The jurisdiction of a court in allowing amendment in respect a relief which is barred by the time the amendment is prayed, is the question involved in this revision. As amend­ment, when allowed, relates back to the date of the filing of the suit, the question of limitation does assume importance where, by the time the amendment is prayed the period of limitation has expired, though it had not when the suit was filed. 2. There can be no dispute by now that court should be extremely liberal in granting prayer of amendment as recently stated in Haridas vs. Godrej Rustom, AIR 1933 SC 319, by refe­rring to P.H. Patil vs. K. S. Patil, AIR 1957 SC 363 wherein the main test laid down for allowing amendment was to find out whether the proposed amendment would cause any serious prejudice to the other side, apart from the same being neces­sary for t he purpose of determining the real question in con­troversy between the parties. It is question of injustice which is involved when an amendment is allowed in respect of a relief which is barred by limitation. Even so, there have been pronouncements from across the bank of Jamuna and from overseas that limitation is only one of the relevant factors to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion to allow amendment. The pertinent question is when can the discretion be said to have been exercised judicially, when amendment is allowed even beyond the period of limitation? 3. In L. J. Leach & Co. & Jardine Skinner & Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 , it was pointed out by the Apex Court in para 16 that though it is true that a court would, as a rule, de­cline to allow amendment if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of application, but that is a factor to be taken into consideration in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered and does not affect the power of the Court in ordering amendment if that is required in the interest of justice. Reference was made in this connection to Charan Das vs. Amir Khan, AIR 1921 PC 50 and Kishan Das vs. Rachappa, ILR 33 Bombay 644. 4. Reference was made in this connection to Charan Das vs. Amir Khan, AIR 1921 PC 50 and Kishan Das vs. Rachappa, ILR 33 Bombay 644. 4. The case of Charan Das shows that the Privy Council upheld the order of amendment allowed by the Judicial Commissioner des­pite accrual of a legal right by the defendants due to lapse of time, because the plaintiffs therein through some clumsy blundering had attempted to assert right that they undoubtedly possessed but in a form which the statute did not permit. It was, therefore, held that the plaintiffs should be at liberty to express their intention in a plainer and less ambiguous manner and to amend the plaint so as to express the rights which has been really their intention all along to establish, although the amendment of the plaint was sought to be made at a time when the suit itself, if instituted then, would have been time-barred. In that case the plaintiffs had really claimed preemption (and not only declaration of preemption right), but had not in a plain lan­guage claimed possession of the property. It was observed by the Privy Council that the cause of action for both was one and the same and the amendment seeking possession was, therefore, upheld because it was felt that the plaintiffs were by doing so only expressing their intention in a plainer and less ambiguous manner. 5. In taking the above view, the Privy Council mentioned of its earlier decision in Zahoor Ali vs. Rutta Koer, (1867) II MIA 468. That was a case where some claim was advanced against one Rutta Koer on some bond executed by her when her estate was under Court of Wards. The suit was held to be wholly misconceived (for reasons with which we are not concerned), but the Privy Council felt that the appellant should be allowed to bring a new suit against Rutta Koer upon the bond, treating the same as a mere money bond, and appre­hending that such a suit may probably be met by a plea of limitation, it was observed that in the circumstances of the case such a defence would be inequitable so forbade Rutta Koer from doing so. 6. Kishan Das, ILR 33 Bombay 644, was referred by the Supreme Court not only in Leach & Co. but in P.H. Patil vs. K.S. Patil AIR 1957 SC 363 too. 6. Kishan Das, ILR 33 Bombay 644, was referred by the Supreme Court not only in Leach & Co. but in P.H. Patil vs. K.S. Patil AIR 1957 SC 363 too. There the plaintiffs had ini­tially come up for dissolution of partnership accounts and had alleged that in pursuance of a partnership agreement they had delivered cloths worth Rs. 4001.00 to the defendants. At the appellate stage the plaintiffs abandoned the plea of partnership and prayed for leave to amend by adding a prayer for recovery of Rs. 4001.00. Though by that time the claim for money was barred by limitation, the amendment was allowed, which was held to have been rightly allowed, as the claim was not a new claim. Applying this principle, it was held in P. H. Patil (supra) that the amendments were rightly allowed though the period of limitation had expired by then, as the amendments did not really introduce a new case, nor was the defendant called upon to meet a new claim set up for the first time after the expiry of the limitation. 7. A case still more to the point is that of A.K. Gupta vs. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96 The following observations finding place in para 7 are pertinent: - "It is not in dispute that at the date of the application for amendment, a suit for a money claim under the contract was barred. The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new cause of action particularly when a suit on new case or cause of action is barred. Wealdon vs. Neale, (1887) 19 QBD 394. But it is also well recognised that where amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a different or additional approach to the same facts the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation. See Charan Das vs. Amir Khan 47 Ind App 255. (AIR 1921 PC 50) and L. J. Leach and Co. Ltd. vs. Jardine Shiknner & Co. 1957 SAR 438. ( AIR 1957 SC 357 )." 8. See Charan Das vs. Amir Khan 47 Ind App 255. (AIR 1921 PC 50) and L. J. Leach and Co. Ltd. vs. Jardine Shiknner & Co. 1957 SAR 438. ( AIR 1957 SC 357 )." 8. What has been stated in para 8 further fortifies the position that the statute of limitation cannot be relied on when "What is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleading sought to be amended". In that case, the plaintiff had originally sought a declaration of right to increase in contractual rates following increase in the labour rate. When the maintainability of the suit was challenged in view of section 42 of the old Specific Relief Act (as is the position in the case at hand), amendment was prayed for to add an extra relief for a decree for the enhanced contract money. This was allowed by the High Court in appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the order by majority by pointing out that the cause of action for the enhanced amount was the contract itself on which the suit was based, and the amendment only sought to introduce a claim based on the same cause of action, namely, the contract, and introduced no new case or facts. What is meant by the expression "cause of action" was explained to mean "a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts"-the traditional meaning of the expression as "every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed" was held inappropriate in the present context. 9. What has been stated in Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar, AIR 1974 SC 1126 would also sustain the proposition that amend­ment can be allowed, "the law of limitation notwithstanding". But then there can be no denial that the question whether the limitation has expired or not, is a very relevant circumstance to be borne in mind while allowing amendment- see Maitreyee Banerjee vs. Prabin Kumar, AIR 1982 SC 17 . This aspect has been emphasised in Ganesh Trading Co. vs. Moji Ram. But then there can be no denial that the question whether the limitation has expired or not, is a very relevant circumstance to be borne in mind while allowing amendment- see Maitreyee Banerjee vs. Prabin Kumar, AIR 1982 SC 17 . This aspect has been emphasised in Ganesh Trading Co. vs. Moji Ram. AIR 1978 SC 484 also, which has referred to various provisions of the Code to say that power of amendment is intended to promote the ends of justice, by observing that the original error is "not incapable of being rectified so long as remedial steps do not unjustifiably injure rights accrued". Reference has been made to this decision as it sounded a death-knell to the traditional think­ing that amendment is not to be allowed where entirely new cause of action is substituted. As per this decision, even this could be done if it could be compensated by payment of cost to the other side. Bat lapse of time barring the remedy is mentioned in this decision as well by stating that in such a case the Court should ordinarily refuse the prayer. (See Harcharan vs State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 43 . In Haridas ( AIR 1983 SC 319 ) too, while upholding the amendment allowing insertion of the relief of recovery of possession (as prayed in this case), it was noted that there was no question of any valu­able right of limitation having accrued to the defendant being taken away. But then, if there be special circumstances, an amendment may not be refused only because it has been prayed beyond the period of limitation. When no new case is set out, or what is prayed for is merely an elucidation of what was the real intention of the suitor when he approached the Court, or if the equities of the case demand, amendment may be allowed even if limitation has expired. 10. Let the facts of the present case be now examined. The suit was filed in 1971 seeking a declaration that certain deed of gift in favour of defendant No. 1 was fraudulent and illegal. This suit was filed after defendant No. 1 alongwith proforma defendants 2 and 3, had filed another suit (T. S. 5/71) claim­ing 3/5th share in the property of one Mahim Poddar. In that suit, the plaintiff came to know of the aforesaid deed of gift. This suit was filed after defendant No. 1 alongwith proforma defendants 2 and 3, had filed another suit (T. S. 5/71) claim­ing 3/5th share in the property of one Mahim Poddar. In that suit, the plaintiff came to know of the aforesaid deed of gift. It has been averred in para 5 of the present plaint that (on the strength of the gift) the defendant No. 1 is also claiming the land and houses covered by this suit. An objection was taken to the maintainability of the suit in view of the proviso to section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Amendment seeking the relief of recovery of khas possession was prayed in 1981 after evidence had been closed and even argument had been heard. 11. The present is thus not a case where it could be said that the relief now asked for is an expression in "plainer and less ambiguous manner" of what the real intention of the plain­tiff was when he came to the court. His sojourn was to take care of T.S. 5/71 where some claim was advanced on the strength of the deed of gift. So he assailed its legality. Recovery of possession was not his desideratum then. Further the claim for possession is not founded on the deed of gift whose declara­tion as illegal is the principal aim of the suit. The present claim has its foundation in some other right asserted by the plaintiffs. 12. Thus the facts cannot be regarded as so special as to allow the amendment despite lapse of about 10 years after approach to the court during which period the defendant claims to have acquired a valuable right in her due to expiry of the period of limitation. Nonetheless, it is not a case where the suit should fail due to non-claiming of the relief of posses­sion. Such a plea was allowed in Haridas (supra) where no valuable right of limitation was taken away. So, the prayer for amendment cannot be disallowed fully. The impugned order is, therefore, upheld, but to meet the demand of equity it is, ordered that it would be open to the petitioner to ad­vance her plea of limitation, as if the prayer for possession has been first made on the date the amendment petition was filed. So, the prayer for amendment cannot be disallowed fully. The impugned order is, therefore, upheld, but to meet the demand of equity it is, ordered that it would be open to the petitioner to ad­vance her plea of limitation, as if the prayer for possession has been first made on the date the amendment petition was filed. The plaintiffs shall pay appropriate court fee also as per law, along with the cost as ordered by the learned trial Court. 13. The petition is disposed of as above.