JUDGMENT Parekh, J. - By this writ petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus, the petitioner challenges an order dated 14th September, 1982 passed by the Government of Maharashtra in exercise of its powers under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974 (52 of 1974), with a view to preventing the petitioner from indulging in smuggling goods. 2. The petitioner's case is that he is an Iraqi national. That he had come to Bombay for the first time on 18th March, 1982 on a pleasure trip for about 10 days. That he left Bombay on 28th March, 1982. That on his return to Kuwait, he contacted the Directors of Kuwaitian Company and acquainted them with the possibilities of procuring cheap labour from India. That his company, therefore, depicted him to return to Bombay and negotiate procurement of Indian labour. That he hence came to Bombay on the 8th April, 1982 by Kuwait Airways Flight No. KU 300. That during this journey, he lost a bag and was given a landing certificate bearing No. 19736 at the Bombay Airport. In this landing certificate, his bag was described as a brown coloured bag which carried a tag. That he had reported this loss to the Customs authorities. That on his arrival in Bombay, he took a taxi and went to Colaba looking for accommodation. That at this time, he met one Arab gentleman who gave his name as Abdul Abbas Ali. That he then inquired of the said Abdul as to where he the petitioner, could secure accommodation. That he, the petitioner, also told the said Abdul Abbas Ali about his having lost his bag during the travel and that he would hence have to do some shopping having lost all his things. That the said Abdul Abbas Ali then took him to a local hotel where they had break-fast. That during the course of conversation, the said Abdul Abbas Ali informed the petitioner that his (the said, Abdul Ali's friend was to come from Kuwait to Bombay and by then must have checked in at Hotel Natraj and asked the petitioner to accompany him. That since the petitioner had not checked in at any hotel, nor had he any baggage, he agreed to accompany the said Abdul Abbas Ali. That since the petitioner had not checked in at any hotel, nor had he any baggage, he agreed to accompany the said Abdul Abbas Ali. That both of them went to Hotel Natraj and reached there about 11.00 a.m. That on reaching Hotel Natraj, the said Abdul Abbas Ali went to the receptionist and enquired if any Iraqi national had checked into the hotel on the morning of 8th April, 1982. That thereupon the said Abdul Abbas Ali was told that one Sahb Mohomed Hussain, an Iraqi national and one Mohamed Gulam Hussain, a national of Kuwait had checked in at the hotel and were occupying Room No. 608. That they then went to the said room. That on that day, the Customs raided the said room No. 608 and the petitioner was detained for interrogation. He was then put under arrest, produced before the Magistrate and was remanded to custody and thereafter from time to time. That on 12th July, 1982, he was released on bail. That on the 15th September, 1982, the impugned order dated 14th September, 1982 was served on him along with the grounds in support thereof and he, the petitioner, was detained in pursuance thereof. That on or about 19th October, 1982 he made a representation to the State Government and to the Central Government. That the representations to the said two authorities were sent through jail. That he the petitioner, also made a representation to the Advisory Bord through his advocate and in this representation, he requested the Advisory Board that he, "the petitioner, he given a hearing, and at the time of the hearing, an interpreter who knew Arabic be kept present, since he, the petitioner, did not know English, and further that the articles and things that were seized during the said raid in room No. 608 of Hotel Natraj be produced at the hearing. That by a letter dated 21st October, 1982, the Advisory Board informed him that arrangements were made to keep an interpreter who knew Arabic present at the time of the hearing. That he was interviewed by the said Board on 4th November, 1982. However, on that day, according to him, the services of the interpreter were not afforded to him by the Board as it was of opinion that the petitioner knew English. That he was interviewed by the said Board on 4th November, 1982. However, on that day, according to him, the services of the interpreter were not afforded to him by the Board as it was of opinion that the petitioner knew English. That the result was that he the petitioner could not effectively put his case before the Advisory Board. That by his advocate's letter dated 5th November, 1982, addressed to the Advisory Board, he recorded the said facts. That he then received a letter dated 5th November, 1982 from the State Government informing him that the State Government had rejected his representations. That he also received a letter dated 9th November, 1982 from the Central Government informing him that the Central Government had also rejected his representations. That he also received a letter dated 12th November, 1982 from the Secretary of the Advisory Board refuting the various contentions that he had canvassed in his advocate's letter dated 5th November, 1982. That on 24th November, 1982 the State Government confirmed the order passed by the Advisory Board. That he hence filed this writ petition on 1st December, 1982, challenging the order of detention. 3. This petition reached hearing time and again, when the respondents kept on asking for time to file their affidavit in reply. With a view to see that the say of the respondents was not shut out, time was granted to the respondents, time anti again The respondents finally filed an affidavit in reply, inter-alia, denying the several statements and contentions canvassed by the petitioner in the petition. 4. At the hearing of this petition, Mr. Chari, the learned Counsel for the petitioner stated that in the petition, the petitioner had made certain statements and allegations vis-a-vis the Advisory Board but he, the petitioner, "was not pressing" them. Mr. Chari then submitted an application unconditionally withdrawing the several statements and wanton allegations made against the Advisory Board and seeking the deletion thereof. In view of this application, the said statements and allegations concerning the Advisory Board have been treated as deleted. 5. Insofar as the challenge to the order dated 14th September, 1982 is concerned the same has been challenged on several grounds, but then, this petition can be disposed of only on a short point that has been raised by Mr. Chari. 6. Mr. 5. Insofar as the challenge to the order dated 14th September, 1982 is concerned the same has been challenged on several grounds, but then, this petition can be disposed of only on a short point that has been raised by Mr. Chari. 6. Mr. Chari contended that about 62 items were placed before the detaining authority to enable the detaining authority to consider the same and to arrive at a conclusion as to whether an order detaining the petitioner ought to be passed or not. That as a matter of fact, the detaining authority had enumerated these items in a list captioned "list of documents placed before the detaining authority". That a perusal of this list (a copy whereof has been annexed to the petition shows that some of the documents mentioned in the list are in Arabic. That these documents in Arabic involved endorsements in Arabic on passports, letters, and jottings in a diary. That admittedly, the detaining authority did not and does not know Arabic. That the detaining licence could not have applied its mind to these documents since they were in Arabic and the impugned order was clearly passed by the detaining authority without applying its mind to the documents placed before it and the order was hence bad in law. That the petitioner had in this petition in paragraph 12(n)(ii) specifically spelt out this ground and had in fact averred as follows: "12(a)(ii) Obviously, the detaining authority does not know Arabic and the documents have not been translated into English and it is thus obvious that the detaining authority has passed the impugned detention order without applying his mind to the documents placed before him." 7. That a perusal of the affidavit in reply filed by Mr. M.R. Natarajan, Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra shows that not only have the said averments made by the petitioner remained uncontroverted but they have not been dealt with at all. On the other hand, what has been stated in paragraph 12 and paragraph 26 of the said affidavit-in-reply is as follows: "12. With reference to para l2(c) of the petition, I hereby state and submit that it is not necessary to disclose to the detenu as to who on behalf of the Government acted as detaining authority and as to who on behalf of the Government considered the representation submitted by the petitioner. With reference to para l2(c) of the petition, I hereby state and submit that it is not necessary to disclose to the detenu as to who on behalf of the Government acted as detaining authority and as to who on behalf of the Government considered the representation submitted by the petitioner. The order of detention in question was passed by the competent authority under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. I further state that I have been authorized to exercise the powers of the Government to pass the detention order under the said Act. In exercise of the said powers I considered the entire material very carefully and I was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the detenu with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods. I say that the record placed before me was considered by me very carefully and thereafter I passed the order, of detention in question". "26. With reference to ground (q) of para 12 of the petition, I say that after considering the entire, material placed before me I was subjectively satisfied to issue the detention order against the detenu, I deny that there is no nexus between the offence and the order of detention." That the avernment in these paragraphs stating that the detaining authority, i.e. the Government and/or Mr. Natarajan, the Assistant Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra had considered the record and or the entire material placed before it was false as the detaining authority could never have considered the documents in Arabic since the detaining authority did not and does not know the language. That in view of this, the order must now stand vitiated. 8. Mr. Kamble, the learned Counsel for the respondents assisted by the Government Pleader Mr. Kotwal, urged that it is true that these Arabic documents-were placed before the detaining authority. That it is also true that the detaining authority did not and does not know Arabic. That it is also entirely correct to say that in the affidavit-in-reply it was and is averred that the detaining authority had considered all the "record" and/or the entire material" that was placed before it. That it is also true that the detaining authority did not and does not know Arabic. That it is also entirely correct to say that in the affidavit-in-reply it was and is averred that the detaining authority had considered all the "record" and/or the entire material" that was placed before it. However, if it is to be accepted that the detaining authority did not know Arabic, then all that must come about is that the detaining authority had not looked into those documents which were and are in Arabic and had passed orders on such other documents which were in the language which the detaining authority knew. That if it is the contention of the petitioner that the documents which were and are in Arabic are of any relevance, and would have influenced the detaining authority in one way or the other, then the burden was on the petitioner to establish that same, and if he, the petitioner failed to discharge this burden, then Mr. Chari's argument would be of no consequence whatsoever. 9. The learned Counsel for the respondents urged that a similar position arose in the case of Ashadevi v. K. Shivraj and another1. In that case what had transpired was that an order was passed on the basis of a confession made by the detenu. That a letter passed by the detenu immediately thereafter retracting from the confession was not placed before the detaining authority prior to the passing of the order of detention. That in this context, the Supreme Court held that the said letter containing the retraction would be of some consequence since it would have influenced the detaining authority one way or the other, and that if the detaining authority had not considered the same, then the order stood vitiated. The learned Counsel for the respondents urged that in view of this, it was not sufficient for the petitioner to merely contend that certain documents were not considered but the petitioner would have to go further and indicate that the documents in question could have weighed with the detaining authority to come to one or the other conclusion. That nothing was indicated by the petitioner's counsel to this effect. 10. The learned Counsel for the respondents also placed reliance on the observation made in Criminal Application No. 1269 of 1981, disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court per Dharmadhikari and Puranik, JJ. That nothing was indicated by the petitioner's counsel to this effect. 10. The learned Counsel for the respondents also placed reliance on the observation made in Criminal Application No. 1269 of 1981, disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court per Dharmadhikari and Puranik, JJ. on the 14th October, 1981. In that case, it was the contention of the petitioner that certain diaries were seized, but when material was placed before the detaining authority, these diaries were not produced before him. That the order was defective since the detaining authority had no opportunity to consider the entries in the diaries. That the Court went on to hold that if that was the detenu's contention, then it was for him to show that the entries in the said diaries were material, and would have weighed and/or would have influenced the detaining authority. 11. Counsel for the respondents urged that since nothing was pointed out on behalf of the petitioner if the documents in question could have weighed or influenced the detaining authority one way or the other, Mr. Chari's argument could not survive. 12. Counsel for the respondents further urged that apart from this, the affidavit of Natarajan made it clear that the detaining authority had furnished to the detenu in English language all the documents and statements relied upon by the detaining authority or referred to in the grounds. That as a matter of fact, in paragraph 13, it was averred as follows: "13. With reference to ground (d) of para 12 of the petition, I further state and submit that the petitioner is conversant with the English language and an the documents and statements relied upon by me or referred to in the grounds of detention were supplied to the Detenu in English language and the rest of the averments are not correct". That this must make it clear that the matter which the detaining authority considered was in English and such matter had been supplied to the petitioner/detenu. That merely because the detaining authority had furnished photostat copies of documents which were in Arabic was immaterial. That in view of this averment, the contention canvassed by Mr. Chari could not survive. 13. That this must make it clear that the matter which the detaining authority considered was in English and such matter had been supplied to the petitioner/detenu. That merely because the detaining authority had furnished photostat copies of documents which were in Arabic was immaterial. That in view of this averment, the contention canvassed by Mr. Chari could not survive. 13. Now, considering the rival contentions on this aspect of the matter, it may be stated that the averments made in paragraphs 12 and 26 are to the effect that the detaining authority had considered the "record" and/or the "entire material" placed before the detaining authority, Then again, it is an admitted position that documents in Arabic were placed before the detaining authority. It is also in admitted position that the detaining authority did not and does not know Arabic. All this must make it obvious that the detaining authority could never have considered the "record" placed before it, or considered the "entire material" placed before it. The averments made in the affidavit that the detaining authority had considered the record and/or the "entire material" cannot be accepted. 14. Insofar as the averments made in paragraph 13 of the affidavit-in-reply are concerned, they are an answer to ground (d) of paragraph 13 of the petition and what has been stated in ground (d) is as follows: "(d) The petitioner further says and submits that in paragraph 3 of the grounds of detention it is mentioned that copies of the statements and documents which were furnished to the petitioner were placed before the detaining authority, The petitioner says that, among these documents and statements several of them are in Arabic and the petitioner categorically states that the detaining authority who is purported to have issued the detention order does not know Arabic language. Furthermore, most of the documents in English are not accompanied by any translated copy in Arabic which is the only language known to the petitioner and as such the said documents could not have been placed before the detaining authority and correct translation of these document and without knowing the contents thereof and without considering the veracity of the contents the detaining authority had a subjective satisfaction and he has thought it fit to detain the petitioner. The petitioner says that subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is hopelessly impaired and the detention of the petitioner is, therefore, vitiated". (Italics ours) Therefore, the averments contained in paragraph 13 of the affidavit-in-reply do not really answer the question. But even if it is assumed that the averments made in paragraph 13 assist the respondents to some extent, there can be little doubt that the averments in paragraph 13 of the said affidavit are contradictory to the averments made in paragraphs 12 and 26 of the affidavit-in-reply. It has been repeatedly held that these affidavits are in the nature of evidence, and if conflicting and contradicting statements are made in the affidavit, then this must not only detract from the respondents case but must prove wholly destructive thereof. The affidavit-in-reply filed in this matter has been so indifferently drawn-up and made that it can hardly assist the respondents in any manner. 15. As regards the two cases cited by Counsel for the respondents are concerned, the contention of the detenus in each of the said cases was that certain relevant material was not placed before the detaining authority before the passing of the order and, it was in this light that the Courts had held that if such was the grievance of the detenu, then the detenu must establish that such of the documents could have had a bearing on the decision of the detaining authority and if he could do this, the order would stand vitiated. The facts in the present case are wholly different. In this case, the material was placed before the detaining authority, but the detaining authority could not appreciate the material because it was in Arabic, and not only this but in the affidavit-in-reply, the detaining authority made bold to aver, although falsely, that it had considered all the material placed before it. The ratio of the said two cases could hence be of no assistance to the respondents. 16. In view of the discussions, it must be held that the detaining authority had failed to apply its mind to the materials placed before it, much less had it shifted the relevant material from the irrelevant, before or in passing the detention order. The order must stand vitiated on this ground alone. 17. At the hearing of this matter, Mr. In view of the discussions, it must be held that the detaining authority had failed to apply its mind to the materials placed before it, much less had it shifted the relevant material from the irrelevant, before or in passing the detention order. The order must stand vitiated on this ground alone. 17. At the hearing of this matter, Mr. Chari, the learned Counsel for the petitioner canvassed two other grounds which according to him would vitiate the order, viz., (a) that the representations made by the petitioner on 19th October, 1982 was not expeditiously disposed off but on the other hand there was gross delay in doing so and (b) that the Customs had made a proposal to the detaining authority for the detention of the petitioner as far back as 4th June, 1982. That at that time, admittedly the petitioner was in custody. That he was released on bail on 12th July, 1982. That the detention order was passed after a delay of two months. However, in view of the above discussions, it has become unnecessary to deal with these two contentions. 18. In the result, the order dated 14th September, 1982 is quashed and set aside. The petition succeeds. The rule is made absolute. The petitioner is directed to be set at liberty, if not otherwise required. 19. At this stage, Mr. Kamble, the learned Counsel for the respondents state that leave to appeal to the Supreme Court may be granted and although the order has been quashed, the operation of this order be stayed. 20. Mr. Chari, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that insofar as the proceedings before the Magistrate are concerned, the petitioner himself had applied for the cancellation of his bail and he is in custody. Therefore, the question of stay does not arise. 21. Considering the rival contentions on this point, the leave to appeal refused, the operation of this is however stayed till 7th February, 1983. 1. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 447.