Was Shylock a sinner? How Shakespeare depicted him, critics will always differ: What is then the universal truth valid for all times and climes? Usury is abhorent, not money lending per se. Because, banking fulfils social needs. Money lending is but its crude form. It may not be progressive. But has it outlived its utility for all people? 2. Private business in Money lending may not be appreciable today to modern taste or to the prevalent social norms. What the Assam Money Lenders Act, 1934, for short the Act, purported to achieve? In those days when modern bank­ing was unknown in the country side needy people it cannot be disputed had to depend on the mahajans or money lenders. Sometime money was needed to save a life, sometime to save a family from destitution when any natural calamity befell it. Can it be said that the legislature was not cognizant of this situation? Was the Act enacted to make money lenders themselves destitutes or to stop the service they were rendering to the society in those days? 3. The short title of the Act indicates that it was meant merely to "provide for effectual control of money lending busi­ness in Assam". A better provision for the "control of money lending" had to be made and "additional powers" had to be given to "courts to deal with money lenders". So runs the preamble. The provisions of this Act have to be construed, as canons of construction mandate, in a manner as will agree with the legislative intent which pervade the preamble. Another rule that deserves primacy in our Republican Constitutional set up is presumption of constitutionality to ensure the Act a live tenure till law givers cut it short. 4. What is challenged in this court in these proceedings is the decree of affirmance passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Karimganj in Money Appeal No. 12/79 upholding the dismissal of Money Suit which the plaintiff-petitioner filed for recovery of a sum of Rs.660/- as principal and interest due to him under two pronotes executed by the defendant-opp. party. Both courts unsuited the plaintiff operating against him the bar of section 7-D of the Act. party. Both courts unsuited the plaintiff operating against him the bar of section 7-D of the Act. The concurrent finding of the courts below which is binding on me is that the plaintiff-petitioner was carrying on the business of money lending on the date on which the suit was instituted and that he did not hold a valid certificates of registration for carrying on the said business as contemplated under the Act. Section 7-D is as follows : 7-D. Suit not to proceed without registration certificate, etc.-No. suit for the recovery of a loan advanced by a money lender shall proceed in a civil court until the court is satisfied that he holds a valid registration certificate or that he is not required to have a regis­tration certificate by reason of the fact that he does not carry on the business of money lending. 5. It appears to me, however, that both the courts failed to appreciate the scope, extent and purport of the above provision. What it contemplates is, according to me, that court in which a suit for recovery of loan advanced by a money leader is filed shall not "proceed" with the trial of the suit if it is not "satisfied" that the plaintiff possesses a "certificate of registration" and that such a certificate is required because it is found on the evidence adduced in the case that he "carries on the busi­ness of money lending". The requirement of "satisfaction", in my opinion, clearly indicates that there has to be a determi­nation of the question or objection on evidence adduced in the case. In other words in such case? when the court is satisfied on evidence that the plaintiff does not carry on the business of money lending or when the objection is upheld but is over­come by the plaintiff by filing the registration certificate, it cannot refuse and shall 'proceed' with the trial. In my opinion section 7-D does not enable the court to dismiss outright a suit after it has arrived at a finding that registration certificate is required on the facts and circumstances of the case but is not filed in the court to enable it to ''proceed" with the trial. In my opinion section 7-D does not enable the court to dismiss outright a suit after it has arrived at a finding that registration certificate is required on the facts and circumstances of the case but is not filed in the court to enable it to ''proceed" with the trial. If the requirement of the registration certificate has to be satis­fied on the finding to that effect arrived by the court the section en­visages, in my opinion, an opportunity to be given to the plain­tiff to produce the registration certificate. The section does not envisage a complete "ouster" or an indefeasible threshold bar. It is settled law that ouster clauses are construed strictly. Therefore, the words and expressions used in section 7-D must be given a restricted meaning. The word "proceed" and "hold" must be so construed as to achieve this result. Opportunity to “hold" certificate is to be given and not taken away so as to impair the right to ''proceed' with the suit. The expression "holds a valid registration certificate" is not to be construed as a con­dition-precedent. 6. It is equally settled that the court would not presume a right being killed or a liability being extinguished unless such an intention is manifested by a clear and constitutional legis­lative intent. This is to be gathered from a conjoint reading of the relevant provisions of the Act and of the parallel and/ or relevant statutory and constitutional provisions. Let the other provisions of the Act itself be, therefore, examined first. The term "money lender" is defined in section 2(1). A person who in the "regular course of business" advances a loan is a money lender His legal representatives and successors-in-interest, whether by inheritance or assignment, are also included in the term "money lender". The definition apparently, in my opinion, signi­fies that the right of a money lender in respect of any loan advanced by him would not be defeated by his personal dis­ability as it would enure to the benefit of his assignees and his heirs who may not be "money lenders". His right was indefeasible; the legislature did not tinker with it in such manner as to destroy it. It also appears clear to me that the provisions of the Act applies in case of a person whose "business" is money lending. His right was indefeasible; the legislature did not tinker with it in such manner as to destroy it. It also appears clear to me that the provisions of the Act applies in case of a person whose "business" is money lending. It does not apply to a case when a person advances a loan for other considerations and not on business consideration. The mere fact that in a short span of time a person has advanced loans to different persons "would not per se make such person a "money lender". It is his intention in advancing the loan and his dealings manifested by such trans­actions which make him a money lender. Who, therefore, is a money lender, in my opinion, is primarily for the authority contemplated under the Act ("Registrar") to decide. Section 7-A provides that the Registrar shall maintain a register of money lenders in the prescribed form. Section 7-B provides that every person who "carries on or intends to carry on the business of money lending" shall get himself registered by an application in the prescribed form made to the Registrar who shall grant him the "registration certificate". Section 7-C (1) debars a person from carrying on money lending business with­out a registration certificate. Sub-section (2) thereof provides a penalty for contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1). For the first offence simple imprisonment which may extend to 3 months or fine which may extend to Rs. 500/- or both, and for a second or subsequent offence imprisonment of either des­criptions which may extend to 6 months or fine which may extend to Rs. 1000/- or both, are prescribed as punishment. Reading these two provisions, section 7-B and 7-C together, it appears clear to me that the provision of section 7-D is meant to give a meaning, content and purpose thereto. The purport of section 7-D is to ensure merely that no "money lender" carries on money lending business without complying with the provisions of the Act. In my opinion it is not meant to provide a second penalty in the nature of killing the right of the money lender to recover the loan. 7. The legislative history of the enactment supports the above view. Originally the term "money lender" was defined to mean simply "a person who grants loan". There was no provision for registration. In my opinion it is not meant to provide a second penalty in the nature of killing the right of the money lender to recover the loan. 7. The legislative history of the enactment supports the above view. Originally the term "money lender" was defined to mean simply "a person who grants loan". There was no provision for registration. Sections 7-A, 7-B, 7-C and 7-D were inserted for the first time in 1969. Civil Courts jurisdiction to entertain or to "proceed" with a money lender's suit was not fettered originally in any manner. What was prohibited by old section 9 was decree, on account of arrear of interest, for more than the principal. 8. The provision may also be examined from the consti­tutional angle. If section 7-D is construed to mean that a money lender, not holding a registration certificate loses his right to recover the loan through judicial process, it will amount to an unreasonable restriction on his right to carry on the trade or business of money lending. It will be difficult to sustain the restriction as being reasonable "in the interest of general public". Such a construction will be violative of Art. 19(1) (g). A consti­tutional objection may be available under Art. 251 also inas­much as section 37 of the Contract Act obligates performance of respective promises by the parties to a contract. Section 7-D would be clearly "repugnant" to the purport and object of section 37. To give effect to the statutory rule of presumption of cons­titutionality, it is necessary, therefore, in my opinion, to cons­true section 7-D in a manner which will exclude application of the theory of complete ouster, as adopted by the courts below in this case. 9. The provisions of the Rules made under the Act also bear examination. It is clear that a certificate is not granted for mere asking. Rule 9 provides for "summary inquiry" on the receipt of an application for grant of a registration certificate. Indeed, it is in the course of such inquiry the Registrar shall have to be satisfied about the fulfillment of the statutory require­ment contemplated thereunder. It is clear that a certificate is not granted for mere asking. Rule 9 provides for "summary inquiry" on the receipt of an application for grant of a registration certificate. Indeed, it is in the course of such inquiry the Registrar shall have to be satisfied about the fulfillment of the statutory require­ment contemplated thereunder. He has to examine the appli­cant or "person responsible for the management of the business of money lending" or such other person as he may deem fit and, by calling such information as he may consider necessary, he has to satisfy himself about the "bonafides" and conduct of the applicant. It is apparent that in the course of inquiry the Registrar has the jurisdiction and authority to determine whether the person was in fact carrying on, or intended to carry on, the "business of money lending". His jurisdiction is therefore, primary. This jurisdiction, in my opinion, does not admit usurption by civil court. Therefore, whenever a question arises as to whether the bar of section 7-D operates in the facts and circumstances of the case and the court is of the opinion that such bar does operate, the procedure to be followed in such cases would be to stop trial of the suit and not to dismiss the suit. The court shall give an opportunity to the plaintiff to produce the certificate of registration and without such opportunity being given the court shall not have the juris­diction to pass any order in the suit. Thus, dismissal of the suit in such circumstances is not contemplated under the law. 10. In the instant case both the courts had come to the categorical finding that (i) the plaintiff did not hold a regis­tration certificate as contemplated under the Act and further, (ii) he carried on business of money lending. It was, therefore, clearly a case where the requirement of satisfaction of the court as to the plaintiff holding a "valid registration certificate" was not fulfilled. The plaintiff, in such circumstances, and on these findings, ought to have been given an opportunity to produce the registration certificate and until such an opportunity was given there could not be any occasion to pass any order as regards disposal of the suit which would clearly be an order without jurisdiction. The plaintiff, in such circumstances, and on these findings, ought to have been given an opportunity to produce the registration certificate and until such an opportunity was given there could not be any occasion to pass any order as regards disposal of the suit which would clearly be an order without jurisdiction. The legal requirement is that the court should have stopped the trial of the suit after coming to the aforesaid find­ings and allowed and opportunity to the plaintiff to produce the requisite registration certificate. This not having been done in the instant case I am clearly of the opinion that the impug­ned judgments and decrees dismissing the suit are wholly without jurisdiction and they are, therefore, set aside. 11. Accordingly the case is remitted to the trial court with a direction that the case would be taken back on file and the court shall fix a date by which the plaintiff shall produce the registration certificate envisaged u/s 7-B of the Act. The court shall proceed with the trial of the suit if such a certificate is filed after adequate opportunity is allowed to the plaintiff to do so. Thereafter, the court shall dispose of the suit on merits. In the event of plaintiff's failure to produce the said certificate it shall be open to the court to dispose of the suit for non-prosecution without entering into the merits of the claim. 12. In the result the application is allowed to the extent indicated above. The rule is made absolute. In the facts and circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.