The revision petitioner in this case is the defendant-mort­gagor. The validity of the order passed on 30.5.79 in Title Suit No. 65 of 1974 by learned Munsiff, Goalpara is challen­ged in this proceeding. 2. It was a suit by the mortgagee for foreclosure of the mortgage executed by the defendant-petitioner. On 16.2.76 an order was passed by the Court for ex-parte hearing of the matter on 9.3.76. Accordingly, on that date the Court passed "exparte preliminary decree" of foreclosure after recording the evidence of the plaintiff and after it found that there was no application filed for setting aside the order of exparte hearing. However, the only direction in the order was to the effect that the defendant shall within one month execute the sale deed apparently because it was a mortgage by conditional sale. It was further directed that in default the deed shall be executed through the Court. Accordingly, the decree was drawn up in High Court Form No. J. 30 (1) which tear the heading 'Preliminary Decree for Foreclosure'. In the decree, in the 1st para­graph there, some blanks were left which were meant for stating the amount decreed. In the 2nd paragraph it was stated that "an exparte preliminary decree" was passed in fav­our of the plaintiff and that " the defendant shall execute and register the sale deed of the mortgaged land with in a month as otherwise the sale deed will be registered through Court" In the 3rd paragraph it was stated that "in default of payment as aforesaid, the plaintiff may apply to the Court for a final decree that the defendant shall thenceforth stand absol­utely debarred and foreclosed on and from all right to redeem the mortgaged property". On 25.9.78, the defendant mortga­gor filed a petition in the case. It was stated in the petition that the plaintiff has not so far applied to the Court for drawing up the Final Decree, It was further stated that the mortgagor-petitioner was an indigent person and he had no other land and further that to satisfy the debt under the mor­tgage he had arranged funds which he shall deposit with costs on order being passed to that effect by the Court. The petit­ioner shall suffer irreparable injury if he is not allowed to refund the amount. 3. The petit­ioner shall suffer irreparable injury if he is not allowed to refund the amount. 3. On 26.9.78 the records along with the petition were put up before the Court came to the finding that the order-passed on 9.3.76 was completely wrong and did not accord with the order contemplated under Order 34 Rule 2 C.P.C. As a result, a Final Decree was passed although what could be passed under the said provisions was only a " Preliminary Decree". It was further observed in the order that the erron­eous order passed on 9.3.76 was, therefore, vacated and the case was re-heard ex-parte. After going through the deposition of the plaintiff, the Court found the claim to be prima facie established and an exparte decree for a sum of Rs. 400/- was accordingly passed. By the same order, time was allowed to the defendant to pay the decretal amount within 3 months and the Court directed a "Preliminary Decree" to be drawn up accordingly. In the last part of the order there was a further direction to the effect that if the plaintiff by virtue of the order dated 9.3.76 has got sale deed of the suit land executed through the Court, notice to issue to him to return the deed fixing 30.11.78 for return thereof. 4. On 30.5.79 the impugned order was passed by the Court. It was observed in the order that the point to be determined was whether the order dated 26.9.78 could be rightly passed by the Court On behalf of the defendant it was submitted that the order was passed under Section 151 CPC invoking the inherent power for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. What was done by the Court was merely correction of its own wrong. However, it appears that the contention of the plaintiff prevailed with the Court and not the defendant's. The plaintiff contended that the defendant ought to have preferred an appeal under Section 97 C.P.C. or that the order could have been passed under Section 114 C.P.C.. The Court rejected the contention that the order dated 9.3.76 impugned before him could be rightly passed under Section 151 C.P.C. In arriving at this finding the learned Magistrate relied on a decision reported in AIR 1968 Delhi 215. The Court rejected the contention that the order dated 9.3.76 impugned before him could be rightly passed under Section 151 C.P.C. In arriving at this finding the learned Magistrate relied on a decision reported in AIR 1968 Delhi 215. The observation in that case was to the effect that "ordinarily" when a Court has made mistake the aggrieved party has to get it corrected by appeal, revision and review and not by invoking the inhe­rent power under S. 151 C.P.C. In this view of the matter the Court held that the defendant's prayer for depositing, and Court's accepting, the mortgaed money was misconceived. The Court observed that the plaintiff will get the benefit in the circumstances of the mistake of the Court, if any, in the order. It was further observed that the defendant had slept over his fights for more than 2½ years neglecting the legal remedies open to him and therefore he could not invoke the inherent powers of the Court. 5. Before me, Mr. J. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party, the mortgagee, in supporting the impugned order, adopts the reasons of the learned Court and further sub­mits that in this case circumstantces have changed as a result of execution of the sale deed by the Court in favour of the mortgagee, and therefore, this Court should not invoke its power under Section 115 C.P.C. To interfere with the impugned order which was even otherwise, according to the learned counsel, just, proper and legal. However, I do not feel persuaded to accept either the reasons by the learned Court in the impugned order or this submissions made before me by Mr. Singh. On the other head, it appears to me that the order passed by the Court on 9.3.76 was perfectly legal. I am further of the opinion that the order passed on 30.5.79 is entirely without jurisdiction and it must be quashed by this Court. Because, it is the duty of this Court to ensure not only that the subor­dinate courts act within the bounds of their jurisdiction but also that on account of the impugned order no "failure of ustice'' is occasioned or "irreperable injury" caused, in view of the new proviso to S. 115 C.P.C. 6. I may first test the order passed on 26.9.78. For this, as alluded, let it be once recapitulated that an "exparte" order passed on 9.3.76. I may first test the order passed on 26.9.78. For this, as alluded, let it be once recapitulated that an "exparte" order passed on 9.3.76. Whether this order itself was without jurisdiction or not is, in my opinion, the main issue involved in this lis. As we have seen, in the order passed on 9.3.76, there is no mention of the amount for which the decree was passed as contemplated under sub-rule ( 1 ) clauses ( a ) and ( b ) of order 34 Rule 2 C.P.C. This provision contemplates that when the Court comes to the conclusion that the decree for foreclosure has to be passed in favour of the plaintiff, it shall pass a "Preliminary Decree” either ordering that an account be taken of what was due to the plaintiff at the date of such a decree for the principal and interest of the mortgage, cost of the suits, if any and further costs or declaring the amount so due at that date. Evidently, as we have seen in the order passed on 9. 3. 76, no amount was specified in any manner. The further requirements of the provisions of Rule 2 are also noteworthy. In passing the decree it is contemplated that the Court shall direct that the defend­ant shall pay the amount found or declared due, on or before such date as the Court may fix, within 6 months. If the amo­unt found or declared due under the Preliminary Decree is not paid on or before the date so fixed or the defendant fails to pay within such time as the Court may fix, the plaintiff shall then be entitled to apply for a Final Decree debarring the defendant from all right to redeem in the property. Sub-rule (2) of Order 34 Rule 2 C. P. C. envisages that on good cause shown and upon terms to be fixed by the Court from time to time at any time before the Final decree is passed, the Court may extend the time fixed for payment of the amount found or declared due under sub-rule (1). Evidently, even these other requirements do not appear to have been satisfied in this case. In the order passed on 9. 3. 76 what was merely contem­plated was that the defendant-mortgagors shall execute the sale deed and in the event of default the sale deed would be exec­uted through Court. Evidently, even these other requirements do not appear to have been satisfied in this case. In the order passed on 9. 3. 76 what was merely contem­plated was that the defendant-mortgagors shall execute the sale deed and in the event of default the sale deed would be exec­uted through Court. This direction was pulpably violative of the provisions of the Order 34 Rule 2 C. P. C. Not only an order was passed for account to be taken of amount due and in the alternative no declaration of the amount due was made, no date was fixed for payment thereof. By this the right of the defendant-mortgagor to apply for extension of time if he was unable to pay the amount decreed within the time fixed by the Preliminary Decree, was taken away. Obviously, the defendant could not be faulted for non-compliance with the direction made in the order. Because, such direction is not at all contemplated by law and wholly without jurisdiction. There is no doubt in my mind that the order passed by the Court on 9. 3. 76 was wholly without jurisdication. Law is well settled that an order passed without jurisdication is a nullity. It is not merely an illegal order. The defendant need not have to move any Court for setting aside the order. It was well within the competence of the Court to right its own wrong which emanated from misconception of its jurisdication. To correct a jurisdictional error of the Court under Section 151 C. P. C. was well within its competence. Indeed, if the Court has not corrected its own error and righted out the wrong, it would have amounted to abuse of the process of the Court. For, the defendant-mortgagor would have thereby been forced to go for a suit and would have evidently suffered irreparable injury if a sale deed was executed pursuant to the said order as a result of which the plaintiff mortgagee would have been intitled to the right of ownership to deal with the suit property in any manner he liked. I, therefore, hold that the order passed on 26. 9. 78 was a perfectly legal and valid order and not only that it was a final order insofar as the parties litigated the is under Order 34 Rule 2 C. P. C.. 7. I, therefore, hold that the order passed on 26. 9. 78 was a perfectly legal and valid order and not only that it was a final order insofar as the parties litigated the is under Order 34 Rule 2 C. P. C.. 7. After having come to the above conclusion I have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order passed on 30.5.79 is without jurisdiction. Indeed, on 30.5.79 there was only the same petition No. 2920 before the Court on which a final and con­clusive order was passed earlier on 26.9.78. Mr. J. Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party has submitted that there was another petition before the Court on 30.5.79 which was filed by his client, plaintiff mortgagee. However, on a reading of the order I do not find that any such petition was before him on that date or that the learned Court applied its mind to the said petition and had adjudicated thereon. Indeed, as alluded, from the order it appears that the learned Court concerned itself to adjudge merely the validity of the earlier order passed on 26.9.78. Therefore, if the plaintiff was in any manner aggrieved by the order passed on 26.9.78 he had other reme­dies and admittedly the plaintiff did not follow the legal reme­dies available to him to set aside the said order. The Court bad no jurisdiction, not acting suo molo but at the instance of the parties, to set aside its order passed on 26.9.78 unless a case for review was made out. As I have found there was no case for review and in passing the impugned order on 30.5.79 the learned Court could not, and did not, exercise its juris­diction in review. Further I find that the reasons given in the order holding the earlier order passed on 26.9.78 to be illegal and also not cogent, convincing or relevant. As I have already observed, it was well within the competence of the Court acting under S. 151 C P. C. to correct its jurisdictional error as a result of which the process of the Court was being abused and miscarriage of justice taking place. 8. Before parting with the records, I may deal with the last submission of Mr. Singh that this Court should take notice of the subsequent events, viz. the execution of the sale deed which the plaintiff got executed through the Court. 8. Before parting with the records, I may deal with the last submission of Mr. Singh that this Court should take notice of the subsequent events, viz. the execution of the sale deed which the plaintiff got executed through the Court. So far as I think due to Court's wrong the parties need not suffer and it is the duty of the Court to ensure restitution to right to wrong. Therefore, as a consequence of the first order passed on 9.3.76, taking benefit thereof the fact that the plaintiff has got the sale deed executed would not disentitle the defendant mortgagee of the relief of the restitution. Accordingly, the direction of the learned Munsiff in its order dated 26.9.78 to the effect that the sale deed should be returned by the plaintiff to the Court is also legal and valid and cannot be inter fered with. 9. In the result, the application is allowed and the Rule is made absolute. In the circumstances of the case, however, I make no order as to costs, Send down the records forthwith.