Judgment :- 1. By his order Ext. P1 Dated 6-12-1977 the 1st respondent, the Incometax Officer, C Ward, Trivandrum assessed the income of the petitioner for the assessment year 1975-76 and determined the tax payable at Rs. 1,11,50,375. In addition to this he charged Rs. 5,57,515 as interest under S.139(8) of the Income-tax Act ("the Act") on the ground that the income-tax return which was due to be filed on or before 31-7-1975 was filed out of time on 23-1-1976. From the order of assessment the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. In giving effect to the Appellate Authority's decision the first respondent by his order Ext. P2 dated 31-3-1978 reduced the interest to Rs. 5,09,770. Thereafter the petitioner moved a petition Ext. P3 dated 25-8-1973 under the proviso to S.139(8) (a) before the 1st respondent seeking waiver of the interest on the plea that it was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing the return within the prescribed time. The first respondent however rejected the petition by his order Ext. P4 dated 5-9-1978. The petitioner carried the order Ext. P4 in revision under S.264 before the 2nd respondent, the Commissioner of Income-tax, Ernakulam. Ext. P5 is a copy of the revision petition. During the pendency of the revision the first respondent passed an order Ext. P6 dated 22-9-1979 levying a penalty of Rs. 6,11,724 under S.271(1) (a) holding that he was not satisfied that reasonable cause existed for the delayed submission of the return by the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the order Ext. P6 before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). By the order Ext. P7 dated 14-1-1980 the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) cancelled the penalty in the view that the petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing the return within the time. The petitioner brought to the notice of the 2nd respondent the above order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). On 27-5-1980 the 2nd respondent passed the order Ext. P8, declining to vacate the order Ext. P4 but reducing the interest charged by Rs.1 lakh. The petitioner seeks to quash Exts. The petitioner brought to the notice of the 2nd respondent the above order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). On 27-5-1980 the 2nd respondent passed the order Ext. P8, declining to vacate the order Ext. P4 but reducing the interest charged by Rs.1 lakh. The petitioner seeks to quash Exts. P4 and P8 briefly on the following grounds: (i) Once the assessing authority is satisfied that an assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing the return in time, he is bound to waive the interest liable to be charged under S.139 (8) (a) because the power to waive interest is coupled with a duty especially as the levy is more in the nature of a penalty. In Ext. P8 the 2nd respondent has also observed that the evidence had satisfied the Income-tax Officer that "the petitioner Company was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing the return within time." On this finding the 2nd respondent ought to have waived the entire interest. (ii) The proviso to S.139 (8) (a) read along with R.117(A) (v) of the Income-tax Rules makes it clear that on such a finding, the assessing authority is bound to waive the interest. The word "reduce" in the proviso to S.139 (8) and R.117A must mean "to rescind or annul"; else there would be scope for the exercise of arbitrary power under the proviso to S.139 (8)(a). The fact that the power conferred is not to reduce the rate of interest also indicates that reduction can only mean complete obliteration of the interest on the prescribed conditions being satisfied. Whether it is for the reduction or waiver of the interest, the assessee must satisfy the same prescriptions as is shown by R.117A. The word 'reduce" must therefore mean abate, rescind or annul. (iii) The statement in Ext. P8 that there was loss in Government revenue on account of the postponement of the payment of the tax on making the self assessment and that this was occasioned by the non-submission of the return in time is based on an irrelevant consideration and has been invented by the 2nd respondent for not waiving the interest in its entirety as is clear from the provisions in R.117 (A) (v). These irrelevant considerations have influenced the free exercise of the. power by the concerned authority. These irrelevant considerations have influenced the free exercise of the. power by the concerned authority. It is a power coupled with a duty and not a discretionary power and when it is found that an assessee is prevented from submitting the return in time, the authority is bound to waive the interest in its entirety. 2. The 1st respondent has filed a counter-affidavit to the following effect: The contention that once the assessing authority is satisfied that an assessee is prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing the return of income within the time, he is bound to waive the interest leviable under S.139(8) is not correct as S.139 (8) gives a discretionary power to the Income-tax Officer to reduce or waive the interest payable by the assessee. The further contention that the word 'reduce' in the proviso to S.139 (8) (a) must mean "rescind or annul' is also not correct, for what the proviso states is only that the Income-tax Officer may in such cases and under such circumstances reduce or waive the interest payable by the assessee. It does not mean that whenever the circumstances prescribed by R.117A are satisfied the entire interest should be reduced. Had that been the intention the word 'reduced' would not have been used. The proviso to S.139 (8) gives power to the Income-tax Officer to use his discretion in,certain cases, as prescribed and to reduce or waive the interest. The mere fact that the assessee has satisfied the conditions in R.117A does not automatically mean that the entire interest levied should be waived. The Income-tax Officer is also required to take into consideration other facts. The fact that the Government had lost revenue on account of the postponement of payment of tax under S.140A is a very relevant consideration to be taken into account in waiving interest The intention of the legislature in levying the interest under S. J39(8) is also to compensate the loss of revenue on account of the belated payment of tax under S.140A as a result of not filing the return under the conditions specified in S.139(1). The contention that irrelevent considerations have influenced the free exercise of the power by the concerned authority is not correct. The Original Petition is thus without merit. 3. The facts of the case as set out in the Original Petition lie within a narrow compass and need not be recapitulated. The contention that irrelevent considerations have influenced the free exercise of the power by the concerned authority is not correct. The Original Petition is thus without merit. 3. The facts of the case as set out in the Original Petition lie within a narrow compass and need not be recapitulated. The only point raised by the petitioner is that as it has been found in Ext. P8 that "It could therefore be inferred that the evidence produced by the petitioner-company was to the satisfaction of the ITO and the petitioner-company was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing the return within time." The respondents the first respondent as the original authority and the second respondent as the revisional authority ought to have totally waived the interest. Sub-section (i) of S.139 provides for the suo mote furnishing of returns of income and sub-section Cl) provides for the furnishing of return pursuant to notice issued by the Income-tax Officer, within the prescribed time. Sub-section (4) provides for the submission of returns by persons who had not furnished returns-with-in the time allotted under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) Sub-section (8) so far as relevant, lays down that where the return under sub-section (1) or (2) or (4) for an assessment year is furnished after the specified date or Ss not furnished, the assessee shall be liable to pay simple interest at 12 percent per annum, for the period and on the amount specified. The proviso to subsection (8) enacts: "Provided that the Income-tax Officer may, in such cases and under such circumstances as may be prescribed, reduce or waive the interest payable by any assessee under this sub-section." The prescription contemplated by the proviso is made in R.117A which is headed, 'Reduction or waiver of interest payable under S.139'. It reads, to quote the material provisions: "The Income-tax Officer may reduce or waive the interest payable under S.139 in the case and in the circumstances mentioned below, namely: ................... (v) in any case in which the assessee produces evidence to the satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer that he was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing the return within time." 4. What the proviso to sub-section (S) of. (v) in any case in which the assessee produces evidence to the satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer that he was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing the return within time." 4. What the proviso to sub-section (S) of. S.139 and R.117A(v) between themselves prescribe is that the interest payable under S.139(8) may be reduced or waived even where the assessee had satisfied the Incometax Officer that he was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing the return within time. The petitioner however contends that on such satisfaction being given, as here, the original or the revisional authority as the case may be, has to totally waive the interest. In aid of this argument, it was contended that the words "reduce" or waive" connote the same thing and that interest has therefore to be given up in full. This it was contended, the respondents had failed to do. 5. The petitioner could succeed if only the contention that the word "reduce" is interchangeable with "waiver". That requires to be considered. 6. The relevant meanings of the word 'reduce' in the Concise Oxford Dictionary are: 'diminish (reduce liquid to two-thirds of its bulk; reduce the prices of the goods, the temperature of the mixture); convert to smaller number of omission, reclassification etc.' and of 'waive': "Refrain from insisting on or using, tacitly or implicitly, relinquish or forgo (right, claim, opportunity, legitimate plea etc.)..." Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary gives the following relevant meanings: "Reduce ...to bring into a lower state: to lessen: to diminish in weight or girth: to weaken: ...to break up separate, disintegrate:" "Waive:...to give up voluntarily, as a claim or a contention; to refrain from claiming, demanding, taking, or enforcing: to forgo." Roget's International Thesaurus 3rd Edition gives the following: "Reduce, decrease, diminish, lessen, take from; lower, depress, step down (coll) tune down (coll) scale down (U.S.) downgrade; depreciate, deflate; curtail, retrench, cut, cut down, cut back, roll back (as prices (coll)); shorten, compress." Waive in the same book has the/following relevant equivalents: "Give up, relinquish, surrender, yield, forgo, renounce, forswear, drop;" None of these dictionaries establishes counsel's contention that the two words have the same meaning and are interchangeable. While 'reduce' means to diminish, or decrease "waive" means to refrain from insisting on, or claiming or demanding or to relinquish or forgo or give up etc. While 'reduce' means to diminish, or decrease "waive" means to refrain from insisting on, or claiming or demanding or to relinquish or forgo or give up etc. Counsel however endeavoured to make out his case by referring to Collins Gem Dictionary of Synonyms & Antonyms and Reader's Digest Use the Right Word A modern guide to Synonyms. In Gem 'reduce' is defined, to quote the relevant senses, as abate, abridge, contract, curtail, decrease, diminish, lessen, shorten. None of the senses equates 'reduce' with waiver, not even "abate" on which particular emphasis was placed by counsel. "Abate" in 'Gem' means only 'decline, decrease, diminish, ebb, lessen, mitigate, moderate, reduce, sink, slacken, subside, wane" and in Concise Oxford Dictionary it means : Diminish; make or grow less; Do away with (nuisance): lower (price); deduct (specified or unspecified part of price); mitigate (violence, pain); weaken (energy) 'Gem' in my view affords. the petitioner no support. 7. Turning to the Guide by Reader's Digest the Synonyms for 'reduce' are: 'abate, curtail, diminish, lower'. It is further observed "These words mean to make or to become smaller or less, but they are not in all cases interchangeable. Reduce has a wider range of connotations than the other words and is also the most general. It means to make less in size, amount, number, extent or intensity: to reduce house hold expenses; to reduce a labour force during a slack season; to reduce speed on a highway undergoing repairs; to reduce the acreage of a property by selling off several paddocks"... The same book explains 'abate' thus: "Abate means to reduce, as in strength or degree, usually from an excessive intensity or amount. In this sense, it is most frequently an intransitive verb In a legal sense, abate is used transitively and means to do away with completely or to make null and void in whole or in part: to abate a nuisance; to abate rent." It was argued from this last use and illustration of the word 'abate' that it could be used to denote waiver of interest and as abate is a synonym of reduce, waive is also a synonym of reduce. I find it difficult to agree with this contention and the process underlying it. For one thing "waiver" is not a synonym for "reduction" and for another the word 'abate' is no synonym for the word 'waive'. I find it difficult to agree with this contention and the process underlying it. For one thing "waiver" is not a synonym for "reduction" and for another the word 'abate' is no synonym for the word 'waive'. I do not also think that this tortuous process is permissible or legitimate to determine the meanings or equivalents of the word 'waiver' 8. The proviso to S.139(8) uses the words "reduce or waive". The use of the two words as alternatives signifies that they were employed not as interchangeable or as conveying the same idea; the intention obviously was to convey different ideas and to confer two different powers, the power to reduce interest and if it was so thought fit to waive interest altogether. I see no compelling reason to attribute a needless tautology to the legislature. 9. The power to levy interest for delayed furnishing of return under S.139(8) is compensatory and not punitive as has been held by this Court in Kerala Tile & Clay Works v. C.I.T., 104 ITR. 597. In Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. Santosh Industries, 93 ITR. 563, one of the decisions followed in that case, the Gujarat High Court observed: "Interest is not charged to him by way of penalty but he is required to pay it, because by reason of extension of time, the filing of the return would be delayed and that would in its turn delay the assessment and consequent realisation of tax from the assessee. It is, therefore, by way of compensation for delay in realisation of tax that interest is required to be paid by the assessee." Ext. P8 does not therefore err in having taken into account anything irrelevant. 10. The 2nd respondent was within his jurisdiction when he observed that this was not a fit case for a total waiver of the interest. There is no ground made out to quash Exts. P4 or P8. The Original Petition is dismissed. No costs.