JUDGMENT : R.C. Patnaik, J. - This is an application under 226 of the Constitution of India for judicial review in the shape of orders of certiorari and mandamus of the removal of the Petitioner from service. 2. The Petitioner was serving as a Rakshak under the South-Eastern Railway and was posted at the relevant time at Bolangir in the railway district of Chakradharpur. He was placed under suspension with effect from 12-6-1976 in connection with Police Station Case No. 166 of 1976 of Sadar Police Station, Bolangir. The Assistant Security Officer-opposite party No. 5 holding that an enquiry is not practicable removed him from service without any enquiry. The order was passed in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 47 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 and so far as is relevant is to the following effect: ...An enquiry into the above misconduct/delinquency is not considered practicable as provided under Rules 44, 45 and 46 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959, because of the facts that it is not considered feasible or desirable to procure the witnesses of the security/other Railway Employees since this will expose them and make them ineffective for the future. These witnesses if asked to appear at a confronted enquiry are likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults thereafter or even they and their family members may became targets of acts of violence. I have, therefore, decided in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 47 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959, that Sri K. Raja Rao, Rakshak 5001 of Protection Branch/RPF Bolangir Post (name, designation and station) should be removed from Rail way Service with immediate effect. By order dated 16-7-1976, the period during which the Petitioner was under suspension was treated as non-duty. Appeal and revision preferred by the Petitioner did not bear any fruit. 3. Mr. C.V. Murty, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, strenuously urged two points at the hearing. Firstly, the dispensing with enquiry under Rule 47 was arbitrary and malafide and secondly the order of removal without an opportunity of healing on the question of punishment was bad. 4. The Railway Protection Force Act, 1957, was enacted to provide for constitution and regulation of a force called "the Railway Protection Force" for the better protection and security of railway property. 4. The Railway Protection Force Act, 1957, was enacted to provide for constitution and regulation of a force called "the Railway Protection Force" for the better protection and security of railway property. The Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959, were made in exercise of powers conferred on the Central Government u/s 21 of the Act. 5. Chapter IX of the Railway Protection Force Rules contains provisions relating to discipline. Rule 44 prescribes the procedure for imposition of major penalty. Rule 44(10)(2)(c) reads as under: (2) If it is of opinion that any of the penalties specified in Clauses (a) to (d) of Rule 41 should be imposed, it shall.... (c) consider the representation, if any, made by the member so charged in response to the notice under Clause (b) and determine what penalty, if any should be imposed on the member so charged, and pass appropriate orders on the case, Rule 47 states: Special procedure in certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 44, 45 and 46, where a penalty is imposed on a member of the Force (a) on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or (b) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said rules, the Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit. 6. Mr. Murty urged that the decision of the disciplinary authority was justiciable and it was open to the court to scrutinise the reasons furnished by the disciplinary authority for holding that it was not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed under the rules. Mr. Pal appearing for the opposite parties submitted that discretion having been vested in the disciplinary authority, the reasons on which he was satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry were outside the pale of judicial review. 7. Clause (b) of Rule 47 contains provisions similar to those in Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servant Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1968. 8. 7. Clause (b) of Rule 47 contains provisions similar to those in Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servant Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1968. 8. From a plain reading of Rule 47, it is clear that the procedure prescribed in Rules 44, 45 and 46 may be dispensed with, if the penalty is sought to be imposed on a member of the Force on the ground of his conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal change or where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure for enquiry. The rule authorises the Disciplinary Authority to consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders as it deems fit. 9. Rule 47 requires the disciplinary authority to furnish reasons for his satisfaction. If his satisfaction would have been conclusive, the rule would have permitted him to keep the reasons in his breast. The rule requires disclosure of reasons so that the member of the Force is apprised of the ground for dispensing with the enquiry. The disclosure of reasons in the order is a safeguard against arbitrary and capricious decision. Any reason would not do. In The Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Another Vs. The Company Law Board and Others was observed: Though an order passed in exercise of power under a statute cannot be challenged on the ground of propriety or sufficiency it is liable to be quashed on the ground of mala fide, dishonesty or corrupt purpose. Even if it is passed in good faith and with the best of mention to further the purpose of the litigation which confers the power, since the authority has to act in accordance with and within the limits of that legislation its order can also be challenged if it is beyond those limits or is passed on grounds extraneous to the legislation or if there are no grounds at all for passing it or it the grounds are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion or satisfaction requisite under the legislation. In anyone of these situations it can well be said that the authority did not honestly form its opinion or that in forming it, it did not apply its mind to the relevant facts. Similar view was taken in Rohtas Industries Vs. S.D. Agarwal and Others, . In anyone of these situations it can well be said that the authority did not honestly form its opinion or that in forming it, it did not apply its mind to the relevant facts. Similar view was taken in Rohtas Industries Vs. S.D. Agarwal and Others, . To put it in other words, if the disciplinary authority in exercise of discretionary power has been influenced by considerations that cannot lawfully be taken into account or by the disregard of relevant considerations, a court would normally hold that the power has not been validly exercised. So, grounds of satisfaction are justiciable to the extent that they are germane to and have rational nexus with the purpose of the provision. 10. It has been held in Bal Krishna Mishra v. Union of India 1983 Lab. I.C. 1113, that the opinion cannot be challenged: except on the grounds that no opinion was at all formed or that the same was formed on illusory or nonexistent grounds or that the authority had acted, mala fide and/or on extraneous reasons. We are satisfied from the reasons recorded that the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority was not arbitrarity or dishonestly rearhed and the reasons given were germane to and had rational nexus with the purpose of the provision. 11. Coming to the second prong of attack, we hold that the Petitioner was entitled to a second opportunity to make his representation on the question of sentence. In The Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and Another Vs. T.R. Chellappan and Others, the Supreme Court was interpreting a similar provision contained in Rule 14 of the Railway Servant Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1968, the relevant provision being: ...the Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit: Their Lordships observed: ...This matter can be objectively determined only if the delinquent employee is heard and is given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed by the said authority. In other words, the term 'consider' postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person. Such an enquiry would be a summary inquiry to be held by the disciplinary authority after hearing the delinquent employee. In other words, the term 'consider' postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person. Such an enquiry would be a summary inquiry to be held by the disciplinary authority after hearing the delinquent employee. The statutory provision referred to above merely imports a rule of natural justice in enjoining that before taking final action in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard and the circumstances of the cue may be objectively considered. This is in keeping with the sense of justice and fair-play.... In Bishundeo Singh v. Union of India 1983 Lab. I.C. 934, it has been held that a member of the Force is entitled under Rule 47 to an opportunity to make his representation on the question of punishment. The same view has been taken also in Ramcharitra Sharma v. Union of India 1977 Lab. I.C. 194. Singasan Rabi Das v. Chief Security Officer, Railway Protection Force 1981 Lab. I.C. 954 and R.K. Misra v. The General Manager Northern Railway 1972 (2) S.L.R. 127. 12. Mr. Pal. the learned Counsel for the opposite parties, drew attention to two decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Bal Krishna Misra's case 1983 Lab. I.C. 1113 (supra) and in Jayanta Kumar Roy v. Union of India 1982 Lab. I.C. 77. We may, however, point out that those two cases arose after the amendment of Article 311 by the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1971 doing away with the requirement of second opportunity and the amendment of Railway Servant Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1968. The Constitution 42nd Amendment Act came into force with effect from 3-1-1977. The Petitioner was removed from service by order dated 5-7-1976. Hence, the two decisions of the Calcutta High Court referred to above, have no application. Further we find that Rule 47 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1967, has not been amended as yet. So, the rule laid down in The Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and Another Vs. T.R. Chellappan and Others, applies with full force. 13. As admittedly no opportunity was given to the Petitioner to show cause or make representation on the question of punishment, the challenge on the second ground is well-founded. 14. So, the rule laid down in The Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and Another Vs. T.R. Chellappan and Others, applies with full force. 13. As admittedly no opportunity was given to the Petitioner to show cause or make representation on the question of punishment, the challenge on the second ground is well-founded. 14. In the result, though we sustain the order in so far as it dispensed with an enquiry on the ground that it was not reasonably practicable, we quash by certiorari the order of removal from service as violative of Rule 47 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959. The writ application is accordingly allowed with the observations made above. We make no older as to costs. B.K. Behera, J. 15. I agree. Final Result : Allowed