Judgment S.Samsul Hasan, J. 1. Amendment of the plaint by order dated 19.4.1982 passed by the Execution Munsif, Patna, has given rise to this application. 2. The suit is for eviction under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977, (hereinafter referred to as the 1977 Act). The amendment of the plaint is as follows: Paragraph 9 (a)--That defendant No. 2 Madhur Jalpan had also committed breach of tenancy by subletting premises for its occupation as tenants of the plaintiff to Baiju Panwala and Shri Jai Narain Kesri and as such the defendants are liable to be evicted from the suit premises also on the ground of sub letting. By this amendment the plaintiffs wanted to add one of the prescribed grounds for eviction which they had not utilised when the plaint was originally presented, that is to say sub-letting of the tenancy is being added as a ground for seeking eviction. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has raised two grounds while canvassing that the amendment should not have been allowed. The first ground is that the amendment petition was filed when the 1977 Act had lapsed and, therefore, no fresh application for any such step could have been entertained. Two aspects arose from this submission, The first was that with the lapsing of the 977 Act the right of the landlord to seek eviction due to sub-letting was no longer in existence and secondly, like a petition under Sec.13 of the 1977 Act, which entitles a landlord to seek interim step for realisation of arrears of rent as well as future rent, the lapsing of the 1977 Act amendment also could not be sought. 4. In my view, there is no substance in this submission at all. Firstly, it has been held by two Division Bench decisions of this Court in relation to 1947 Act and 1977 Act that there is no hiatus between them. Secondly, in view of the provisions contained in Sec.1(3) of 1977 Act and Sec.1(3) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1983, (hereinafter referred to as the 1983 Act) there is no hiatus between the two Acts and the right of the parties to seek relief under the expired Act, ie, 1977 Act, is protected. Secondly, in view of the provisions contained in Sec.1(3) of 1977 Act and Sec.1(3) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1983, (hereinafter referred to as the 1983 Act) there is no hiatus between the two Acts and the right of the parties to seek relief under the expired Act, ie, 1977 Act, is protected. The relevant provisions of Sec.1(3) of the 1977 Act reads thus: Sec.25 shall come into force at once and the remaining provisions of this Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st of April, 1976, and the Act shall remain in force up to and including the 31st March, 1981: Provided that the expiration of this Act shall not-- (a) render recoverable any sum which during the continuance thereof was irrecoverable or affect the right of a tenant to recover any sum which during the continuance of this Act was recoverable by him there under; or (b) affect any liability incurred under this Act or any punishment incurred in respect of any contravention of this Act or any order made there under; or (c) affect any investigation or legal proceeding in respect of any such liability or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such punishment may be imposed, as in this Act had not expired. the relevant provisions of Sec.1(3) of the 1983 Act provides as follows: Sec.28 shall come in force immediately and the remaining provisions of this Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st of April, 1981, and shall continue to remain in force: Provided that the period between expiration of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 (Bihar Act XVI of 1977 and the commencement of this Act shall not-- (a) render recoverable any sum which during the continuance thereof was irrecoverable or affect the right of a tenant to recover any sum which during the continuance of that Act was recoverable by him there under; (b) affect any liability incurred under that Act or any punishment incurred in respect of any contravention of that Act or any order made there under; or (c) affect any investigation or legal proceeding in respect of any such liability or punishment as aforesaid: and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be instituted, continued, or enforced and any such punishment may be imposed as if that Act has not expired As already stated, from the provisions quoted above, it will be clear that there is no hiatus between the two Acts. That apart, the amendment of the plaint arises out of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure under which the suit is being tried and irrespective of the provisions of the afore said Acts the power to seek an amendment does not disappear. 5. The question of adding the subletting of a tenancy, as ground for eviction by amendment has to be examined. If sub-letting had not been a ground for eviction in the 1977 Act itself or the 1983 Act and that ground was not available any other enactment, something could be said but, that is not so. Therefore when there is no hiatus between the two Acts and also when a proceeding commenced under the 1977 Act itself has been saved and is continued if the Act has not been repealed, then the right under that Act also survives In my view, therefore, there is no merit in the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and they are not accepted. 6. 6. The next point raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the amendment is not bona fide and is merely meant to harass the defendants by raising new pleas. It is stated that the plaintiffs had all along the knowledge that the two alleged sub-letters were there because the plaintiffs lived in the upper floor of the same building where rented portion is situated, and, therefore, the amendment is not bona fide. It is also submitted that really no portion of the rented premises has been sub-let. 7. In my opinion, these are submissions that will not affect the claim for amendment if it is justified in law and on facts and can be looked into at the trial when the Court is called upon to decide whether the defendants have sublet a portion of the tenanted premises. By this I may not be understood to say that the bona fide and mala fide character of the amendment itself can be examined at the trial. 8. I, therefore, now come to the question whether the amendment is justified in law. Both parties relied on A. K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. V/s. Damodar Valley Corporation -- . which reads thus: The expression cause of action in the present context does not mean every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed as was said in Cooke V/s. Gill (1873) 8 C.P. 107 (116). in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. That expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. Such a view was taken in Robinson V/s. Unicos Properly Corporation Ltd, 1962 (2) All. E.R. 24. and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other view would make the rule futile. The words new case have been understood to mean new set of ideas: Dornan V/s. J.W. Ellis and Co. Ltd. 1962 (1) All. E.R. 303. This also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. No amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any right acquired by any party by lapse of time. Ltd. 1962 (1) All. E.R. 303. This also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. No amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any right acquired by any party by lapse of time. In paragraph 10 applying the above principles the Court upheld the amendment. Paragraph 9 of -- was interpreted by both the sides in their own way, and, an attempt was made by the petitioners to show that this was entirely a new case that is being added by the opposite party. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of the opposite party that this is not a new case and it was stated that only when a new case is made out, amendment can not be allowed. Undoubtedly, the expression new claim made on a new basis constituted new facts means that firstly there must be a claim that is alien to the plaint, then that claim needs new facts to be proved. In the present case, as I will state hereinafter, the claim does not set up a new case as the claim in the plaint is for eviction. In the absence of any new claim, therefore, if certain new facts that augment the old claim are introduced by way of amendment in the plaint, it cannot be said to be hit by any legal disability. 9. Numerous other decisions were also cited by both the parties. I do not propose to go into any discussion of these decisions and will base my conclusion on Ganesh Trading Co. V/s. Moji Ram A.I.R. 1936 S.C. 484. and Suraj Prakash Bhasin v. Smt. Raj Rani Bhasin -- . In the case of M/s. Ganesh Trading Co. (supra) it was held: It is true that if a plaintiff seeks to alter the cause of action itself and to introduce indirectly, though an amendment of his pleadings, an entirely new or inconsistent cause of action, amounting virtually to the substitution of a new plaint or a new cause of action in place of what was originally there, the Court will refuse to permit it if it amounts to depriving the party against which a suit is pending of any right which may have accrued in its favor due to lapse of time. But, mere failure to set out even as essential fact does not, by itself, constitute a new cause of action. A cause of action is constituted by the whole bundle of essential facts which the plaintiff must prove before he can succeed in his suit. It must be antecedent to the institution of the suit. If any essential fact is lacking from averments in the plaint the cause of action will be defective. In that case, an attempt to supply the omission has been and could sometime be viewed as equivalent to an introduction of a new cause of action which, cured of its short-comings, has really become a good cause of action. This, however, is not the only possible interpretation to be put on every defective state of pleadings. Defective pleadings are generally curable if the cause of action sought to be brought out was not ab initio completely absent. Even every defective pleadings may be permitted to be cured, so as to constitute a cause of action where there was none, provided necessary conditions, such as payment of either any additional Court-fees, which maybe payable or, of costs of the other side, are complied with. It is only if lapse of time has barred the remedy on a newly constituted cause of action that the Court should, ordinarily, refuse prayers for amendment of pleadings. 10. As I read this decision, it has endowed the Courts with power to liberally grant amendment, unless disabilities, as stated in the above passage, occurs, that is to say, that the amendment seeks to affect a right that has already become absolute in favor of the defendant by efflux of time. Another reason for refusing the amendment would only be if an entirely new case, not consistent with the present suit, is made out. None of these conditions apply in favor of the petitioners. Neither a new claim is being introduced nor has any right of the defendants become perfected by efflux of time. 11. Without going into any detailed discussion as to what is the cause of action and what amounts to relief, in the 1977 Act and in the 1983 Act undoubtedly the reasons for eviction have been prescribed. In effect, they provide the grounds for eviction. Two reasons have already been pleaded for seeking eviction. 11. Without going into any detailed discussion as to what is the cause of action and what amounts to relief, in the 1977 Act and in the 1983 Act undoubtedly the reasons for eviction have been prescribed. In effect, they provide the grounds for eviction. Two reasons have already been pleaded for seeking eviction. It cannot be said that if a third reason prescribed by law is sought to be added by amendment, it enlarges the scope of the suit. 12. Another aspect of importance arises from the case of Suraj Prakash Bhasin (supra), paia 6, which is quoted below: The liberal principles which guide the exercise of discretion in allowing amendments have been laid down in numerous decisions of this Court. Multiplicity of proceedings being avoided is one criterion. Amendments which do not totally alter the character of the action are readily granted while care is taken to see that injustice and prejudice of an irremediable character are not inflicted on the opposite party under pretence of amendment of pleadings. The Court must be guided by the rule of justice expressed by the Privy Council in Ma Shawe Mys V/s. Maung Po Hnaung A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 249 at pp. 250-51 : See p. 1283-84 of A.I.R. Comms. CPC (1908) 9th Edn. Vol. 2. All rules of Court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice and it is, therefore, essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose, so that full powers of amendment must be enjoy d and should always be liberally exercised, but nonetheless, no power has yet been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, not to change, by means of amendment, the subject matter of the suit. From this it appears that it by amendment to the plaint multiplicity of the suit can be avoided, then such an amendment should not be refused. 13 In this case the opposite party justifiably conceded that a fresh suit, could be instituted against the petitioner-defendants for eviction on the ground of sub-letting that is now sought to be added in the plaint. If that right sub-silts in the plaintiffs, there is no reason why it should not be adjudicated in the present suit. 13 In this case the opposite party justifiably conceded that a fresh suit, could be instituted against the petitioner-defendants for eviction on the ground of sub-letting that is now sought to be added in the plaint. If that right sub-silts in the plaintiffs, there is no reason why it should not be adjudicated in the present suit. The plea may have been left out in the original plaint inadvertently or the plaintexts may have obtained knowledge about sub-letting at a later stage but there is no reason why they should not be allowed to get the matter adjudicated once for all in the present suit. The amendment, therefore, in my view, has been rightly allowed. The court below is now direct d to proceed with the suit as expeditiously as possible, not allowing any undue adjournments. 14. The application is, accordingly, dismissed, but, without costs.