Judgment Hari Lal Agrawal, J. This is an application by the plaintiff against the order of the court below rejecting his application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside a compromise decree. 2. The plaintiff instituted a title suit in the court below for declaration of his right over certain landed properties besides other reliefs. On 25.1.1978 a petition of compromise was filed purporting to be on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner and the contesting defendants. That was not the date fixed in the suit. According to the terms of the compromise the plaintiff relinquished all his claim in the suit land. On 13.2.1978 the trial court recorded the compromise and dismissed the suit on that basis making the compromise petition as a part of the decree. When the petitioner came to know of this fact he made an application on 10.3.1978 for recalling the order on the ground that the petitioner had not entered into the compromise and the defendants after gaining over his pairvikar had manipulated the compromise petition. A miscellaneous case was registered on the basis of this application and a witness was also examined by the petitioner. On taking the view that since the compromise was recorded on the basis of a written petition, the order could be challenged only through a regular suit and not under a petition under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the application was dismissed. Accordingly the petitioner has come to this Court. 3. The question is as to whether the petitioner could agitate the point by an application in the same suit or could be compelled to institute an independent suit. 4. Objections to the recording of the compromise can be filed at two stages-one before it is actually recorded and the other after it is recorded. There has been also an amendment in rule 3 by the 1976 Act. Under the said provision there was a conflict of decisions as to whether where a compromise was alleged by one party and denied by the other, and where one party to the compromise was not willing to abide by the compromise the court had the power to record a compromise and base a decree thereon. Under the said provision there was a conflict of decisions as to whether where a compromise was alleged by one party and denied by the other, and where one party to the compromise was not willing to abide by the compromise the court had the power to record a compromise and base a decree thereon. The amended rule however, now makes it clear that the court has jurisdiction, in the case on a dispute between the parties as to the compromise, to inquire into and decide whether there has been a lawful compromise in terms of which the suit should be decreed. The insertion of rule 3A barring a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which it is based was not lawful makes the inquiry all the more pertinent and it is open to the court to decide the matter by taking evidence in usual way or upon affidavits, The rule restricts the power of the court to record agreements or compromise to such agreements as are lawful and the court is, therefore, bound to inquire into the question whether the compromise it is asked to record is lawful or not. By adding an explanation by the amending Act to this rule, the position has been made further clear by providing that an agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Contract Act shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule. Before this provision the law was that only a suit lay to set aside a consent decree on any of the grounds on which a contract can be set aside and a distinction was always drawn between a fraud practised upon the party and a fraud practised upon the court. Before this provision the law was that only a suit lay to set aside a consent decree on any of the grounds on which a contract can be set aside and a distinction was always drawn between a fraud practised upon the party and a fraud practised upon the court. This was the consistent view of this Court also and reference can be made to the case of Ramprasad Sahu and another v. Mahadeo Sahu and others laying down that an inquiry into an allegation by one party that an agreement admittedly executed by it was brought about by fraud of another party, was not within the purview of Order 23 Rule 3 and the Court was bound to give effect to the compromise as if it was lawful having regard to its own terms and the aggrieved party had to institute a regular suit for setting aside the compromise and the decree passed thereon, The cases however have always drawn a line where the agreement or compromise was admitted by the party but fraud or other elements making the said compromise voidable or void, was alleged. In such cases the remedy of the party was to institute a suit, but where a party completely denied to have consented to the agreement at all, then in later case, namely, the case of Bindeshwari Prasad Chaudhary v, Debendra Prasad Singh and ors after considering a large number of cases it was held that if fraud had been committed upon the party as a result of that fraud the Court had been misled into passing certain orders, which otherwise it would not have passed, then it was a fraud practised upon the court itself and in such a case under the inherent powers, the court was not only entitled to but it must, set aside any order or orders which may have been passed by it upon a false representation. The fact of that Case was that, according to the case of the respondents first party, they had never entered into a compromise and had no knowledge of the filing of same and the judgment-debtors had fraudulently and collusively got a compromise petition filed by virtue of which the entire claim was withdrawn by bringing One Rambilas Singh in their collusion-a situation very much similar to the case in hand. In that case the court had come to the conclusion that the signatures of the decree holders were forged in the compromise petition and that it amounted to a fraud practised upon the court as well, the compromise decree was accordingly set aside on a petition. 5. A learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Anant Mahadeo Godbole v Achut Ganesh Godbole and others construing the newly substituted rule 3A, has held that the words "not lawful" have wide connotation and include cases where compromise suffers from want of authority or exceeding of authority. All those types of challenges cannot now, because of bar to suit under rule 3A, be the subject matter of a second suit. Similar was the view taken by another learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jew and others Vs. Ram Bhagwandas Shaw. 6. The petitioner did not challenge the compromise on the ground that while obtaining his consent some kind of firaud or the like was committed upon him. He has denied the very foundation of the consent or the agreement and in that view of the matter, the compromise was itself unlawful and the court would have refused to record the same. The case is, therefore, covered by the principle laid down In Bindeshwari Prasad Chaudhary's case (supra). This question, therefore, should have been examined by the court in the summary procedure on the petitioner's application under section 151 of the Code, under its inherent jurisdiction. 7. In that view of the matter, the learned Subordinate Judge has committed a serious and apparent error of jurisdiction in dismissing the application of the petitioner as not maintainable and asking him to institute a regular suit. From the above discussions it is clear that the action of the opposite party on the allegations made by the petitioner would also amount to a fraud upon the Court as well and in that view of the matter, it must be held that the allegations of the petitioner should have been investigated under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. 8. I would accordingly allow this application and direct the court below to dispose of the application of the petitioner on its merits. Application allowed.