JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member. - This review application has been filed against the judgment dated October 12, 1981 in a revision/reference by which the order of the learned trial court August 23, 1974 in proceedings under Section 122-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act was set aside and in view of a bona fide question of title involved, the trial court was directed to provide opportunity under Section 122-B(4-B) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. 3. The learned counsel for the applicant has argued that since there is a finding that it was a permissive possession of the revisionist on account of lease, a question of jurisdiction is involved and not a question of title that there can be no order of ejectment under Section 122-B of the Act without cancellation of the lease even if it is unapproved, and so the proceedings were not maintainable. The learned D.G.C. (R.) has argued that there is no such finding of permissive possession in the judgment in question, that there is no valid lease on record, that there is nothing on record to show that the proposed lease had been approved and that the ruling cited by the revisionist viz. 1977 R.D. 352, when applied to the instant case, also indicated that a bona fide question of title was involved and this being accepted by the Board, there was no apparent error on the face of the record. 4. The learned counsel for the applicant also cited rulings reported in Ram Baran v. State of U.P., 1980 R.D. 59, Shayam Lal, Rama and Kripa v. Gaon Sabha, 1982 U.P.R.J. 45, Ram Subhawan v. L.M.C., 1982 A.W.C. (Rev.) 123 and Lal Singh v. Gaon Sabha, 1982 A.W.C. (Rev.) 2. In the first of these cases, viz. Ram Baran v. State of U.P. (supra), a Patta of Abadi site was granted by the L.M.C. to a relative of the Pradhan without permission of the Collector in writing as provided under Section 28-C(1)of the Panchayat Raj Act and the Patta holder was held to be no trespasser and it was further held that the applicant not be ejected under Section 122-B of the Act. In the second ruling in Shyam Lal v. Gaon Sabha (supra) and two similar references it was held that if the allotment of Abadi sites was either not sanctioned by the S.D.O. or no previous sanction was obtained from the S.D.O. such allottees are not rank trespasser and the proceedings under Section 122-B of the Act against them are not maintainable. These two cases relate to allotment of Abadi sites and the provision of prior permission of the S.D.O. to the proposed allotment is contained in rule 115-N(2) proviso. The purpose of referring these rulings is to show that the proceedings under Section 122-B of the Act were not maintainable for want of jurisdiction and an error apparent on the face of the record has been occasioned. 5. Both these rulings relate to allotment of Abadi sites while the instant case related to 1.32 acres land for cultivation, allotted without prior permission of the S.D.O. as required in Sections 195 and 197 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. act itself and so no lease could be granted in pursuance of the L.M.C. These two rulings, therefore, are found distinguishable from the instant case. 6. The procedure for grant of lease has to be properly understood and it must be clarified that a lease by the L.M.C. as regards the procedure, cannot be equated to a lease by ex-zamindars in pre-vesting days. While zamindars were full proprietors, the L.M.C. or the Gaon Sabha is not, and is bound by certain procedural restrictions. The resolution by the L.M.c. does not constitute a lease but only its decision to grant a lease subject to prior approval by the S.D.O. The lease document can be executed only after such approval and any rent paid by the prospective lease in anticipation of grant of lease cannot establish his right. This procedure also established that without such approval, no question of lease arises, it is whether premature to think patta or whether it is void or voidable. Even if by mistake, the L.M.C. executes the patta document without obtaining approval of the S.D.O. it must be deemed void on account of non-fulfilment of an important and necessary pre-condition. 7. This procedure also established that without such approval, no question of lease arises, it is whether premature to think patta or whether it is void or voidable. Even if by mistake, the L.M.C. executes the patta document without obtaining approval of the S.D.O. it must be deemed void on account of non-fulfilment of an important and necessary pre-condition. 7. The third ruling in Ram Subhawan v. L.M.C., 1982 A.W.C. (Rev.) 123 is also distinguishable as it involves a lease granted with the permission of the S.D.O. and it was held that that lease land no longer remained the Gaon Sabha land. The fourth ruling cited Lal Singh v. Gaon Sabha, 1982 A.W.C. (Rev.) 2 has no doubt been misconstrued. Since in that case, the learned first appellate court and the Board both had held that the applicant was a trespasser and confirmed the ejectment order, which being an error apparent in view of the rulings, the review application was allowed. But the correct legal position was also stated in para 5 which is reproduced below: "5. It is a fact that the learned Additional Commissioner and the Member, Board of Revenue both have held the revisionist to be a trespasser. It is a different matter than neither the trial court gave such finding, nor there is any requirement under Section 122-B(3) of the Act that before ejectment, the opposite party must be shown to be a trespasser. The requirement in law is only that he should be in occupation in contravention of the provision without title. This is what the trial court also found." 8. In fact, being not a rank trespasser of being in permissive possession has no significance in the proceedings under Section 122-B of the Act and the requirements for proceedings under this section are merely to be in occupation in contravention of the provisions of this Act. Even if a person is in permissive possession, it has not been shown to be in accordance with the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. The Act does not say anything about any kind of trespass or its effect and the use of words 'trespasser', 'no rank trespasser' or 'in permissive possession' in proceedings under S. 122-B of the Act only creates confusion and difficulty, besides not assigning any specific status to such so called non-trespasser or permissive occupant. The Act does not say anything about any kind of trespass or its effect and the use of words 'trespasser', 'no rank trespasser' or 'in permissive possession' in proceedings under S. 122-B of the Act only creates confusion and difficulty, besides not assigning any specific status to such so called non-trespasser or permissive occupant. Even if the Gaon Sabha or the L.M.C. permitted a person to occupy any land, such occupation could well be against the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and would not protect the person against ejectment under Section 122-B of the Act. Such permissive possession cannot act as a bar to proceedings possession cannot act as a bar to proceedings under Section 122-B of the Act and the question of jurisdiction cannot be raised on this ground. The learned D.G.C. (R) was also right that in the judgment dated October 12, 1981, there is no finding that there was any permissive possession, such finding would have been irrelevant indeed. 9. Again no law has been shown that as proceedings under Section 122-B of the Act can be taken up without cancellation of a lease (void, voidable or otherwise). This section is comprehensive as regards bona fide question of title and as soon as the question is found raised, the court has to stay proceedings and afford opportunity under Section 122-B(4-B) of the Act which is fair enough. This is the course confirmed by the ruling in 1977 R.D. 352 also. 10. It is thus clear that no error apparent on the face of the record is made out and the application being without force, is hereby dismissed with costs.