Judgment :- 1. The accused in C.C. No. 71 of 1982 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ottapalam is the petitioner in this case. He had unsuccessfully appealed his conviction under S.394 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three years before the Court of Session, Palghat in Criminal Appeal No. 163 of 1982. The challenge in this petition is against the judgment of the Court of Session confirming his conviction and sentence. 2. The facts are only a few, but the points involved are matters of great moment in the context of rights for personal liberty under Art.14 and 21 of the Constitution in the context of the obligation of the State to provide legal aid to the poor as provided under Art.39A of the Constitution and S.304 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. The petitioner is alleged to have threatened Pw.1 a female school teacher, with a dagger at about 7.30P.M. on 22-2-1982 while pw.1 was returning along a Panchayat road from Vengali temple, and he is alleged to have caught hold of a golden chain worn by pw.1. Since she resisted the petitioner's attempt to snatch away the chain, the petitioner could get only a portion of the gold chain and he made good his escape when Pw.1 made a hue and cry. The petitioner was arrested in connection with another crime at about 11.00 p. m. on 22-2-1982. Pw-1 gave Ext. P1 first information at the Police Station, Ottapalam, on 23-2-1982 and identified the petitioner who was then in the lock up as the assailant. The police recovered M. 0.1 knife from the petitioner and also recorded a confession from the petitioner. The petitioner was in custody from 11.00 p.m. on 22-2-1982 and during the course of the trial which commenced on 12-4-1982 and ended in his conviction on 11-6-1982. He was not informed of his right to be released on bail under S.167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor was he provided with the service of a lawyer at the cost of the State to enable him to move for bail as enjoined upon all Magistrates in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, 1980 (1) SCC 108. I deem it necessary that the following observations of the Supreme Court contained in the decision referred to supra bears repetition, since in spite of the positive mandates contained therein, the undertrial prisoners are yet to be afforded the benefits of the decision of the Supreme Court: "When an undertrial prisoner is produced before a Magistrate and he has been in detention for 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, the Magistrate must, before making an order of further remand to judicial custody, point out to the undertrial prisoner that he is entitled to be released on bail. The State Government must also provide at its on cost a lawyer to the undertrial prisoner with a view to enabling him to apply for bail in exercise of his right under priviso (a) to sub-section (2) of S.167 and the Magistrate must take care to see that the right of the undertrial prisoner to the assistance of a lawyer provided at State cost is secured to him and be must deal with the application for bail in accordance with the guidelines laid down by us in our Order dated February 12.1979. We hope and trust that every Magistrate in the country and every State Government will act in accordance with this mandate of the Court. This is the constitutional obligation of the State Government and the Magistrates, and we have no doubt that if this is strictly carried out, there will be considerable improvement in the situation in regard to undertrial prisoners and there will be proper observance of the rule of law." 4. Handicapped as he was due to absence of any legal counsel for his defence, the petitioner stood his trial with a sense of resignation characteristic alike in the forsaken underprivileged and perhaps the hardened criminal. The charge against him was sought to be proved by the oral testimony of 7 witnesses, of whom pws.1 and 2 alone were claimed as occurrence witnesses and by documentary evidence Exts. P1 to P4. The accused did not cross-examine any of the witnesses, and the trial Magistrate found him guilty on the basis of the evidence of pws.1 and 2 which he characterised as "consistent, cogent and natural". He also observed that "nothing has been brought out to shake the credibility of the witnesses and their evidence stands unchallenged". P1 to P4. The accused did not cross-examine any of the witnesses, and the trial Magistrate found him guilty on the basis of the evidence of pws.1 and 2 which he characterised as "consistent, cogent and natural". He also observed that "nothing has been brought out to shake the credibility of the witnesses and their evidence stands unchallenged". On such evidence, he found the petitioner guilty of an offence under S.394 of the Indian Penal Code, but refrained from imposing any fine, since "no useful purpose will be served in this case by imposing a fine on the accused since the accused is not in a position to pay the fine". This awareness of the indigence of the petitioner was unfortunately confined only to the sentencing process and not to earlier stages. 5. In appeal, the Sessions Judge noted the absence of cross-examination as due to the double disability of the petitioner who was in custody and was unable to engage counsel. He also put the blame of allowing the evidence of the witnesses to go unchallenged squarely at the door of the petitioner, without making any attempt, at least at the appellate stage to provide legal counsel to the appellant. He accepted the version of the incident given out by Pws. I and 2 and concluded "that from the evidence of pws.1 and 2 no conclusion other than the one reached by the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate can be reached". 6. Counsel for the petitioner, Sri Ravindran, submitted that the trial court and the appellate court went wrong in not providing legal aid to the petitioner to defend himself inspite of the legal and constitutional obligations in this behalf. He further submitted that denial of counsel in these circumstances also amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. On merits, he submitted that the version of the incident as spoken to by pws.1 and 2 is divergent' and contradictory, and on that evidence, the petitioner could not have been found guilty. He further submitted that even the unchallenged evidence of pws.1 and 2 does not make out an offence punishable under S.394 of the Indian Penal Code in any case. 7. He further submitted that even the unchallenged evidence of pws.1 and 2 does not make out an offence punishable under S.394 of the Indian Penal Code in any case. 7. The amplitude of the right of the indigent to be provided legal aid at the cost of the State has been the subject matter of consideration by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions, beginning with (1978)1 SCR. 153. There were observations even earlier in the decision reported in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978)1 SCC. 248, which deal with the amplitude of of the right to personal liberty under Art.21 and the right to counsel under Art.22 of the Constitution of India. Art.21 provides, that "no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." Art. 14 of the Constitution states: "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India."' Article 22 of the Constitution provides, that "No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice." Article 39A of the Constitution, which was introduced by the 42nd Amendment, provides: "The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities." The guarantee that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law postulates a procedure which will pass the test of equality before law and equal protection of the laws. Equality before law is ensured only when the underprivileged and indigent are afforded opportunities to defend themselves as effectively as any other in proceedings likely to result in deprivation of personal liberty. This is ensured by providing that he shall not be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. Equality before law is ensured only when the underprivileged and indigent are afforded opportunities to defend themselves as effectively as any other in proceedings likely to result in deprivation of personal liberty. This is ensured by providing that he shall not be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. The assurance of securing the legal system promoting justice on the basis of equal opportunity by providing free legal aid and ensuring that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities are only steps in implementation of the right to fair trial and to equalise the handicaps to the extent possible. S.304 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: "304. "Legal aid to accused at State expense in certain cases: (1) Where, in a trial before the Court of Session, the accused is not represented by a pleader, and where it appears to the Court that the accused has not sufficient means to engage a pleader, the Court shall assign a pleader for his defence at the expense of the State. (2) The High Court may, with the previous approval of the State Government, make rules providing for (a) the mode of selecting pleaders for defence under sub-section (1); (b) the facilities to be allowed to such pleaders by the Courts; (c) the fees payable to such pleaders by the Government, and generally, for carrying out the purposes of sub-section (1). (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that, as from such date as may be specified, in the notification, the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply in relation to any class of trials before other Courts in the State as they apply in relation to trials before Courts of Session." S. 304 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was introduced consequent on the Law Commission's 48th Report. What it stated in Para.26 and 27 are as follows: "26. We are of the view that defence of indigent accused by a pleader assigned by the State should be made available to every person accused of an offence, i.e., in all criminal trials so that mere poverty may not stand in the way of adequate defence in a proceeding which may result in the deprivation of liberty or property or loss of reputation. 27. 27. In making this recommendation we do not pause to consider the technical question whether a literal interpretation of the language of Art.14 and 22 (1) of the Constitution requires that the State should arrange for counsel in particular classes of cases. The philosophy underlying the Constitution, reflected in the provisions for equal protection of laws and in the chapter on directive principles, shows that the Constitution, is impuged with respect for human rights. That philosophy is sufficient to furnish inspiration for a provision that will put an end to the invidious discrimination that otherwise arises between person and person because of poverty. Where a poor man has to defend himself without counsel, there is lacking that equality which is demanded by the spirit of the constitution. Denial to the indigent of the benefit of counsel's examination of the record, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, is nothing less than denial of justice. 'The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual'." 8. The spirit of the Constitution which was considered as a justification for introducing S.304 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was spelt out with greater clarity in the decision reported in Mrs, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC. 248. Dealing with Art.14 and 21 of the Constitution in the context of personal liberty it was observed by Bhagwati J: "The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Art.14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Art.21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Art.14. It must be "right and just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Art.21 would not be satisfied." Dealing with the same question, Krishna Iyer J., observed in the same judgment as follows: "Procedure which deals with the modalities of regulating, restricting or even rejecting a fundamental right falling within Art.21 has to be fair, not foolish, carefully designed to effectuate, not to subvert, the substantive right itself. Thus understood, 'procedure' must rule out anything arbitrary, freakish or bizarre, A valuable constitutional right can be canalised only by civilised process. Thus understood, 'procedure' must rule out anything arbitrary, freakish or bizarre, A valuable constitutional right can be canalised only by civilised process. You cannot claim that it is legal procedure if the passport is granted or refused by taking lots, ordeal of fire or by other strange or mystical methods. Nor is it tenable if life is taken by a crude or summary processor enquiry. What is fundamental is life and liberty. What is procedural is the manner of its exercise. This quality of fairness in the process is emphasised by the strong word 'established' which means 'settled firmly' not wantonly or whimsically. If it is rooted in the legal consciousness of the community, it becomes 'established' procedure. And 'law' leaves little doubt that it is normae regarded as just since law is the means and justice is the end. Procedural safeguards are the indispensable essence of liberty. In fact, the history of personal liberty is largely the history of procedural safeguards and right to a hearing has a human-right ring. In India, because of poverty and illiteracy, the people are unable to protect and defend their rights; observance of fundamental rights is not regarded as good politics and their transgression as bad politics." Dealing with the right to counsel, Krishna Iyer J., in the decision reported in Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 3 SCC. 544, observed as follows: "The other ingredient of fair procedure to a prisoner, who has to seek his liberation through the court process is lawyer's service. Judicial justice, with procedural Intricacies, legal submissions and critical examination of evidence, leans upon professional expertise; and a failure of equal justice under the law is on the cards where such supportive skill is absent for one side. Our judicature, moulded by Anglo-American models and our judicial process, engineered by kindred legal technology compel the collaboration of lawyer-power for steering the wheels of equal justice under the law.". His Lordship also referred to the following observation of the American Jurist, Prof Vance of Yale: "What does it profit a poor and ignorant man that he is equal to his strong antagonist before the law if there is no one to inform him what the law is? His Lordship also referred to the following observation of the American Jurist, Prof Vance of Yale: "What does it profit a poor and ignorant man that he is equal to his strong antagonist before the law if there is no one to inform him what the law is? Or that the courts are open to him on the same terms as to all other persons when he has not the wherewithal to pay the admission fee" After referring to various American authorities, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights etc., the following formulations were made in the above decision: "Maneka Gandhi's case has laid-down that personal liberty cannot be cut out or cut down without fair legal procedure. Enough has been set out to establish that a prisoner, deprived of his freedom by court sentence but entitled to appeal against such verdict, can claim as part of his protection under Art.21 and as implied in his statutory right to appeal, the necessary concomitant of right to counsel to prepare and argue his appeal. If a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment is virtually unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal, inclusive of special leave to appeal, for want of legal assistance, there is implicit in the Court under Art.142, read with Art.21 and 39A of the Constitution, power to assign counsel for such imprisoned individual 'for doing complete justice'. This is a necessary incident of the right of appeal conferred by the Code and allowed by Art.136 of the Constitution. The inference is inevitable that this is a State's duty and not government's charity. This is a necessary incident of the right of appeal conferred by the Code and allowed by Art.136 of the Constitution. The inference is inevitable that this is a State's duty and not government's charity. Equally affirmative is the implication that while legal services must be free to the beneficiary, the lawyer himself has to be reasonably remunerated for his services." It was held therein, that "Even so we uphold the right to counsel not in the permissive sense of Art.22(1) and its wider amplitude but in the peremptory sense of Art.21 confined to prison situations." The two points relevant for our purpose emerging from the exposition of the legal position in the above decision are the following: "(i) Where the prisoner is disabled from engaging a lawyer, or reasonable grounds such as indigence or incommunicado situation, the Court shall, if the circumstances of the case, the gravity of the sentence, and the ends of justice so require, assign competent counsel for the prisoner's defence, provided the party does not object to that lawyer; (ii) The State which prosecuted the prisoner and set in motion the process which deprived him of his liberty shall pay to assigned counsel such sum as the court may equitably fix." It was observed, that "these benign prescriptions operate by force of Art.21 (strengthened by Art.19 (1) (d) read with sub-article (5)) from the lowest to the highest court where deprivation of life and personal liberty is in substantial peril. 9. These imperatives coupled with constitutional and other legal provisions were reiterated in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary (1980) 1 SCC.108, in the following terms: "We may point out that according to the law as laid down by us in our judgment dated March 9,1979, it is the constitutional right of every accused person who is unable to engage a lawyer and secure legal services on account of reasons such as poverty, indigence or incommunicado situation, to have free legal services provided to him by the State and the State is under a constitutional mandate to provide a lawyer to such accused person if the needs of justice so require. We do not know whether "the State Government has set up any machinery for the purpose of providing free legal services to persons who are accused of offences involving possible deprivation of liberty and who are unable to engage a lawyer on account of poverty or indigence. This constitutional obligation cannot wait any longer for its fulfilment, since more than 30 years have passed from the date of enactment of the Constitution and no State Government can possibly have any alibi for not carrying out this command of the Constitution. We are repeating this observation once again in the present judgment because we find that barring a few, many of the State Governments do not seem to be alive to their constitutional responsibility in the matter of provision of free legal services in the field of administration of criminal justice. Let it not be forgotten that if law is not only to speak justice but also deliver justice, legal aid is an absolute imperative. Legal aid is really nothing else but equal justice in action. Legal aid is in fact the delivery system of social justice. If free legal services are not provided to such an accused, the trial itself may run the risk of being vitiated as contravening Art.21 and we have no doubt that every State Government would try to avoid such a possible eventuality." 10. It is surprising that even in spite of positive mandates based on the constitutional guarantees contained in the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, the trial and appellate courts did not alert the accused to his right to be defended by counsel engaged by the State at its cost. In view of the peremptory need to provide counsel for the indigent accused, to which category the petitioner herein belongs, as is evident from the trial Magistrate's observations, and the fact that no such counsel was provided either at the trial or appellate stage, I am inclined to agree with the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been denied a fair trial and his liberty was jeopardised on an unequal application of the laws and in contravention of the procedure established by law. The trial Magistrate has relied upon the evidence of pws.1 and 2, which, according to him, stands unchallenged, little realising that the only reasonable facility of challenging that evidence which should have been provided to the accused by the trial Magistrate was not provided to him and he was left to fend for himself. The handicaps of a person in court, if he does not get the services of a competent lawyer in the present system of the administration of justice need not be over-emphasised. 11. It was observed by Black, J. in 372 US. at 344: "Governments, both State and Federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime, lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defences. That government hires lawyers - to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but is in ours." In Jon Richard Argersigner v. Raymond Hamlin 407 U. S.25, Douglas J., observed% "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defence, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defence, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate or those of feeble intellect." 12. The evidence of Pws.1 and 2, on which considerable reliance was placed by the trial and appellate courts, stands unchallenged, and for that reason becomes more respectable only because the accused was not provided with the expertise of a competent counsel, which the accused was entitled as part of his personal liberty guaranteed under Art.21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. In the nature of the evidence of Pws.1 and 2, it would quite easily have been possible to tear that evidence into shreds if the accused was being defended by a counsel. The denial of this opportunity, according to him, has resulted in considerable prejudice to him. Denial of such an opportunity even at the appellate stage has also resulted in violation of the principles of natural justice. 13. Even on merits, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner merits serious consideration. There are at least three versions about the use of the knife by the accused at the time and as part of the incident, which is the subject matter of the offence alleged against him. In Ext. P1, first information statement, what is stated is that when the accused attempted to snatch away pw.1's gold chain with the knife drawn, the knife grazed the inside right palm of Pw 1 causing a bleeding injury. When examined in Court Pw.1 stated that she was stabbed with M.O.1 knife, whereas Pw. 2 only stated that the accused threatened Pw. 1 brandishing a knife. No medical evidence regarding the injury allegedly sustained by Pw.1 has been adduced, nor does Pw. 2, who is alleged to be an eye witness, even say that Pw.1 was stabbed with the knife. Apparently influenced by the respectability of Pws.1 and 2, the trial and appellate courts have omitted to notice the inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence of these two witnesses. How come that Pw. 2, who is alleged to be an eye witness, even say that Pw.1 was stabbed with the knife. Apparently influenced by the respectability of Pws.1 and 2, the trial and appellate courts have omitted to notice the inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence of these two witnesses. How come that Pw. 2 who is a witness to the entire incident fails to notice the accused stabbing Pw.1 with the drawn knife? How come that Pw. 2 who is attracted to the scene by the hue and cry of Pw. 1, which is admittedly after the snatching away of the chain witnesses the threat of Pw.1 by the accused when Pw.1 is positive that as soon as she made a hue and cry and people began to collect, the accused made good his escape? Had these materials been processed and properly utilised by counsel defending the accused, I am almost certain, that the accused stood a fair chance of acquittal. What the petitioner lost by the denial of the right to counsel by the trial and appellate courts was his "day in court" and the consequence was rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years. I am only suggesting that had the petitioner been permitted to have his day in court, defended by counsel, as he was entitled to because of the mandates of Art.14, 21, 22 and 39A of the Constitution and S.304 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he would not have been convicted at all. This is part of his right to equality in our justice delivery system. It is the soul of fair trial in the context of personal liberty and the procedure established by law. 14. The need to provide legal aid to indigent accused as part of fair trial was highlighted by the Supreme Court as early as in 1978 in Haskot's case. It was reiterated in Hossainara cases notwithstanding all of which, the Supreme Court had again to note with dismay, the apathy of the instrumentalities of the State in providing effective legal aid to the indigent against whom the dice is heavily loaded. In the decision reported in 1981(1) SC. It was reiterated in Hossainara cases notwithstanding all of which, the Supreme Court had again to note with dismay, the apathy of the instrumentalities of the State in providing effective legal aid to the indigent against whom the dice is heavily loaded. In the decision reported in 1981(1) SC. 635 Bhagwati J., observed: "It is unfortunate that though this Court declared the right to legal aid as a fundamental right of an accused person by a process of judicial construction of Art.21, most of the States in the country have not taken note of this decision and provided free legal services to a person accused of an offence. We regret this disregard of the decision of the highest court in the land by many of the States despite the constitutional declaration in Art.141 that the law declared by this Court shall be binding throughout the territory of India." Bhat J., in the decision reported in 1981 KLT. 448 again voiced the note of concern and caution when he observed: "The Supreme Court also has repeatedly pointed out that if the State is not in a position to render legal aid to such an accused person in custody, whether it be on account of financial stringency or otherwise, the entire proceedings may be vitiated by such failure on the part of the State to render legal aid". We are today on the 2nd anniversary of this note of caution administered to the State and the Magistracy by Bhat J., in the above decision. Obviously no such action as would have met the mandates in the context of personal liberty to provide free legal aid to the indigent undertrials have thus far been taken. It is of course true that the State has framed rules for providing free legal aid as pointed out by the counsel for the State. Obviously those who should inform the deserving of their rights to such legal aid were themselves not aware Of the peremptory need to alert the accused of such availability as the present case makes out. The declaration of law in this respect was as early as in 1978 by Krishna Iyer J. The consequential mandate were formulated by Bhagwati J., in Hussainara case in 1979. The exasperating apathy of the State to take any steps to effectual these mandates was noticed again by Bhagwati J., in 1981. The declaration of law in this respect was as early as in 1978 by Krishna Iyer J. The consequential mandate were formulated by Bhagwati J., in Hussainara case in 1979. The exasperating apathy of the State to take any steps to effectual these mandates was noticed again by Bhagwati J., in 1981. The possible invalidation of proceedings in case of non-compliance with the mandate to provide legal aid was specifically highlighted by Bhat J., two years ago. Yet the accused, admittedly indigent and without any counsel to defend him is convicted because the evidence led against him by the prosecution has not been challenged by cross-examination. The stage of declaration of the law, reminders about the same, reprimand for non-observance and caution of possible invalidation for non-compliance are long past. Only invalidation of proceedings taken in gross violation of the positive mandates of the Supreme Court giving effect to the right to personal liberty is likely to jolt the State to the awareness of the need for positive action for due compliance. In that hope, and also because this Court is bound by the declaration of the law made by the Supreme Court, I am constrained to invalidate the conviction of the petitioner by the trial Magistrate and the confirmation thereof by the appellate Court. 15. Even otherwise, in the absence of any evidence relating to the hurt caused by the accused to Pw-1, and in the absence of any medical evidence in that regard or any cogent and consistent evidence relating to illegal restraint or information, there is not even a distant chance of the accused being found guilty of an offence under S.394 of the Indian Penal Code, even assuming that the incident involving the snatching away of the gold chain could be found against the accused. I am therefore inclined to agree with the counsel for the petitioner that even on merits no offence punishable under S.394 of the Indian Penal Code has been made out. In view of the fact that I am inclined to agree with the counsel for the Petitioner that the entire proceedings are liable to be invalidated for the refusal of assistance by counsel at the cost of the State to the accused, I need not dilate on this aspect any further. In view of the fact that I am inclined to agree with the counsel for the Petitioner that the entire proceedings are liable to be invalidated for the refusal of assistance by counsel at the cost of the State to the accused, I need not dilate on this aspect any further. In the result, I allow this petition and set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused passed by the trial Court in C.C. No. 71 of 1982 and its confirmation in Criminal Appeal No. 163 of 1982 by the Court of Session, Palghat.