made out that S. 9 of this Act was attracted. 6. Sri U. K. Misra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, urged that the lower Appellate Court has observed that the house was in the form of Khandhar and hence this be deemed to be settled with Tribhuwan Singh and others - the ex-intermediaries under S. 9 of U.P. Act I of 1951. S. 9, in so far as it is relevant, states that all buildings situate within the limits of an estate, belonging to or held by an intermediary, shall continue to belong to, or be held by, such intermediary and the site of the building with the area appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government. The expression "Building" is not defined in this Act. This has to be understood, therefore, in the ordinary sense regard being had to the particular context. In Ghanshiam Das v. Debi Prasad, 1966 Rev Dec 310 : AIR 1966 SC 1998 the question before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was whether brick-kiln could be regarded a 'building' within the meaning of this section. This has to be understood, therefore, in the ordinary sense regard being had to the particular context. In Ghanshiam Das v. Debi Prasad, 1966 Rev Dec 310 : AIR 1966 SC 1998 the question before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was whether brick-kiln could be regarded a 'building' within the meaning of this section. It was held that, being not defined in the Act, the word 'building' has to be construed in its ordinary grammatical sense, unless there is something in the context or object of the statute to show that it is used in a special sense different from its ordinary grammatical sense. The definition appearing in the Webster's International Dictionary was cited with approval as under : (at p. 2000 of AIR) : "That which is built specify, (a) as now generally used a fabric or edifice, framed or constructed, designed to stand more or less permanently and covering a space of land for use as a dwelling, store house, factory shelter for beasts or some other useful purpose. Building in this sense does not include a mere wall, fence, monument, hoarding or similar structure though designed for permanent use where it stands, nor a steamboat, ship or other vessel of navigation.". The existence of roof, it was pointed out accordingly, is not always necessary for a structure to be regarded as 'building' in this context. In that case there was mere pit dug in the ground with bricks by its side, but no structure standing on the Bhatta. It was held that this could not constitute a building. Similar question had arisen before a Division Bench of this Court in Newand Ram v. Gaon Samaj Rura, 1961 All LJ 910 Therein also the controversy was with respect to a brick-kiln. The tests adopted as reasonable by this Court in that case were : (1) Would an ordinary man think that the structure was a building?. (2) Has the relevant structure four walls and a roof, and (3) Can anyone say that the structure was built?. It was found that the kiln did not contain any walls and there was no question of there being any roof. It did not have even an enclosure or structure. It was not intended to be used for residential purpose, nor could it be used for any of the ordinary purposes for which a building is so employed. It was found that the kiln did not contain any walls and there was no question of there being any roof. It did not have even an enclosure or structure. It was not intended to be used for residential purpose, nor could it be used for any of the ordinary purposes for which a building is so employed. There was no structure at all and the view taken was that the brick-kiln could not be treated as a building within the meaning of S. 9 of the Act. 7. In Mahesh Chandra v. U.P. State, 1963 All WR (HC) 323 : 1963 All LJ 439 the question was whether a Gher bounded by walls without having any roof structure inside is a 'building'. The test adopted was the same, namely whether in the ordinary sense it could be regarded a building. A 'building' would signify ordinarily something which is built, of course, being regarded as flexible depending upon the context. In rural areas, it was observed the enclosures are considered necessary for agricultural purpose and are of common existence even though without roof. These enclosures are Ghers, they are to be regarded as 'building' within the meaning of section 9. The learned Single Judge held accordingly following his earlier decision reported in Ram Diya v. Gram Samaj, 1963 Rev Dec 34 which too related to a Gher. 8. In Gram Sabha Mauza Buhalwa v. Gauri Shanker Pd., 1971 Rev Dec 124, the structure involved in controversy was described as under : "From the plan prepared by the Commissioner it appears that pucca foundation had been dug and brick work laid in the shape of a platform, ten inches or so high from the ground level. On this platform on three sides structures have been raised in the shape of sheds on bamboo poles fixed in the ground and covered by tin or iron sheets revetted to the cross-beams. In the shed so constructed sixteen compartments have been made around some of which have pucca floors and some not. The sixteen compartments are used as shops by the sellers. In the open space there is a Pipal tree with a pucca Chabutra below it.". In the shed so constructed sixteen compartments have been made around some of which have pucca floors and some not. The sixteen compartments are used as shops by the sellers. In the open space there is a Pipal tree with a pucca Chabutra below it.". In the context of such a structure it was held that the 'building' contemplated in S. 9 of the Act would be a kind of structure which could be used for his benefit by the owner somewhat permanently, that is, before the day of vesting he was using it either for residence or for other purposes like tethering of cattle, carrying on some cottage industry. 9. The central theme behind the connotation of the expression `building' would, therefore, seem to be the existence of a structure or construction used or capable of being used for residence or for non-residential purposes such as tethering cattle, keeping of agricultural implements, or the like. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fifth edition) the expression 'building' is defined at page 176 as under : "Structure designed for habitation, shelter, storage, trade, manufacture, religion, business, education and the like. A structure or edifice enclosing a space within its walls, and usually not necessarily covered with a roof.". A structure or a construction need not be pucca. It may be kachcha. It is also not necessary that there must be a roof covering the same in the context of S. 9. But all the same there has to be shown to exist a structure or construction used or fit for being used for residence or non-residential purposes common to the ordinary village life. Nothing of the kind is shown to exist in the present case. There were bare remnants of a house or 'Imarat' that once existed. Chikhuri Singh had died nearly 3f-36 years prior to the suit as stated by D. W. Gorakh Nath Singh. Tribhuwan Singh and others, the Zamindars, were admittedly residents of another village, namely, Bhaupur and it is neither alleged nor shown that they were making use of the remnants of certain walls of this land by themselves or through someone for residence or non-residential purposes. Nor is there a finding of the lower appellate Court to this effect. 10. In Bechanram Singh v. Rajaram, 1967 Rev Dec 297 cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, there was a Chhaoni in a dilapidated condition. Nor is there a finding of the lower appellate Court to this effect. 10. In Bechanram Singh v. Rajaram, 1967 Rev Dec 297 cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, there was a Chhaoni in a dilapidated condition. It was held by a learned Single Judge that in villages where kachcha houses are constructed, they very often fall down in rains and it cannot be said that as long as the owner of the house has an intention to rebuild the house that house does not exist and the land is merely an abadi site or vacant land. The facts therein were distinct because there is no indication even remotely of any such intention in the instant case. Moreover, the site may not be deemed i, he settled with the erstwhile owner thereof unless it is shown within the meaning of S. 9 that there was some construction of structure existing on the date immediately preceding the vesting which might be described as a 'building' or, according to the Hindi version of S. 9. 'Imarat' applying the tests propounded by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Newand Ram v. Gaon Samaj Rura, 1961 All LJ 910 (supra). 11. Having regard to the discussion made above, I am clearly of the view that the khandhar in the instant case could not be considered a 'building' within the meaning of S. 9 and hence it could not be deemed to be settled with Tribhuwan Singh and others on the date of vesting. Consequently, the plaintiff-respondent did not acquire valid title to the land in dispute by the purchase made by him on June 15, 1964. 12. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and the decree passed by the trial Court dated May 27, 1971 is restored. Costs on parties.