T.S. Mishra, C.J.- This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against an order of the Additional Dist­rict Judge, Kamrup, Gauhati rejecting the reference petition on the point of limitation. 2. The facts giving rise to the petition lie in a narrow compass. A notice under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was issued on 22nd May, 1970 in respect of land measuring 127 Bighas 1 Katha 6 Lechas covered by K. M. Patta No. 1 and K. P. Patta No. 1 of village Khanapara, Mouza Beltola within the district of Karmur, which was followed by a Notification under section 6 of the Act dated 17th January, 1972 and by a notice under section 9 of the Act whereupon the petitioners filed a claim petition on 24th February, 1971 claiming compensation at the rate of Rs. 2,000/-per Katha against the Collector's assessment of Rs. 1,000/- per Bigha. The petitioner No. 1 was heard by the Collector on 20th March, 1972 who passed an order directing preparation of an award. However, he fixed no specific date for the purpose. Ultimately, the Collector prepared and signed the award on 25th March, 1972 asking the parties to receive payment of the amount of compensation. The petitioners allege that they received the compensation on 20.1.1973 under protest and they came to know about the award made on 25.3.72 only on 29.1.1973 itself. They then filed a petition under Section 18 of the Act before the Collector on 21st February, 1973. The Collector then referred the matter to the civil Court. The State contested the reference before the Additional District Judge, Kamrup, Gauhati in whose court the reference was registered. The Additional District Judge framed issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties. Since the collector did not allege that the reference was barred by time, no issue was framed on the point. It, however, appears that the petitioners examined seven witnesses in support of their claim. However, at the time of hearing of the reference case it was urged on behalf of the collector that the reference was barred by time, inasmuch as it was filed after the expiry of the period of six months from the date of the award. It, however, appears that the petitioners examined seven witnesses in support of their claim. However, at the time of hearing of the reference case it was urged on behalf of the collector that the reference was barred by time, inasmuch as it was filed after the expiry of the period of six months from the date of the award. The learned Additional District Judge accepted this contention and while holding that the reference was barred by time, dismissed the reference by order dated 8.5.81. Aggrieved, the petitioners have filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking the quashing of the said order. The petition has been resisted by the respondents and an affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by the Collector of Kamrup, Gauhati. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have carefully gone through the order impugned before us. For the petitioner it was urged that the period of limitation would commence, under Section 18 of the Act, from the date of the knowledge of the award and as the petitioners had received the knowledge of the award on 29th January, 1973 their petition under Section 18 of the Act, filed on 21st February, 1973, was not barred by time. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the petition under section 18 of the Act was barred by time, in as much as there was no material or evidence worth the name to show that the petitioners had acquired the knowledge of the award only on 29th January, 1973 and not before. The contention was that as the source of the knowledge had not been disclosed there was no justifiable ground to hold that they could know of the award only on 29th January, 1973 and not on 25th March, 1972, when the award was made, or shortly thereafter. 4. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties it would be appropriate to refer to Section 18 of the Act. 4. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties it would be appropriate to refer to Section 18 of the Act. Sub­section (2) of Section 18 being material is extracted herein below: "(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made,- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award : (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collec­tor's award whichever period shall first expire." From a reading of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18 it is quite plain that the time for presenting the application under Section 18 of the Act shall commence from the date of the knowledge of the award. Clause (a) of the proviso says that the person concerned shall file his petition within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award if he was present personally or represented before the Collector at the time when the Collector made his award. If present, he would naturally acquire the knowledge of the contents of the award there and then. However, if he is not present then the Collector should give a notice under sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act to the parties concerned. By receipt of such a notice the party will acquire the knowledge of the contents of the award and then also the period available to him for making an application under Section 18 of the Act would be six weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice. Hence emphasis is laid on the knowledge of the party of the contents of the award. If a person is not present at the time of making of the award he can have no knowledge of the contents of the award. But, if somehow or other he comes to acquire the knowledge of the contents of the award he may file a petition under Section 18 of the Act within the prescribed time. No doubt, in sub-section (2) of Section 18 the words used are "within six months from the date of the Collector's award". But, if somehow or other he comes to acquire the knowledge of the contents of the award he may file a petition under Section 18 of the Act within the prescribed time. No doubt, in sub-section (2) of Section 18 the words used are "within six months from the date of the Collector's award". These words fell for construction before the Supreme Court, first, in Raja Harishchandra vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer : AIR 1961 SC 1500 , then in State of Punjab vs. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum : AIR 1963 SC 1604 , and again in Pratap Narain vs. The Chief Commissioner, Delhi : 1969(3) S.C.C 631 . In Raja Harishchandra (supra) it was observed by the Supreme Court that if the award made by the Collector is no more than offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property then the making of the award as pro­perly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. The Supreme Court laid down that tae date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office; it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words "the date of the award" occurring in the relevant section would not be appro­priate. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is and essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought in fores. The making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it, it can be said to be made when pro­nounced. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it, it can be said to be made when pro­nounced. If the date when the award would be made is commu­nicated to the party and it is accordingly announced on that date the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if notice of the date of its pro­nouncement is not given and award is pronounced and the party is not present the award would be said to be made known when it is communicated to the party concerned. 5. The above decision was referred to with approval in State of Punjab (supra) as also in Pratap Narain (supra). The period of six weeks under sub-section (2) section 18 will, therefore, run from the date of the knowledge of the award. The know­ledge of the award dees net mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. Of course these contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the party is present at the time of making of the award it has to be pre­sumed that the contents of the award have been made known to him. 6. We shall now proceed to examine the facts of the instant case in the light of the principles stated hereinabove. The peti­tioner No. 1 was heard by the Collector on 20th March, 1972 and he passed an order directing the preparation of the award. He did not, however, fix any particular date as to when the award would be made. The petitioner, therefore, could not know as to when he was to present himself before the Collector nor could he know as to when the collector would make and sign the award. It is not in dispute that the collector did make and sign the award on 25th March, 1972 and the petitioners were not present before him at that moment. There is no dispute that no notice under section 12 (2) of the Act was served on the petitioners. They contended before the court below that they came to know of the award only on 29th January, 1973 when they received the compensation under protest. 7. There is no dispute that no notice under section 12 (2) of the Act was served on the petitioners. They contended before the court below that they came to know of the award only on 29th January, 1973 when they received the compensation under protest. 7. The learned Additional District Judge, referring to the evidence of D. W. 1, held that as the claimants were either personally present or were duly represented it could not be said that the claimants had no knowledge of the award. This finding is based on presumption and not on any evidence D. W. 1 said that the collector heard the claimants on 20th March, 1972 and that the award was published on 25th March, 1973 but he did not say that the claimants were informed on 20th March, 1972 that the award would be made on 25th March, 1972 nor did he say that the claimants or any of them wars actually present on 25th March, 1972 before the collector when he made his award. The finding that it could not be said that the claimants had no knowledge of the award, is perverse. Moreover, there is no finding showing that the claimants had acquired any know­ledge either on 25th March, 1972 or any date before 29th January, 1973. The petitioners have stated on oath that they did not acquire knowledge of the award either on 25th March, 1972 or any other date before 29th January, 1973 when they received the compensation under protest. There is no reason to disbelieve the above statement. The petitioners had came to know for the first time of the making of the award on 29th January, 1973 and, as such, the petition under section 18 of the Act filed on 21st February, 1973 was well within time. The learned Additi­onal District Judge committed an error in holding that the said petition was barred by time. The impugned order of the learned Additional District Judge suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record and it deserves to be quashed. 8. In the result, the petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 8th May, 1981 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gauhati is quashed. The Rule is made absolute. In the circumstances of the case we, however, make no order as to costs. 9. 8. In the result, the petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 8th May, 1981 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gauhati is quashed. The Rule is made absolute. In the circumstances of the case we, however, make no order as to costs. 9. The learned Additional District Judge is directed to hear and decide Reference Misc. Case No. 252 of 1973 on merit. As the matter has become very old we direct him to decide the case within two months from the date of the receipt of the records. Office is directed to send down the records with­out any loss of time.