Judgment Hari Lal Agrawal, J. 1. This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order of the Commission of Mines or Geology, contained in Annexure I, setting aside the order of the Collector of Bhojpur who had accorded sanction for the mining lease in respect of 10.25 acres of sandy land for collection of sand in favour of the petitioner. One of the grounds which have been assigned by the Commissioner for interfering with the order of the Collector is that the respondent No. 5 Shri Jalad Narayan Singh had made the application for mining earlier than the petitioner. 2. Little facts may be stated. The plots in question are Nos. 3094 and 3096 having a total area of 25 acres. In the year 1980 the entire area was settled with respondent No. 5 on rejecting the other applications, but he. For some reasons, did not execute the lease, which occasioned for making a fresh settlement. When applications were invited the petitioner a well as respondent No. 5 again applied for the settlement of the total area. The Collector, however, granted a lease in favour of respondent No, 5 for 14.75 acres and to the petitioner in respect of 10.25 acres out of the total area. The petitioner executed the case document in respect of the said area of 10.25 acres but the respondent No, 5 took the matter in revision before the Commissioner under Rule 45 of the Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1972 (for short the Rules). The Commissioner in the impugned order has recorded the following conclusions. The events of 1970-80 were not relevant for the year 1981 and there was no reason for rejecting the application of respondent No. 5 in respect of 10.25 acres and giving it to the petitioner. Earlier, he has referred to the fact that the application of respondent No. 5 was earlier in point of time and that he could give preference to the petitioner only after obtaining prior approval of the State Government and that having not been done, the lease in favour of the petitioner was illegal. 3. This necessitates reference to some of the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1967 (for short the Act). 3. This necessitates reference to some of the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1967 (for short the Act). "Minor minerals" have been defined under Clause (a) of Sec.3 as follows: minor minerals means building stones gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes and any other mineral which the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral. Sec.11 speaks of certain preferential claims of prospecting licences and in Sub-section (2). It provides that "where two or more persons have applied for a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the same land, the applicant whose application was received earlier shall have a preferential might for the grant of the licence or lease, as the case may be over an applicant whose application was received later. But the same effect is the provision contained in Rule 12 of the Rules. Rule 20 further provides that the Collector has to assign reasons in writing and communicate to the applicant if he refuses to grant or refuse a mining lease over the whole or part of the area applied for. Chapter III of the Rules deals with the procedure how the mining leases are to be granted, beginning from the filing of the application upto the execution of the document and assessment of rent and royalty etc. It is obvious that the learned Commissioner has interfered with the order of the Collector on the above provisions. 4 Learned Counsel challenged the order of the Commissioner on the basis of Sec.14 of the Act which has excluded the application of Sections 4 to 13 to quarry leases, mining leases and other mineral concessions in respect of the minor minerals. Sec.11(2) of the Act contains a provision for giving "preferential right for the grant of the licence or lease, at the case may be, over an applicant whose application was received later" to a person whose application was received earlier. It was contended that by making this provision inapplicable the Central Legislature intended to obviate such a treatment to an applicant whose application happened to reach earlier than the other and, therefore a provision to the same effect made in Rule 12 of the Rules would run counter to the said intention. It was contended that by making this provision inapplicable the Central Legislature intended to obviate such a treatment to an applicant whose application happened to reach earlier than the other and, therefore a provision to the same effect made in Rule 12 of the Rules would run counter to the said intention. This argument is based upon the principle that under the rule making power the authority making the rule cannot make any rule which may be in conflict with the provisions of the Act and in that event the provisions in the Rules must give way to the provisions of the Act. The argument prima facie appears to the attractive and at one point of time we had felt inclined to allow the application on this ground alone, but on giving a second thought we felt just otherwise for obvious reasons. Firstly I would deal with the legal basis for this argument made on behalf of the petitioner. The provisions of the Act do not contain anything which runs confer to the scheme of Rule 12. Rather the priority rule contained in Sec.11 does not apply to all the other minerals except the minor minerals. Had there been any such provision that the priority rule would not apply to the case of the minor minerals, then the State Government could not under its rule making power prescribe to the contrary. Simply by withdrawing the provision with respect to the minor minerals and giving wide powers to State Government to make rules in respect of minor minerals "for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or mineral concessions" the Central Legislature left the matter to the discretion of the State Government and for obvious reasons, as was observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Baijnath Kedia V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. -- . It was observed in that case that Entry 54 of the Union List Speaks both of regulation of mines and mineral development and Entry 23 is subject to that Entry. Therefore, to what extent such declaration can go is for the Parliament to determine and this must be commensurate with the public interest. It was, therefore, necessary for the Parliament to determine as to what would be the extent of the powers of the State Government. 5. A Bench of this Court in the case of Laddu Mal and Ors. Therefore, to what extent such declaration can go is for the Parliament to determine and this must be commensurate with the public interest. It was, therefore, necessary for the Parliament to determine as to what would be the extent of the powers of the State Government. 5. A Bench of this Court in the case of Laddu Mal and Ors. V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. -- . while considering the question of the liability to pay royalty by the persons manufacturing bricks out of earth and clay etc. had to deal with the exclusion of Sections 4 to 13 as mentioned in Sec.14 and it was observed that the sole purpose for conferring of such powers as covered by those sections on the State Government in respect of minor minerals was for the purposes of the Act and in that view it was found that imposition of royalty was within the powers given to the State Government to make rules under Sec.15 of the Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner however, had placed reliance upon the case of Ramlal Laichand V/s. H.G. Dange A.I.R. 1963 Bom. 117 which also was a case of clay and it was observed therein that in view of the provisions contained in Section 14 the rule of priority would not apply to prospecting licences and mining leases in respect of the minor minerals. The ratio of this case is based only on the provisions of Sec.14 of the Act and no rule framed by the State Government, as in the present case, was under consideration. Obviously, therefore, in the absence of any other provision to the contrary and in view of Sec.14 of the Act, the priority rule could not apply. The decision is, therefore, apparently distinguishable, In that view of the matter and for the discussions made above, I am of the view that the 1972 Rules framed by the State Government under its rule making power does not create any conflict with the scheme of the present Act ; rather by incorporating the provisions of priority under Rule 12 it simply manifests the intention of the Central Legislature and it must be given its full play. Some other infirmities pointed out in the order of the Collector by the Commissioner, particularly of Rule 20, do not call for any consideration by this Court. 6. Some other infirmities pointed out in the order of the Collector by the Commissioner, particularly of Rule 20, do not call for any consideration by this Court. 6. In view of the discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs, I do not find any merit in this application and would dismiss the same, but in the circumstances I shall make no order as to costs. S.N.Jha, J. 7 I agree.