Saikia, J.:- The petitioner Company, M/s. Sheba Wheels (P) Ltd., impugns the decision of the respondent, Assam Gas Com­pany Ltd., shortly 'the Gas Company', rejecting its tender for works of laying natural gas pipelines. 2. The Gas Company by a tender notice dated 13.9.1982 (Annexure I to the writ petition) invited sealed itemwise rated tenders from "competent and experienced API Standard Steel Pipeline Laying Contractors and of testing inspection of Welding, Radiography and Hydraulic Testing contractors of repute with sound technical and financial capabilities and possessing required cons­truction equipment, skilled manpower etc" for its works of laying Cross-Country natural gas pipeline, namely,- “1. (a) Laying of 200 MM dia Cross-Country natural gas pipeline from ASEB to HFCL at Namrup, Assam and all its related works strictly as per API specifications. Length : 3 K. M. (approx). Time to complete : One month from the date of letter of intent. (b) Laying of 350 MM dia Cross-Country natural gas pipeline from Duliajan to Namrup, Assam and all its related works strictly as per API specifications. Length : 30 K. M. (approx). Time to complete : THREE MONTHS from the date of letter of intent. (c) Laying of 350 MM dia Cross-Country natural gas pipeline from Duliajan to Naharkatia, Assam, DCS and all its related works strictly as per API specifications Length & K. M. (approx). Time to complete : TWO MONTHS from the date of letter of intent. (d) Laying of 400 MM dia Cross-Country natural gas pipeline from LAKWA to NAMRUP (One portion with 400 mm x 55 K. M. and other portion with 600 x 5 K. M.) and all the related works strictly as per API specifications. Length : 60 K. M. (approx). Time to complete : FIFTEEN months from the date of letter of intent. (e) Testing of welders as per API standard and app­roving the same welding joint inspection during constru­ction at site, for 10% (approx. of welded joints) Radiographic Testing and technical analysis to ensure proper work as per API specifications, for (a) to (d) above. (f) Pig passing, Hydraulic testing of the pipeline and purging with natural gas of the above pipelines as per API specifications." 3. The terms and conditions were clearly stated in the Notice Inviting Tenders, shortly "the NIT". of welded joints) Radiographic Testing and technical analysis to ensure proper work as per API specifications, for (a) to (d) above. (f) Pig passing, Hydraulic testing of the pipeline and purging with natural gas of the above pipelines as per API specifications." 3. The terms and conditions were clearly stated in the Notice Inviting Tenders, shortly "the NIT". The Gas Company reserved the rights to issue tender documents to eligible cont­ractors only on application; accept or reject any or all tenders without assigning any reason thereof: and the right to award the said works in SI. No. 1(a) to (d) to one or more contra­ctors. In paragraphs 1 and 3 of the NIT, while applying for tender documents, the tenderers were required to submit, inter alia, documentary evidence of previous experience in similar jobs financial soundness, equipments, manpower etc. to enable the Gas Company to decide the eligibility of the tenderer. 4. The petitioner company claims to be an Engineering Construction Company undertaking and carrying out various engineering contracts, including construction contracts through qualified experts and skilled personnel having adequate experi­ence and skill of high standard, employed by the company. 5. Altogether 13 parties were issued tender papers out of which only 8, including the petitioner company, submitted tenders, each depositing earnest money of Rs. 15,000/- with its tender. 6. The petitioner company submitted its tender dated 29.12.82 (Annexure-II to the writ petition). By its letter of the same date (Annexure-III to the writ petition) it also offered 5% (five percent) rebate on scheduled rates for laying and construction of 400 mm O. D. 54 K. M. long (approximately) referring to Drawing Set No. AGC/PROJ. IV/82, pipeline and this latter was to form an integral part of its offer enclosed. The Gas Company in its letter dated 4.2.83 (Annexure-IV to the writ petition) raised objection as follows :- "1. We thank you for showing your interest for the pipe laying work of our company. We have gone thro­ugh your offer and noted the following : (a) Till date your company has not taken up any work of laying cross country natural gas/crude oil pipe­line confirming to API 1104 standard which is our requirement and practice. (b) We cannot agree to your condition of 50% more than the stipulated consumption of coating/wrapping materials. (c) You have asked for 7. (b) We cannot agree to your condition of 50% more than the stipulated consumption of coating/wrapping materials. (c) You have asked for 7. 5% of the total pipe len­gth as un-accountable permissible loss, wastage, damage, breakage etc. From our past experience we have recor­ded that practically no such allowance is required. The actual wastage recorded is only 5 to 6 mtr. in a length of 10 K. M. pipeline. Hence we do not agree to this condition. (d) In our PERT chart you have shown 2 months time for completion of the 24" x 4 k. m. line and 15 months time for the 16" x 54 k. m. portion. Our time of com­pletion as indicated in the tender is 15 months for the entire project. Hence your requirement of time does not meet our target. (e) You have not agreed to the compensation clause as stipulated in our tender which has been agreed by others. (f) You have indicated that you may sub-Jet the whole work/part of it to Sub-Contractor. This is contrary to our practice. 2. Under the above circumstances we rerget to inform you that your offer cannot be considered." The petitioner company replied by a Phonogram dated 28.2.83 (Annexure-V to the writ petition) stating that they were capable of executing pipeline project as per API Code and were agreeable to the Gas Company's terms and conditions. The petitioner company also sent a letter dated 10.3.1983 (Annexure-VI to the writ petition) stating, inter alia, that "although the company might have not yet itself executed any such work under its own, but the company is having all the requisite experience having sufficient experience to execute such works"; that it was agreeable to negotiate as to consumption table for coaltar: that it was agreeable to accept the amount of loss of materials in execution as per field practice; that there was some confusion about its PERT chart Drawing No.SW/AOC/P-IV/2 about the completion of works and about its compen­sation clause and about sub-leting of works: and that it would be glad to come to the Gas Company and explain, clarify, elucidate and negotiate in these respects. This was followed by another letter dated 14th May, 1983 (Annexure-VII to the writ petition) for extending the validity of its offer for a further period of six months i.e. upto 28th September, 1983. This was followed by another letter dated 14th May, 1983 (Annexure-VII to the writ petition) for extending the validity of its offer for a further period of six months i.e. upto 28th September, 1983. It further stated; "As a very very special case, we con­firm to withdraw our terms and conditions given in our above offer and hereby confirm to accept the terms and conditions of the Department as per NIT". By letter dated 23.5.1983 (Annexure-VIII to the writ petition) the Gas Company wrote to the petitioner company with reference to their letter dated 14.5.83, and its own letter dated 4.2.83 affirming that the petitioner company's offer could not be considered. By letter dated 30.5.1983 (Annexure-IX to the writ petition) the petitioner company requested the Gas Company to reco­nsider its case; but by letter dated 7.6.83 (Annexure-X to the writ petition) the Gas Company once again affirmed that they were not in a position to consider the petitioner Comp­any's case any further. The petitioner company by telegram dated 27.6.83 (Annexure-XI) stated that the Gas Company's decision was arbitrary/ex-parte and requested the latter to consi­der and not to reject its offer in order to avoid legal compli­cations. These being of no avil the petitioner company filed this writ petition on 7.10.83 whereupon the Rule was issued on 11.10.83 and it was ordered interim that the Gas Com­pany shall not allot the contract work to anyone. 7. Mr. A. Sarma, the learned counsel for the petiti­oner company, submits, inter alia that the Gas Company comes within the meaning of 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and as such it is bound by the obliga­tion to act fairly, justly and properly and it cannot exercise its power arbitrarily; that the petitioner company having sub­mitted a valid tender fulfilling the requirements of the NIT, the Gas company was bound to consider its tender along with those of others and its refusal to do so would amount to dis­crimination and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; that the Gas company having issued the tender docu­ments and the petitioner company having been eligible possess­ing the requiste qualifications mentioned in the NIT, the refusal to consider its tender is arbitrary, unconstitutional and void and is liable to be commanded by a Mandamus to consider the tender. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. D.N. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the Gas company, taking us through the counter affidavit, answers that the petitioner company was initially found ineligible and the Gas Company even refused to supply the tender documents to it. The Technical Assistant of the Gas company by order dated 10.11.82 (Annexure-B to the counter affidavit) directed the Accounts Officer to arrange refund of the amount deposited for tender documents by the petitioner company. It was only when the petitioner company by their telegrams dated 10.11.82 and 15.11.82 (Annexure-A and C to the counter affidavit) requested the Gas Company to issue tender documents to them, the documents were issued without prejudice however expressing that there was every possibility of the same being not considered. Even so, submits Mr. Choudhury, the tender of the petitioner company, along with other tenders, were placed before the Technical Committee in its meeting on 12.4.83 and the Committee observed that the tender of the petitioner company was found to be incomplete as they did not quote for 8" diameter pipeline and their speculation like wastage rate of 7.5% for pipes were found to be unreasonable; and accordingly it was rejected. 9. The only question that requires judicial determination, accordingly, is whether the petitioner company's tender was duly considered; and whether rejection of its tender is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 10. On the question of consideration Mr. Sarma strenu­ously submits that the petitioner company's tender was not con­sidered as it was repeatedly stated in the Gas Company's letters dated 4.2.83, 23.5.83 and 7.6.83. Facing the submission of Mr. Choudhury that the tender was placed before the Tech­nical Committee in its meeting on 12.4.83 and the Com­mittee rejected it, as substantiated by the proceedings of the Technical Committee dated 12.4.83 and 26.4.83, Mr Sarma submits that the above two grounds were not at all relevant and the petitioner company could have been negotiated with as four other tenderers were negotiated with and given works of different phases. Failure to negotiate, it is submitted, is arbitrary discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Con­stitution of India. 11. To the facts of the instant case we have to apply two basic principles of law, namely, freedom of contract and that no writ will issue to give effect to contractual obligation. Admittedly the relation between the parties is basically con­tractual. 11. To the facts of the instant case we have to apply two basic principles of law, namely, freedom of contract and that no writ will issue to give effect to contractual obligation. Admittedly the relation between the parties is basically con­tractual. Freedom of contract on whatever terms might seem most advantageous to the individual has been the basic prin­ciple of the law of contract. However, as Anson pointed out, "Freedom of contract is a reasonable social ideal only to the extent that equality of bargaining power between contracting parties can be assumed, and no injury is done to the econo­mic interests of the community at large. In the more compli­cated social and industrial conditions of a "collectivist society it has ceased to have much idealistic attraction. It is now realized that economic equality often does not exist in any real sense, and that individual interests have to be made to subserve those of the community. Hence there has been a fundamental change both in our social outlook and in the policy of the legislature towards contract, and the law today interferes at numerous points with the freedom of the parties to make what contract they like". However, the basic requirement of the two free minds being ad idem has not so far been affected. Considered from this angle the petitioner company's tender, if duly considered along with others and is properly rejected, the petitioner can have no grievance and in such a case no writ will lie to enforce a contract, which is not supported by any statutory force and therefore appertains to the realm of private law. In K. N. Guruswamy vs. State of Mysore, (1955) 1 SCR 305 ; AIR 1954 SC 592 , it was held that where a party interested in a contract claims that he has not received the same treatment and he has not been given the same chance as anybody else tie is entitled to move a petition under Art. 226 of the Cons­titution of India. As was held in The D.F.O., South Kheri vs. Ram Sanehi Singh, AIR 1973 SC 205 , there could be no doubt that a writ petition was maintainable, even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, where the action challenged was of public authority invested with statutory power. As was held in The D.F.O., South Kheri vs. Ram Sanehi Singh, AIR 1973 SC 205 , there could be no doubt that a writ petition was maintainable, even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, where the action challenged was of public authority invested with statutory power. Where the contractual relationship is not of statutory origin it may entirely belong to the realm of law. In Kulchhinder Singh vs. Hardayal Singh, AIR 1976 S.C. 2216 the Supreme Court was aware of the wide amplitude of Article 226 and its potent use to correct manifest injustice, but did not agree that contractual obligations in the ordinary course, without even sta­tutory complexion, could be enforced through it. The law of contract may involve a State, a statutory body, or a public body in contractual actions. But they cannot be siphoned off into the writ jurisdiction. This was also the view taken in Calcutta Gas Company vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 S.C. 1044 ; Prem Sagar vs. Standard Co., (1964) 5 SCR 1030 . In Har Shankar vs. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissi­oner' AIR 1974 S.C. 1121 , it has been reiterated that the writ jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Con­stitution is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurred. So also in D.F.O. vs. Biswanath Tea Company Ltd., AIR 1981 S.C. 1368 where the respondent company tried to enforce through a writ petition the rate of removed timber, it was held that the Company was not enforcing its right under Rule 37 of the Assam Land Revenue and Local Rates Regu­lation, but was seeking to enforce a contractual right under the specific terms agreed to between the company and the Government and that such contractual right could not be enforced in a writ petition. 12. Applying the above principles to the facts of the ins­tant case we are of the view that an application under Article 226 will lie if the contractual relationship is of statutory nature and does not entirely belong to the realm of private law of contract. The Gas Company being a 'State' we have to scrut­inise its impugned action of rejection of the petitioner company's tender in the context of its constitutional obligation. But while doing so we cannot act as a court of appeal. The Gas Company being a 'State' we have to scrut­inise its impugned action of rejection of the petitioner company's tender in the context of its constitutional obligation. But while doing so we cannot act as a court of appeal. From the proceed­ings it appears that though the Gas Company in the afore­mentioned letters stated that the petitioner company's offer could not be considered, nothing has been pointed out to us to dis­believe the submission of Mr. Choudhury that even so the peti­tioner company's tender was placed before the Technical Com­mittee which in its meeting dated 12.4.83 rejected it expressly on two grounds, namely, that the tender was incomplete as it failed to quote for 8'- dia pipeline and their speculation like wastage rate of 1. 5% for pipes were found to be unreasonable. The Committee found M/s. Ario Brothers as lowest quoters and having discussed various aspects of laying pipe keeping in view the time factor and also to encourage the local enter-preneurs, decided to negotiate with the second, third and fourth lowest quoters and also decided that the Committee would have their recommendations on the basis of the above informations which would be placed before them on 26.4.83 at 8 A. M. and according on 26.4.83 after detailed consideration decided that Phase-I work should be equitably distributed amongst 3 lowest quoted contractors provided they agreed to do the work at the lowest rate quoted by M/s. Ario Brothers. Regarding the Phase-II work, the Committee was informed that there was a likelihood of re-routing the pipeline and therefore the Committee directed that a letter be written to the parties concer­ned suitably that they will be contacted when Phase-II work was finalised. On the basis of the above facts will it be reasona­ble to hold that the petitioner company's tender was not consi­dered? Mr. Sarma's submission that the Committee on 12.4.83 was not the final committee as it was attended by only three members, but that met on 26.4.83 was the final Committee as it was attended by five members is not reasonable, inasmuch as the first Committee itself directed the information to be placed before it on 26.4.83 which indicates that it was the same Com­mittee. Mr. Sarma next submits that the Committee on 26.4,83 did not consider the petitioner company's tender. Mr. Sarma next submits that the Committee on 26.4,83 did not consider the petitioner company's tender. That was obvi­ously because in its first sitting the Committee rejected the petitioner's tender on the two express grounds. The submission that those grounds were not tenable under the facts and circum­stances of the case is also not tenable in view of what tran­spires from the communications between the parties. We arc inclined to agree with the submission of Mr. Choudhury that the works involved are highly sophisticated one requiring high level expertise and utmost perfection. Sligtest leakage of gas may result in devastating fire. We consider it unsafe to scrutinise and disagree with what the Technical Committee found in this regard. In para 6 of the counter affidavit the Gas Company stated that the tender submitted by the petitioner company was incomplete and did not fulfill the requirement as per NIT. In the tender the petitioner failed to show their earlier experience in laying gas pipeline; and that the petitioner company did not quote for 8" diametre pipeline and the stipulation like wastage rate of 7.5% for pipes were found to be unreasonable. In para 10 of the counter affidavit it has been stated that although the petitioner company was found not eligible even at the initial stage, however at the insistence of the petitioner company the tender documents were furnished to them. It is further stated that in the Technical Committee besides the General Manager., Director of the Assam Gas Company Ltd., and Technical Service Manager, Dr. P. Bharali of M/s. Oil India Ltd. a Pipeline expert and Shi P. Deuri, Director of Assam Gas Company and General Manager of District Industries Centre, Dibrugarh were present; and that all the three persons of the Committee, including the General Manager possessed Engineering Degree Besides other technical qualifications. The Committee on 26.4.83 consisted of Dr. Bharali, Shri Deuri and Shri M. C. Barua of Finance Depart­ment, Government of Assam and Shri D. Saikia, Deputy General Manager of Hindustan Fertiliser Corporation, Namrup. In face of these proceedings it cannot be held that the petitioner com­pany's tender was not considered by the Gas Company along with the other tenders. The submission to that effect has, there­fore, to be rejected. 13. The next question is that of arbitrariness and discri­mination. We may scrutinise the reasons given in the counter affidavit in this regard. In face of these proceedings it cannot be held that the petitioner com­pany's tender was not considered by the Gas Company along with the other tenders. The submission to that effect has, there­fore, to be rejected. 13. The next question is that of arbitrariness and discri­mination. We may scrutinise the reasons given in the counter affidavit in this regard. It is stated that the work in question related to the work of the Hindustan Fertilizer Corporation on whose behalf the laying of the pipes are to be made. It is also stated that the entire contract work is of highly technical and sophisticated nature and the same was to be completed within the time bound period and that too within the dry working season, that is, December, 1983 and March, 1984. Since the day of transportation of natural gas is to start latest from 1st January, 1985, the Gas Company could not hazard to give the contract to an inexperienced party on an experimental basis; inasmuch as the work which is involved in this case is a per­manent piece of work and is to be done once for all and if any little defect like leakage etc. is caused, in that event, it will cause huge loss to the consumers as well as to the supplier inasmuch as in order to repair such pipeline entire 54 K. Ms. line will have to be depressurised and thereafter the repair work can be undertaken and for such sophisticated works the Gas Company cannot venture to grant contract to a totally inexperienced party. In face of the proceedings of the Technical Committee we find it difficult to accept Mr. Sarma's submission that the earlier communications with the petitioner company were not placed before the Technical Committee. Ad­mittedly the General Manager was present in the Committee. It is not reasonable to expect ail the details to be recorded in such proceedings. The Technical Committee had to select from amongst the tenderers. As was observed in M/s. Produce Ex­change Corporation Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Excise, Assam, AIR 1972 S. C. 2181, the Government cannot show any undue favour to any party; but for good reasons it may prefer one party to another. The Government does not require any special power for preferring one class to others so long as the classification made by it is based on national grounds. The Government does not require any special power for preferring one class to others so long as the classification made by it is based on national grounds. It is true that no rule confers on the Government to prefer one set to others. But what B important is that no rule prohibits it. It follows from the nature of contract itself. It is true, as was held in M/s. Radhakrisna Agarwal vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 S.C. 1496 that Article 14 of the Constitution imports a limitation or imposes an obligation upon the State's executive powers under Article 298 of the Constitution and all constitutional powers carry corresponding obligations with them, and that this is the rule of law which regulates the operation of organs of Government functioning under a Constitution. Ft is also true that at the very threshhold or at the time of entry into the field of consideration of persons with whom the Government could contract at all, it no doubt, acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in exercise of its constitutional powers. As Bhagawati, J. cardinally observed in Ramana AIR 1979 S.C. 1628 , in the context of ever increasing welfare and social services in our welfare State it is necessary to structure and restrict the power of the executive Government so as to prevent its arbitrary application or exercise. Government contracts are often largasses or even subsidies. Law has not been slow to recognise this new form of wealth and the need to protect individual interests. The Government is still the Government when it acts in the matter of granting contracts and it is not like a private indi­vidual who can pick and choose the person with whom it will deal. The State need not enter into any contact with any one, but if it does, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure. The State need not enter into any contact with any one, but if it does, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure. As was held in Ramana (supra), "The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences etc., must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Govern­ment departs from such standard or norm in any parti­cular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, un­reasonable or discriminatory. 14. Subject to the above principles, while scrutinising an action in the matter of acceptance or rejection of a tender by a ""State", we have to bear in mind the basic element of offer and acceptance and the requirement of two free minds being lad idem'. We are also to see the nature and the subject matter of the contract. The duties enforceable by mandamus, although not necessarily public duties, are those imposed by law and mandamus will not lie to enforce a right founded purely on private contract, however clear that right may be. It is settled law that duties imposed on corporations, not by express provisions of law or charter, or necessarily arising from the nature of the privileges or obligations conferred, but arising out of private contractual relations involving no question of public trust or duty, will not be enforced by mandamus. This is so because mandamus is ordinarily limited to the enforcement of obligations imposed by law; and further because the writ can­not be substituted for a decree for specific performance. Man­damus may not issue to control the exercise of discretion. As Street observes in his 'Governmental Liability', to decide whether mandamus lies, one must discharge the general functions of the body and consider whether in respect of that specific matter sought to be enforced there is 'the smallest fragment of valid discretion anywhere'. The Court has to find that a discretion has been exhausted and only a duty remains. Of course, man­damus will issue when a discretion is abused, or where a dis­cretion has been exercised without substantial evidence on which to justify it, or statute has been misinterpreted. The Court has to find that a discretion has been exhausted and only a duty remains. Of course, man­damus will issue when a discretion is abused, or where a dis­cretion has been exercised without substantial evidence on which to justify it, or statute has been misinterpreted. Again, the grant of mandamus is always discretionary even though there is a prima facie case. Besides, the principle of governmental effectiveness often may require that no contract would be en­forced in any case where some essential governmental activity would thereby be rendered impossible or seriously impeded. Of course, in our country we do not have a theory of "adminis­trative contracts" or "public contracts", as in France, whereby many of the contracts made by public authorities are governed by different rules from private law. The limiting principles of essential validity of contracts are applicable to the contracts by Government or its instrumentalities in our country. Subject to the limiting principles as to essential validity and the con­stitutional obligations of the State as discussed above, the parties are still free to make their own contracts. 15. It is again true that in cases where the question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before an entry into the field of contract, facts have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation of Article 14 could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfacto­rily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 16. We have considered the facts of instant case in light of the law as to eligibility of tenderers laid down in Ramana's case (supra) and reaffirmed in Kasturlal's case AIR 1980 S.C. 1992 . Where the qualifications are laid down in the notice inviting tenders it is not permissible to accept a tender of a person who does not fulfill the requisite qualifications; and the test laid down in such cases is objective and not a sub­jective one. The petitioner company itself admitted some of its shortcomings. Where the qualifications are laid down in the notice inviting tenders it is not permissible to accept a tender of a person who does not fulfill the requisite qualifications; and the test laid down in such cases is objective and not a sub­jective one. The petitioner company itself admitted some of its shortcomings. It is well settled rule that the executive authority must be rigorously held to the standard by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. It cannot be said in the instant case that the Gas Company did not adhere to the terms and conditions of eligibility laid down and the rights reserved in the NIT. We have also applied the tests of reasonability and public in­terest to the facts of this case. We, however, do not find any clement of arbitrariness or discriminations in this case parti­cularly in view of the shortcomings already admitted by the petitioner company in its communications with the Gas Company and the patent defects in its tender as pointed out by the Technical Committee. The submission in this regard has also to be rejected. 17. In the result this petition is found to be without merit and it is dismissed. The Rule is discharged. The interim stay order dated 11.10.1983 passed in Civil Misc. Case No.725 of 1984 stands vacated. We pass no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.