JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendants' Second Appeal from a decree for permanent injunction restraining them from interfering with the plaintiffs possession over the land in suit. The land is situate in a village, where the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act applies. The plaintiffs case was that he is the owner in possession of the land in suit for the last more than fifty years, and that the defendants tried to take illegal possession in 1963, whereupon the plaintiff filed a criminal case under S. 457/405, I. P. C. in which the defendants were convicted. Their revision was also dismissed, but, in spite of that, the defendants, threatened to take forcible possession of the land. The defence was that the plaintiff is not the owner of the land and was never in possession thereof, and that the defendants had all through been in possession of it. The following were the issues raised by the trial Court : "l. Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the disputed Bera? 2. Whether the plaintiff has been in possession over the said bera within 12 years prior to the suit" If not its effect? 3. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?.". 2. The trial Court took up issue Nos. 1 and 2 together for consideration and held, on an appraisal of the evidence on the record, that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he is the owner of the land in suit and had been in possession within 12 years next before the institution of the suit and dismissed it. On issue No. 3, the trial Court held that the plaintiff was proved to be out of possession, that the suit was for permanent injunction and, therefore, no injunction could he granted and dismissed the suit with these findings. 3. Two points were raised before the lower appellate Court, first, that the plaintiff had proved his title and possession within limitation, and the trial Court's finding to the contrary was erroneous, and second, that the suit for permanent injunction was maintainable as the land in suit was not actually occupied by the defendants. According to the judgment of the lower appellate Court, the plaintiffs house is situate to the north of the land in suit. According to the judgment of the lower appellate Court, the plaintiffs house is situate to the north of the land in suit. The defendants' house lies to the east of it, and to the south, there is a rasta and the field of Laturi. To the west also, there is a rasta and the field of Laturi. The defendants appear to have purchased the land to the south of the land in suit from Laturi and built a house thereon. The lower appellate Court believed the plaintiffs evidence and held that the land in suit belonged to him. For doing so, the lower appellate Court relied upon the judgment of the Nyaya Panchayat convicting and imposing a fine on the defendants for an offence under S. 447, I.P.C. According to that judgment of the Nyaya Panchayat, the defendants were directed to renuye their encroachment from the land. The lower appellate Court took the view that the judgment of the Nyaya Panchayat supports the statement of the plaintiff and his witness Ram Sevak, According to the lower appellate Court, although the judgment of the criminal Court is not binding on a civil Court nor does it operate as res judicata, yet it cannot he said that it is wholly useless, and further that it is relevant and is admissible to see the parties to the case, the matter in dispute and the decision of the Court with its date. The lower appellate Court held on that basis that the judgment of the Nyaya Panchayat (Ext. 1) shows that the plaintiff was held to be in possession till 1963, when the defendants trespassed upon it, and that they were convicted under S. 447, I. P. C. and ordered to remove the encroachment. On the second point, the lower appellate Court took the view that there was no construction on the land in suit and the defendants had placed some bricks only and cannot be said to he in actual physical possession of the land. Their position could only be said to be that of trespassers, who had placed some material on an open piece of land without any further physical possession. According to the lower appellate Court. such a trespasser could be restrained from using the land any further and from interfering with the owner's possession over it. 4. Mr. Rajeshji Verma, learned counsel for the appellants, contended firstly that. According to the lower appellate Court. such a trespasser could be restrained from using the land any further and from interfering with the owner's possession over it. 4. Mr. Rajeshji Verma, learned counsel for the appellants, contended firstly that. on the abolition of zamindari, ownership of the land like the land in suit could, if at all, he claimed only under S. 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. That provision requires, before any land can be deemed to be settled with a person resident in a village that it must be the site of a well or of a building or appurtenant thereto. All that has been said in para 1 of the plaint is that the plaintiff has been the owner in possession of the land in suit for the last more than 50 years since the time of his ancestors, and the plaintiff had his cattle enclosure thereon and used to store cow dung cakes, fuel, grass and Bhoosa, and further that the water spout of his house flowed through the land in suit. According to Mr. Rajeshji Verma. the allegation so made in para 1 of the plaint does not amount to saying that the land in suit was the site of the plaintiffs house or appurtenant thereto. and even if the plaintiff had been using the land for any of the said purposes, as alleged, he could not he held to be the owner of the land. The land must be deemed to have vested in the State and later on in the Gaon Sabha under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. According to the learned counsel for the defendant-appellants, they had, on the other hand, expressly pleaded that the land was appurtenant to the house of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and had been in their possession. The question whether the house in suit was appurtenant to the defendants' house or was owned by them, as such, was not raised at the trial. The only question raised was whether the plaintiff is the owner of the disputed Bera, and the question whether the defendants were the owners of the land in suit or not, might have been seen in the course of appraising the evidence of the parties, but the primary question was whether the plaintiff was the owner of the land in suit or not. According to the learned counsel, the necessary foundation for a claim of ownership to the land in suit was not laid in the plaint. Even so assuming that to be an excusable defect of pleadings, the plaintiffs evidence had to show that the land in suit was appurtenant to his house. In the evidence also, all that the plaintiff stated was that the land in suit was in his possession since the time of his ancestors, that it was 14 to 15 cubits long and 10 to 11 cubits wide, that it was near his house towards its south and that he used to keep his pigs, and had his manure pits and a drain and parnala for discharging water from his house, and further that he used to make cow dung cakes and keep his fire wood thereon. The question is whether the user of the kind detailed by the plaintiff in his plaint and in his statement could amount to saying that the land in suit was appurtenant to his house. On that point, Mr. Rajeshji Verma cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Maharaj Singh v. State, AIR 1976 SC 2602 . After noticing the provisions of Sections 4, 6 and 117 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and their effect, the Supreme Court explained the meaning of appurtenance in paras 25, 26 and 27 of the report at page 2610, in the following words : "What is integral is not necessarily appurtenant. A position of subordination. something incidental or ancillary or dependant is implied in appurtenance. Can we say that the large spaces are subsidiary or ancillary to or inevitably implied in the enjoyment of the buildings qua buildings: That much of space required for the use of the structures as such has been excluded by the High Court itself. Beyond that may or may not be necessary for the hat or mela but not for the enjoyment of the chabutras as such. A hundred acres may spread out in front of a club house for various games like golf. But all these abundant acres are unnecessary for nor incidental to the enjoyment of the house in any reasonable manner. It is confusion to miss the distinction, fine but real. 'Appurtenance' in relation to a dwelling or to a school, college... A hundred acres may spread out in front of a club house for various games like golf. But all these abundant acres are unnecessary for nor incidental to the enjoyment of the house in any reasonable manner. It is confusion to miss the distinction, fine but real. 'Appurtenance' in relation to a dwelling or to a school, college... includes all land occupied therewith and used for the purposes thereof (Words and Phrases Legally Defined. Butterworths, 2nd Edn.). The word 'appurtenances' has a distinct and definite meaning........... prima facie it imports nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to the subject-matter of the devise or grant, and which would. in truth, pass without being specially mentioned. Ordinarily, what is necessary for the enjoyment and has been used for the purpose of the building, such as easements, alone will be appurtenant. Therefore, what is necessary for the enjoyment of the building is alone covered by the expression 'appurtenance'. If some other purpose was being fulfilled by the building and the lands, it is not possible to contend that those lands are covered by the expression' appurtenances'. Indeed 'it is settled by the earliest authority, repeated without contradiction to the latest, that land cannot be appurtenant to land. The word 'appurtenances includes all the incorporeal here ditanients attached to the land granted or demised, such as rights of way, of common..... but it does not include lands in addition to that granted'. Words and Phrases (supra). In short, the touchstone of 'appurtenance' is dependence of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a building. Obviously, the hat bazaar or meta is not an appurtenance to the building. The law, thus leads to the clear conclusion that even if the buildings were used and enjoyed in the past with the whole stretch of vacant space for a hat or mela, the land is not appurtenant to the principal subject granted by S. 9. viz. buildings.". 5. Applying the aforesaid case the mere fact that the plaintiff has his residential house near the land in suit would not make, it appurtenant to that house. It may be that' the land was being put to some use by the plaintiff, but the question is whether the land was appurtenant to a building on the date of vesting. That crucial fact was neither alleged nor proved in the present case. It may be that' the land was being put to some use by the plaintiff, but the question is whether the land was appurtenant to a building on the date of vesting. That crucial fact was neither alleged nor proved in the present case. The plaintiff could not claim any rights over the land in suit under S. 7(aa) either, for it was not shown that the land was necessary for the more beneficial enjoyment of any land which he might have been holding on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. In short, a mere use of the land for such purposes as claimed by the plaintiff does not confer upon him any right or title to or interest in the land. 6. On the plaint allegations and the plaintiffs evidence, it was not possible to grant him a decree on the basis of possessory title either. The suit was a suit for injunction only and the basis of the claim was that the plaintiff was owner in possession. The evidence shows that at an earlier stage there was an effective and successful interference with the plaintiffs use of the land which led to criminal proceedings. The plaintiff even stated that he had been dispossessed and possession was restored to him in the criminal proceedings. This case was thus not fit for grant of an injunction even on the basis of past possession. Indeed it is not possible to hold that the kind of use of the land said to have been made by the plaintiff could he said to amount to such possession as might have enabled him to sue for injunction or for possession on the basis of past possession only. 7. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside. The suit is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, I would leave the parties to hear their own costs throughout.