G. N. SABHAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the defendant is directed against the judgment and decree dated 10-2-1975 passed by the Addl. Civil Judge, mysore, in RA No. 145 of 1967 on his file, dismissing the appeal and cross-objections with costs, on confirming the judgment and decree dt. 19-4-67 passed by the Munsiff, Nanjangud, in OS No. 628 of 1965 on his file, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff as prayed for. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff averred that on or about Septr. , 1959, the defendant agreed to grow and supply cured tobacco to the plaintiff and received an advance cash and materials of the total value of Rs. 1,682-72 P. for construction of a tobacco curing barn, seedlings and manure, on credit, on several dates as per the statement of accounts and vouchers furnished along with the plaint. ( 3 ) PURSUANT to the agreement, the defendant also executed a written agreement dt. 29-9-1959 to the same effect. The defendant, however, in spite of demand did not pay the balance due from him. Hence,, the plaintiff instituted the suit for recovery of the said amount amounting to Rs. 1,674-66 P. Rs. 1,034-66 is the balance due and Rs. 640 is interest by way of damages at 12% per annum from 31-3-1960 till the date of realisation. ( 4 ) THE defendant contested the suit. According to him, he was not due any amount. On the other hand, the plaintiff himself had to pay him as he did not properly calculate the price of tobacco. He also stated that the suit was barred by time. ( 5 ) THE trial Court raised the following issues as arising from the pleadings. x x x ( 6 ) CONSIDERING the evidence on record the learned Munsiff disallowed the claim of the plaintiff for past interest at Rs. 640 and decreed the suit only for Rs. 1,034-66 P. with proportionate costs and future interest at 6% per annum from the date of the suit till realisation. Against that judgment and decree the defendant preferred an appeal at RA No. 145 of 1967 before the learned Civil Judge, Mysore. The Addl. Civil Judge, Mysore, who heard the appeal raised the following points as arising for his consideration : x x x ( 7 ) THE learned Civil Judge re-assessing the evidence on record answered points nos. Against that judgment and decree the defendant preferred an appeal at RA No. 145 of 1967 before the learned Civil Judge, Mysore. The Addl. Civil Judge, Mysore, who heard the appeal raised the following points as arising for his consideration : x x x ( 7 ) THE learned Civil Judge re-assessing the evidence on record answered points nos. 1a,1b and 2 in the affirmative and points Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the negative. In that view, agreeing with the trial court, the learned Civil Judge dismissed the appeal with costs as also the cross- objections. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree the defendant has come up with the above second appeal before this Court. ( 8 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the appellant strenuously urged before me that the Courts below were not justified in holding that the suit was not barred by time. Hence, he submitted that the appeal was entitled to succeed. ( 9 ) AS against that, the learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiff-respondent argued supporting the judgment and decree of the trial Court confirmed by the first appellate Court. ( 10 ) THE sole point, therefore, that arises for my consideration in this appeal is : Whether the Courts below were justified in holding that the suit was not barred by time ? ( 11 ) THE plaint averment reveals that the cause of action arose on or about 31-3-1960 when the balance was struck. The suit was filed on 5-6 65. The first appellate Court has agreed that the defendant is not an agriculturist within the meaning of MAR Act and that way the limitation is not saved. The first appellate court, however, has pointed out that though the cause of action arose on or about 31-3-1960, the defendant by his letters Ex. P 13 dt. 23-10-1961 and Ex. P 14 dt. 13-12-1964 acknowledged his liability and hence the suit was within time. It is that observation of the first appellate court that the suit was within time because Exs. P 13 and 14 that is challenged before me. In order to appreciate the contention, it is necessary to read Exs. P 13 and 14. The relevant portion of Ex. 13-12-1964 acknowledged his liability and hence the suit was within time. It is that observation of the first appellate court that the suit was within time because Exs. P 13 and 14 that is challenged before me. In order to appreciate the contention, it is necessary to read Exs. P 13 and 14. The relevant portion of Ex. P 13 reads : ( 12 ) THE learned Civil Judge, however, relying on the two decisions of the Supreme court, namely, Shapoor Freedoom Mazda v. Durga Prasad Chamaria (1) and Tilak ram v. Nathu (2), has held that the party contending admits the jural relationship between the parties and that is enough to spell out acknowledgment. In that view the learned Civil Judge has held that the suit was not barred by time. This was specifically challenged before me. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant defendant invited my attention that the Supreme Court has made it clear that the defendant should not only admit the jural relationship but also the subsist. ing liability. In Shapoor Freedoom Mazda's (1) case it is stated in para 8 of the judgment thus :"the question as to what is an acknowledgement has been answered by fry, L. J. as early as 1884-26 Ch. D 474 at p. 481. This answer is often quoted with approval. "what is an acknowledgement, asked Fry, L. J. , and he proceeded, in my view an acknowledgement is an admission by the writer that there is debt owing by him either to the receiver of the letter or to some other person on whose behalf the letter is received but it is not enough that he refers to a debt as being due from somebody. In order to take the case out of the statute, there must upon the fair construction of the letter, read by the light of the surrounding circumstances, be an admission that the writer owes the debt. With respect, it may be added, that this statement succinctly and tersely gives the substance of the provisions contained in S. 19 of the Limitation Act". It is also stated in para 6 of the judgment thus :"the statement on which a plea of acknowledgement is based must relate to a present subsisting liability though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability may not be indicated in words. It is also stated in para 6 of the judgment thus :"the statement on which a plea of acknowledgement is based must relate to a present subsisting liability though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability may not be indicated in words. Words used in the acknowledgement must, however, indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor, and it must appear that the statement is made with the intention to admit such jural relationship. Such intention can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission, and need not be expressed in words. If the statement is fairly clear then the intention to admit jural relationship may be implied from it Stating generally Courts lean in favour of a liberal construction of such statements though it does not mean that where a statement was made clearly without intending to admit the existence of jural relationship, such intention could be fastened by far-fetched process of reasoning". As pointed out above, in the instant case, the defendant has specifically denied his liability. That being so, it cannot be stated that he has admitted jural relationship or that he has acknowledged the subsisting liability. ( 14 ) IN the case, namely, AIR 1967 SC 935 , the Supreme Court has reiterated what it has stated in the earlier case referred to above. These two cases are further referred to approvingly in Lakshmiratan cotton Mills Co. , Ltd. , v. Alumininm Corpn. of India Ltd. (3 ). In para 11 of the judgment this is what the Supreme Court has observed :"it is clear that the statement on which the plea of acknowledgement is founded must relate to a substisting liability and the section requires that it must be before the expiration of the period prescribed under the Act. It need not, however, amount to a promise to pay, for an acknowledgement does not create a new right of action but merely extends the period of limitation. The statement need not indicate the exact nature or the specific character of the liability. The words used in the statement in question, however, must relate to a present subsisting liability and indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties, such as, for instance , that of a debtor and a creditor, an the intention to admit such jurat relationship. The words used in the statement in question, however, must relate to a present subsisting liability and indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties, such as, for instance , that of a debtor and a creditor, an the intention to admit such jurat relationship. Such an intention need not be in express terms and can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission and the surrounding circumstances, Generally speaking, a liberal construction of the statement in question should be given. That of course does not mean that where a statement is made without intending to admit the existence of jural relationship, such intention should be fastened on the person making the statement by an involved and far-fetched reasoning. (See Mazda v. Durga Prasad Chamaria 1962-1 SCR 140- ( AIR 1961 SC 1236 ) and Tilak ram v. Nathu. AIR 1967 SC 935 )". ( 15 ) THUS, I am satisfied that it is necessary in order to spell out acknowledgement that the defendant should admit the jural relationship, namely the subsisting liability. As pointed out above, the defendant in the instant case by Exs. P 13 and 14 has specifically denied the subsisting liability and as such the jural relationship of creditor and debtor. The suit, therefore, is clearly barred by time, ( 16 ) IN the result, therefore, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial Court confirmed by the first appellate Court are hereby set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed as barred by time. ( 17 ) ON the peculiar facts of the case, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs throughout. --- *** --- .